No one can claim to have thought seriously about the question “How ought I to live?”, the guiding question of political philosophy, without having confronted the powerful answer to it supplied by hedonism. Although there are many versions of hedonism, philosophic and popular, serious and silly, they are united by the thought (or sense) that pleasure is the chief good that human beings of necessity seek (e.g., Feldman Reference Feldman2001 and Reference Feldman2004). In attempting to recover for ourselves full awareness of a doctrine of more than merely scholarly interest—for it holds out the promise of guiding us to the good we desire, namely, a happy life—we may reasonably look for instruction to the long and complex tradition of hedonism, to both its proponents and its critics.
Precisely the richness of that tradition, however, demands that, at the outset at least, we limit our inquiry in some way, and a survey of the surviving records quickly suggests the name of one great thinker who was both very important to and early in the history of hedonism: Plato. Three dialogs of Plato offer analyses of the argument that pleasure is the good—the Gorgias, Protagoras, and Philebus. In the Gorgias, Socrates attacks Callicles' hedonism in such a way as to demonstrate the incompatibility of Callicles' mostly subterranean moralism with his extreme hedonism: Callicles' disgusted censure of certain intense bodily pleasures (and of Socrates' shamelessness in even mentioning them) means that Callicles actually looks to morality or decency as a standard higher than pleasure in deciding how to live, and it is with a view to that standard that Socrates proceeds to refute him (Gorgias 494e1–8). In this way Socrates reveals the limitations of Callicles, to be sure, but not necessarily those of hedonism, since it is possible to imagine a hedonist capable of following out the logic of hedonism with unblushing consistency, free of such scruples (compare Hackforth Reference Hackforth1958, 5).
In the Protagoras, Socrates imputes to “the many” a consistent hedonistic calculus, but he does so ultimately in order to trap the wily Protagoras in a contradiction concerning his attachment to courage (consider Protagoras 353a7–b3).Footnote 1 For among the “precautionary measures” used by the avowed sophist to protect himself is his disavowal of being a hedonist (317b5, 316d1–2, 351c1–d7), the result of a calculation of what the “safer” answer is with a view to the present circumstances and indeed with a view to his life as a whole (351d2–4). Socrates' elaborate explanation of the alleged hedonism of “the many,” which culminates in an advertisement for the sophists far better than Protagoras' own (357b5–e8; compare 328a8–c2), is an extended exercise in making the great sophist squirm: Protagoras chose not to confess to the hedonism that could have been the basis of a most attractive come-on to the students most promising in his eyes—those of the ilk of Alcibiades and Critias, for example (316a3–5)—students who combine great wealth with the driving ambition to possess for themselves the greatest goods, apparently unfettered by moral concerns. In the sequel, however, Socrates also brings out the fact that Protagoras' admiration of courage is incompatible with his (implicit) acceptance of hedonism and his (all but explicit) denigration of justice: Protagoras sincerely admires those who sacrifice themselves in the name of courage, even if they feel no pleasure in doing so (Bartlett Reference Bartlett2003).
In both the Gorgias and Protagoras, then, Socrates makes use of arguments pertaining to hedonism for reasons other than an analysis of hedonism strictly speaking. Only the Philebus takes as its direct aim the examination of pleasure's claim to be the human good. It would seem that Plato's most penetrating critique of hedonism, then, is to be found in the Philebus and only there.
The present study will begin with an overview of the Philebus, a notoriously difficult and labyrinthine dialog,Footnote 2 as a necessary preparation for a commentary on those of its parts most directly linked to Plato's critique of hedonism. This critique depends on the recognition, first, that the need for self-knowledge is fundamental to, and perhaps prior to, the desire for pleasure and, second, that there are certain intense pleasures the experience of which makes self-knowledge very difficult to attain and which can on that ground be reasonably criticized. Reflection on Plato's critique of hedonism is important in itself, of course, but, as the essay's final section will argue, it deserves attention also because it brings into sharper focus the specific moral obtuseness of the contemporary approach to hedonism, one that is, from the Platonic point of view, also a massive obstacle to self-knowledge more generally.
OVERVIEW OF THE PHILEBUS
The question that unites Plato's Philebus is that of the best way of life for a human being or, more precisely, whether the best human life consists in the enjoyment of pleasure or the possession of knowledge. As the dialog opens, we learn that Socrates and Philebus have just brought their argument about this question to a halt. Plato thus declines to present that argument to us directly, but he makes perfectly clear its result: it has done nothing whatever to prompt Philebus to abandon his opinion of the superior goodness of pleasure (12a6–8). In that prior conversation, we now learn, Socrates had contended that prudence, understanding, memory, and their kin are, for all those capable of possessing them, better than and superior to enjoyment, pleasure, delight, and the like—things that Philebus had maintained were good “for all animals” (11b4–6).Footnote 3 We learn too that Socrates does not object to Philebus' contention that pleasure is good or a good (11b4–7; see also 13b1). Socrates, then, is no ascetic or (as he insists later on) he is not one of the “enemies” of Philebus, who have conceived an excessive hatred of pleasure (44b6–d5) ultimately on what appear to be moral grounds (consider 46a5–11). Rather, he contends and Philebus denies that understanding (to phronein), thinking (to noein), and the like are superior to pleasure, superior in goodness, which here means in the profit or advantage (ōphelimōtaton: 11c1–2) they bestow on those possessing them (Gadamer Reference Gadamer and Wallace1991, 103).
It is striking that Socrates' opening recapitulation (11b4–c3), which meets with the complete approval of Philebus (11c4), avoids mentioning “the” good in summarizing the two competing positions (see 13e5–6; 19d3–6; also 66e3–5); Socrates and Philebus, it appears, have been debating simply the relative merits of pleasure and phronēsis or the question of which is the better thing to possess. Socrates' most emphatic statement here, according to which the capacity to share in phronēsis and the like is “the most advantageous thing of all” for all who are or will be so capable, need mean only that these intellectual abilities are particularly useful to us in satisfying our most important needs, not that they satisfy them all completely or permanently, for example, let alone for everyone. He surely does not mean by “good” here some transcendent “good in itself” that is other and higher than what is advantageous to the one possessing the good thing, as a refreshing drink, for example, is good for a thirsty human being. However much Socrates' presentation of what is good will change, in an attempt both to satisfy and to improve Protarchus, he does not explicitly mention “the idea of the good” anywhere in the dialog. There is also no reason, in the opening sections, to attribute such a transcendent view of “the good” to Philebus.
Protarchus is a different story. Protarchus proves to hope for precisely “the good” so understood, and he is the first in the dialog to speak explicitly of it (13b7). He is encouraged to do so, it is true, by Socrates' introduction of a crucial question that is a supplement to and hence separate from the summary of the Socrates–Philebus conversation he had just given: “in addition to these points, let us agree also to the following: [. . .] each of us now will undertake to present a characteristic [hexis] and disposition [diathesis] of soul that is capable of supplying to all human beings the life that's happy” (11d2, 4–6). The good thing now on the table, then, is happiness or the good (consider Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1097a30–1097b6), and whatever it may be it must be available to all human beings. To be sure, Philebus himself had asserted that pleasure is good “for all animals” (11b5), as we noted, whereas Socrates had carefully limited his own case in favor of phronēsis by speaking only of those capable of it (11b9–10; consider also 52b6–8). But Philebus probably intended by this phrase nothing other than an emphatic statement of the universality of the goodness of pleasure: that all animals necessarily seek out pleasure is a clear sign of its natural goodness (consider the comparable argument of Eudoxus as reported by Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1172b9–15); Philebus surely did not mean to equate the experience of pleasure with “happiness,” for we do not properly speak of the happiness of animals (NE 1099b32–1100a1). But, to repeat, the good proves to have a very different meaning for Protarchus.
After Protarchus takes over the argument in favor of pleasure, now in the form of the proposition that pleasure is “the” good “for all,” for all human beings and animals and even plants (22b3–8), it gradually becomes clear that this qualification amounts in him to the hope that there is a way of life capable of making all human beings happy (11d4–7; also 61a1); Protarchus has some concern for the welfare of all human beings. Yet this concern would seem to have a root other than hedonism, the most obvious focus of which is the pleasure experienced by the hedonist himself or herself. Protarchus, then, has not faced the most important implication of the most basic premise of hedonism, for he proves to have jumped too quickly to the view that pleasure is “the good”—at one point he claims merely to be repeating what he has heard from others (38a5; compare 29a1–4)—without having faced squarely the prior and more fundamental question of whose good most concerns him or deserves to concern him, his own good or the good of others.Footnote 4
Accordingly, in order to rid Protarchus of his hedonistic inclination, Socrates simply makes use of Protarchus' own, half-hidden moral opinions; he both elicits Protarchus' latent moralism and encourages it to have its necessary effect on his hedonism. That effect in the course of the Philebus is easy enough to track: having begun from the assertion that the distinction “bad pleasures/good pleasures” makes no sense because all pleasures are good (13b3–c2), Protarchus subsequently admits or contends not merely that there are indeed bad pleasures—which a philosophic hedonist would readily admit on the ground that some immediate pleasures lead to greater pains later on (consider Protagoras 353a7–b3)—but that there are unseemly (33b2–c4), depraved or wicked (37d2–5; 40e9–41a4; consider also 45e5–8), unjust (49d1–8), and shameful (65e4–66a3) pleasures, all of which are of course to be shunned. One might note in this context too Protarchus' remarkable inability to take a stand or at least to keep to one: by means of a very dubious argument Socrates leads Protarchus to abandon early on the view that pleasure is the good, as distinguished from being merely one of at least two goods (21d4–5 and context; 22b3–9), and he will for a time agree that pleasure is not good at all (54d4–8, 55a10–11)—only to accept Socrates' final argument (or rather “divination”: 66b5) that includes the revelation that the best life will indeed contain certain “pure” pleasures, not in the first or second rank but in (exactly!) the fifth (66a4–c7).
It is true that the moral character of the critique of hedonism in the Philebus is not immediately apparent, least of all where it is very much in play, in the dialog's opening, and notoriously abstract, discussions. The character of those discussions is determined in part by the fact that Protarchus is a “sophisticate.” For Protarchus has been exposed to just the kind of rhetorical–sophistic education that Socrates had warned Hippocrates away from in the Protagoras, for example: Protarchus notes in passing that he has heard Gorgias “many times,” and he does not bat an eye at the rather nasty thing he has heard him say (58a7–b3; consider Gorgias 452e1–8 and 454b5–7; consider also Philebus 14c11–d3 and 42d9–43a3 for other indications of his prior education). At the beginning of the dialog, to repeat, Protarchus wrongly believes that he believes “the good” with which he is concerned to be his own pleasure, and after considerable exertions Socrates succeeds merely in bringing him back to the necessary beginning point of any serious reflection on the good life, namely, the decent opinion that what we care about most is not our own good (be it pleasure or something else) but virtue in general (55b1–c3) and justice in particular (39e10 and context)—to say nothing of “purity.”
As laudable as Socrates' accomplishment here is in demolishing Protarchus' confused understanding of hedonism, this very confusion means that Socrates fails to encounter, let alone conquer, hedonism in its full vigor. His manifest success with Protarchus, then, must be judged unsatisfying by anyone who seeks the truth about the matter in order to know how to live (consider 11c9–d1, d4–6). But Protarchus is of course not Socrates' only interlocutor here, and the dialog's strange title serves to remind us of the presence throughout of Philebus. In fact Socrates himself repeatedly indicates that he remains interested in Philebus and his opinion: he tries early on, with only limited success, to draw Philebus into the conversation with Protarchus (12a4 and a6, 16b5, 22c1, d5, 26b8, 27e1), and he continues to speak of and to both young men (e.g., 28a5)—even long after Philebus has sunk into a determined silence (44b6, 50e2, 59b10, 60a7, 64b6, 66e2).
What is one to make of Philebus? As has been indicated, Philebus clearly remains devoted to the goodness of pleasure at the conclusion of his conversation with Socrates (12a6–8). Plato's title, then, by reminding one of the (mostly) silent presence of an obstinate objector, points also to a Socratic failure. It is true that Philebus might appear to be merely a dogmatic hedonist not open to a true conversation with Socrates, let alone a conversion (consider Hackforth Reference Hackforth1958, 6), and some commentators argue, for this or other reasons, that the transition from Philebus to Protarchus as interlocutor constitutes a clear ascent (e.g., Benardete Reference Benardete1993, 1 n.4; consider also Frede Reference Frede and Philebus1993, xviii). That Philebus is not an ideal interlocutor seems beyond dispute. If, however, we compare Socrates' summary of his conversation with Philebus to the argument that he insists on in the remainder of the dialog, we must conclude that he had not put all his cards on the table when speaking with Philebus: the good life is the life of thought and pleasure correctly combined and not, as he had argued before, that of thought as distinguished from pleasure. (Although his summarized argument with Philebus is compatible with pleasure's being a secondary good, Socrates presents as a wholly new turn in the argument, new to Protarchus and hence to Philebus, the proposition that the good life is thought and pleasure combined, a certain “third” thing: 20b6 and following; also 14b4). If Philebus remains unpersuaded by a position that Socrates himself abandons, because it turns out not to be his true one, is this not a point in Philebus' favor? Further, it is Philebus who originally took the lead in disputing with Socrates, it is Philebus who interrupts Socrates' remarks on One and Many with a sober and sobering doubt about their relevance (18a1–2, d3–8), and it is Philebus who evidently enjoys supremacy among the assembled youths, whom he, as their leader, is wont to address as “boys” (16b4–5; 44c1–2). What is more, in his “worship” of Aphrodite, Philebus (roughly, “Youth-lover” [Bury Reference Bury1973, 101; Gosling Reference Gosling1975, 73; Frede Reference Frede and Philebus1993, 1; Benardete Reference Benardete1993, 1n.1]) is surely a more erotic fellow than Protarchus, whose journey from defender of hedonism to rather priggish marm is amazingly quick; and Socrates himself points out, in a crucial passage, the connection between the soul's eros and (Socratic) dialectic (58d4–5 and context).
All of this suggests that we be open to the possibility that the serious defense of pleasure is offered less by Protarchus than by Philebus, the brevity of whose appearance in the dialog is, to say the least, compatible with this possibility.Footnote 5 If the very position we most need to observe is presented only fleetingly and piecemeal, it is still possible not only to put those pieces together (consider Bolotin Reference Bolotin1985, especially 2–6), but also to supplement them by reflecting on the manifest defect or defects of Protarchus. For a hedonist with the right to reject Socrates' arguments—whether or not Philebus himself ultimately fills that bill—would at a minimum have to do precisely what Protarchus has not done, namely, think through and accept the consequences of the selfish character of “the good” according to hedonism. Could it be, then, that the complex conversation with Protarchus is simultaneously aimed also at “Philebus,” that is, at the more impressive sort of hedonist? As it seems to me, the most important arguments in the dialog have just this character: Socrates presents his true views to both Philebus and Protarchus, but he does so sometimes with sound arguments and sometimes with defective ones, the very defects of which make them more, not less, attractive to Protarchus. For example, the argument according to which the good life is the proper combination of thought and pleasure—what is indeed Socrates' view—carries conviction with Protarchus because it relies on two unproven beliefs or hopes that are deeply held by him but not by Socrates: “the good” must be complete or perfect, on the one hand, and sufficient, on the other, which amounts to saying that someone in possession of “the good” needs nothing else whatever or is simply happy (see pp. 145–146 below).
What then of Socrates' sound arguments? To respond adequately to the more impressive sort of hedonist, to a “Philebus,” Socrates would be compelled to go beyond a moral critique of hedonism by confronting the question of the good head-on, so to speak: supposing there to be a human being who could consistently argue that the good with which he is most concerned is necessarily his own good, in what does it truly consist? In pleasure or knowledge or something else? The Philebus attempts to answer just this question. That is, it offers both an apparently effective but ultimately unsatisfying moral critique of hedonism, directed at a compliant Protarchus, and an apparently ineffective, extra-moral critique directed at a recalcitrant Philebus. But it would be more precise to say that Plato declines to indicate what effect the conversation reported in the Philebus had on its titular character. Was it ineffective in fact? The crucial question is this: does Socrates' serious critique of hedonism deserve to win over Philebus—to say nothing of the unnamed others who listen silently to the entire conversation (15c7–8, 19c4–5, 52e3, 67b9) and, by extension, the reader?
Plato's APPROACH TO THE CHALLENGE OF HEDONISM
Protarchus and The Good
Socrates begins his treatment of the question whether pleasure, knowledge, or some third possibility is the good they seek by asserting that pleasure is complex and that it is as result necessary to inquire into its “nature” (12c4–6). If we take a bird's-eye view of the conversation that follows, however, we see that they do not turn to address directly the nature of pleasure—its kinds or forms (eidē) and their genesis—until 31b4. The Philebus, in other words, will offer (what proves to be) a powerful analysis of the nature of pleasure only after a remarkably long delay. What then is the purpose of the intervening sections that constitute this delay? To answer this question, it will be helpful to begin by noting the “action” that occurs there—that is, the principal effects of Socrates' arguments on his two interlocutors—before turning to examine some of the arguments themselves.
Protarchus is at first surprisingly resistant to the view that there are important qualitative differences among the various pleasures (Bolotin Reference Bolotin1985, 8). Yet Socrates manages to wrest from Protarchus his agreement with or at any rate acquiescence in that proposition—“Let pleasures be many and dissimilar” (14a8)—and this in turn prompts us to expect an analysis of the kinds of pleasure there are and of the defining class characteristic that unites them. What we receive instead is the discussion of One and Many. This discussion prompts Protarchus first to issue a playful threat against Socrates and then to call for him to be eager to find a “way and contrivance” to rid their argument of “such confusion” and so to uncover “some nobler path” than the one they are on (16a7–b3). The nobler path in question (16b5) meets with the approval of Protarchus (17e7–8), until Philebus twice raises the simple question, which Socrates deems to be a good one (18a3–4, d6), of what in the world the present argument has to do with them and what its significance is (18a1–4, 18d3–8). Socrates' further elaboration of it, however, leads Protarchus to insist, in his longest remark of the dialog, that Socrates cease obstructing them as he is: Socrates should either go through the forms of pleasure and knowledge himself or even abandon the attempt altogether (19c1–e5; 20a1–8). Thus we see that, from having secured Protarchus' agreement that there are indeed qualitatively different pleasures, Socrates “succeeds” only in leading Protarchus to abandon the attempt to discover them and therewith the nature of pleasure. Socrates then agrees to forego the analysis of the forms of pleasure (20c4–5) and argues instead that neither pleasure nor knowledge by itself can constitute the good or the good life but only some combination of the two can do so. In this way he brings to a close the first main section of the dialog (11a1–23b4).
Whatever else one might say about this procedure, it is marked by an obvious peculiarity: Socrates and Protarchus dismiss pleasure as the good before turning to examine what pleasure is! Yet this strange procedure has several advantages. First, it permits Socrates openly to dismiss the immoral answer to the question of how to live that is hedonism (consider 20b9–c2), thereby not only saving Protarchus from such a doctrine but also earning greater freedom for himself to explore it later on as an already discredited view; and, second, it encourages those who see the fraudulent character of this quick dismissal of pleasure to retain a serious interest in Socrates' subsequent and more revealing exploration of it. It may be too that Socrates' aim in these early sections is to accomplish what he does in fact accomplish, that is, to put Protarchus off the inquiry into pleasure; it is surely the case that, by beginning the dialog on pleasure as he does, Plato erected a forbidding gate or fence separating readers from the heart of the matter, and perhaps also diverting their attention from it.Footnote 6
A detailed analysis of the discussion of One and Many is beyond the purpose of the present essay. Two observations must suffice. First, that discussion is most clearly meant to suggest, to Protarchus but also and perhaps above all to Philebus, that the world at its core can be grasped by the human mind. Philosophizing need not be an exercise in futility, Philebus' manifest frustrations notwithstanding. Second, the arguments specific to these opening sections afford us a clear view of Protarchus' hopes concerning the good or the good life, hopes that run deeper in him than does the hedonism he initially thinks will realize them. As we have seen, Protarchus at first denies what experience would suggest, that there are important qualitative differences among the pleasures. His resistance stems from his view that, however contrary the things that give rise to pleasure may be—moderation or licentiousness, prudence or foolishness—the pleasures in question are one (12d7–e2); and this view is in turn the product of his contention that all pleasures are good (13b6–c5): the premise “pleasure is the good” means to Protarchus that all pleasures without exception are good (and good for all human beings), an extreme view that no philosophic or even sensible hedonist would maintain. In Protarchus' opinion, then, there is some one class of good things wholly without admixture of the bad, and he thinks he has found in pleasure the unalloyed or pure good he seeks.
It is in this general context that Socrates suggests that they come to agreement about “certain small matters” (20c8). The brief exchanges that follow are the most important of the dialog to this point and in large part determine its course. For Socrates now makes explicit Protarchus' own convictions or hopes concerning “the good,” convictions that have thus far been largely implicit, although they have already begun to produce their necessary effects. Socrates brings out Protarchus' hopes first by asking two questions that as such cannot be taken as declarations of his own view: when asked by Socrates whether it is necessary that the good be something both “complete” (or “perfect”: teleon) and “sufficient,” Protarchus replies emphatically that it is (20d1–6; see also 60b7–c5). To these two questions Socrates adds an affirmative statement of his own, what he calls “the most necessary thing to say about it, as I think,” namely, that everything that knows of or recognizes the good hunts after it and seeks it out in its wish to get hold of it and to possess it for itself (peri hauto: 20d7–10). Protarchus agrees to this as well.
Just what Protarchus means by contending that the good is “complete” and “sufficient” appears in the course of Socrates' argument that neither phronēsis nor pleasure can be the good, but only some combination of these two can be. The crucial premise is this: “if in fact either of these is the good, then it ought to require nothing further in addition” (20e4–21a2, emphasis added). The good they are now seeking, in other words, must by itself supply us with all that we might need or want in life. Socrates easily and quickly shows that a life spent enjoying all of the greatest pleasures, but wholly devoid of intellectual awareness, would be as deficient as a life of thought, understanding, and calculation wholly devoid of pleasure. It is on the basis of this comparison that hedonism is officially rejected in the Philebus and that Protarchus ceases to consider himself a hedonist (21e3–4, 22b3–9, e4–6). Yet the question on the table is “the good” understood as the human good, that is, as the best way of life for a human being or the best human possession (19c6), and the comparison here is entirely inadequate because it speaks of two lives manifestly impossible for human beings. For, as Socrates himself notes, the life of pleasure devoid of intellectual awareness is the life of a shellfish or mollusk, not that of a human being (21c1–d1), just as the life of intellectual awareness devoid of all pleasure would be impossible for us (consider in this regard Socrates' earlier mention of certain pleasures attending thinking or understanding or the awareness of these: 12d1–4, 15d9–e1 and context). In other words, Socrates has succeeded in dismissing only a version of hedonism that could not be lived by any human being, and such hedonism as might actually be lived—with reason, calculation, memory, and the rest in service of the maximization of pleasure—remains a genuine possibility. (The life of the mind as it might actually be lived too remains.) Protarchus' remarkable agreements here speak to the power in him of his conviction that, to repeat, whatever “the good” is it must be complete and sufficient and so by itself secure for us—that is, for all human beings (11d4–7)—an altogether happy life: if pleasure stripped of all else will not make us happy, then it cannot be the good. The conclusion may follow from the premises, but the premises are entirely questionable. Above all, is there such a complete and sufficient good for human beings, the possession of which by itself will render us all happy?
The first dismissal of pleasure as the good in the Philebus is convincing to Protarchus on account of the moral hopes he entertains concerning the good understood as happiness: he hopes there to be some one good in the world, the possession of which will complete him in such a way as to render him in need of nothing further; when Socrates argues, by hook or by crook, that pleasure is not such a good, Protarchus ceases to consider himself a hedonist. The fraudulent character of that dismissal means, however, that one should expect an additional, and more serious, critique of pleasure.
The Examination of Pleasure
In the dialog's central and longest section (31b4–55c3), Socrates examines pleasure and, it turns out, pain: in what do they exist, and through what pathos do they come into being? Socrates now contends that they come into being in the third or “common” or mixed class, although he had suggested, immediately before, that pleasure “itself is unlimited and belongs to the class that in and of itself neither has nor ever will have a beginning or middle or end” (31a8–10). The prospect of an unlimited—and unending or eternal?—pleasure is now dropped in favor of what happens “according to nature,” as Socrates repeatedly indicates (31c3; 31e10–32a4; 32a6–8; 32b1); and according to nature, not only do pleasure \textit{and} pain necessarily belong together, but pain precedes the generation of pleasure. That is, pleasure is the result of the natural restoration or “filling” of a certain (bodily) emptying or depletion, as the pleasures of eating and drinking follow on the pains of hunger and thirst. These examples suggest that, far from being unlimited, the pleasures in question are temporary, giving way in time to the pains of emptying, which are primary. Together they constitute one form (eidos) of pleasure.
More intriguing is “the other eidos” (32c3–4, 33c5) of pleasure, namely, those pleasures that are bound up with the expectations or anticipations “of the soul itself”: the expectation of or hope for future pleasures is itself pleasant and heartening, just as the expectation of pains is frightening and painful (32b9–c2). These pleasures and pains, moreover, bound up with our awareness of and concern for the future, are so important that Socrates makes the goodness of the entire class of pleasure rest on them. In short, our hopes and fears will be \textit{the} test case determining the adequacy of hedonism:
for I think that, as regards my opinion, at any rate, it is in these [expectations] of both pain and pleasure, when each in turn comes into being pure (as it seems) and unmixed, that what pertains to pleasure will become manifest, whether the whole class is to be welcomed or whether we ought to grant this to some other of the previously mentioned classes, but as for pleasure and pain, just like hot and cold and all such things, there are times when we ought to welcome them and others when we ought not, on the grounds that they aren't good, but sometimes some of them do admit of the nature of the good things. (32c6–d6)
In the immediate sequel (32d9–36c2), Socrates makes three principal arguments. In the first, Socrates holds out the possibility that we might live without pleasure or pain, which means in this context that we might live free of the natural processes of emptying and filling, that is, of “destruction” and “preservation” (32e1–3). And if in living that life we would have to sacrifice the pleasures of “filling” (together with those of the pleasant hope preceding it), we would also gain the freedom from being “emptied” (and the painful fear preceding it). Must this not mean, however, that there is a way for us to live free of the natural decay or destruction altogether—of which “filling” too forms a part, it turns out (see 42c9–d3)—and thereby to preserve ourselves (33d9–34c4; consider 14a6)? Socrates not only identifies this life with the life of thinking—and in so doing explicitly returns to the unreal or impossible life of nous wholly devoid of pleasure (compare 33a8–b3 with 21d6–4)—but also calls it “most divine,” a suggestion Protarchus accepts on the supposition that it would be unseemly for gods to experience pleasure or its contrary (33b6–10). Thus Protarchus holds out the hope that human beings might live free of the limits and demands of nature itself, especially the natural necessity of decay and the pains that the anticipation of it must bring; Protarchus holds out the hope that we might live in a manner akin to the immortal gods. And in sketching such a possibility, Socrates encourages Protarchus to indulge in the very thing under discussion, for it is pleasant indeed to anticipate a life so understood.
Socrates proceeds to explore our pleasures, both “true” and “false,” in a series of three arguments (36c3–55c3). In the second and therefore central of these (41a7–42c4), Socrates indicates that, just as seeing things far off or close up obscures the truth and causes us to form false opinions, so now experiencing pleasures and pains “close up” will obscure the truth and cause us to form false opinions: whereas in the first argument (36c3–41a6) Socrates was concerned with how opinions affect our pleasures, he is now concerned with how pleasures (and pains) affect our opinions (of the pleasures and pains we are experiencing), the “contrary” of the prior point (41e9–42b7). The “false” pleasures in question are those that seem greater and more intense than they really are because of the presence of pain, just as the “false” pains are those that appear, in the presence of pleasures, smaller and less intense than they really are (42b2–c2). Socrates fails to give a single example of the pains and pleasures he has in mind. He does allude, however, to a point agreed to earlier, according to which pain and pleasure admit of degrees, “the more and less,” and so are among the unlimited things (41d5–10). The earlier agreement concerned the classification of the pleasant and unmixed life led by Philebus, who contends that pleasure is altogether good because it is unlimited in point of number and degree (“the more”: 27e1–9). This allusion suggests that the pleasures in question may be or include those with which Philebus is most identified, he whose particular goddess is Aphrodite (12b1–10). Might the pleasures of Aphrodite be heightened or exaggerated by the presence of a certain pain, just as some “true” pains may be falsely diminished by the presence of those pleasures? The clarification of this possibility falls among the purposes of the third, last, and longest discussion of pleasures “true” and “false” (42c5–55c3).
The question of whether pleasure is nothing other or more than the absence of pain prompts Socrates to introduce Philebus' “enemies,” who, in their hostility to hedonism, hold this view. On the one hand, Socrates denies that they are correct; on the other, he suggests that he and Protarchus treat them as “prophets” or “allies” or “witnesses” (44c5, d7, 51a4–5), for something can be learned from them. The discussion that follows is long, complex, and wide-ranging. Only once his discussion of their opinion has concluded does Socrates indicate clearly its twofold purpose:
I am somehow not quite persuaded by those who claim that all pleasures are a cessation of pains, but, as I said, I make use of them as witnesses to the fact that some things seem to be pleasures but aren't at all, and that certain other [pleasures] have appeared [phantastheisas] to be great as well as numerous, but they have been kneaded together with both pains and the relief from the greatest distresses [odunōn] related to a difficulty [aporias] of both body and soul. (51a2–9, emphasis added)
As to the first stated purpose, Socrates completes it early on: those who claim that they are enjoying pleasures, when in fact they are enjoying merely the cessation of pain, are mistaken and to that extent enjoy “false” pleasures. More important is Socrates' second stated purpose, and the questions it prompts us to ask will guide the analysis of the view of the “enemies” that follows: what are the other great and numerous pleasures that have appeared or been imagined, what are the pains and “greatest distresses” in question, and what is the “difficulty” that involves both soul and body?
Socrates' inquiry here into the nature of the class “pleasure” is conducted simultaneously with and so is shaped by his exposition of the view of Philebus' enemies. Although he reminds us of this fact (44c5–d2, 45c7–8, 46a5–6, 51a3–5), he also fails to make it quite clear when he is speaking in his own name and when in that of the “enemies,” which amounts to saying that he is willing to allow Protarchus (and the reader) to make the mistake of thinking that he too shares their highly moralistic condemnation of pleasure (consider also 44e3–4). It is in the context of this condemnation on the part of others that Socrates conveys crucial elements of his own critique of pleasure.
He begins as follows: in order to discern the nature of pleasure, the enemies say that one ought to look to the highest and most intense pleasures, which are the bodily ones and are preceded by the greatest desires; such desires are found, not in the healthy but in the sick and go together with a certain “wickedness” of soul and body, not “virtue” (44d8–45e8). To understand pleasure as such, then, one must look to the pleasures that accompany “illnesses,” that is, to “unseemly” pleasures: those that accompany the scratching or rubbing of itches (consider Gorgias 494c4–e2) and, following closely on these, the most intense of the bodily pleasures, the sexual pleasures, vividly described here by Socrates (47a3–9). A person will be more inclined always and in every way to pursue these pleasures, “the more licentious as well as senseless he happens to be, and he calls these ones greatest and counts as happiest him who lives his life to the greatest possible extent in their midst” (47b5–7). This description calls to mind Socrates' own, early in the dialog, of the pleasures of the licentious and the foolish (12c4–d6), where he had also noted, in a very important remark, that the foolish are “full of both foolish opinions and hopes” (12d3): the opinions and hopes guiding the licentious and foolish (or senseless) are the ones now under discussion. And by taking up each of the mixtures of pleasure and pain—those of the body, of the soul, and of body and soul—in an order different from the one in which he had originally enumerated them, Socrates sees to it that the topic of the most intense bodily pleasures is followed by that of hope (compare 46b8–c4 with 47d5-9 and context; hope is mentioned at 47c7).
Something of the importance of these intense bodily pleasures is suggested eventually in the lengthy discussion of the mixtures of pleasure and pain belonging to the soul itself. Socrates enumerates seven such mixtures—anger, fear, longing, lamentation, eros, emulation, and envy—with envy (or malice: phthonos) receiving by far the lengthiest treatment (compare Benardete Reference Benardete1993, 57 with, e.g., Frede Reference Frede and Philebus1993, 56, n.2, and Russell Reference Russell2005, 189, n.47). Still, Socrates makes clear that his chief purpose in taking up envy is to be able to demonstrate more easily the mix of pleasure and pain in fear and eros (50c10–d2; 48b4–6). It would be very difficult to see how fear—that is, the anticipation of pains (32b9–c2)—could also be pleasant, were it not for the example of fearing that Socrates himself had given early on: he professes to feel a more-than-human fear of misnaming the gods (12c1–4). This experience would surely confirm, for ourselves and others, the seriousness of our concern to be pious or “dear to the gods.” And such seriousness, in turn, would heighten our hopes to know the goods that belong only to those who are themselves good or pious.
The case of eros is more puzzling. Socrates had earlier spoken of eros in the strange example of one who, being emptied “for the first time,” “desires” (erai) to be filled (compare Frede Reference Frede and Philebus1993, 37 n.1): eros presupposes some awareness of “emptying,” that is, of “destruction.” Could it be that the pain that accompanies eros is the pain of the anticipation of death, the “difficulty” (aporia) affecting both body and soul and giving rise to the “greatest distresses”? If this is so, then the “filling” in question must be the assurance that death is in fact not an end, together with the pleasant hope to which such assurance would give rise. And the more immediate pleasures that typically accompany eros— the pleasures that have been given so remarkable a description in this section and that have been alluded to from the beginning of the Philebus (12b1–c4)—have to an extraordinary degree the capacity to foster that hope. As Socrates points out, to experience the peak of them is as it were to die; it is somehow to experience, though of course to survive, death (47b2–4); the singular union of lover and beloved holds out the promise of the overcoming of the mortality of each. Eros, then, is properly a mixture of pleasure and pain because it requires the pain of the awareness of death, of one's individual mortality, in order fully to experience the most intense of the bodily pleasures with which it is associated, pleasures which cannot, however, be considered merely bodily because they point beyond themselves to, and encourage, through both their natural intensity and their natural consequence, the most intense pleasure of soul that is the expectation of or hope for an eternal existence.
The lover's erotic dedication to the beloved, which presents itself as being for the sake of the beloved alone (consider 53d9–10 and context), is but one, albeit very important, example of selfless dedication: the possession of such goodness as consists, not in one's own pleasure or even in thinking but in justice and piety (39e10–11), too may bring with it the hope of overcoming death. The great and numerous pleasures that have been imagined—those that accompany fear and eros as well as anger and lamentation—have indeed been “kneaded together” with great pains and can in a sense be said to be but respites from them.
Plato's CRITIQUE OF HEDONISM
In attempting to discover the core of Plato's critique of hedonism in the Philebus, one may begin from the fact that Protarchus, while still understanding himself to be a hedonist, readily agrees that he would accept the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures for the whole of his life only if he could have mind, knowledge, correct opinion, and memory too (20e1–21d4–5 and e3–4). This agreement suggests that, precisely for hedonists, it is not enough simply to experience even great pleasure constantly, in the manner of an oyster; they wish also to be aware that they themselves are doing so, which requires, at a minimum, the persistence of the “I” experiencing the pleasure and therefore such things as mind and knowledge. In addition, hedonists derive much pleasure from the capacity to recollect past pleasures and anticipate future ones. Yet anticipation and recollection of this kind, which necessarily fall to the lot of all human beings (39e4–7, 40a3–4), are choiceworthy not only because they are pleasant but also because they are essential to what the hedonists most want, namely, to experience pleasure for themselves. Socrates repeats the argument just summarized much later in the dialog (60d3–e5)—needlessly, so far as Protarchus can see (60e6–7)—in order to confirm this importance of self-awareness to precisely the pleasure-seekers. Indeed, Protarchus himself confirms it repeatedly. At the end of their inquiry into One and Many, for example, he notes that, though it would be noble to know all things, nonetheless it seems to be a “‘second sailing’ not to escape one's own notice” (19c1–3): in the absence of a complete knowledge of everything, the next best thing is to know oneself. And, in the context of the analysis of the third kind of “false” pleasures that includes a critique of those who are ignorant of themselves, Protarchus volunteers and approves of the Delphic dictum, “Know Thyself” (48c10).Footnote 7
If the hedonists must grant the importance of self-knowledge, the crucial question, which the Philebus prompts one to raise, would seem to be this: what if there are pleasures the experience of which makes it difficult, if not impossible, to gain the requisite self-knowledge? When Socrates determines, at the end of the Philebus, the proper mixture of goods in the good life, he first includes certain “true” pleasures and then examines the opinions he has these pleasures themselves express, what might be called a dialectical examination. The (true) pleasures, who take their bearings by what is possible and what is advantageous (63b7–9), condemn “the greatest and most intense” pleasures on the ground that they pose “myriad impediments” to them. For example, these intense pleasures set the souls in which the (true) pleasures dwell into utter confusion on account of the “mad pleasures” they create: the greatest and most intense pleasures are themselves responsible for fostering certain “mad pleasures” (63d2–6, with the MSS).Footnote 8 As the earlier account of just these most intense pleasures had suggested, they prompt us to “forget” our mortality and thereby prompt us also to forget ourselves in a crucial respect; the present context too makes mention of the “forgetting” these extreme pleasures cause (63e2). The state of soul associated with those most intense pleasures even requires us to forget what Socrates himself had called “the most necessary thing” about the good, namely, that we wish to possess it for ourselves (20d7–10; consider 35a3–4, 47b2–7, 53d9–e7). That state of forgetting too, then, must number among the “mad pleasures.” At the same time, and in keeping with their stated opposition to the “mad” pleasures, the “true” pleasures themselves do not wish to exist apart from knowledge, including self-awareness (consider 63b7–c3).
As the present analysis has argued, the most serious part of the examination of pleasure is devoted to exploring those “greatest and most intense pleasures” that are magnified by the presence of the pain of “decay,” even as they work to distort, by diminishing, that very pain. By encouraging us to forget the “limit”Footnote 9 that characterizes our life, then, such intense pleasures have the effect of taking us away from ourselves as we truly are or of making self-knowledge more difficult. The suggestion of the Philebus is that, in the face of that limit, we naturally attempt to escape it, to begin with by forming the eros to be fulfilled or completed (see again 35a3–4); and such eros in turn prompts us wholeheartedly to dedicate ourselves, not apparently to “the most profitable of all things” for us (11c1–2; also 19c4–6), but to such things as “virtue” and “purity.” We see this desire at work in Protarchus himself, who easily accepts the collapse of “the good” into “the noble,” which is the class to which purity and virtue presumably belong (64e5–6; compare 15a4–7); and in so doing he “forgets” what Socrates had suggested was our altogether necessary wish to possess the good for ourselves. The peak of such dedication is surely the virtuous lover's dedication to the beloved (consider 53d9–10 and context), itself accompanied and encouraged by the intense pleasures at issue.
It is true that the demonstrable importance to hedonists of self-awareness does not by itself establish the priority of it to pleasure. Might not the most impressive sort of hedonist be eager to possess self-knowledge, and to forego many intense pleasures, precisely to secure the experience of the most solid pleasures? One would be closer to settling the case, perhaps, if one could demonstrate the necessity of our preferring to possess a painful truth to a pleasant falsehood, especially if the truth and falsehood in question were of great importance to us. Is there something inherent in our desire to know that cannot be reduced to pleasure? In the Philebus, to repeat, Socrates and Protarchus agree that the most necessary thing to say about the good is that everything that recognizes it hunts after it and seeks it out, in its wish to seize it and possess it for itself (20d7–10). This may remind one of Diotima's lesson to Socrates, conveyed in the Symposium, according to which human beings desire to possess the good, to possess it for themselves, and to possess it always or eternally (206a3–10). But is not the desire to possess the good eternally, in the manner of a god, in tension with the desire to possess it for ourselves? For to desire to become immortal would be to desire to cease to be ourselves as we are, as we can be known to ourselves to be. In what amounts to a gloss on the problem with which the Philebus leaves us, Aristotle notes that “each wishes the good things for himself, and nobody chooses to possess all things by becoming someone else—for even now the god possesses the good—but rather while being whatever he is” (Nicomachean Ethics 1166a19–26). And this insight, the acceptance of which requires the surrender of a very great hope, is for that reason painful but nonetheless necessary to fulfill our deepest attainable wish, to possess the true good for ourselves—for no one would willingly be deceived about this—as we truly are. We require self-knowledge or self-awareness, then, in order both to know our genuine needs that determine the true good or goods and to be aware that we are in possession of them. And if that possession and that awareness are accompanied by pleasure, as they may well be, it cannot be said that we choose them primarily for such pleasure: they demand also the painful knowledge of the necessary limit attending us as mortals.
CONCLUSION: HEDONISM AND THE PROBLEM OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE TODAY
The preceding analysis of the Philebus has stressed the importance of self-knowledge in Plato's critique of hedonism. It is just here, however, in the matter of self-knowledge, that a massive obstacle to the recovery of Plato's argument appears. For that argument relies on a basic premise that can no longer be assumed to be accepted by those who approach the question of hedonism today, and perhaps not even to be familiar to themFootnote 10—the premise that hedonism is an inherently disreputable doctrine because it is necessarily selfish. It is no accident that Callicles' attack on conventional justice, for example, is followed by his profession of hedonism, and insofar as that attack does not extend quite so deeply in him as he thinks, he is forced to abandon his hedonism. In Plato's presentation of them, the topics “hedonism” and “injustice” are linked. This is true even in the Philebus, which at first blush abstracts from moral questions entirely: once freed from his hedonism, Protarchus takes his bearings by what morality—justice, piety, shame, decency—demands (see p. 143 above).
The reasoning behind this linkage may be summarized as follows. For the hedonist who knows what he is about or who is no fool, his concern with “the good” is altogether selfish: “the good” is indeed pleasure—my pleasure! Hedonists seek in all things to maximize their own good, understood as pleasure, and they will engage in what may appear from the outside to be moral actions only insofar as these happen to increase their pleasure (or to decrease their pain); if the demands of justice or the law are displeasing, the hedonist consistently seeks to avoid them. The hedonist, then, is contemptuous of the claims of justice or morality as such, even if hedonistic calculation—so as to avoid penalties, for example—will sometimes or even often prompt him or her to comply with them. Moreover, no one should take comfort in the hope that there may be hedonists who happen to delight in promoting the good of others or in nobly sacrificing their own. For clear-sighted hedonists will realize that they have no selfless concern for others but view them strictly as means to increase their own pleasure; and this realization destroys the supposed pleasure involved in noble service or self-sacrifice because it reveals the groundlessness not only of the opinion that one is a noble fellow but also of the very pleasure one may have once taken in holding that false and foolish opinion. The hedonist shorn of illusion will ask: why not take the route to my pleasures that is direct and sensible? Thus hedonism appears in the pages of Plato as a disreputable doctrine—if not necessarily, for that reason, a false one.
The contemporary treatment of hedonism certainly recognizes the logical possibility of such inherent selfishness, in the form of “egoistic hedonism.” That version is supplemented, however, by another and far more influential one, “universalistic hedonism,” which looks not to the pleasure of the individual but to that of the community or aggregate (for the terms, see Sidgwick Reference Sidgwick1962). The most important source for such public-spirited hedonism is the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill. Mill advocated a frank hedonism because he thought the term “happiness” to be best explained by recourse to the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain: “By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure” (Reference Mill and Robson1969, 210). Yet he promoted hedonism as one passionately concerned with “the greatest good of the greatest number,” that is, with the well-being of “all mankind” and even of “the whole sentient creation” (214). Indeed, Mill identified as “the principal cause which makes life unsatisfactory,” “selfishness” (215).
At this point, however, a Callicles or Thrasymachus might well ask: why in the world are you concerned with the maximization of the pleasure of anybody other than yourself? Mill's sole reply is as follows:
If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. (1969, 234)
From the observation that each individual strives to secure his or her own happiness understood as pleasure, then, Mill wishes to infer the goodness of securing, and indeed the duty to strive to secure, the general happiness. The concern for the general happiness, however, does not follow from and is in fact radically different from the self-seeking of each. The difficulty is not that Mill commits the so-called fallacy of composition, that is, of “moving from the claim that each desires his happiness to the claim that all (i.e., each) desire the happiness of all (i.e., not the happiness of each but the total happiness of all collectively)”Footnote 11 (Crisp Reference Crisp1997, 77–78; Ryan Reference Ryan1974, 118). The difficulty is rather that Mill himself jumps without argument from the point of view of the selfish individual hedonist to that of someone concerned, for an unstated reason, with the good of the whole; “the sum of all these [individual] goods must be a good,” Mill avers—but good for whom and for what reason precisely (Reference Mill, Mineka and Lindley1972, 1414)? Why should any in their right minds be concerned with that collective (alleged) good, as distinguished from their own? The most fundamental argument concerning the reasonableness of the individual's interest in the pleasures of all human beings is lacking. This lack is clearest in Mill himself: Mill's deeply moral concern for all sentient creatures is not traceable to his hedonism, and only ad hoc arguments could render his guiding concern defensible on hedonistic grounds—arguments that in any case Mill himself never made. One is thus led to conclude that there beats at the heart of the most influential version of modern hedonism an undefended moral concern not reducible to the “General Happiness” principle but rather productive of it. “The controversy Mill sees himself as engaged in is not whether there is such a thing as morality, but, given that there is, what is required by it” (Crisp Reference Crisp1997, 79).
The decisively limited character of Mill's inquiry into hedonism amounts to his having assumed that the best life will of necessity be a just or moral one. By contrast, Protagoras, Callicles, and Thrasymachus, among other characters in the Platonic dialogs, all challenge us to scrutinize this assumption shared at the outset, to be sure, by every decent human being—a challenge that Plato as dramaturg too manifestly thought had to be confronted by anyone wishing to lead what he held to be the truly good life, the life of Socrates. The centrality of the problem of the goodness of justice is hinted at even in the Philebus, for at a crucial point Socrates defers, in the ranking of the various goods available to us, to the knowledge of “a certain human being who understands what justice itself is and possesses a logos that follows his thinking and who, in addition, thinks about all the beings in a similar way” (62a2–5). And to know what “justice itself is,” one would have to follow out the inquiry into justice as Plato sets it forth, with the arguments of Callicles and Protagoras, among others, squarely in mind. In brief, the implicit and unchallenged moral concern at work in the most influential discussions of hedonism today is, by contrast, the focus of scrutiny in the Platonic counterparts—in the Philebus and, much more obviously, in the Gorgias and Protagoras.
This unexamined moral concern is unlikely to be subjected to scrutiny today partly on account of the success of the project of modern political philosophy broadly speaking. That project sought to solve the problem of justice once and for all by openly advocating a frankly selfish hedonism (Vaughn Reference Vaughn1982)—for the sake of and ultimately in service to the common good: justice itself now demands that we be truly selfish. The citizens of the new political order, the “rational and industrious,” could finally have their cake and eat it by being thoroughly selfish and by congratulating themselves on the benefits they thereby confer on the common good. The agency of the “invisible hand” would effect miracles. From the older point of view, however, the very great political gains achieved by this doctrine of “self-interest well understood” would likely come at the price of self-knowledge. For the triumph of this selfish-yet-moral doctrine makes it exceedingly difficult even to raise the questions that Plato insists are key to self-knowledge, the question of what morality demands of us, and, following closely on this, the question of the precise nature of “the good” with which we are most deeply concerned, one's own or that of others. The study of the Philebus is important today, then, because it permits access to a searching analysis of hedonism, a task important in its own right. More than that, however, the Philebus also prompts us to begin to recover for ourselves the simple but profound questions indicated, whose importance as a path to self-knowledge we are in danger of forgetting entirely.

Comments
No Comments have been published for this article.