The author, a professor of law and ethics at Emory University, wrote this book to show that even in the secular West, law and religion “cross-fertilize each other,” so that the laws of the secular state retain religious dimensions and still “depend upon some of the enduring religious teachings of the West” (26). He makes his case by combining historical detail with careful analysis and recommendations.
The introduction concisely reviews the interaction of law and religion in ancient Rome, and on through Western Christendom, the Protestant Reformation including its Lutheran, Anabaptist, Calvinist, and Anglican forms, the Enlightenment, and modern secularism. The book has three main parts. The first, “Law, Religion and Human Rights,” reviews the development of “rights talk” (35) with emphasis on the Protestant and Enlightenment (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, etc.) formulations and their influence on the French and American constitutions and declarations.
The author sees the Reformation as “the second great human rights movement of the West” (85), the first being the eleventh-century-Catholic insistence on “freedom of the Church” (80) from domination by civil rulers. Though he writes from a Protestant perspective, Professor Witte sees the post-Vatican II Catholic Church as poised to lead a universal human rights movement at the start of the third millennium (83). His related description of the advocacy of human rights on a natural law foundation by orthodox churches is of special interest in light of Pope Benedict XVI's efforts to heal the breach between eastern and western Christianity.
In a provocative aside, the author notes the United Nations declaration and other declarations of the rights of religious conversion and proselytism and the challenges to those rights posed by Muslim theory and practice. Those issues are also discussed in an intriguing chapter on the uneasy coexistence of the Russian Orthodox Church with other religious groups in post-1989 Russia.
The second part of the book, “Law and Religion in American History and Today,” notes the extent to which the American founding generation was influenced not only by medieval Catholic and later Protestant ideas on religion and law, as embodied in the common law, but also by the secular individualism of the Enlightenment. Despite the Enlightenment influence, “[t]he founders' principal concern,” the author accurately observes, “concerned equality among religions, not equality between religion and nonreligion” (183).
The religion clauses of the First Amendment say nothing about the “separation of Church and state,” a metaphor found in Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter to the Danbury Baptist Association (208). The author, however, sees that principle of separation as integral to the founding of the American republic. He describes how the theory of church-state separation became a weapon in the nineteenth-century hostility toward Catholics, which found expression in riots and arson as well as in laws, such as the “Blaine Amendments,” adopted by numerous states to insulate public schools against domination by a growing Catholic population.
From the founding until the 1940s, the First Amendment was interpreted to permit governmental encouragement of theistic religion while maintaining neutrality among sects. In the 1920s the Supreme Court began to interpret the due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate and apply the Bill of Rights, including the religion clauses, strictly against the states. Theretofore, the Bill of Rights had been construed, as originally intended, as a restriction only on the federal government. The author correctly notes that in the 1940s the Court set in concrete this application of the religion causes of the First Amendment to the states. In a later series of cases culminating in Torcaso v. Watkins (1961), Engel v. Vitale (1962), and Abington Township v. Shempp (1963), the Court went further and interpreted the First Amendment to require government at all levels to maintain, not neutrality among sects while encouraging theistic religion, but neutrality between theistic and nontheistic religion. The author notes the treatment by the Court of the references to God in the national motto and the pledge of allegiance as merely “ceremonial deism” (258, n. 41).
The more basic question is whether it is possible for the state to be neutral on the question of the existence of God. If the pupil asks the public school teacher whether the Declaration of Independence is true when it affirms the existence of God, what is the teacher to say? If he says yes, that is a preference of theism. If he says no, that is a preference of atheism. The only answer that the Supreme Court would appear to approve would be something like: “I, speaking on behalf of the state, cannot know and cannot affirm whether God exists.” Is this not a preference of an agnostic secularism that, as the Court acknowledged in Torcaso, is itself a religion? This issue is perhaps beyond the scope of this useful book. It would be interesting, however, to have the author's view as to whether the Supreme Court's mandate of neutrality between theism and nontheism forces public officials to affirm implicitly a nontheistic religious tenet—that recognition of God by the state is inconsistent with good government.
After a useful chapter examining Protestant views on crime and punishment, the third part of the book discusses “Law, Religion, and the Family.” The author compares Christian and Enlightenment models of marriage. The Christian model sees marriage as a religious, social, and natural, as well as contractual association. The Enlightenment model, which sees marriage as a privately bargained contract, is the “legal reality” in America today (315). The author accurately summarizes the implementation of the Enlightenment model in a judicially created constitutional right of privacy that includes legalized abortion as well as other manifestations of sexual privacy. He compares Greek, Roman, Catholic, and Protestant conceptions of the ends and goods of marriage. Surprisingly, the author does not discuss the Anglican Lambeth Conference of 1930; that was the first time that any Christian denomination had ever said that contraception could ever be objectively right. The separation of the unitive and procreative aspects of sex, of course, provides a rationale for the legitimization of homosexual activity and legal recognition of same-sex civil unions and same-sex “marriage.” Regrettably, the author does not get into those subjects.
After a useful discussion of covenant marriage legislation, the author offers a discussion of clerical celibacy that, unfortunately, becomes a less than well-informed criticism of that disciplinary requirement of the Catholic Church. That discussion would have been clarified by the inclusion of statements by John Paul II and Benedict XVI on this issue. The author also criticizes the Catholic bishops who protected sex-abusing clergy. So what else is new? One proof for the divine origin of the Catholic Church is the fact that in two thousand years the priests and bishops have not been able to kill it.
Chapter 15 offers an attractive meditation on the mutual duties of parents and children as described in the “household manuals” of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. American public schools would be improved by inclusion of some of those manuals in the curriculum, assuming that the students could read them.
The concluding chapter is a perceptive review of the rise of legal positivism in America and the contrast of that jurisprudence with the natural law and Christian tradition.
In summary, this readable book provides a useful historical review of the relation between law and religion in Western culture. Some might find it overly sanguine about the extent and impact of religious influence on the secular state today. But the author makes his case persuasively. The religious dimension persists because it is rooted in human nature. There is, of course, room for debate and disagreement on Dr. Witte's analyses and conclusions. Yet I cannot imagine that any serious student of the issue, whether neophyte or expert, could read this book without satisfaction and profit.
