In recent decades, the global decline in democracy has been primarily driven not by military coups but by the rise of populist leaders who systematically erode democratic institutions from within.Footnote 1 These leaders, often charismatic and populist, craft narratives that divide society into “us” versus “them,” positioning themselves as the true representatives of “the people” and against corrupt elites. In contexts in which trust in formal political institutions is declining, citizens increasingly turn to these leaders, who promise to restore the will of the people by dismantling a status quo that they identify as elite rule.
A key tool in this process is the use of constitutional amendments, which, although apparently legal, are employed to weaken checks and balances and consolidate executive power. Studies show that 50 percent of populists in power have amended or rewritten constitutions, often extending their own terms or diminishing institutional constraints on their authority.Footnote 2 This phenomenon, known as abusive constitutionalism, involves the strategic use of constitutional mechanisms to make a state significantly less democratic than it was before.Footnote 3
The formal, or legal, institutional perspective on democratic backsliding is primarily concerned with the decay of liberal values and institutions, particularly the rule of law. Rule of law backsliding refers to the process through which elected authorities systematically weaken, capture, or annihilate internal checks on power.Footnote 4 Unlike conventional autocracies that rely on overt repression, contemporary authoritarian regimes often employ legal means to consolidate power, making the erosion of democracy appear legitimate and lawful.
Abusive constitutionalism is central to this process, because it allows authoritarian leaders to reshape the legal and institutional framework of the state to entrench their power. By manipulating constitutional rules, these leaders can undermine judicial independence, weaken legislative oversight, and diminish the capacity of political opposition, all while maintaining a veneer of legality. The gradual nature of this process often prevents significant domestic or international resistance, allowing authoritarian regimes to consolidate power over time.
The Turkish case: constitutional amendments and democratic backsliding
Turkey’s experience under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, or AKP) since 2002 offers a compelling case study of abusive constitutionalism in action. Turkey’s current constitution, introduced in 1982 during military rule, has been amended numerous times, with thirteen significant amendments occurring during the AKP’s tenure. These amendments have played a critical role in Turkey’s democratic backsliding, transforming the country from a fragile democracy into a hybrid regime characterized by authoritarian governance.Footnote 5
When the AKP first came to power, it was amid an economic crisis and political turmoil. Initially, the party was seen as a force for democratization, appealing to both liberals and moderate Islamists. The AKP promised to address key issues such as human rights, the Kurdish question, local governance, and judicial reform, while maintaining a commitment to secularism. Early on, the party embraced a pro–European Union stance, using EU accession negotiations as a catalyst for passing reform packages that curtailed military influence in politics, abolished the death penalty, and strengthened judicial independence. These reforms were celebrated as steps toward consolidating democracy and ending military tutelage in Turkey.
A pivotal moment came shortly after the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the party’s leader, was initially barred from becoming prime minister due to a prior conviction for inciting religious hatred, stemming from a poem he recited in 1997. At that time, Article 76 of the Turkish Constitution prohibited individuals convicted of such crimes from serving in parliament. However, in 2002, the AKP, along with support from opposition parties, pushed through a constitutional amendment that removed this barrier. This amendment allowed Erdoğan to run for a parliamentary seat in a by-election in 2003, enabling him to assume the role of prime minister.
The AKP’s ostensible commitment to democratization began to wane after the party’s second term in office, particularly following the 2007 elections. The party’s strategy shifted toward consolidating power through constitutional amendments, gradually eroding the checks and balances that were essential to a functioning democracy. The first major constitutional change came in 2007, when the AKP introduced an amendment that allowed for the direct election of the president by popular vote. This amendment reduced the presidential term from seven to five years and enabled the reelection of the president, thereby strengthening the executive branch. Although this change was presented as a democratizing reform, it also allowed the president to assert a direct electoral mandate and concentrated power in the office of the presidency, laying the groundwork for future authoritarian consolidation.
In 2010, the AKP pursued another set of constitutional amendments that expanded political control over the judiciary. These amendments increased the number of members in the Constitutional Court (CC) and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, making them larger and more broadly representative.Footnote 6 Although it was argued that the amendments did not directly alter the already significant role of the executive in making appointments to the court, they enabled the AKP to have more candidates that it preferred advance through judicial appointments and promotions, raising “concerns regarding the colonization of the judiciary by partisan judges and prosecutors.”Footnote 7 , Footnote 8 This restructuring of the high judiciary in Turkey is sometimes described as an initially legitimate or “good” case of court-packing, ostensibly aiming to strengthen the democratic system, in which “the context and implementation of the reforms ultimately negated any positive impact.”Footnote 9 Indeed, a recent study highlighted a significant ideological shift in the court after 2010, as it became more conservative, coupled with a significant decline in the executive’s respect for the constitution after these amendments were made.Footnote 10 It is argued that the 2010 amendments began a process of “un-constitutionalism,” degrading the constitution and legitimizing unconstitutional practices.Footnote 11
The amendment package also addressed several basic rights and freedoms, claiming to aim for a more democratic environment. This effort was viewed positively by EU institutions and the Venice Commission, although they noted concerns regarding implementation.Footnote 12 These included new rights, such as the protection of personal information and access to information; the expansion of some rights such as the ability to join multiple labor unions simultaneously within the same line of work, and the right of civil servants and other public employees to engage in collective bargaining; allowing individuals to file complaints with the CC regarding rights violations; and weakening the CC’s power to ban political parties. Some, on the other hand, considered these measures “to be sweeteners to make people vote affirmatively in a referendum” that was otherwise harmful to judicial independence.Footnote 13 For example, although the constitutional amendment did give individuals standing to file challenges to rights violations with the CC, the substantive rights recognized for such challenges were limited to those rights protected by the European Convention on Human Rights, and did not include a range of other rights, such as socioeconomic and cultural rights, or “third-wave” rights, such as rights to a healthy environment and the right to participation in cultural heritage. The limitations on the ban of political parties were perceived as a defensive move to shield the AKP itself from further threats of closure.Footnote 14
Moreover, the campaign period for the 2010 constitutional amendments further intensified societal polarization. As with all republican constitution-making processes since 1924, these amendments were driven by a single actor—in this case, the AKP—without broad consultation or deliberation.Footnote 15 The party framed it as a populist referendum, held on the anniversary of the 12 September 1980 military coup, presenting it as a binary choice between democracy and military tutelage.Footnote 16 The amendments passed with 58 percent in favor and 42 percent against, seemingly bolstering public trust in AKP policies.Footnote 17
Whatever might be said of the 2010 constitutional amendments, their significance has since been dwarfed by the sweeping changes ushered in by another amendment package in 2017. These amendments were put to a referendum during a state of emergency, with little debate, and resulted in a transition from a parliamentary system to a presidential system. The amendment package abolished the office of the prime minister and vested extensive powers in the president, including the authority to issue decrees with the force of law, appoint and dismiss ministers and high-level officials without parliamentary approval, and dissolve parliament.Footnote 18 The president also gained increased influence over the judiciary, with the power to appoint members of the Constitutional Court. These changes, which gave the president unprecedented powers that could be used without parliamentary oversight, marked a de facto regime change.Footnote 19
The 2017 referendum process itself exemplified tactics of abusive constitutionalism. The AKP framed the referendum as a necessary response to internal and external threats, portraying the transition to a presidential system as essential for Turkey’s stability, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in the summer of 2016. The referendum and the preceding campaign were conducted under a state of emergency, declared one week after the coup attempt, which reduced political association rights and paralyzed political debate at a critical moment for democratic deliberation. The state of emergency created a playing field heavily tilted in favor of the incumbent. Irregularities in the electoral process further undermined fairness, including but not limited to a media landscape dominated by state-owned and pro-government outlets, unfair allocation of ballot board council chairpersons between the government and opposition parties, the inability of voters—especially in southeastern regions—to register,Footnote 20 and the higher election board’s decision to count unstamped ballots as valid on the very day of the referendum.
As in the 2010 referendum, voters were asked to vote on the entire package of amendments rather than on individual articles. This strategy, combined with the impact of the state of emergency, undermined democratic deliberation. Despite these constraints and an uneven playing field, 48.6 percent of voters opposed the amendments, signaling significant resistance to the proposed changes even under highly adverse conditions. However, the AKP took the narrow approval—51.4 percent in favor—as a validation of the “national will.”
Abusive constitutionalism and Turkish democracy
The constitutional amendments enacted under the AKP have had profound and lasting impacts on Turkish democracy. By centralizing power in the executive, these amendments, which were imposed by majority party vote,Footnote 21 have weakened the rule of law, eroded judicial independence, and dismantled formal checks on presidential authority. The AKP’s use of referendums to legitimize these changes by invoking the national will is a textbook example of how populist leaders can use democratic mechanisms to undermine democracy itself.
The 2007 amendment allowing direct presidential elections set the stage for Erdoğan’s eventual consolidation of power. The 2010 judicial reforms eroded the independence of the judiciary, enabling the AKP to exert greater control over the legal system. The 2017 transition to a presidential system institutionalized personal rule and eliminated key checks on executive power, creating a political environment in which the president could govern with minimal accountability.
These constitutional amendments have not only undermined the democratic institutions of Turkey but also have set a dangerous precedent for other countries experiencing democratic backsliding. Turkey’s experience demonstrates how populist leaders can use legal and constitutional mechanisms to entrench their power, making it increasingly difficult for opposition forces to challenge their authority.
The debate over the constitution in Turkey continues, particularly since 2018, with recurrent calls for a new, “civilian” constitution by the ruling party led by the president, which claim to be troubled by the right to individual application to the CC that was introduced by the 2010 amendments.Footnote 22 Turkey’s experience with abusive constitutionalism under the AKP provides valuable insights into the broader phenomenon of democratic backsliding. The AKP’s strategic use of constitutional amendments to consolidate power illustrates how formal political institutions can be manipulated to erode democracy and the rule of law. By examining Turkey’s democratic decline through the lens of abusive constitutionalism, this essay highlights the potential for formal legal processes intended to serve as a guardrail against democratic erosion to, conversely, be instrumentalized by populist authoritarians as a mechanism for undermining democracy.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer for feedback on the original version of this article.
