This book analyses the role of business associations in Latin American tax reforms implemented during the 1990s and early 2000s. Based on well-established theories of business power (developed several decades ago by renowned scholars such as Albert Hirschman, Charles Lindblom, Ralph Miliband, and Wright Mills, among others), Fairfield argues that ‘when economic elites have strong instrumental and/or structural power, increasing taxes on income and wealth is difficult’ (p. 53). According to this traditional theory of business power, business interest groups have two sources of leverage over policy-makers: instrumental power and structural power. Instrumental power is based on relationships with policy-makers (i.e., partisan linkages, institutionalised consultation or informal ties) and organisational resources (i.e., organisational cohesion, media access or money); meanwhile, structural power stems from the policy-makers’ expectations about the consequences of their policies on investment decisions. Based on this conceptualisation of business power, Fairfield argues that economic elites in Chile were more successful in imposing their tax policy preferences because they were better organised, better connected and better resourced than their peers in Argentina (and Bolivia), because divestment threats were more credible, and because Chilean policy-makers were particularly cautious of expansive fiscal policies. Fairfield also argues that, although most of the governments in the region had limited capacity to neutralise business interests, some of them have successfully developed circumventing strategies to weaken the political influence of business associations in tax negotiations.
Fairfield supports her argument with carefully gathered qualitative evidence (mostly media reports and interviews) through case studies of Argentina, Bolivia and Chile. The rationale of her argument is straightforward: after the democratic transition, Chilean business was better organised around the CPC and better connected with the right-leaning coalition in congress. She concludes that Chilean business associations were instrumentally powerful, and consequently, they were particularly influential in the policy-making process and successful in neutralising a number of revenue-raising initiatives promoted by the governing centre-left coalition between 1994 and 2010. Additionally, policy-makers in post-authoritarian Chile were unwilling to promote unattractive economic policies that could harm private investment and macroeconomic stability. According to Fairfield, these two factors explain why direct taxation is particularly low in Chile and why it was difficult for Concertación governments to implement progressive tax reforms.
This was not the case in post-authoritarian Argentina, where business interest groups were less organised, encompassing business associations were weaker, sectoral business associations had weaker linkages with legislative parties and their resources for lobbying were less abundant. Fairfield argues that Argentine business interests were not instrumentally powerful, or at least, they were less instrumentally powerful than their Chilean peers. Furthermore, politicians and policy-makers were not particularly concerned about macroeconomic stability or protecting direct private investments. The Argentine economy was more diversified than the Chilean economy, and capital mobility seemed less threatening. Therefore, the high level of fragmentation among the Argentine economic elites and the relatively low importance of disinvestment threats made it easier for Peronist governments to raise direct tax revenues over the past two decades.
For the case of Bolivia, Fairfield draws more nuanced conclusions than in the previous two cases. Business associations in Bolivia were rather weakly institutionalised (regionally fragmented business organisations, weak or unstable partisan linkages, and ineffectual channels with policy-makers), rendering them less capable of influencing the political agenda. But most importantly, business power was effectively counterbalanced by constant and credible threats of massive popular mobilisation.
Fairfield's book makes a crucial contribution to the study of business and tax politics in Latin America. Her argument is quite straightforward and convincing, and the evidence presented is extensive and carefully crafted (especially in the case of Chile; the chapter on Bolivia is less exhaustive). Fairfield's book offers a proficient description of the political conflict behind a number of recent tax reform initiatives in Latin America, highlights different sources and dimensions of business power and analyses its consequences for tax policy in the region. The examples selected give the reader a good sense of the political interaction between economic elites, business-friendly legislative parties, and government officials. They also illustrate the salience of tax issues for voters and public opinion.
However, this book does not provide a forceful theory about the political and institutional mechanisms that translate business power into policy outcomes. How does business power oppose a government's tax policy preferences? Fairfield provides some clues about their strategies and about the government's methods to circumvent business opposition, but this book does not elucidate the interaction between government and business in the policy-making arena. The disproportionate focus on business power does not allow us to completely understand the role of government officials and technocrats in the policy-making game, and it downplays the dynamic relationship between economic elites and politicians. Fairfield herself recognises that partisanship matters and the president's tax policy preferences are not only a function of business power (policy-makers’ tax preferences can also be quite responsive to public opinion even in contexts where business is quite powerful – e.g., Piñera's 2012 tax reform). Nevertheless, this book only provides a cursory discussion of the effects of partisanship, the dynamics of coalition building in congress, and the distinct but entwined roles of the president and business in crafting those coalitions to change tax policy.
In summary, Fairfield makes an important contribution to the field's understanding of instrumental and structural business power (the evidence presented on instrumental power is far more convincing than that of structural power) and their possible correlation with tax policy outcomes in Latin America. However, more research needs to be done to develop a causal theory on the mechanisms that translate business power into political influence and specific tax policies. Such a theory would require us to focus proportionately on both business and policy-makers, and understand the dynamics of the political bargaining between them.
