Should we care about injustices committed by past generations? There are many who argue that as a matter of justice we should redress the unjust past. Critics claim this view is mistaken, because we cannot establish what would have happened if the past injustice had not been committed. There are simply too many counterfactuals involved to establish that anyone alive today has been left worse off by a historical injustice. Furthermore, the critic points out, there are too many past injustices to redress. Alas, as human history is besieged with injustices, we need a criterion to select the ones that should be rectified. Past injustices also seem to be redundant for those already committed to equality in the present. If we only allocate the unjust past an instrumental value in repairing an unequal present, the past is left without normative importance.
Alasia Nuti's Injustice and the Reproduction of History: Structural Inequalities, Gender and Redress confronts these challenges head-on in a thought-provoking and rich analysis of historical injustices and structural inequalities. She argues that we should focus our attention on those injustices that are reproduced in the present. According to Nuti, if we are to adequately address some present injustices and inequalities, we cannot dismiss an unjust past, as these injustices have been reproduced over time through different means. Moreover, they are being newly reproduced now. Thus, her main argument is that the unjust history we should care about is still present.
When it comes to the question of justice, the relation between past and present is complex. Historical injustices do not persist over time in their original form and are not passively handed down from one generation to another. According to Nuti, we need to consider the things that have changed since the original injustice was committed if we are to understand the way injustices are reproduced. Indeed, she argues that understanding change is the key to understanding how the past is reproduced. She is pursuing a framework that explains how enduring cultural, social, and economic conditions reproduce injustices, making an unjust history present in a dynamic way. In other words, the book aims to detemporalize injustice by describing how injustices can persist over time through structures.
Nuti defines historical-structural injustices as “unjust social-structural processes enabling asymmetries between differently positioned persons, which started in the past and are reproduced in a different fashion, even if the original form of injustice may appear to have ended” (44). She advocates for structural understanding of history, where past injustices are thought of not just as events that spanned across a certain time, but also as structures. Through long-term structures, history is embedded and reproduced in the present. These structures provide the background conditions for events and contribute to their occurrence, but they do not directly cause them. Rather, structural processes are mechanisms that make certain events possible. While an unjust past contours our social reality, it does not determine it.
Nuti highlights how it is not just blatant discrimination and radical injustices that require our attention, but also the routine and even somewhat trivial “banal mechanisms,” such as racial stereotypes and implicit biases, that are performed systematically and habitually. She argues that the impact of these latter mechanisms is likely to be underestimated in our weighing how injustices are endured over time, even when these mechanisms play a fundamental part in explaining the more radical forms of injustice. Nuti offers Black Lives Matter and the criminalization of race as an example of how the banal and radical forms are related. The radical injustice of police officers systemically shooting unarmed black people is related to historical stereotypes that links blackness with danger, resulting in biases and mostly unconscious expectations. Stereotypes of dangerous black criminals have their roots in slavery and the racial segregation that followed, and they were used to justify the harsh and unequal legal treatment of black people. The normalized and habitual banal mechanisms of structural reproduction thus provide the conditions where radical injustices can occur. Nuti labels this the banal radicality of the reproduction of the unjust past (43–44).
Similar banal mechanisms, like unequal division of domestic labor, also help to perpetuate conditions for violence against women, according to Nuti. (She suggests that gendered norms should be directly challenged through a mandatory caregiving service.) Injustices suffered by women in liberal democratic societies are rarely framed in this way, just as gender dynamics within the group that suffered an injustice are often left unaddressed when historical injustices are discussed. By theorizing present injustices faced by women as substantially connected to history, the book refreshingly merges debates about historical injustices and gender inequalities.
Although the book rightly focuses on structural groups (i.e., collectives who suffer from wrongs and injustices through “structural descent”), the overall argument would have benefited from also including enduring non-structural groups (i.e., collective agents, such as corporations, political parties, and associations, which are set aside after three paragraphs). To be fair, Nuti discusses the importance of institutions and policies in dismantling historical-structural injustices, and in the last chapter mentions how powerful collective agents need to tackle these injustices. Yet she leaves out what is often the key in achieving such change, namely, their members, only touching upon the importance of individuals-in-roles.
Nuti also oversimplifies such membership by characterizing collective agents as groups with “shared identity and unity of intentions among members” (58) who have voluntarily chosen their membership, in contrast to members of a structural group, who are picked out by external categorization, such as gender or race. This overlooks how historical-structural injustices also affect what kind of non-structural groups we become members of and what roles we occupy in them. For example, while the lucky ones among us get to choose what we do for a living and as a member of what collective, in many cases there is no such choice. This can be due to a lack of options (a company is the main employer in a small town) or more subtle structures that direct our choices, such as pink-collar workers and the uneven division of labor along gender lines in nursing and other care work (a phenomenon discussed in the book).
Although the book notes that collective agents vary in hierarchy and complexity, it omits differences in terms of the degree to which a group's goals are shared. These can come apart: we can have very hierarchical groups whose members remain uncommitted to the shared identity and goal of the group, and very loosely organized groups, where the members are highly committed to the group and its goals, such as social movements. Trying to understand the motivations and commitments of individuals-in-roles can be illuminating, as collective agents have a role to play in reproducing structural injustices, not just in redressing them. It takes different measures to change the behavior of someone who is just going with the flow, as opposed to that of someone who buys into the group. Therefore, members of collective agents should be brought into the discussions about how to stop injustices from being reproduced. After all, while historical-structural injustices provide the background conditions for personal interactions, they leave room for individual agency.
