Introduction
In 1963, then President Makarios III of Cyprus announced that a 13-article amendment would be made to the constitution.1 Thereafter, conflict between the two societies on the island started. The Turkish side resigned from the government, and constitutional order was extinguished de facto. The Turkish populace claimed that the Greeks did not represent them anymore and declared autonomy. Mediation attempts between the two societies during 1963–1974 remained without result. The conflicts between the societies continued. In 1967, a military coup took place in Greece and the conflicts in Cyprus escalated. When the Cyprus Policy of the Regime of Colonels (who came into power with the coup in Greece) turned out to be absolute enosis by violence, Makarios was toppled on 15 July 1974 and Nikos Sampson was declared President in his place. Based on these developments, Turkey, in its capacity as guarantor country and pursuant to the right granted it by Article 3 of the Treaty of Guarantee,2 intervened militarily on 20 July against the coup3 of 15 July, which had upset the status quo. When the Geneva Negotiations, held to re-establish peace, proved fruitless, Turkey conducted the second military operation on 14 August and captured 36% of Cyprus. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 360,4 requiring the end of the military actions in Cyprus and the immediate retreat of foreign forces.
We could define 1963 as the start of the Cyprus Conflict, which since then has acquired a secure place in the literature of international politics. Today, 52 years later, a resolution of the conflict has yet to be found. As a matter of fact, for long years the difficulty of power-sharing that could occur in a federative system lay at the centre of the negotiations that were made under UN supervision between the two sides in Cyprus. The UN formula (a two-region and two-society federal system based on political equality) that makes up the substance of the resolution, is a parameter that has been in effect ever since the 1977 Framework and 1979 Ten Points Agreements. The UN’s resolutions based on these two agreements have stated that the solution to be reached will be a federation of two societies constitutionally and two regions territorially.
Javier Perez de Cuéllar was a vital participant in the Framework Agreement negotiations in 1975 as a special Cyprus representative of the UN Secretary General. He was actively involved in the Cyprus Conflict until he became the UN Secretary General in 1982. Cuéllar presented the framework document for the resolution to both sides in Cyprus in 1983 under the name of ‘manifestations’ and consequently he declared his Proposals in writing in 1989 using his own initiatives.Reference Kızılyürek5 Cuéllar’s Proposals were based on the balance between the two sides proposed in all UN documents until then. Also in his initiatives, Cyprus’s sovereignty was confirmed as a two-society, two-region federation, and all the separatist factors were bypassed. In the resolution writ, the outline of Cuéllar’s Proposals consisted of adhering to fundamental liberties in the framework of definite rules concerning the return of land to Greek Cypriots, travel and settlement rights. The structure of the federal republic and a single international personality were clearly indicated in the document, and numerous of its articles expressed in no uncertain terms the structure of the new state’s administration, and the powers of the President and Vice President.Reference Perikleus6 The attributes of the international personality were to be utilized by the federal government in accordance with the federal constitution. The federated states were to operate in areas under their jurisdiction so as not to avert the functions and authority of the federal government as stipulated in the Constitution.Reference Tamçelik7 In Cuéllar’s Proposals too, the federal constitution was based on the principle of two societies. He tied demilitarization – agreed to in the previous accord – to a timetable to be concluded prior to the declaration of the federal republic. On the other hand, he also stipulated that the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee would be updated.Reference Perikleus8 As a result, his Proposals came to naught.
The ‘Set of Ideas’ of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who succeeded Cuéllar as UN Secretary General, is a continuation of Cuéllar’s Proposals9 and includes a map explicitly defining, for the first time in the history of UN recommendations, the borders of two federal states.Reference Richter10 A federal structure made of two federated states was taken as the basis for solution; the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and Alliance was preserved as it had been envisaged in 1959; and it was further indicated that Federal Cyprus would grant ‘most favoured nation’ status to Turkey and Greece in all matters.Reference Perikleus11 The framework agreement would be finalized in a four-part conference to be held after the approval of the two sides, and within 30 days it would be presented for referendum separately in both communities. Boutros-Ghali’s Set of Ideas, which is one of the most extensive studies prepared for Cyprus prior to the Fifth Annan Plan, favours a balance between the two sides. This UN initiative not only set forth the concepts of two communities, two regions, equal participation and a founding partnership, but also clearly revealed the traces of a federation. The Secretary General’s plan took into account the legitimate concerns and interests expressed continuously by both sides. However his Set of Ideas, much like the Proposals of his predecessor, Cuéllar, were not accepted by either party, and nothing came of them.
It would not be wrong to say of the Fifth Annan Plan – the final version of the plan presented for referendum and formed as a result of mediation efforts begun in 1997 by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan (1997–006) – that it was a comprehensive result of all relevant UN Initiatives from 1974 until today. The Plan, in essence, includes as its basis the Framework and Ten Points Agreements, Cuéllar’s Proposals and Boutros-Ghali’s Set of Ideas. However, the Plan differs from all preceding UN Initiatives on one vital issue. Each of the previous UN plans was only a draft or framework of principles in the foundation of a comprehensive final document to be developed in the future; none offered any guarantee of accord. The fifth version of the Annan Plan presented for referendum, on the other hand, is an extensive plan which is ready for operation, starting from the first day and includes a federal republic and founding states. The plan, entitled ‘The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem’, comprised 182 main pages, an appendix of 131 completed codes, and an additional 9000-odd pages of ‘cooperation agreements’ and 1134 ‘treaties and instruments’.12 The citizens of the Republic of Cyprus and of the TRNC, on 24 April 2004, in answering the question, ‘Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the laws to be in force, to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins the European Union united?’13 sealed the fate both of the Fifth Annan Plan and of the island. According to the referendum results, approximately 76% of Greek Cypriots voted no and 24% voted yes, while approximately 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted yes and 35% voted no. Because the Greek Cypriots disapproved the Foundation Agreement, the Fifth Annan Plan was null and void, and there were no legal results to the referendum.
Negotiations Following the Annan Plan
Following the referendum, further negotiations, as might be expected, were interrupted for a long time. Meanwhile, Dimitris Christofias, who was elected President of the Republic of Cyprus after Tassos Papadopoulos, belonged to a school of thought supporting a solution on the basis of a bicommunal federation. Negotiations begun in 2008 quickly gained momentum but failed to show results, thanks in no small part to TRNC President Mehmet Ali Talat, who had socialist leanings. The negotiations of Talat’s successor, nationalist Derviş Eroğlu, likewise yielded no results with either Christofias or Anastasiades, who was elected to the Presidency after him. With the support of the left (Socialist Democracy Party, United Cyprus Party and Republican Turkish Party – United Powers) 68-year-old Akıncı received nearly 60% of the votes in the April 2015 election, defeating his rival Eroğlu and becoming the fourth President of the TRNC. Akıncı’s negotiations with Anastasiades for a solution of the Cyprus dispute are ongoing under the supervision of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s special advisor on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide.
No Solution is Imminent
Akıncı, whom – of all the world – only Turkey recognizes, is no stranger to the Cyprus issue. Akıncı is one of the individuals who founded the Peace and Democracy Movement during the Annan Plan era and who played a vital role in securing the ‘yes’ vote of Turkish Cypriots during the referendums held for the Plan. In this context, it can be taken for granted that the new President will play a more active role in the resolution of the Cyprus Question and will form tighter relationships with the Cypriot side in the negotiations that were interrupted by the exclusive economic regional crisis and restarted at the end of May. However, it is not hard to predict that Akıncı, who addresses crowds with the slogan, ‘We Will Make the Change’, who declares that he wants to enter a new era in Turko-Cypriot affairs and that a ‘Sister-Country’ relationship with Turkey would be more beneficial for TRNC than a ‘Daughter-Country’ one, and who has started a small polemic14 against Turkey with these words, has a hard row to hoe if he wants to fulfil his wishes. One of the most important catalysts of the 2004 rejection of the Fifth Annan Plan – if not the most important one – was the failure of Greek Cyprus’s unilateral membership in the EU to bring peace to the Island. Quite the contrary: following the EU’s acceptance of South Cyprus, the gap between the sides has increased even more. In general, the most important topics of the Cyprus Negotiations currently under the mediation of the UN are governance and power-sharing; land exchange, ownership and indemnities; the guarantor system; and demilitarization.
Governance and Power-Sharing
The federal resolution proposed for the Cyprus problem introduces the concept of political equality. However, it cannot be disregarded that just as a unitary state is not acceptable for Turkish Cypriots, for Greek Cypriots the two-state solution is equally unacceptable. Greek Cypriots prefer a unitary state and will give a green light to a resolution that is, in essence, a continuance of the Republic of Cyprus, while Turkish Cypriots desire a two-state resolution that will bring the TRNC international recognition. If the resolution is to be a federal state, the Greek Cypriots would prefer a more centralized federal state where there are hierarchical laws. Owing to their superior numbers, the Greeks wish to constitute the majority in decision making. At this point, it can be foreseen that there will not be a resolution without the full participation of the Turkish Cypriots, and even if there is a resolution based on pluralism, it will not last. Moreover, a certain class of Turkish Cypriots does not wish to face the reality of losing the Republic that they have, and having to hand over the status quo. In addition, a clear majority of Greek Cypriots have no desire to share the additional legitimacy they secured with EU membership. It is obvious that, for two societies who have between them a deep separation and little mutual trust in questions of power-sharing, there is no other alternative than the rules and constitutional legislation that govern such issues.Reference Lijphart15 Without trust, this type of power sharing arrangement may even lead governments to deadlock. It must be remembered that one of the most important factors making negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots a zero-sum game is the lack of trust. Thanks both to the prejudice with which each side views the other and to the policies implemented for years, not allowing an affiliation between the communities has increased the chasm between them, and this has always served the purpose of those politicians who want the status quo to continue. Spreading this ethnic discrimination to the opinions of the societies has made it easier for parties who advocate rejection of the UN resolution proposals to agitate.
The attitude towards the principle of power-sharing between the sides can also be related to mistrust about the execution of power. Likewise, the regulations of a possible federal resolution, redolent of the Swiss model in particular, would bring about many changes in comparison to the presidential system of the Republic of 1960, all of them relatively foreign concepts for the communities of the island. Moreover, the suspicious attitude toward the co-presidential system of the EU’s proposed resolution is an important sign of unwillingness on the basis of power sharing. Greek Cypriots’ opposition to models that give unlimited authority to a single person at the federal level was revealed by Interpeace’s public opinion polls in 2009. In addition, seeing as a threat the possibility of a Turkish Cypriot having an administrative authority on the island, even for a limited time, as a result of the possible co-presidential authority, is an indication of how difficult it is for Greek Cypriots to form a partnership with Turks.16 After all, the UN resolution proposals stipulate open, balanced and net power and authority share between the two societies. Perhaps the most important points that have continuously obstructed the negotiations since the 1974 intervention are the power and authority matters. As has been indicated above, while the Greek side has adapted a strong central administration, the Turkish side has preferred a loose federation. The Greek Cypriot state, assumed to be an integral part of a functional structure after 1974, has been accepted by everyone. Over time, the fact that this state benefited more from its dominating force than did the other, coupled with the desire of the side possessing that power to keep the state alive and strengthen the Republic of Cyprus, have impeded the wish to make peace on the island and unite its two halves. The Republic of Cyprus is accepted in the international system as the only legitimate state on the Island. Greek Cypriots, acting on this reality and exploiting its resulting convenience in every situation, have no inclination to share the legitimate power they have. As a result, their actual wish is to enable continuation of the republic by some constitutional amendments. This means making the existing administration legitimate by constitutional means and preserving the unitary state structure by granting authorities downward. It seems Anastasiades will have great difficulty imposing on his citizens a replacement of the administration system that his country currently has with the federative system anticipated as the basis of the negotiations.
Actually, there are numerous scenarios on the table concerning executive power. However, any executive power model chosen must satisfy the demand of Turkish Cypriots for political equality and at the same time show, as the Greek Cypriots want it, that political equality is not numerical equality. There are two models that can satisfy these two positions. One of these is the classic liberal model having a mixed presidential and parliamentary system, based on the agreement of the ideological and political opinions of the political parties in the government formation; the other is the Northern Ireland type, a preferential parliamentary system securing the participation of all political parties in the island but requiring consensus for execution.
Let us examine these systems more closely. In the mixed model, a symbolic President and Vice President alternately fulfil the role of President. They represent the political equality of the two constituent states and assure the harmonious execution of the constitution. The parliamentary system secures the active participation of the Turkish Cypriots and emphasizes the numerical ratio of the two societies. If the classic parliamentary system is to be implemented in Cyprus, advance collaboration between Cyprus’s Turkish and Greek political parties will be necessary.
In the Northern Ireland model, on the other hand, all parties and sides are represented in the government according to the number of votes they receive. When the model is adapted to Cyprus, whichever party is first amongst the Greek Cypriots in the parliamentary arithmetic of that day will fill the Presidency, and the first party amongst the Turkish Cypriots will fill the Ministry of the Interior. The second party of Greeks in the parliamentary ranking will take the Ministry of Justice, and the second party of the Turkish side will take the Ministry of Education, and so on. This will grant all parties participation in the government despite their ideological differences provided they reach an agreement in the Cabinet. Any party that wishes to stay in opposition will waive its right to a ministry. As a result, the deliberators will decide which administration system can be applied in the newly established republic.
Property Issues
Some of the most important issues of the Cyprus Question are identification of the regions that will make up the federation, land return under the administration of the Greek Cypriots, and return of estate property by people who relocated after the intervention of 1974 to the region administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In tandem with these problems, freedom of travel and settlement, and ownership rights are some of the most vital aspects of the negotiations, especially for the Turkish side. Negotiations for the return of people forced to leave their homes after 1974 and for details related to the return of their properties to them, and protective measures taken to preserve the population structures of the founder states (especially of the Turkish founder state) actually mean for Greek Cypriots a type of deprivation of individual rights. Generally, stipulated limitation of ownership rights creates anxiety, especially on the Greek side.
Land and property restitution issues in the Cyprus problem are undeniably complex. Ownership is closely linked to land and is one of the most significant topics for arriving at a solution because it is subject to the philosophy of direct resolution. If two-region and political equality are achieved between the two societies, each citizen will have the right to demand equality regarding personal life and ownership. The implementation conditions making up the largest section of the Fifth Annan Plan contain a detailed legal text intended to avoid incorrect interpretation.Reference Perikleus17 The main reason for this is the extremely complex structure of the matter. The problem of displaced persons and of the return of their properties has been one of the most important reasons for not resolving the Cyprus issue; its resolution requires that the peace desired in Cyprus be both stable and legally sound. Kofi Annan, in his April 2003 report to the UN Security Council citing decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), after indicating that the Court had the right to award compensation to the Greeks for their properties in the north, stated that the events in Cyprus occurred nearly 40 years ago and that the displaced persons had reconstructed their lives and economies during this period, then said that his plan was closer to a restrictive approach on the land matter.18 The Fifth Annan Plan’s extremely detailed provisions about land indemnity and settlement rights found resolutions within itself for the Acquis Communautaire restrictions (derogation) and also facilitated the implementation with its seriousness during the inspection.Reference Perikleus19 What is important here is that the displaced persons (about one third of the Greek Cypriots and half of the Turkish Cypriots) have rebuilt their lives and economies in the 40-year period since the events in Cyprus. People’s habits are very important to them. Ultimately, Greek Cypriots were leading much more prosperous lives in comparison to Turkish Cypriots during the 2000s. People who had to migrate to the Greek side of the island following its division into two have built new lives for themselves in the next 30 years. The return of properties stipulated in the negotiations, and the possibility of thousands of Greeks migrating back to their former lands and building new lives there, have created a frightening situation. These people think that if a possible plan is accepted, they won’t be able to adapt to a new and unknown situation. The new generation following the division was born in cities and is comparatively accustomed to city life. When this generation is suddenly told that they need to return to their parents’ villages, they may meet this news with astonishment, suspicion, even fear. Thus, applications of Greeks to the Real Estate Property Commission – founded in the TRNC for the dual purpose of forming an effective internal legal way to meet the Greeks’ demands regarding their properties situated in Northern Cyprus and of contributing to finding a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus issue – are on the increase these days. The Commission was established in 2006. Only 100 people filed applications that year. In the next seven years, a total of 4759 people applied.20 The Commission has concluded 471 of the cases, among which 119 were withdrawn; by 2013, indemnities amounting to £105,268,533 had been paid.21
In addition, another point that needs to be considered here is that land on the island is limited. Therefore, one of the most complex matters in all UN negotiations has been the land return. Both sides are aware of the fact that if they have sufficient land, they can invest in agriculture and tourism (both of which are vital to the island). In the future, whoever improves more in these two areas will reach a more prosperous level and become more powerful.
From this it can be seen that the best way to achieve results in negotiations regarding the land and property problem is to find an equitable balance between the individual rights of the Greek Cypriots who migrated from their homes following the 1974 intervention and the collective rights of the Turkish Cypriots in security provisions.Reference Kürkçügil22
The Guarantor System and Demilitarization
There are great differences in opinion between the two sides on the guarantor issue. Greek Cypriots want the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee to be completely rescinded. If this is not possible, they demand a fundamental revision in which states other than Turkey and Greece play the roles of guarantors. This reservation of Greek Cypriots is related to the ability of Turkey and the TRNC to ignore liabilities and undertakings resulting from the terms of the new agreement to be forged, and their capacity to retreat on the vitally important matters of land return and demilitarization. Without a doubt, Turkey and Greece’s history both before and after the First World War, especially the sorrowful conflicts caused by Turkish Cypriots’ withdrawal from the government in December 1963, followed by the trauma of the 1974 intervention, have created deep reservations for Greek Cypriots. When Turkey’s military power, population size and geographic advantage are added to this, it is easy to see why the instinct to preserve their ethnic and cultural presence has grown in Greek Cypriots.
Greek Cypriots have an understanding of not accepting foreign guarantees. For them, Turkey is still a threat and contains danger. A significant factor increasing this discontent is the presence of two separate states in Cyprus and the perception that the TRNC is an extension of Turkey. As long as this state exists or its presence is recognized legally by any resolution agreement, the thought that the Turkish military presence will continue on the island creates a psychological uneasiness. These opinions are understandable; likewise, the effects experienced by the Greek Cypriots of the great defeat of war in 1974 can still be felt today. So the excessive number of soldiers on the island has always been a problem for Greek Cypriots and makes them feel insecure.
The guarantor system of the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece is regarded by Greek Cypriots as the interference of third parties in their sovereignty. It is for this reason that any guarantee agreement for peace that gives Turkey the right to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus is a political situation unacceptable to Greek Cypriots. For them, involving Cyprus in such a risky situation again after the 1974 intervention is extremely unfavourable. They would prefer intervention by the EU if a problem following the merger stems from an administration dilemma, or by the UN if it is a problem with implementation.Reference Kaymak, Lordos and Tocci23
It is also obvious that Turkey will not renounce its rights – which it sees as indispensable – as envisaged in the Fifth Annan Plan as concerns the continuation of the guarantor system. According to recent news coming from the island, Turkish and Greek Cypriot negotiators have already put the guarantee issue on the agenda.24 On 26 May, the parties without which such a meeting would be exceedingly difficult – Turkey included – were continuing to examine mutual theses under the headings Land, Ownership and Guarantees. Greek Negotiator Andreas Mavroyannis explained that a new guarantee system is being sought to answer the anxieties of both sides, and that Europe will be the main pillar of this system. Mavroyannis stated that the Greek Cypriot side is of the idea that the guarantee system is bankrupt and needs to be liquidated; he opined that the two sides must decide together about security guarantees that will cover all Cypriots and improve the sense of security of both communities. He emphasized the importance of the participation of Cyprus in the UN and in its security and defence policies and said that ‘Demilitarization is one of the “sacred cows” of the Cyprus problem, and this is something that pulls it to revision. Cyprus can and must participate fully in European safety and defence, and as a full member it can have all the advantages of this participation.’25 The then upcoming visit of European Commission Chairman Jean Claude Juncker to the island in the second half of July was expected to embody the degree of Europe’s participation in the procedure.
In a live television broadcast nearly coincidental with Mavroyannis’s above statement, Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan said in no uncertain terms that Turkey would continue in its role as a guarantor country. ‘We’ve always said so,’ Erdoğan continued. ‘If a favourable result comes of these meetings, Cyprus will no longer be a problem. And this, of course, must happen via a structure based on two constituent states: both Northern Cyprus and Southern Cyprus. However, I have to state openly and clearly that we can never renounce our rights as a guarantor country.’ To the program moderators’ remark that ‘There seems to be a tendency to push the guarantor states off to the side, as if the EU were a guarantor,’ Erdoğan responded with: ‘That’s not a fair approach. It’s absolutely impossible to accept because the EU have not once fulfilled their own duties. How are we supposed to trust their justice? Besides, the EU have no such right. Three countries have guarantor country rights: England [sic], Greece and Turkey. The EU do not have such a right. Although Southern Cyprus said no to the Annan Plan, the EU accepted her. We won’t forget these realities. So we’re in a situation here where we need to make everything safe so they don’t destroy our brothers, our kinsmen in Northern Cyprus.’26 With these words, he clearly put forward Turkey’s position on the subject of guarantorship for the renewed negotiations.27
What really is known is that a state which is an EU member does not need guarantees; however, from a realpolitik viewpoint the demand of Turkey to remain as a guarantor should be replaced. Of course, the difficulty level for Turkey to have this wish granted (Greece does not want to stay as a guarantor and the UK seems unwilling) has increased in comparison to the Zurich–London Agreements.
Conclusion
For both sides the idea of reunification raises concerns about their social structures and identities. The people of the island think of themselves as Greek or Turkish before they think of themselves as Cypriots. A strong civil identity is necessary for the new system to be sustainable as envisaged by the UN initiatives. In other words, it is not clear whether it will create a new Cypriot identity. Many Cypriots are in identity crises because the problem has remained unresolved since 1974. Since it has not yet been explained by politicians what kind of a country they will be citizens of in a possible peace situation, Greeks and Turks fear losing their identities following a merger. Politics and the media also play a big role, of course, in the inability to create a single Cypriot people from the two different communities, just as the inability to shake off the traumas of the past is associated with the different histories being taught on either side. The two societies living separately for such a long period has strengthened the nationalists and extremists. Today’s younger generations, born after the division of 1974, far from coming together are not even aware of each other. The two sides have separate states, separate lives, separate armies. When the different levels of prosperity between the two sides are added to these factors, it is extremely difficult to build one state from these two communities. This is one of the most crucial obstacles to the agreement that Akıncı and Anastasiades are planning.
The presence of a superordinate identity can only occur with the emergence of a political and common structuring. There is currently a de facto division on the island. In the history of the Republic of Cyprus, founded as a result of the Zurich and London Agreements, a partnership can only be spoken of as having existed between 1960 and 1963. There were, of course, two identities in the Republic of Cyprus: those of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as connected to citizenship in the Republic. Since this situation ceased to exist with the withdrawal of Turkish Cyprus from the administration following the events of 1963, it is no longer possible to discuss an over-arching identity there. It is very difficult to express this identity without first formulating the principles upon which it was based. It would be extremely artificial to imagine a common identity of people among whom a debate has been ongoing for 40 years. There is no background or foundation for such an over-arching identity. Such identity has not even been clearly formed in Belgium, the centre of the EU. Despite the presence of a King and of more reasonable population balances than exist in Cyprus, the problems experienced by Belgium are obvious. The huge difference in the population balance in Cyprus constitutes one of the greatest hindrances in the terms of the agreement. The side with the larger population sees itself as having a greater say, while the side with the smaller population feels an equal need for political neutrality in order to protect themselves. This vicious circle creates an environment of continuous conflict.
Another important point to be dealt with by the new President Akıncı is how to get the Greeks to accept the TRNC as the main respondent of the problem; at present they view Turkey as such and disregard the TRNC. In recent history, although Greek Cypriots attempted to balance the power on the Island with elements of global power, they were not able to achieve the result they wanted. As a result of failing to merge with Greece (enosis), Greek Cypriots saw EU membership as a new opportunity and wanted to tip the power balance in their favour with a new strategic partnership against Turkey. Thanks to the decision-maker statesman role of Papadopoulos, Greek Cypriots during the negotiation and referendum era of the Fifth Annan Plan saw the rejection of a plan formed by the arbitration of the UN as being in their interest. Since the UN remains incapable in implementing sanctions in today’s international system, ensuring profits and balancing power between states are achieved by international organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and supra-nationalistic constructs such as the EU. With no solution in sight, the Republic of Cyprus continued the next era of negotiations with a desire to turn her strategic weaknesses to her advantage by joining the EU and using her newly acquired membership against Turkey. It is an issue of concern how Anastasiades – who, together with former Republic of Cyprus President Glafcos Clerides (1993–2003), accepted the Fifth Annan Plan – will use his own inner dynamics and whether he will see the TRNC as a respondent rather than Turkey. Whether Northern Cyprus, whose economy is completely dependent on Turkey and large sections of whose civil compensations are paid indirectly by Turkey, can find a solution on its own is highly doubtful.
The Greek Cypriot government’s policy in the international arena of containing Turkey continues with the Republic of Cyprus’s recent rapprochement with Egypt and Israel, the invitation Anastasiades received to visit Armenia’s capital Yerevan with the Presidents of three other countries (Russia, France and Serbia), the joint military exercises planned to be conducted in the Eastern Mediterranean with Israel and Greece, and the summit held in Nicosia at the end of April 2015 with Republic of Cyprus, Egypt and Greece. On 29 April, Anastasiades hosted Egyptian President Abdel Fatttah el-Sisi and Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras. In the statement made at the end of the meeting, it was indicated that the issues of energy, security, tourism and a free trade agreement between the parties were discussed, in addition to the main item on the agenda: the determination of the Restricted Economic Zone (REZ). Previously, on 12 December 2013, as per the agreement that had been signed concerning the strengthening of hydrocarbon resources in the common region, it was relayed that Egypt would act jointly with those two countries in the Mediterranean and join in the direct searches. With the clarification that Cairo would participate in all of the studies to be conducted in the Mediterranean, Greek Cypriots announced that the joint decision regarding the process of liquefying Cyprus’s natural gas in the refineries of Northern Egypt’s Damietta region would be put into action.27, 28 The possibility that these policies will find a response seemed to have increased immensely following the Parliamentary election held in Turkey in June 2015 in which the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) lost its majority. It then seemed possible that the AKP, to form a government, would sit at the table with the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP), which defends the status quo and has made radical statements about the Cyprus matter. History, however, decided otherwise.
In March 2010, the US Geological Survey (USGS) determined that there is a potential 3.455 billion cubic metres of natural gas in the Levant Basin of the Eastern Mediterranean and a potential 1.7 billion barrels of petrol.Reference Kırdar and Ratip30 Following this announcement, in September 2011, the American Noble Energy Corporation, working with their Israeli partner Delek, started their hydrocarbon search studies in an area that Southern Cyprus declared the Restricted Economic Zone.Reference Kırdar and Ratip31 As a result of the first searches, it was determined that there were 198 billion cubic metres of natural gas, enough to meet half of the EU’s annual natural gas consumption in only a part of the Aphrodite field.Reference Kırdar and Ratip32 How the hydrocarbon deposits will be shared is still under discussion. Petrol and natural gas deposits, whose presence in the region is no longer doubted, have brought disputes to the maritime authority areas. In the Fifth Annan Plan, in the laws and provisions regarding the maritime authority areas and the continental shelf, it was determined that the authority rests with the central state;33 furthermore, in relation to natural resources, the decision authority for the exploration, extraction and usage of hydrocarbons will again be the central state.34 Today, this issue has become one of the most crucial parameters and issues of the resolution. The Republic of Cyprus wants to limit the continental shelf borders with Turkey to the median line going through the island and Anatolia. However, Turkey asserts that the Republic of Cyprus does not have the authority to make an agreement alone on behalf of the whole of Cyprus, and that it does not recognize the agreements Southern Cyprus has entered into, including with Israel, Lebanon, Egypt and Greece. On 5 April 2004, approximately 20 days before the Annan-Plan referendum, the Republic of Cyprus declared in the official newspaper, the REZ and joint region in the annex of Article 52 of the Constitution.Reference Başeren35 Pursuant to this law, the Republic of Cyprus announced the joint region 24 miles in width and the Restricted Economic Zone 200 miles in width.Reference Başeren36
Another striking detail is the status of the maritime authority region that lies inside four lines drawn from Akrotiri and Dhekelia to the UK as a result of the Zurich and London Agreements. According to the 1960 Constitution, in these regions, considered to be British soil, the sovereignty right belongs to the UK, therefore unilateral amendments made to the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus do not include these lands.Reference Charney and Alexander37 Whether the UK has a share in the processing of possible hydrocarbon deposits is a matter for another study. Ultimately, the issues of the processing of hydrocarbons around the island and the determination of the Restricted Economic Zone between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey have become a part of the resolution process, and it is impossible for Akıncı to reach a decision on these matters independent of Turkey. It appears it will be difficult for Akıncı to benefit from the hydrocarbon fault lines around the island that will offer no definite contribution to the economy before 2020; and he will need to exert extra effort to fulfil his election pledges.
Of primary importance on the agenda in the Akıncı-Anastasiades meetings are the UN-supervised opening of the Maraş (Varosha) Region, which is currently closed to settlement, and the return of Greek Cypriots to their houses and workplaces there; the actualization of a code for direct trading from Gazimağusa (Famagusta) Port; opening the way for products of Turkish Cypriots to enter the European markets duty-free, like those of the southerners; and agreeing on a package providing for direct flights from Ercan Airport. Such trust-building measures should pave the way to a complete resolution. Achieving such compromises in parallel to the comprehensive solution will be a crucial development on the way to the main resolution. However, since Akıncı is not (cannot!) be the only decision maker, actualization of the proposed Ercan-Gazimağusa compensation to Maraş, which constitutes the most important of the security building measures, would appear difficult.
It is next to impossible to state with accuracy that Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are the only interested parties in the Cyprus Question. A multitude of decision makers ranging from Greece to Turkey, from the UK to the USA, from Russia to the EU, and the UN in general, is another indication of the complexity of the resolution of the problem. It is obvious that the Helvetian Confederation (the Switzerland System) proposed in the Fifth Annan Plan, and the Belgium Model put forward subsequently, are not solutions to the problem. Since no solution formula has yet been found for the Cyprus problem, it all seems like wasted time. Maybe what is needed, rather than a formula, is decisiveness in the parties who will implement the multi formula.
Mehmet Direkli is an Assistant Professor and Erasmus Coordinator in the Political Science Department of Kanuni University, Turkey. His research areas are peace and conflict studies and European law. He conducted numerous interviews about the Cyprus Conflict, especially with Mr Günter Verheugen, Mr Alvaro De Soto and Ms Katie Clerides. Mehmet Direkli holds a BA in International Relations from Gazi University, an MA in European Law from the University of the Saarland, and a PhD in Political Science from the University of Vienna.
