In its subtitle, Giandomenico Majone's book refers to the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome in 2007. But the book is not a birthday present—at least not a pleasant one. The title is reminiscent of Europe's Would-Be Polity by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold (1970). If their book can be seen as the refinement and adaptation of neofunctionalist integration theory to the adolescent problems of the European Community, Majone's is the pitiless diagnosis of a midlife crisis. He dismisses both the European Union's “crypto-federalist” method of integration and much of the scholarship that has grown around it. Contrary to what the title suggests, the book deals only to a very minor extent with the EU as a foreign policy actor. It is a polemic essay. Do not expect well-balanced and richly referenced arguments or data-based theory testing. But Majone draws on much of his earlier work (above all, Dilemmas of European Integration, 2005) and sharpens the conclusions drawn there.

The author deciphers the “operational code” of European integration, depicts its unintended (and undesirable) consequences, describes the impasse in which the EU finds itself, and discusses solutions. According to Majone, European integration has followed a few major operational principles. As a response to the failure of mass-based European federalism in the early post–World War II era, European elites have pursued what he calls a crypto-federalist strategy. They have prioritized institutional integration over all competing values, including democracy and economic efficiency. Following the “bicycle theory of integration,” which assumes that integration cannot pause without collapsing, they have pursued continuous movement regardless of ultimate ends. Finally, they have used the “strategy of the fait accompli” or “integration by stealth”; that is, they have prepared and established further steps of integration in a way that prevented open debate, accountability, and modifications. Majone attributes a pivotal role in this strategy to the “Community method,” which accords the unelected European Commission a formal monopoly of agenda setting.

This elitist, technocratic, and unaccountable style of decision making focused on integration for its own sake produces inefficient policies that are neither abandoned nor adequately reformed (such as the common agricultural and fisheries policies), as well as far-reaching integration projects (such as monetary union and Eastern enlargement) that not only lack democratic support but also proper attention to risks and resources. Even postwar peace and economic prosperity in Europe only coincided with European integration but were not caused by it.

Yet the biggest successes of the crypto-federalist strategy—the introduction of the euro and big bang enlargement—exposed its limits at the same time. For one, they affected the people more directly than earlier integration projects, politicized European integration, mobilized Euro-skepticism, and triggered negative referendums against treaty revisions in a variety of countries. In addition, enlargement increased the economic and social heterogeneity of the EU, thereby undermining the one big project that Majone supports: the single market.

What is to be done about the conundrum in which the EU finds itself? Majone rejects all solutions that would amount to replicating the nation-state model at the regional level. Not only does the EU lack the normative and financial resources to sustain a Europe-wide democratic welfare state; such a solution would also not tackle the core problem, which does not consist in a neoliberal EU (Majone disputes this) or in its democratic deficit but in the pursuit of ever deeper and wider integration in the face of economic and social heterogeneity. The Community method may have been suitable for a small group of homogeneous and integration-friendly countries but not in the current environment.

In its stead, Majone advocates differentiated integration. Rather than aiming at the Europe-wide and unified centralization of all policy sectors, the EU would be a club of clubs with different levels of centralization and membership. This would allow for a bottom-up process in which each country could choose the levels and field of integration that its citizens desire. Each club would bring together countries with homogeneous preferences, and competition between clubs would improve the overall results of integration.

This is a timely book. Even though it came out a bit too late for the fiftieth anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, it was published before the euro zone debt crisis that moved many of the issues discussed by Majone into the spotlight. It is also a book that shows a rare combination of historical depth, broad knowledge of EU policies and institutions, familiarity with specific issues and cases, and clear analytical focus. Given the polemical nature of the book, the author can be forgiven for painting European integration with too-stark contrasts and colors. The Commission's role as the villain of crypto-federalism is exaggerated. It has been the greatest institutional loser of the series of treaty reforms in the past 20 years, and Majone's prime examples of the EU's hubris—monetary union and enlargement—have mainly been the product of intergovernmental negotiations. The “strategy of the fait accompli” does injustice to the intense debate and conflicts about enlargement and monetary union, not only among the member states but also in the mass media.

There is a tendency in the book to attribute everything that went wrong in Europe to the EU while denying it any credit for what went well. Many claims involve difficult counterfactuals and would have benefited from comparing the EU to other international organizations or nation-states. Inefficient policies, learning failures, the underestimation of risks, and the overstretching of resources are certainly not a monopoly of the EU. Finally, it is misleading to include the bulk of EU research in the great crypto-federalist conspiracy. The main features of the EU's “operational code” and policymaking, the democratic deficits, and the backlash against elitist integration projects have long been uncovered and debated.

These critical points concern style more than substance. Majone argues convincingly, first, that the traditional method of integration is confronted with severe problems of mass support, resources, and capacity, that is, the major ingredients of a crisis of system integration; and, second, that the great leap forward to the pan-European democratic welfare state is neither viable nor realistic. His plea for differentiated integration is not only theoretically attractive but also supported by reality. European integration has become ever more differentiated, precisely as a result of the flagship projects of the 1990s: monetary union and enlargement. Whether member states, old or new, join the euro zone has become de facto a matter of (electoral) choice. It seems that the very excesses of crypto-federalism Majone criticizes help bring about the kind of European integration he favors.

More discussion is needed on the trade-offs involved in differentiated integration. Majone describes the “old Europe” and “new Europe” coalitions that formed on the occasion of the war against Iraq in 2003. These were exactly the competing clubs based on homogeneous sets of preferences that match his general vision of differentiated integration—and a guarantee for keeping the EU in the position of a would-be world power for the next 50 years.