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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2005
This is a clear, readable, and thoughtful account of recent Afghan history that will be of interest to the expert and general reader alike. It covers the period from 1880, when the “Iron Amir” Abdur Rahman Khan came to the throne, to 2001, with two chapters added to take account of developments after 11 September.
The early historical background is well presented; here Rasanayagam has had the benefit of material collected by the late Louis Dupree, whose encyclopedic book Afghanistan remains an essential reference work, and of the Tarzi family's knowledge of events under the monarchy. For the later chapters, he has drawn on his own experience as director of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees office in Peshawar in the 1990s and contacts established with Afghans, Pakistanis, and U.N. personalities. Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan has contributed a foreword.
While the book follows a generally chronological sequence, in the second chapter there is a discussion of the Afghan monarchy from the time of Abdur Rahman to the coup that unseated Zahir Shah in 1973. Here the basic political forces in Afghanistan—the state and the tribal and ethnic groups—are introduced, and reference is made to the new urban, educated, and increasingly Westernized social group that had its heyday in the 1960s. Like those in Paris and elsewhere in the West, students at Kabul University were indulging in “free-wheeling debates and attacks on the status quo” (p. 26). One thing lacking is an attempt to evaluate the character of Zahir Shah, who is merely stated as having reigned while his uncles ruled. When this reviewer was in Kabul in the late 1960s, Zahir Shah was widely considered more comfortable in the role of gentleman farmer than that of monarch. When he paid a state visit to London in 1971, the queen remarked on his charm. Perhaps he was too gentle a character ultimately to hold the kingdom together. But it should not be forgotten that his reign lasted forty years.
Describing the democratic experiment that took place in the last decade of Zahir Shah's rule, Rasanayagam asserts that, although many of the delegates to the Loya Jirga that debated the 1964 constitution were illiterate, they had great verbal facility, and this led to a more animated discussion than might have been expected. The constitution that they approved provided a starting point for the constitution adopted in January 2004, which was debated at considerably greater length—and with greater heat—by a more literate membership. But there was more to argue over in a postconflict situation.
In both cases, the place of Islam was of particular importance, and throughout the book the author is at pains to describe its various facets and their relevance to the political scene. Thus, Pakistan's links to the Taliban are examined in detail, and the point is made that the ulama and village mullahs of Afghanistan, marginalized during the period of state building, were sympathetic to the Taliban's philosophy, even if the impetus for the movement came from madrasas in the Pushtun belt of the North-West Frontier Province. In one of his rare expressions of strong feeling, Rasanayagam criticizes Pakistan's Westernized elite for corruption and their failure to provide social justice, which created fertile ground for the growth of radical Islamic tendencies. In places, his discussion of Islam ranges too widely for comfort, as in a description of Islam in Iran. (Here he seems to be relying on an article by Bernard Lewis.) Thus, Ayatollah Montazeri was not opposed in principle to Khomeini's idea of vilayat-i faqih, nor does the Guardian Council control the judiciary, army, and security apparatus. In the penultimate chapter, which has the title “Holy War, Unholy Terror,” a description of early Islam and its relevance to al-Qa

ida's terrorism is useful but breaks no new ground and may be considered unnecessarily long.
Chapters on the Soviet occupation and withdrawal, the fragmentation of Afghanistan after the withdrawal, and the rise of the Taliban contain a wealth of material concerning the communist movement, the mujahideen, Afghan refugees, and the role of the United Nations, as well as that of the United States and the Soviet Union. Rasanayagam is critical of the United Nations' reluctance to condemn outright states that continued to interfere in Afghanistan after the Geneva Accords. He provides considerable detail of the United Nations' later difficulties with the Taliban, described by Lakhdar Brahimi as “an organization that hands out edicts that prevent us doing our job” (pp. 198–99).
Although the story ends in 2002, the book sets the scene for an understanding of more recent developments. Early on, it indicates that the development of civil institutions in countries such as Afghanistan will require a long haul. It ends by warning that, after years of war and anarchy, the old tribal mindset based on patronage is still there. A major task in post–Taliban Afghanistan will be to see that the tribes and ethnic groups “become the partners, and not the rivals, of a national government” (p. 266). The problems encountered in arranging the presidential election in October 2004 and preparing for parliamentary elections in 2005 illustrate how difficult that task could be.
It is a pity that this informative book has an index that is inadequate and in places inaccurate. But the book can be highly recommended.