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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2004
Iranian History and Politics is a collection of previously published essays written by Homa Katouzian over the span of twenty years. While the book's chapters can be read independently, they are inter-related in that they are all governed by a grand theory that attempts to explain the logic and dynamics of Iranian history from antiquity to the present. The book is divided into two parts: the first sets out to elaborate the theory, while the second provides “historical applications” (p. xii) of it. The first part is a study in sociology, while the second part is a study in history.
Katouzian's point of departure is that historical writing is invariably predicated on theory, noting, “One observes because one has questions, problems, hypotheses, all of which are a priori, prior to observation, theoretical” (p. 3). Katouzian therefore is not a naïve positivist working under the assumption that the historian can actually detach himself or herself from the subject of inquiry to produce an “objective,” neutral, and transparent account of the past.
Katouzian consciously engages with Iranian history by means of what he calls “the theory of arbitrary rule.” This, in a nutshell, is a variation of Marxist notions of the Asiatic Mode of Production and of “Oriental Despotism.” While the European states, from classical times to the present, “have been bound by law” and thus made possible the security of life and of property necessary for the emergence of functional social classes, at the very same time in Iran “there was no law, no long term code or tradition that governed the relationship between the state and society, or within society itself” (pp. 22–23). Consequently, no distinct social classes existed to counterbalance the arbitrary power of the state (or, incidentally, to generate any of the changes that have ultimately come to represent the regime of Western modernity). Though Katouzian dismisses the applicability in Iran of Wittfogeli's “hydraulic” theory of bureaucratic despotism, he nevertheless seems to follow Marx's analysis of pre-colonial India in stressing a theory of fragmented society, meaning that historically the Iranian state has been able to rule despotically—and, hence, arbitrarily—not because this state was strong but because society was weak (pp. 61–76).
In applying the theory of arbitrary rule, Katouzian attempts to offer an overarching explanation for why “Iranian revolutions have not been quite like any of the European revolutions, old or modern” (p. 21). The emergence of social classes in the law-bound European states meant that revolts and revolutions in Europe would always be waged by some social classes against other (usually, ruling) classes. “Whether the Spartacist, Medieval and Reformation peasants revolts, the English revolutions of the seventeenth century, the French revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the Russian revolutions of the twentieth century. European revolutions have this entire feature in common” (p. 22). In Iran, however, where “lawlessness” and arbitrary rule had always reigned supreme, there were no functional and autonomous social classes to take up the cause of revolt against other, more privileged social classes. The arbitrary state and the society were completely disconnected and antithetical to each other. Consequently, the whole of society (indistinguishable by any particular social classes, and often including state officials) would rise up to overthrow the arbitrary state. “With all the differences among them,” writes Katouzian, “there has been [this] familiar pattern in revolts of society against the state since ancient Persia” (p. 31); even the most recent 1979 Revolution, he argues, “was a massive revolt, true to the ancient pattern, of the society against the state” (p. 51).
Katouzian goes on to contend that the dynamics of arbitrary rule and the peculiar nature of upheavals in Iran have given rise to an endemic and vicious cycle in Iranian history—the “recurring cycle of arbitrary rule-chaos-arbitrary rule” (pp. 25 ff). The frequent collapse of the arbitrary state by the whole of society, he says, would invariably lead “to chaos brought about by the arbitrary society, until a new absolute and arbitrary ruler emerged from the ashes of civil conflict and destruction” (p. 105), and so on. The history of 20th-century Iran is faithful testimony to this process, Katouzian argues. In the aftennath of the Constitutional Revolution, “the ancient traditions of chaos resulting from the fall of the state were as strong as ever,” and the ensuing “foundation of the Pahlavi state was in line with the emergence of a strong state after the chaos which had followed Iranian upheavals throughout the country's history” (pp. 53–54). The 1979 revolution, too, was true to the tradition of massive revolts against arbitrary rule and moreover, like them, it “was followed by conflict and chaos” (p. 30); “once again there was a democracy which looked more like anarchy, and a public sphere which was closer to abuse and violence” (p. 110).
There is rigor in Katouzian's theory of Iranian history, but it has self-evident shortcomings, as well. Katouzian's arguments are more persuasive when he transcends the boundaries of the grand theory, as often is the case in the historical section of the book. Two essays in particular merit consideration. Chapter 9 is an impressive historical reconstruction, a tour de force, of the campaign against the notorious Anglo-Iranian Agreement of 1919. Careful research into British archival documents coupled with a close reading of contemporary Persian sources have enabled the author meticulously to trace the failure of the agreement to a number of important causes, such as the upsurge of Iranian nationalism; the adamant opposition to the agreement by France, the United States, and Russia; and Lord Curzon's own “incredible rigidity” in dealing with the unfolding situation.
Chapter 10 is Katouzian's highly revisionist study of the 1920 revolt of Shaykh Mohammad Khiyabani in Azerbaijan. The conventional narrative has it that Khiyabani and his supporters were pro–Bolshevik and in reaction to the 1919 agreement, revolted against the central government with the aim of securing the succession of Azerbaijan. However, Katouzian's lucid analysis of previously unread sources—such as an unpublished manuscript on the revolt by Ahmad Kasravi—clearly shows that the revolt had not been intended mainly as a reaction to the 1919 agreement, was not pro–Bolshevik, and was not separatist in its goals. “Its primary aim,” Katouzian convincingly demonstrates, “was to obtain a form of home rule, led by Khiyabani himself, to impose order and discipline in Azerbaijan, and bring about modernization along European lines” (p. 203).
In sum, while Katouzian sets out to elaborate an overarching theoretical explanation for Iranian history and Iranian revolutions from ancient to contemporary times, he is actually at his best working in the archives, focusing on the micro-level, writing meticulously researched histories of particular moments in time that ultimately shed light on the underlying dynamics of modern Iranian history at large.