This book is a valuable and intelligent reexamination of the roots of modern Arabic political thought in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It is a collective work, framed and edited very ably by Jens Hanssen and Max Weiss. It is based on a conference at Princeton University in October 2012 marking the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Albert Hourani's seminal work: Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798–1939. Hanssen and Weiss's book title is slightly misleading in that it does not really cover Arabic thought beyond—i.e. after—the liberal age; but the editors do promise a second volume which will do just that (xv).
The volume provides a valuable exegesis of Hourani's thought and an assessment of his role in the making of modern Middle East studies. It also presents an extremely rich revisiting and broadening of research on the various thinkers of this bygone period, which is often referred to in Arabic with the term Nahda (awakening, rising). In addition to the thought leaders examined by Hourani, the authors in this volume explore additional currents of thought in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and India.
For the general reader, the book raises a number of timely questions about the so-called Arab liberal age: was it truly liberal? Did liberalism die off in the Arab world after this period? More broadly, what was, and is, the role of public intellectuals and political thought in impacting political realities in this part of the world?
The authors note that Hourani himself was not completely comfortable with the liberal label he used to describe this long nineteenth century. What his book was examining, he said, was not just “democratic institutions or individual rights” but also “national strength and unity and the power of governments” (13). The period saw the genesis of Arabic liberal writings on democratization, freedom, women's rights, and citizenship, but it also saw the germination of Islamist, nationalist, and leftist currents. Its politics transitioned from Ottoman suzerainty to Western colonial domination.
While the period certainly saw a significant trend of liberalization of political thought and practices compared to the very patriarchal and authoritarian patterns of the past, the period never matured to a truly liberal age, neither in thought nor solid political institutions. The authors acknowledge that Hourani himself recognized the shortcomings of the period; they also describe how Hourani became increasingly rueful about the Arab condition after the Lebanese civil wars of 1958 and 1975, and the various disappointments of Arab governance after independence.
The authors also contend with the argument as to whether this liberal period had—or struck—real roots in the Arab world, or whether it was just a superficial echoing of the West. Many Arab liberals like to think that the Nahda was the Middle Eastern equivalent of the European Renaissance and Enlightenment rolled together, to be followed by more political, economic and scientific advancement; but critics like Moroccan thinker Mohammad Abid al-Jabiri dispute the impact of the Nahda and rather point to the Abbasid and Andalusian epochs as true examples of profound epistemic shifts in Muslim intellectual history (5).
In any case, this protoliberal period was cut short, first in 1939 by the collapse of the liberal order in Europe itself; second after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the rise of Arab nationalist and socialist currents; and third after the defeat of 1967 and the death of Nasser in 1970 and the rise of Islamist groups. And yet the liberal thread in Arabic thought has not died, although as the authors note, police states and radical Islamists have repeatedly tried to kill it (6-7). Perhaps this is because of the regrouping of the liberal order in a post war Western Europe and North America that still influenced Arab thinkers and citizens, but it is probably also due to the recurring disappointment of citizens in the Arab world with repressive and dysfunctional governments whose attempts to cloak themselves in various ideologies could not mask their nakedness. It is no small matter that the uprisings of 2011, in their charismatic initial phase, erupted not under nationalist, leftist or Islamist banners, but raised broadly liberal center-left demands for accountable government, human rights, and human dignity as well as jobs and socioeconomic justice.
Interestingly, for a consistently and admirably highbrow academic book, the editors begin with reference to an October 2011 Op-Ed by the New York Times Middle East correspondent Robert Worth called “The Arab Intellectuals That Didn't Roar.” Worth has a point: political movements in the recent Arab past, including most Islamist, nationalist, leftist and liberal movements, had fairly prominent intellectual leadership. But today, only the Islamist movements, both mainstream and radical, can be said to have intellectual leadership.
The authors do not go on to address this critical point: How did the political intellectuals that Hourani examined in his book impact political realities in their day, and what does that tell us about the very different conditions of today, when public intellectuals have scant presence or impact? Is the “crisis of the Arab intellectual” a result of an impasse in thought, repression by states, or other factors? This volume raises the questions but does not attempt a consistent answer.
The central sections of the book are most solid, providing a filling out of the intellectual history of the liberal age. The final section hints at the promise of contextualizing this era “in light of the Arab Spring” as Layla Dakhli's chapter on two Syrian thinkers of the early twentieth century is partly titled (351). While Dakhli's chapter provides some insightful reflections on this juxtaposition, the book leaves the reader thirsting for more. Perhaps this thirst will be slaked in the promised second volume of this valuable project.
