Classical Greece and modern business ethics seem an unlikely pair. In his introduction to Oikonomia: Ancient Greek Philosophers on the Meaning of Economic Life, Étienne Helmer makes a similar observation about classical Greek texts and economics: “few would think of turning to these texts—written about an economy quite unlike our own (one that was based, among other things, on enslavement)—to gain an understanding of economic modernity” (1). Helmer is one of those few.

While his goal is to bring classical and Hellenistic philosophy into conversation with modern economics, he also offers a resource for business ethicists hunting for past insight into perennial questions. As positioned by Helmer, the monograph represents engagement with “Greek philosophy of economy,” understood as the ancient Greeks’ philosophical analysis of “a set of practices and … the science that accompanies them” (18–19). Even though Helmer’s purpose necessitates greater distillation for business ethicists, his monograph still offers a valuable resource for their efforts.

“Part I: Oikonomia as Knowledge” considers oikonomia as a contested field, first in modern discourse (Chapter 1) and then in antique discourse (Chapter 2). In Chapter 1, Helmer considers how the philosophical discussions of the ancient Greeks on economics subjects have been sidelined. He argues that Joseph Schumpeter sequestered ancient philosophizing from economic subjects. Their reflections fell short of the standard of analysis required for inclusion in the science of economics. While retaining terms “economics” and “economic” for convenience, Helmer recognizes a distinction between oikonomia and economics. He argues that “the term oikonomia designates, in a broad sense, the administration or management of any field of activity—religious, political, military—or even that of one’s own life and, in the restricted sense which interests us here, that of the household (oikos)—sometimes the polis—and of the material and human assets that constitute it” (20).

Chapter 2, for its part, tackles two debates: oikonomia and politics’ relationship and what sort of knowledge is oikonomia. Regarding the first debate, Helmer presents Xenophon and Callicratidas as supporting a close affinity between household and city as well as their respective arts. Contra these, Helmer sets Plato and Aristotle, who clearly demarcate household and city as well as their associated arts. Regarding the second debate, Helmer identifies the agreement between the ancient Greek philosophers that oikonomia unites both technical and ethical knowledge, while they diverge on the extent of the union. For instance, Philodemus of Gadara takes Xenophon to task for overtreating the particulars of agricultural knowledge at the expense of philosophical universality. Yet, Philodemus himself retains a modest technical aspect in his presentation of oikonomia , including “management and accounting advice” (49) in his Peri oikonomias , the ninth book of his On Vices. The union of technical and ethical knowledge under oikonomia should be welcomed by advocates of integrating ethics into management studies.

“Part II: Organizing Human Beings” focuses on the relationships between the humans that make up the household: Chapter 3 covers the relationship between spouses and between parents and their children; and Chapter 4 covers the relationship between slaves and their enslavers. Modern readers will likely reject many aspects of the Greek philosophers’ views on the organization of household members. For instance, Aristotle and Plato each advocate for eugenic public policy, though they differ “on the relevant factors of the production of the best bodies” (71). Additionally, there is near unanimity among the ancient Greek philosophers in viewing slavery as necessary for running households and polities.

“Part III: Putting Things in Their Place” (Chapters 5–7) addresses “the three fundamental operations of oikonomia —the acquisition of assets or wealth, their conservation, and their proper use” (95). Whereas Part II covers the management of human resources, Part III is dedicated to the management of nonhuman resources and their relationship to humans. Since the material covered in Part III more easily maps onto considerations of the modern firm, Part III is a more likely candidate for off-label use within business ethics than are Parts I and II.

In “Chapter 5: Acquisition and Wealth,” Helmer affirms that “acquisition, in effect, is a technical act that can be accomplished by way of a wide variety of arts or techniques, but it is also an ethical act in the sense that acquisition brings into play individuals’ moral dimension, in particular, their link to virtue, freedom, and happiness” (97). Helmer presents two questions raised in ancient Greek philosophy in this regard: “whether or not to put any limitations on acquisition” and what “activities or arts are most conducive to acquisition” (97, 98). In treating the first question, Helmer points out the rare consensus of the ancient Greek philosophers in supporting some limits to wealth acquisition, with the lone exception of Ischomachus in Xenophon’s Economics, who appears to favor limitless enrichment (98–101). Helmer also underscores how this consensus was countercultural in a world “tending to promote accumulation and wealth” (98). While these philosophers recognized that need-fulfillment was foundational to society, they challenged the confounding of desire with need. Helmer distinguishes in this connection between the objective and subjective aspects of wealth. The first is about defining “wealth” and the second is about determining its meaning. Interest in questions related to both aspects differs between the philosophers surveyed: some are interested in both aspects, some just one, some neither.

Once goods are acquired, their ordering and preservation become the task of the oikos’s residents. Chapter 6 takes up these topics. Helmer includes under a section on tidiness both the preservation of goods and the meaning and beauty derived from such ordering. Preservation also encompasses the balance between income and expenditure. By managing expenditures in relationship to acquisitions, householders keep intact and order the capital they have accumulated. Preservation, therefore, is not purely about budgeting but also about security and stability in the oikos, an attribute valuable in other organizations as well.

The book’s final chapter focuses on “Self-Sufficiency and the Science of Proper Use.” In classical Greek reflections on oikonomia , Helmer discerns a link between two senses of usefulness: the first concerns efficiency; the second concerns aiming at the general good. Oikonomia unites the technical and the axiological in “the acquisition, preservation, and use of property in the oikos or in the polis” (139). In their purpose, assets can be both utilitarian and “directed to the supreme good,” which can be expressed in a variety of ways, “ranging from individual or collective ethical benefits to political consequences” (139). Such a perspective should resonate with scholars who hold that businesses can do well for themselves commercially while benefiting society.

As Helmer states in the book’s conclusion, “Greek philosophers’ reflections on oikonomia provide us with valuable tools for understanding certain aspects of the present” (154). Helmer’s account adds to the ethicist’s toolkit perspectives from several schools of ancient Greek philosophy, relying especially on the thought of “Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Pseudo-Aristotle, Epicurus and Philodemus of Gadara, Diogenes the Cynic and some of his disciples, as well as fragments of the Pythagoreans Callicratidas and Bryson” (2). Helmer excludes the pre-Socratics and the Stoics from his analysis because of their minimal contribution. The exclusion of the latter is especially striking given Helmer’s acknowledgement that the Stoics articulated “the greatest coincidence between philosophy and economic activity” (18). The book may, therefore, leave some tools yet to be acquired.

It is likewise striking that Helmer remains silent on the ancient Greek philosophers’ discussions of usury. While he references Aristotle’s treatment of natural and unnatural chrematistics in the Politics (see 106–107, 128, 133, 144), Helmer gives no mention to Aristotle’s influential condemnation of usury as a prominent means of obtaining limitless wealth.

The book is not Helmer’s only foray into ancient philosophy and economics. His previous French publications include a 2010 monograph dedicated to Plato’s economic thought (Helmer Reference Helmer2010), a book chapter on Greek philosophical inquiry regarding the economy (Helmer Reference Helmer2016a), and his book on Epicurean thought regarding economic topics (Helmer Reference Helmer2021). Helmer has also edited a book on ancient philosophy on wealth and poverty (Helmer Reference Helmer2016b).

Thanks are due to University of Chicago Press and David A. Auerbach for making the original 2021 French text, Oikonomia: Philosophie grecque de l’économie, accessible to English readers. Auerbach offers a highly readable translation. At times, however, the ornateness of the underlying French prose runs contrary to modern English’s proclivity for conciseness. The expansion of the index autorum into a general index is an improvement on the French edition. This general index is, however, rudimentary—it lists just sixteen names (two more than the French edition) and seven topics. A notable departure from the index autorum is the exclusion of Pseudo-Aristotle from the new general index. Given the frequent references to Pseudo-Aristotle, this change is surprising.

Overall, Helmer provides a resource for anyone interested in the philosophical investigation of economic life. I wish this book and translation were published years ago. Helmer promises a sequel “about the practices and institutions of commerce, the marketplace, and money in the writings of these same philosophers” (7). Such a volume should also be of value to business ethicists, and I look forward to adding it to my library. Given Helmer’s in-depth research and prolific publication record, I expect not to be disappointed.