Is international law really law? Is there an international legal system? Is there an international rule of law? These three questions strike at the very heart of international law. They are the focus of James Crawford’s Chance, Order, Change: The Course of International Law.
Crawford is eminently placed to address these questions. Formerly the Whewell Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, Crawford was elected in 2014 to the International Court of Justice. Change, Order, Change derives from a lecture series that he gave at The Hague Academy of International Law in June 2013. It is his final published work before taking his place on the bench. Fittingly, it is a personal work, in which Crawford defends his vocation from doctrinal attack.
Part One argues that international law is properly called law. Crawford discusses realism, sovereignty, and indeterminacy, as well as the sources of international law. Throughout, he identifies and refutes the tendency to compare international law to an idealized municipal law. This idealized municipal law is an inviolable and perfectly determinate law, to which international law inevitably pales in comparison. Yet, as Crawford notes, violation and indeterminacy feature in both municipal law and international law: the fact that someone is murdered does not invalidate municipal laws prohibiting murder.
Part Two argues that there is an international legal system. Crawford addresses international personality, dédoublement fonctionnel (role splitting), multilateralism, fragmentation, as well as the purported universality of international law. These diverse topics all raise the issue of whether international law is more than a miscellaneous set of primary rules. Crawford’s responses remind us that international law has the fundamentals of a system: he posits that international law “is a legal system because it is a function of the social process between States and other persons regarding matters of common concern” (p. 145). The many differences between international law and municipal legal systems, such as the lack of a centralized international legislative power, do not detract from this basic fact.
Part Three argues that there exists an international rule of law. Crawford acknowledges that international law “has many weaknesses, faces many difficulties, is changing and needs to change further” (p. 369). Nonetheless, he asserts that international law exhibits features associated with the rule of law: it is predicated on formal equality; it imposes limits on power; it advances human rights. Of course, a true international rule of law requires more. Crawford concedes that the lack of international democracy and the supra-legal status of the Security Council, inter alia, limit the present scope of the international rule of law. But to the extent that these problems are not intractable, the potential for the international rule of law remains vast.
This book is not a history of international law. Nor can it replace a comprehensive textbook. Yet Crawford’s clear argumentation cuts through speculation. Each paragraph is anchored with insights from the author’s rich experience. And the many anecdotes make it enjoyable to read. These qualities make Chance, Order, Change an indispensible adjunct to the reference texts.
