Bernadette Whelan has previously written extensively on various aspects of the relationship between Ireland and the United States. In her new book she focuses on a relatively short period of time, the years between 1932 and 1939, but it was an important and challenging period for both states with new and untested leaders facing difficult choices at home and abroad. Notwithstanding possible similarities between the two states, Whelan acknowledges that this is not a comparative study of the U.S. and Ireland or of Roosevelt and de Valera (p. 22). The book is concerned with the ‘process and operation of the diplomatic relationship’ between the two states and focuses on ‘how foreign policy was used to promote national aims’. This is not primarily a study of high politics; instead, it focuses on the routine detail of diplomatic life in Washington D.C. and Dublin as experienced by the individuals who represented their respective states between 1932 and 1939.

The book is divided into two parts. There is an introduction followed by three chapters on diplomatic culture and the process of appointing representatives to Dublin and D.C. There is a chapter on U.S. diplomats’ lives in Ireland and one on Irish diplomats in the U.S. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 address the work of the diplomats in the U.S. and Ireland, including the impact of migration, political developments in Ireland and the search for a trade agreement between the two states. Chapter 8, ‘Common Worlds, 1939’, addresses issues such as the British royal visit to the U.S., the threat that I.R.A. leader Seán Russell's presence posed to this and the abortive attempt by Ireland to obtain arms and supplies.

One of the strengths of Whelan's comprehensive study is that she demonstrates the significant differences between the foreign policy objectives of Ireland and the U.S. during this period. Whereas American interest in Ireland was cursory, Ireland's presence in D.C. was highly political. Whelan establishes that the main aim of Irish diplomacy in the U.S. was ‘to persuade the U.S. government, politicians and public to assist Ireland, both morally and materially, and to counteract alleged British dominance in U.S. official and political circles’ (p. 18). On this account these objectives were rarely achieved. However, this book is particularly good at showing how Irish diplomats in D.C. successfully created a distinctive Irish diplomatic identity separate from the British dominions by 1939. The Irish Free State was the first dominion to achieve formal diplomatic recognition from the United States. The author makes the case that Irish diplomats and their wives ‘assisted in establishing a national identity separate from that of Britain and the Commonwealth’, though it should be added that this was not always welcome to the British, the State Department or the president.

The U.S. upgraded its Dublin mission in 1927; an important advance for Ireland's international recognition. In contrast with the Irish legation in D.C., Dublin was a low key and comfortable posting for American diplomats. One minister wrote that:

There were less than 1,500 U.S. citizens in Ireland during the 1930s and most of the legation's activities were consular in nature. The author recognises that Ireland was rarely a consideration in American foreign policy. Nevertheless, diplomats had to be sensitive to Ireland's sovereign status, especially after de Valera came to power committed to radically revising the Treaty settlement and its Dominion membership. American diplomats were critical of de Valera's revisionism, fearing that his policy would undermine the ‘political unity’ of the dominions, an outcome opposed by the State Department (p. 216). Nor could de Valera expect sustained support from Irish America. He may have considered this group to be ‘exiles’ from Ireland, but their attachment was sentimental and low key politically. Whelan notes, ‘For most Irish Americans, American patriotism predominated over any wish to act on behalf of Irish issues’ (p. 50).

Whelan argues that Irish diplomacy can be described as ‘soft diplomacy’ due to the power disparities between the two states. This draws on the notion of ‘soft power’ as developed by Joseph Nye. It is a useful concept, though the author might have fleshed out further how this was utilised and the outcome for Ireland. The work of the Irish legation and consular service in the U.S. was not significantly different from that of their American counterparts in Dublin. The main workload involved dealing with visa applications, pensions, inheritance, deportations and repatriations. It was at the political level that differences arise. Whelan suggests that Irish objectives were vague and hints that their efforts were ineffectual. In part this was due to Robert Brennan's (legation secretary, 1934–8; minister, 1938–47) ‘ineptness as a diplomat’ and his ingrained hostility to the State Department, which he considered to be pro-British. This ideological stance was ill-suited for a country with very little to offer the U.S. The diplomats were out of their depth during trade negotiations, failing to counter successfully the American criticism that vast sums of money were transferred between the U.S. and Ireland as a consequence of the illegal sweepstake. The U.S. was unwilling to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with Ireland but agreed one with Britain.

Whelan poses an interesting counterfactual, asking if matters would have been different if John Cudahy (U.S. minister to Ireland, 1937–40) had remained in the post. David Gray, who replaced Cudahy, is widely blamed for the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Ireland. While individuals do make a difference, the key individual in the relationship between Ireland and the U.S. was President Roosevelt. During most of the 1930s Roosevelt was indifferent to Ireland and U.S. diplomacy reflected this. From 1940, Roosevelt was committed to the defeat of Hitler even before the U.S. entered the war. Neither the State Department nor Roosevelt disagreed with Gray because his position largely reflected that of the president.