Memoirs from officials in China's diplomatic corps are rare, and even more so when coming from someone of Ji Chaozhu's unique perspective. Ji had career-long proximity to the most important leaders and decision makers in Chinese foreign policy (including Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yi, Deng Xiaoping, Hua Guofeng, Jiang Zemin, Zhao Ziyang and Qiao Guanhua). No Chinese diplomat had closer proximity to the inner sanctum than Ji, and as such was also witness to many of the political machinations of the Mao and post-Mao eras. No other Chinese diplomat interacted with as many world leaders over a longer period of time as Ji, and thus took part in many of the most sensitive conversations and tough negotiations in PRC diplomatic history. As Ji notes in an uncharacteristically immodest observation in the memoir's preface: “I was eyewitness to an astonishing number of historic events, rubbing shoulders and sometimes becoming casual with a long list of world leaders, including six presidents of the United States.”
The reason for Ji's extraordinary proximity to history was relatively simple: his bilingualism and selection by Mao, Zhou, Hua, Deng, etc., as their primary English interpreter. Ji was not a policy maker, just an interpreter. Hence the apt title of Ji's memoir, “The Man on Mao's Right,” as he stood behind the Chairman and other leaders whispering translations into their ears (given the deafness of Mao and Deng one assumes these whispers were quite audible). After Mao's death, he transitioned from this role to being an official and emissary in his own right – serving in the Chinese embassy in Washington, as ambassador to United Kingdom (or the Court of St. James as he prefers to describe it), and capped his career as Under-Secretary General of the United Nations. Ji retired from active diplomatic service in 1996.
Given this unique proximity and perspective, China scholars (at least this one) have been waiting for Ji's memoir to appear for many years – a more abbreviated version, Ji Chaozhu: cong yang wawa daochang waiguan (Ji Chaozhu: From Puppet to Diplomat) appeared in 2000 from Peking University Press. Unfortunately, the volume is very disappointing in terms of offering new details and insights into the many events Ji witnessed over more than four decades of diplomatic service. To specialists in this field there are, unfortunately, no significant new data of note – concerning either foreign policy or domestic politics. This is not accidental, as Ji intentionally shied away from detailing key meetings in which he participated. His account does include some new contextual background on the Panmunjom armistice negotiations and the Sino-American rapprochement.
This is more a personal memoir than a political one. Ji does not settle old scores, although his distaste for Nancy Tang and dislike for Han Xu are barely concealed (both caused Ji many professional difficulties). His scorn for the Gang of Four and esteem for Zhou Enlai are both predictable. His treatment of Mao is generally quite respectful – Ji observes, “Unlike some biographers of Mao, I decline to pass judgment. Let the facts speak for themselves.”
But through the chronicling of Ji's own life, considerable detail emerges on how different political campaigns impacted someone of his background. Because he had spent much of his youth in New York City (where his family fled following the Japanese invasion), and attended Harvard, Ji was politically suspect during all of Mao's political campaigns. He was banished to do physical labour in the countryside on numerous occasions, enduring repeated separation from his beloved wife Xiangtong and children. He was the target of political persecution within the Foreign Ministry as well (thus the book offers some insights into machinations in the ministry during these years). While Ji interacted with the high and mighty in and out of China, he also suffered repeated indignities and lived a very modest private life.
Ji Chaozhu's memoir is indeed an engaging read and contributes some important historical insights, but given his unique perspective, China specialists would have hoped for, and expected, more.
