Levels of Political Interest and Participation

Literature on Chinese political culture and participation often describes three relatively distinct stages with regard to mass political interest in contemporary China. The first stage was before the 1949 Chinese Communist revolution when most Chinese seemed to be politically apathetic and ignorant (Zhu, Zhao, and Li 1990). This stage was also characterized by what one China scholar typified as a “popular isolation from politics” (Townsend 1967, 10–20). The second stage between the 1950s and 1970s was marked by a “participation explosion” (Townsend 1967, 10–20) due to the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) sustained mobilization efforts that led to unprecedented enthusiasm on the part of the population about public and political affairs, especially during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution. In fact, political participation (in terms of private citizens' efforts to influence public affairs) in the Chinese countryside was much more active than many people think during this period. Peasants used various means to protect and voice their interest, including state institutions (such as local assemblies, mass organizations, elections, and media) and non-conventional activities (such as passive resistance and collective violence) (Burns 1988, 1–2). During the third stage, which covers most of the post-Mao reform period and continues to the present, a popular perception among China observers is that the Chinese people are consumed with material goods and making money and have become increasingly apolitical and pragmatic.⁸

Deng Xiaoping's slogan “Getting rich is glorious” carries the day in modern China.

However, our Jiangsu rural survey shows that this perception of a low level of political interest may not be the case. As Table 1 shows, about two thirds of our respondents were still interested or very interested in national affairs. This figure is surprisingly close to that found in two mass surveys among Beijing residents conducted in the 1990s.⁹

A slightly lower percentage of our respondents (about 62%) cared for local public affairs. This figure is more than 25% lower than what we found among urban residents in Beijing. However, the bottom line is that the majority of the peasants in our survey showed some or strong interest in national as well as local public affairs. These findings seem to contradict the popular perception that most Chinese people, especially most Chinese peasants, are apolitical and not interested in public affairs and politics. In fact, there are many national and local issues that Chinese peasants are truly concerned about, such as corruption at various governmental levels, abuse of power by local and village government officials, and government rural policies.

Even though most of our respondents were still interested in public affairs, the number of people who talked about politics with others was lower. Less than half of the respondents in our survey said they talked about politics often with their family members, relatives, colleagues, and friends (see Table 1). Yet, this number is still very impressive given the stereotype about political inactivity among Chinese peasants. Also, this figure is very close to that in the Beijing surveys, indicating that rural residents in Jiangsu are almost as active as urban residents in Beijing in talking about politics and public affairs.

Next, we wanted to find out how often the rural residents in our survey engage in participatory political acts.¹⁰

Political participation is a complicated and ambiguous term in China. In general, political participation in China can be divided between officially sponsored and mobilized participation and unofficial and spontaneous participation. We dealt with both in our surveys. In the former, we included voting in government-sponsored elections to local people's congresses and villagers' committees. As Table 2 shows, only about a third of our respondents participated in the most recently held election to the county people's congress and about half participated in the most recently held township people's congress elections. Unlike people's congress elections at higher levels (city, provincial, and national), elections to both county and township people's congress are direct elections, meaning regular voters cast votes directly for their representatives. Since people's congresses at both county and township levels are primarily rubber-stamp organizations, people in China generally show low levels of interest in these organizations. As a result, the government has to make great efforts to mobilize people to vote in these elections to legitimize the existence and functions of these “representative” organs. Even though the voting in these elections is government mobilized, the percentage of voting in these elections in Jiangsu's rural areas is still lower than many would expect. This is primarily due to the fact that failure to show up for these elections is no longer treated as a punishable act by the authorities.

As mentioned at the beginning of the paper, villagers' committee elections have attracted much attention both at home and abroad. Just how many Chinese peasants vote in village elections? The figures vary significantly from one report to the next. The Chinese press routinely reports voter turnout in these elections at above 90%. In a document prepared by the Taicang (a county-status city in southern Jiangsu) government, it reported a 99.4% voter turnout in village elections held in Taicang in 1997 (Taicang Municipal Government 1999). Tianjian Shi reports around 76% of the people in his 1990–1991 survey participated in the semi-competitive elections of local work unit leaders (village elections included), even though the figure does not differentiate unit leaders' elections between urban and rural areas (Shi 1999, 1123).

Our survey finds much lower peasant voter turnout in village elections in the areas covered by our study. Approximately half (48%) of the eligible voters in our survey reported they actually went to the central polling station to cast their vote while 42% did not (see Table 2). Interestingly enough, the voter turnout in village elections in our surveyed areas is very close to that in township/town people's congress elections, while peasants' participation in county people's congress elections is the lowest among the three.

The low voter turnout in villagers' committee elections has much to do with institutional constraints and limited choices in these elections in Jiangsu.¹¹

For the most part, nomination of villagers' committee candidates is still very much controlled by the township/town government and the village communist party branch. Open nomination (or “sea election”) was not widely practiced in Jiangsu when the survey was conducted. In addition, open campaigning by candidates was discouraged. What is even more detrimental to the effectiveness of villagers' committee elections in China is the limited power of villagers' committees, which are subject to the authority of the village communist branch. The village party branch secretary is the so-called first hand, or the most important cadre in the village, while the villagers' committee chair is usually the deputy party secretary. All major decisions have to be approved first by the village party branch before adoption and implementation by the villagers' committee. In addition, the power and authority of the villagers' committee is also circumscribed by higher authorities, especially township/town governments. Given these institutional constraints, it is not surprising that peasants in China lose interest in villagers' committee elections.

Apart from officially organized and sanctioned political participation, there are also spontaneous yet conventional political acts initiated by private citizens in China. In our survey, we included voicing opinions or writing letters to village and township/town government leaders and deputies to the county and township/town people's congresses. As shown in Table 3, close to a quarter of our respondents voiced opinions to their village officials and township/town officials. Much fewer people ever contacted their deputies to the township/town and county people's congresses. Apparently, many people were not shy in contacting local government officials, even though it remains doubtful whether contacting officials could effectively affect officials' behavior. In our survey, more than 70% either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement that opinions and concerns voiced by the people to government officials are most often ignored (see Table 3). Very few people in our survey ever contacted deputies to the local people's congresses, even though they are supposed to be official representatives for the people. Obviously, the local people's congresses have yet to become effective representative, legislative, and supervising bodies in China.

Selected Democratic Values among Peasants

There has always been serious debate about whether traditional Chinese political culture is inherently authoritarian and incompatible with modern democratic values (Goldman 1994, 1). Chinese peasants in particular are suspected as carriers of authoritarian culture. In fact, the absence of democratization in China is often blamed on the Chinese peasants who are believed to have a low level of democratic political culture and lack democratic traditions. Moreover, the Chinese people have lived under communism for over half a century, which is likely to leave an indelible imprint on their political orientation and behavior. On the other hand, some China scholars have predicted that marketization of the Chinese economy will inevitably lead to a gradual process of political democratization, if one believes in the linkage between economic development and democratization (White 1993; White 1994; Overholt 1993). What, then, is the picture of mass political culture among Chinese peasants toward democratic elections, pluralism, tolerance, and authorities? Our survey attempts to shed some light in this regard.

Findings presented in Table 4 show that peasants in our survey strongly endorsed democratic elections. An overwhelming majority of our respondents supported the concept that township and county officials, who are currently not directly elected by voters, should be popularly elected to their positions. Close to 60% seemed to support the idea that state leaders should also be promoted through elections. In another survey question, we asked whether all village Party secretaries should be popularly elected. An overwhelming majority of our respondents (82%) favored popular election of village Party secretaries. A major constraint and drawback in current village self-government in China, as mentioned earlier, is the fact that the village Party secretary is the most powerful cadre (or the “first-hand”) and the elected village committee chairman is usually a deputy to the Party secretary. Yet, the Party secretary is not popularly elected. The lack of power by the villagers' committee chairman significantly reduced the meaningfulness and effectiveness of village elections in China.

It is even more surprising to find that a majority of our respondents were not willing to give up on democratic elections even if elected officials did not solve their problems and if elections created chaos, indicating a strong belief in democracy. It should be noted that the Chinese people have a special fear of chaos or luan after experiencing centuries of upheavals, revolutions, and instabilities. The chaotic Cultural Revolution is still fresh in peoples' minds. Capitalizing on this fear, the Chinese government, since the Tiananmen Democracy Movement in 1989, has relentlessly emphasized the need for stability for greater economic development. Chinese leaders have used the stability argument to suppress dissent and garner regime legitimacy by equating democratization with chaos and constantly reminding Chinese people that the unstable situation in some Eastern European countries and Russia in their transition to democracy could happen to China (Zhong 1996, 214–215). Therefore, the survey findings are especially interesting given the Chinese peoples' traditional concern for stability over chaos. Moreover, we also found a strong sense of popular participation. Over 60% of people in our survey did not believe in elite politics and over 50% supported a citizen's right to participate regardless of one's knowledge and educational levels. These findings contradict the negative perception of low political democratic culture among Chinese peasantry.

Table 5 presents findings on attitudes toward press freedom, tolerance, political efficacy, and the necessity for political reforms. Press freedom seems to be strongly favored by our respondents. An overwhelming majority of the peasants in our survey believed that the press should be given more freedom to expose wrong doings such as official corruption, and a significant majority favored the existence of a non-official media alongside the official state media. Close to 90% of our respondents agreed that one is entitled to the same right of free speech as everyone else regardless of his or her political beliefs. When asserted that assemblies and demonstrations should be banned if they cause social instability, more than half of our respondents disagreed. In addition, peasants in our survey seemed to have strong internal political efficacy. Close to 60% of our respondents believed that the well-being of the country is mainly dependent upon the masses, not state leaders. This indicates a strong sense of confidence in themselves among our peasant respondents. Moreover, over 50% of the people in our survey believed that political reforms are sorely needed in China. These findings seem to defy the conventional wisdom that Chinese peasants are socially and politically conservative forces and hold values incompatible with democracy.

In fact, on most of these questions, our peasant respondents in Jiangsu fared equally well or even better than the urban residents in our Beijing surveys. For example, on the question upon whom the well-being of the country relies, most people in our Jiangsu rural survey chose the masses, while most Beijing residents selected state leaders. Findings like these are indeed thought-provoking and need more research and exploration.

Attitudes toward Economic Reforms

As mentioned earlier, many scholars have long argued that there is a strong correlation between the free market economic system and democracy. Given that connection, it is interesting to discover how Chinese peasants feel about the on-going market-driven reforms started in the late 1970s. It is apparent that the economic reforms have dramatically changed the face of China, making it one of the fastest growing economies in the world. These reforms have markedly improved the standard of living for ordinary Chinese. Yet, these reforms have also brought negative consequences such as inflation, declining social welfare programs, corruption, a widening gap between the rich and the poor, and job insecurity. In our surveys conducted in Beijing in the 1990s, we found lukewarm support for the adoption of a complete or predominantly market economy (Zhong, Chen, and Scheb 1998, 773). These economic reforms started in the rural countryside, where they received strong initial support from the peasantry who benefited from the rural reforms in the 1980s. However, since the late 1980s the economic situation in rural China has deteriorated and the income gap between urban residents and peasants has widened to the disadvantage of the peasants due to declining prices for agricultural products, the rising cost of farming, and excessive fee collection by local governments. Given the new peasants' circumstances, we were interested in what peasants thought about the market-driven reforms. We particularly wanted to tap into the opinions and attitudes of the rural residents toward economic and ownership systems, the speed of economic reforms, and widening income inequality.

The responses to our questions on preferences for economic systems and ownership structures showed an interesting pattern. With regard to economic systems, very few preferred a total central planning economy or CPE or a predominantly CPE genuinely mixed economy (see Table 6). Also not many people (only 9.8%) preferred a genuinely mixed economy. Compared to data from our Beijing surveys, these figures are much lower. Around 56% of our respondents preferred either mostly market economy or a total market economy. This figure is much higher than that in our Beijing surveys. A quarter of the people in our Jiangsu rural survey had hard time in deciding what system would be best for them. It seems that a market economy, which has been favored and promoted by the government since the early 1980s, is more acceptable and more supported by rural peasants in Jiangsu than among urban residents in Beijing. This is probably due to the fact that Beijing urban residents have been more affected negatively than Chinese peasants by the market-driven reforms which have led to layoffs of state-owned enterprises. Also, Chinese peasants are more economically independent and do not receive much in the way of state welfare and subsidies.

When it comes to forms of ownership of the means of production, most of the peasants in our survey still preferred predominantly public ownership, even though the figure is lower than that in our Beijing surveys. Close to 15% supported an evenly mixed ownership system, with very few favoring totally private ownership. The support for a predominantly public ownership system among our respondents can be contributed to two factors. The first is the official policy of maintaining a predominantly public ownership system in the economy even though private business (including foreign investment) has made tremendous strides and has been playing an increasingly important role in the Chinese economy in the past two decades. The second factor is the predominant position of collective township and village enterprises (TVEs) that existed in Jiangsu. In fact, southern Jiangsu is well known for its successful collective TVEs, which have been referred to as the “Sunan model” of rural economic development in China.

When asked about the speed of economic reforms, close to 40% of our respondents seemed satisfied with the current pace. However, around 20% thought the reforms have been moving fast (17.6%) or too fast (2.2%). Interestingly, about an equal number of the respondents believed the economic reforms have been moving either slow (14.7%) or too slow (5.6%). Again, these last two figures are higher than those in our Beijing surveys, suggesting peasants in our Jiangsu survey are more reform-minded than the urban residents in Beijing. Once again, around 20% of the respondents had difficulty in answering the question. These findings show that there is no consensus among our peasant respondents on the pace of economic reform, even though most people seemed content with the current pace of economic reforms.

Economic equality is a major socialist value and used to be touted as a proud achievement by the Chinese Communist Party. During the reform era, however, the income gap has widened significantly. In fact, the income gap in China is on par with some developed capitalist countries and worse than others. For example, the Gini coefficient for China in 2001 is 0.458, higher than those in Japan (0.219), South Korea (0.28) and the United States (0.457), and close to those in Hong Kong (0.487) and Singapore (0.481) (Lianhe Zhaobao May 11, 2000, 17; February 10, 2001, 1). The widening income gap often makes many of the less fortunate resentful of the market-driven economic reforms. When asked whether the income gap has become too wide, over 70% of our respondents either agreed or strongly agreed (see Table 7). Obviously, it is a concern for the rural population in our Jiangsu survey. However, when asked whether the government should set an income limit to reduce the widening income gap, more people (46.8%) disapproved of than supported (43.4%) such a move (see Table 7). It might very well be that one's economic standing determines one's position on that issue. Specifically, the less affluent peasants supported a limit on people's income while the well-to-do peasants opposed such a move. Nonetheless, it is sufficient to say that the notion of an income cap is not popular with a substantial number of the peasants in our survey and the socialist value of income equality is probably disappearing in the Chinese countryside.

Evaluation of Government Performance

How do peasants evaluate the performance of the Chinese government? Perceived government performance can be directly linked to regime legitimacy and political stability. Rural instability has become a major concern for the Chinese government in recent years. We believe that peasants' evaluations of government performance reflect their level of satisfaction and can be used as a predictor of stability in the Chinese countryside. The respondents in our survey were asked to rate the performance of government in a number of issue areas using a scale of 1 to 5 points (1-very poor, 2-poor, 3-fair, 4-good, and 5-very good).

The grades they gave are presented in Table 8. Satisfaction with Chinese government performance varies with different issue areas. On the one hand, a substantial number of the peasants in our survey were not happy with the government's efforts in providing job security or employment, minimizing the gap between the rich and the poor, providing adequate medical care, protecting the environment, and combating official corruption. In these issue areas, many people simply gave a passing grade (fair) and few rated government performance as good or very good. It seems that the least satisfied areas among our respondents were the widening income gap and official corruption. Over 50% of our respondents gave either poor or very poor grades to government efforts in minimizing the richpoor gap and over 40% gave similar grades to government performance in reducing official corruption. These two issues are often the sources of instability in China's rural areas. On the other hand, peasants in our survey were more content with the government's efforts in controlling inflation, maintaining social order, family planning, and strengthening national defense. These ratings are understandable. The Chinese government has done a relatively good job in controlling inflation since the late 1990s and the authoritarian nature of the communist regime in China makes it easier to implement policies in the areas of maintaining social stability, family planning, and national defense.

Overall, the evaluation of Chinese government performance is mixed, though there is a considerable level of discontent with government performance in many policy issue areas. It should be noted again that Jiangsu's rural areas are more economically developed than most other rural areas in China. It is safe to predict that the dissatisfaction level among the peasant population in less developed rural areas should be higher than that in Jiangsu.