In this book, David Schlosberg has two main projects. The first is to develop an account of environmental justice by clarifying the conceptions of justice operative within the environmental justice movement and situating them within contemporary theoretical discourses about justice. The second is to demonstrate the potential of the resultant account for illuminating the domain of ecological justice—that is, justice between humans and nature. The former project is a model of synthetic theorizing. Schlosberg's definition of environmental justice is theoretically grounded and empirically informed, resulting in a thorough and nuanced account. The project is also significant methodologically, making the case that theories of justice ought to be informed by the conceptions of justice employed in movements for justice. As a result, the book is essential reading for researchers and students working on environmental justice, and will be of interest to justice theorists more generally. However, the latter project—modeling ecological justice on environmental justice—is not nearly so successful.
Schlosberg's approach to defining environmental justice begins with a defense of a pluralistic conception of justice. He argues compellingly that “a thorough understanding and approach to justice requires us to see the linkages between distribution, recognition, capabilities, and participation” (p. 8), and he advocates for an account on which distributive justice is understood in terms of opportunities and resources for realizing human capabilities or living well, in such a way that justice “is not simply about distribution, but also about all that it takes—recognition, participation, and more—to be able to fully live the lives we design” (p. 34).
Schlosberg also argues that a theory of justice ought to be informed by the conceptions of justice operative within movements for justice. Introducing such empirical elements into theorizing about justice will strike some as objectionable. Theories of justice are supposed to be normative, not merely descriptive of whatever people believe, which often is influenced by biases, misinformation, and other distorting factors. This militates against a naively empirical approach to defining justice (including environmental justice)—that is, whatever those in the movement say it is—but they do not tell against Schlosberg's approach. The point of ethical theorizing, including theorizing about justice, is to “map” well practically relevant considerations in the world and appropriate responsiveness to them, and thereby help us to identify those considerations, reflect upon them, and respond better than we otherwise would—for example, promote just institutions. Defining justice therefore requires considering theoretical arguments about concepts, principles, and value, as well as common beliefs (e.g., about justice), critical evaluation of those beliefs, and additional empirical information about ourselves and our world (e.g., ecological), if it is to be “aligned with the real world” (p. 38).
Given the conception of justice and methodological commitments Schlosberg defends, developing a definition of environmental justice is accomplished by comparing the theory of justice with the way in which environmental justice movement groups and activists think about justice, and then resolving tensions between them (should there be any). He argues that all four elements of his account of justice are prominent within the environmental justice movement, both in the United States and globally. His case for this is strong. It is based on the movement's core documents, the content of the injustice claims made by groups and activists, their sociopolitical critiques, the substance of their demands, and the positive visions they promote. This correspondence is mutually validating. It further justifies the account of justice, while establishing a definition of environmental justice that includes recognition of environmental justice communities, meaningful participation in environmental decision making, and fair distribution of environmental burdens and benefits, with an emphasis on how these impact individual and communal capabilities and functioning. Overall, the author's definition of environmental justice is well justified theoretically, methodologically, and empirically.
Schlosberg begins the second project in the book—employing the account of environmental justice to illuminate the domain of ecological justice—by reviewing possibilities for incorporating environmental considerations into theories of interpersonal distributive justice: recognizing ecological sustainability as a precondition of a stable and well-functioning cooperative arrangement (e.g., polity) in which justice is operative; “including environmental goods along with other primary goods in calculations of distributive justice” (p. 111), both nationally and globally; advocating for environmental ends as part of an “overlapping political consensus” of conceptions of the good (p. 109); and fulfilling duties of justice to future generations, which requires ensuring that adequate ecological resources are available to them. While these approaches might generate duties of justice regarding nature or justify (on pragmatic grounds) treating nature as if it were a recipient of justice in order to fulfill duties to other people, they do not involve recognizing nature (or any part of it) as a recipient of justice “for itself, or as a full member of our community, but solely as it supports the human systems that are nested within it” (p. 115, Schlosberg's emphasis).
Schlosberg therefore considers “whether these broader conceptions of justice offered by theorists, and often articulated by environmental justice movements regarding human relations on environmental affairs, can also be applied to human relations with the rest of nature” (p. 130). He argues that we can model ecological justice on environmental justice. However, the case for this is problematic.
First, there are conceptual difficulties. Nature as such is a poor candidate for being a recipient of justice. Nature does not have a good of its own, let alone interests, since it is not internally organized toward any ends that are distinctly its own. It is the individual organisms that constitute/populate nature that have their own interests. (The same is true of mountains, rivers, ecosystems, and species.) Moreover, environmental justice involves providing people with the resources to develop and exercise their capabilities and flourish. But in nature, the vast majority of individuals do not have much opportunity to flourish. This is not an accidental feature of nature. It is central to it, given population dynamics and natural selection. The sort of active justice operative in environmental justice is therefore untenable when applied to nature or the individuals and communities that constitute/populate it.
Second, even if we can properly conceive of nature (or some parts of it) as recipients of justice, it (or they) might nevertheless lack the type of value/worth that justifies affording them that standing. Absent a defense of their having such value, there is inadequate justification for modeling ecological justice on environmental justice. Schlosberg reviews several attempts by environmental ethicists to establish the value of nonhuman animals or environmental entities in and of themselves, but they are values that favor forms of responsiveness other than justice—for example, compassion and appreciation.
Third, the empirical component of the case for the author's account of environmental justice is nearly absent with respect to ecological justice. Even among those who advocate strongly for recognition of the moral status of nature (or some parts of it) and affording it (or them) more resources and room to flourish, justice is rarely the preferred evaluative framework. As suggested here, there is a rich, diverse, and dynamic set of alternative evaluative resources that appear to better depict our ethical relationships with the natural environment and the individuals that constitute/populate it—for example, compassion, respect, gratitude, openness, appreciation, and wonder.
For all of these reasons, the environmental justice model is not well suited to ecological justice. Of course, this in no way undermines the quality and importance of Schlosberg's account of environmental justice, which is definitive.
