The practical value of happiness as a policy goal is a debated issue. Some people are negative or sceptical about this possibility, while others are more positive or lenient. The editors of Policies for Happiness, Stefano Bartolini et al., ask this question “Should happiness research be taken seriously for the purpose of policy-making?” or “Is happiness a meaningful policy target at all?” The book is a collection of papers on the subject of happiness and policy-making from leading experts, coupled with comments from the editors. The book is dedicated to the memory of Professor Luigi Porta, one of the editors and contributors, who passed away on the 29th January 2016. The editors have summarized the key-points of all the contributions. I recapitulate some key-points related to the central question as I see it: “What is the practical value of happiness as a policy goal?
Frey and Stutzer (section 1.1) are critical about happiness as a policy-goal. They find that collective decisions cannot be based on scientific research. Scientific research can only provide input for the political process that produces such decisions. This anti-technocratic and anti-paternalistic point of view is shared by Sugden and Teng (1.2). They are critical of Richard Layard's proposal (Layard, Reference Layard2011) to accept happiness as a dominant policy-goal.
Clark (1.4) is sceptical about happiness as a policy goal, but for different reasons. In his view we simply do not know enough to support any change in public policies. Graham (1.5) is sceptical because she believes that the impact of policies will always diminish in time due to adaptation. Adaptation refers to the phenomenon that people get used to favourable or unfavourable conditions, and that the positive or negative effects on happiness will decrease as a consequence. The editors present two conclusions of their own:
1. There is no reason why happiness should not become a meaningful policy-goal and a standard in policy-evaluation.
2. The state of research suggests that we may increase well-being by (a) diminishing the importance of economic growth, (b) increasing the importance of social capital, and (c) using the fiscal system to reduce over-consumption.
The editors find that these conclusions hold, even if one accepts an anti-paternalistic point of view and the idea that happiness research has not yet reliably identified any additional effective policies.
The conclusion of the editors, that happiness can be a practical and meaningful policy goal, is very acceptable. There is (at least) one additional argument in favour of this conclusion, but there are also some neglected complications, all related to the subjective nature of happiness.
We need subjective indicators to avoid arbitrariness and paternalism
Happiness is subjective because it is a phenomenon ‘felt’ or ‘experienced’ in the human mind. The distinction between subjective realities within the human mind, and objective realities outside and independent of the mind, is important for a correct understanding of the practical value of happiness as a policy-goal. The distinction can be complicated since important objective realities can also become subjective realities. Safety, health and freedom are objective realities but for many people they are also meaningful subjective realities.
We need subjective indicators like self-reported happiness, to describe subjective realities and we need objective indicators, like GDP, to describe objective realities. The distinction between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ is in this case about the nature of the subject under consideration, or ‘ontological’, and not ‘epistemological’. In an epistemological way the distinction subjective/objective is about the way we describe, assess and measure whatever realities: if we do so ‘subjectively’ it means that our descriptions, assessments and measurements depend on our personal characteristics like taste and ideology. This is usually ‘not done’ in scientific research. If we do so objectively, the results will be independent of such characteristics. As a consequence other observers will get the same results if they describe, assess, or measure the same phenomena.
Happiness, as a subjective reality, is usually measured objectively using standardized questions, as in the Gallup World Poll and the World Values Surveys. The answers to the standardized questions are sometimes qualified as ‘self-reported’ happiness. This is obviously correct, but it would be a mistake to conclude that this self-reported happiness is measured in a subjective way.Footnote 1 Happiness is subjective in an ontological way, and self-reported happiness is objectively measured if the results are independent of the people who do the measurement. This can be done using standardized questions, asked in the same conditions and in the same way, e.g. on paper, face-to-face, via internet or mobile phone.
It is important to develop and apply subjective and objective indicators in combination to assess well-being and quality of life. Objective indicators are used by experts like economists (GDP, Gini's, purchasing power), psychologists (resilience, extraversion, neuroticism), medical professionals (body- temperature, blood pressure, body mass index) or environmentalists (ecological footprint). Such experts describe and analyse important aspects of the objective quality of life. There are however two problems at this point. The first problem is that there are unlimited possibilities to describe objective quality of life, and experts can freely follow their own priorities and preferences. This creates the risk that their selection of indicators is somewhat random and perhaps paternalistic. The second problem is that experts may have assumptions about the relations between objective and subjective realities, but such assumptions are usually just implicit and not, or insufficiently, tested.
The acceptance of happiness as a policy-goal can help the experts to overcome both problems. With subjective indicators experts will be stimulated to consider the comprehensiveness of their indicators and the relations between subjective and objective realities. They will also be stimulated to consider subjective realities with an open mind. If people apply some (internalized) normative standards, as elements in their frames of reference, the observing experts will be stimulated to pay attention to this appreciation, even if they disapprove of the standards.
We need objective indicators for a correct interpretation of happiness
It is, however, also inadequate to develop and apply subjective indicators without any consideration of objective indicators. One trivial reason is that subjective indicators like happiness are usually related to the current appreciation of “life as a whole”. The implication is that people can be happy, even if they have, or will have, some serious subjective or objective problems. They may also be unhappy, even if their actual conditions are, and will be, excellent. A more specific complication is that some people only consider their own individual situation, as they are invited to do in most survey-questions, while other people also pay attention (nevertheless) to the situation of other people, or even to the situation of their community or mankind in general.
A less trivial reason is that frames of reference play a crucial role for happiness. Frames of reference are affected by social comparison and adaptation and can be irrational. As observed by Sen (Reference Sen1999) people can be happy in miserable conditions, but this can never be an excuse to accept objective misery. People can also be unhappy because they are unreasonable in what they want or expect. Happiness is therefore positive, but not by definition an indication that there are no problems, and unhappiness is negative, but not by definition unacceptable in terms of policy. Happiness and unhappiness always deserve a careful and critical interpretation. We need combinations of subjective and objective indicators to understand the mutual relations between subjective and objective realities. This conclusion is perhaps not spectacular. The application of subjective and objective indicators in combination is common practice for many medical experts, yet it is neglected by many experts in other fields.
Policies for Happiness is a book of high analytical quality, offering an alternative approach to social problems. The conclusion that happiness can be a policy goal is convincing. There is at least one additional argument: we need subjective indicators to reduce the risk of arbitrariness and paternalism in the development and application of objective indicators. There are also some neglected complications of using happiness as a policy goal. Frames of reference are important for happiness and can be irrational. Happiness can go together with serious current or future problems and unhappiness is not by definition unacceptable. Happiness and unhappiness alike have to be evaluated carefully and critically, and we need objective indicators to do so!
