Anthologies sometimes struggle to match their contents to the claims of their titles, but this title offers truth in advertising. Every reader of this Journal is familiar with the history of industrialization in Britain, Germany, or the United States. Casual observers of the last few decades are aware of the rapid industrialization of China and South Korea. But between the earliest industrializers and the most recent is a panoply of countries from around the world in which the manufacturing share of GDP increased. This book tells the story of many of them.
The editors set out their criteria for examining a country or region early in the book. They aim at a global periphery “outside Northwestern Europe and its New World offshoots.” That includes southern and eastern Europe, all of Asia, nearly all of Africa, Mexico, and South America. It omits South Africa and Australia (presumably as “offshoots”), Central America, and strangely perhaps, given the literature on sugar processing, Cuba. For a book of 400 pages that breadth is impressive.
The goals for each chapter included estimating the timing of industrialization in each country or region and noting any changes from trend, and explaining why each distinctive path took the form it did. Because each chapter tends to use the same measures of industrialization, such as share of manufactures in GDP or in exports, it is possible to compare timing of industrialization between regions. Further division into shares by industry allows qualitative comparisons among regions beyond simple movement of labor force or production from agriculture to industry—although such comparisons are possible too. Perhaps more emphasis is placed on differences than on levels, resulting in some very high growth rates from small bases, but the authors are generally careful to note this distinction.
Over several chapters, and implicitly over much of the volume, hovers the ghost of Alexander Gerschenkron. His notions of economic backwardness and lagging nations catching up in spurts appears in several chapters. Even where not made explicit, some chapters argue in Gerschenkronian terms: A good two decades after the end of WWII, Korea and Taiwan began their rapid industrialization “spurts” on the basis of “a backlog of technology” that had accumulated since the end of the war, after Japan had begun its own reconstruction (p. 170).
Each chapter in this volume is of very high quality, so to focus on a few particularly engaging essays reflects the reviewer’s tastes and not any shortcomings in the other chapters. That said, the chapter by Dwight Perkins and John Tang on Japan, Korea, and Taiwan addresses many of the recurring themes in the book particularly persuasively. The obvious similarity between Japan and Korea was the utter destruction of physical capital in war. The sources of early industrialization differed however: Japanese growth began during the Meiji period when treaties denied the state the ability to protect local infant industries with tariffs. Korea was able to do later in Gerschenkronian, state-led fashion. The Taiwanese case complicates efforts to draw a simple moral from this comparison, because its state-led efforts to induce domestic heavy industry met with mixed results. Shipbuilding, a success in Korea, was a failure in Taiwan. Still Taiwanese state interventions sometimes succeeded, just not in the intended ways: domestic auto manufacturing never took off, but auto parts became internationally competitive.
Comparing Japan to China elucidates the role of the state as well as the question of growth from a small base. In the chapter on China by Loren Brandt, Debin Ma, and Thomas Rawski, European powers infused the local economy with foreign direct investment, accompanied by new technologies. Domestic industry began to grow along the southeast coast, particularly around Shanghai. But once more, industry in China was a small part of the predominantly agricultural economy. Japan too faced a loss of autonomy with the arrival of Westerners, but on Perkins and Tang’s reading it “took advantage of the world’s open trading system” (p. 170). At least in part, Japan could choose selectively the type of FDI that entered the country—hence for example, the rise of silk production (recalling Matteo Gomellini and Gianni Toniolo’s invocation in the chapter on Italy, “In the beginning was silk” (p. 120). China here is more the acted-upon object than the subject of industrialization, with hardly any state at all to lead. And yet, the beginnings of growth in production of steel ingots, electricity, and cement, can be traced to the early twentieth century.
The East Asian cases are familiar as economic success stories. The chapter on Southeast Asia by Jean-Pascal Bassino and Jeffrey Williamson offers several explanations of why that region lagged behind. Here is a region where industry was closely tied to processing of industrial crops: sugar cane, hemp, tobacco, and so on. The question why industrialization occurred as it did leads to different answers from the cases of East Asia. The state is far in the background, and in the foreground is a factor that appears in histories of the industrializing center: high wages. Southeast Asian wages were higher than those in East Asia, presumably because workers had the option (as in America) of working productive land instead. But this finding raises more questions than it answers. If Robert Allen’s hypothesis is correct, and high wages led to capital-for-labor substitution in the first Industrial Revolution, why did the same process not occur in Southeast Asia? Within the region, if skill shortages were a binding constraint (p. 269) why were Southeast Asian wages so high? And why did the Philippines, with its high levels of schooling, grow more rapidly than the region as a whole in the early twentieth century and then so much slower in the later twentieth century?
These questions illustrate the fruitfulness of this book. Of course explanations presented here seem rather ad hoc. For example, the historical question of property rights appears only in the essay on Russia. But industrial growth is a very complicated phenomenon not subject to monocausal reduction. This volume is a real achievement in considering the world economy as a set of national and regional economies. All economic historians with interests outside the United States and Western Europe will enjoy reading it carefully.
