FACTIONALISM: THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL MODELS

Before the term ‘political party’ gained currency, ‘faction’ was the term given to rival groups in a sovereign state (Boucek Reference Boucek2009). Explaining the transition from faction to party in the introduction to his seminal study Parties and Party Systems, Sartori (Reference Sartori1976: 3) pointed out that the faction label was ‘derogatory’. Scottish philosopher David Hume started faction classification when he differentiated two types of groups, ‘personal’ and ‘real’, claiming that personal factions were ‘founded on personal friendship or animosity’, whereas real ones were ‘founded on some real difference of sentiment or interest’ (cited, ibid.: 8). Hume further divided real factions into those of ‘interest’ and ‘principle’. Some scholars have proffered other classifications. Five decades ago, Zariski (Reference Zariski1960: 33) wrote:

Zariski's postulation is still valid, because it allows for analysis of different types of intra-party groupings, and clearly delineates a wide range of party members' motivations for factional activity. Thus, factions should be viewed simply as loose or informal groups within a larger institutionalised group, which, in this article, I take to be the pro- and anti-Rawlings factions within the NDC.

In a study that re-examined the conceptualisation and categorisation of factionalism in political science, Boucek (Reference Boucek2009) identified three main phases of factionalism: ‘cooperative’, ‘competitive’ and ‘degenerative’. Cooperative factionalism arises in the initial stages of a party's formation or during a regime change. Centripetal forces pull all the groups into a recognisable centralised organisation (ibid.: 470). Such factionalism occurs through ‘a primordial sorting-out process’ during the transition to democracy and when a party is being established (ibid.: 469). Political elites and activists who have similar ideas but are in different political groups often emerge as key players during crucial periods such as regime change and transition to democracy. Then, Boucek notes, a ‘factional structure’ may play a mediating role, and ensure that these groups retain their identities and memberships during party consolidation and, sometimes, beyond. Factionalism in this context, she says, can become consensus-building.

Centrifugal forces, conversely, cause competitive factionalism. A political party splits into several opposing factions. Intra-party and leadership disagreements create dissent, and interest groups within a party become opposed, rather than simply separating (ibid.: 473). Boucek points out that such factional competition ‘exerts centrifugal pulls’ on the party apparatus; she notes that parties often become polarised over ideology. Competitive factionalism can destabilise because inability to agree undermines decision-making. Finally, excessive rent-seeking can result in degenerative factionalism. An overabundance of overdetermined factions means fractionalisation. Factions become platforms for sharing patronage. Boucek (Reference Boucek2009: 477) suggests that ‘perverse incentives and mismanagement’ may cause factionalism to degenerate, which can destroy the party.

Many political parties in advanced industrialised democracies divide over policy goals, ideology, or patronage (Leigh Reference Leigh2000; Reiter Reference Reiter2004). Factions are important in the democratisation process in emerging democracies in southern and eastern Europe (Gillespie et al. Reference Gillespie, Waller and Nieto1995). In the world's ostensible ‘greatest democracy’, the USA, factions are central to the partisan process in both parties. Among Republicans, pro-business conservatives are pitted against social conservatives; the Democratic Party has its New Democrat and liberal wings (Koger et al. Reference Koger, Masket and Noel2010). Nevertheless, organisational cooperation underlies both divisions. In other Western democracies factionalism is of the venal type. Bettcher (Reference Bettcher2005) aptly labels Italy's Democrazia Cristiana (DC) and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ‘factions of interests’ (see Cox et al. Reference Cox, Rosenbluth and Thies1999; Mershon Reference Mershon2001).

OVERVIEW OF FACTIONALISM IN THE MODERN GHANA PARTY SYSTEM

The party system in the Ghanaian Fourth Republic has witnessed factional activities in the two main political traditions, represented by the NDC and NPP. Before I turn my attention to the NDC, a discussion of factionalism in the NPP will be useful. Arguably, factionalism has always been essential to Ghana's politics. Jackson and Rosberg (Reference Jackson, Rosberg and Young2003: 28) broadly observed that ‘the politics of factions has been evident in African political life throughout the independence era’. In Ghana, factional politics was crucial to allocation of state patronage and ministerial portfolios in governments formed by the two pre-eminent political traditions in the three republics preceding the current one.

The NDC's main competitor is the NPP, currently the main opposition party, which derives its founding mythology from the Danquah–Busia tradition (Whitfield Reference Whitfield2009). This conservative tradition is committed to parliamentary democracy and respect for private ownership, and has been called ‘property-owning democracy’. The party made history in 2000 when its presidential candidate, J. A. Kufuor, led it to victory over the ruling NDC in a run-off ballot, thus ending the tradition's twenty-eight years in opposition. The party's mandate was renewed in 2004 for a second term, which ended in 2008 when the NDC recaptured the presidency.

The early history of the party's factionalism was characterised by the rivalry between the Danquah and Busia factions, which was rooted in the historical relations of the Asante and Akyem ethnic groups. In contemporary times the internal politics of the NPP features personal rivalries between prominent politicians; nevertheless, the fissure tends to blur, creating a semblance of ‘cooperative’ factionalism. Ideology is not the basis for disagreements in the NPP's platform, as most members agree that liberal democracy is the way forward, and that the environment must enable citizens to own property. Disagreements concern group interest, intellectual prowess, and personal egos (heirs of ‘natural rulers’ versus middle class professionals). In the past two decades competition for executive leadership positions first saw the Danquah and Busia factions battle for control of the party apparatus. The Busia faction triumphed when Kufuor was elected president in 2001. At the end of Kufuor's two terms, the Kufuor and Akufo-Addo factions emerged.

In the NPP's first presidential contest, which started towards the end of 1991, ‘factions of historical colours’ emerged (Agyeman-Duah Reference Agyeman-Duah2006: 40). Framing this polemic was the fragmentation of the Danquah–Busia tradition into the United National Convention (UNC) and the Popular Front Party (PFP) factions. In the run-up to the 1979 elections, the Danquah–Busia tradition experienced ‘competitive factionalism’, occasioned by a leadership crisis. Commenting on these problems, Chazan (Reference Chazan1983: 287) notes that the UNC faction ‘differed from the PFP leadership on two significant counts: they rejected the over-riding influence of Busia's PP, and were wary of the Asante-Brong monopoly being concentrated in the PFP’.

The two leading aspirants for the NPP's 1992 presidential nomination, J. A. Kufuor and Professor Adu Boahen, belonged to the PFP and UNC factions respectively. Gerontocracy is important in the NPP's internal politics; also significant are an individual's achievements and loyalty to party tradition. In the competition for leadership positions, heirs of so-called ‘natural rulers’ are pitted against plutocrats and self-made middle-class professionals.

John Agyekum Kufuor, an Oxford-educated lawyer, is an Asante aristocrat with ‘deep historical and personal ties to the Golden Stool’ (McCaskie Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009). Kufuor's journey into national politics, however, began with the Second Republic, when he stood on the winning ticket of Busia's Progress Party at the constituency of Atwima Nwabiagya (ibid.). He was allocated a deputy secretary portfolio in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, working directly under his political mentor, Victor Owusu. In the 1979 election, Kufuor was again returned as MP for Atwima Nwabiagya, on the PFP ticket, and remained on the opposition benches until the Third Republic fell in December 1981. He was offered a job by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) junta as Secretary for Local Government, but resigned after nine months in office (ibid).

Professor Albert Adu Boahen was also Asante, and earned a PhD in African history from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in 1959 (Agyeman-Duah Reference Agyeman-Duah2006). Unlike Kufuor, however, Boahen was an Asante commoner, as he ‘belonged by ascription to a cohort of drummers who served both the Dwaben and New Dwaben stools’ (McCaskie Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 462). In 1967 he became the first Ghanaian to head the Department of History at the University of Ghana. He campaigned against military dictatorships, and became a prominent member of the People's Movement for Freedom and Justice (PMFJ), which opposed the Acheampong regime (Agyeman-Duah Reference Agyeman-Duah2006: 44). Locally, Boahen gained much public recognition outside the lecture theatre in 1988, when he delivered the annual J. B. Danquah Memorial Lectures (Nugent Reference Nugent1996). Many scholars agree that those lectures lifted the veil of secrecy over the nation, and began the transition to the Fourth Republic.

Consequently, when in 1992 Boahen launched his presidential bid to lead the NPP, he was already a hugely popular figure in Asante, and with middle-class voters elsewhere in the country. Nonetheless, he seemed to lack political experience, and his closeness to the Danquah faction nearly ended his presidential bid. Similarly, Kufuor's nine-month association with the PNDC government, a regime disliked by the ruling Asante elite, hurt his presidential ambitions (McCaskie Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 463).

Boahen's condemnation of the human rights record of the PNDC administration resonated with many Asante. These acts of bravery conferred upon him the undisputed title of the ‘lone Asante warrior who stood up to the enemy’ (ibid.). Nevertheless, the Asante ruling elites, including the reigning Asantehene, Opoku Ware II, had difficulty endorsing Boahen's candidature. As McCaskie (Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 462) notes, he ‘lacked the right connections’, and was also ‘a stool servant with neither the background nor the mandate to lead opposition to Rawlings’. Kufuor was the preferred candidate of the Asante elites, but was equally disliked by ordinary Asante, who saw him as an opportunist. But as the popularity of Boahen as the acknowledged leader of the anti-Rawlings opposition soared nationwide, the Asante elites were convinced that he was the best candidate to unseat Rawlings in the nationwide election (ibid.). He polled 1,121 votes (52%) to emerge victorious at the NPP Congress (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010), but lost the presidential election to the NDC.

As the 1996 election approached, the Danquah faction canvassed support for Boahen, arguing that he should be allowed to run unopposed, since the NPP's defeat in 1992 had nothing to do with his personality or the party's campaign strategy, but was because of the exploitation of incumbency by the NDC (Agyeman-Duah Reference Agyeman-Duah2006). The Busia faction, on the other hand, strongly supported a contest they argued would deepen the party's internal democracy. These disagreements factionalised the party. The ‘Patriotic Club’ mobilised support for Kufuor, while the ‘COMO’ group promoted Boahen's candidature (ibid.). In the presidential contest Kufuor polled 1,034 votes (52%) to beat Boahen and the other aspirants, thus ending Boahen's political career. A protégé would, however, contest Kufuor in the 1998 presidential primary.

In the party's third presidential primary in 1998, five candidates sought nomination to represent the NPP in the 2000 national elections (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010). The basis of factional division was neither ideological nor related to policy goals, but revolved around the personality of the candidates. J. A. Kufuor and Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo were the two leading aspirants, and they had much in common. Like Kufuor, Akufo-Addo came from a privileged background; like Kufuor, he was an Akan, but from the Akyem sub-group. Similarly, Akufo-Addo was well connected in national politics. His father was Ghana's titular president in the Second Republic, and Dr J. B. Danquah was his grand uncle. Like Kufuor too, Akufo-Addo had legal training in England after receiving his bachelor's degree in economics at the University of Ghana. His political activism began in 1975 when he became General Secretary of the PMFJ. Even though he was close to the leaders of two factions in the 1979 elections, he never aligned with any of the platforms.

Akufo-Addo was the pre-congress favourite, as many at the grass-roots admired his radicalism. Like Boahen before him, he led the Alliance for Change (AFC), which, through the Kume Preko demonstrations, forced the NDC government to back down from implementing an unpopular tax policy. Kufuor, who was seen as the establishment candidate, still defeated Akufo-Addo by a wide margin (65%–32%) because of his personality, ‘but more so because the Asante were indeed concerned to keep their sway over the NPP’ (McCaskie Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 465).

In 2001 Kufuor became president of Ghana after defeating the incumbent NDC in a run-off ballot. Once in office, though, the Busia faction became the Kufuor faction, and consolidated its power base by monopolising all the key sectors of the state apparatus. In the two administrations of President Kufuor (2001–8), members of his faction received the lion's share in the allocation of ministerial portfolios. In 2007, as Kufuor's stay in office drew to a close, no fewer than seventeen candidates, including a younger brother of the president, wanted to succeed him (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010). Many members thought that the flag-bearer mantle belonged to Akufo-Addo by right because of the party's predisposition to gerontocracy (Seini 2012 int.). The declaration of interest by Alan Kyerematen animated the Kufuor and Akufo-Addo rivalry. While Akufo-Addo could be said to belong to the older generation of party leaders, Kyerematen is, arguably, a second-generation leader. Above all, Kyerematen also had the ‘right connections’: being Asante was significant; most important, though, he had royal roots, as a paternal great grandson of Asantehene Kofi Kakari (McCaskie Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 459). The other aspirants lacked these connections, but endorsement by some plutocrats and their acquired middle-class status allowed them to promote their credentials in relation to their achievements serving under Kufuor (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010).

At the start of his second term in 2005, it was clear that President Kufuor was the Danquah–Busia tradition's most successful leader to date. His occupation of the highest office enabled him to groom the next generation of NPP leaders. He exposed this young group to the intricacies of international diplomacy and domestic politics. Alan Kyerematen and Papa Owusu-Ankomah were reshuffled to different ministerial portfolios to prepare them for leadership (Agyeman-Duah 2012 int.). Nevertheless, President Kufuor believed that Alan Kyerematen would make a better president. Covertly, the Kufuor faction deployed the vast powers of the state to aid its ‘anointed’ candidate's campaign (Kennedy Reference Kennedy2009: 15–6). The Akufo-Addo faction accused President Kufuor of trying to ‘disrupt the leadership queue’ and hold on to power. The Kyerematen/Akufo-Addo rivalry dominated the campaign. In December 2007, lobbying of delegates and voting proceeded concurrently, and there were allegations of vote buying. One interpretation of the incident is that when it became clear that Kyerematen was likely to tie with Akufo-Addo, the National Organiser of the party, Lord Commey, a member of the Akufo-Addo faction, without consulting the other party executives, mounted the podium and announced that the voting process had been ‘breached’. It was alleged that Paul Afoko, an ally of President Kufuor, was distributing dollar bills to delegates to swing the vote in favour of Kyerematen.

The small size of the Electoral College (about 2,300 delegates) lends credence to this interpretation. Since 1992 party delegates have gathered at one central venue to select the party's presidential candidate. It was thus easy for factions to host delegates and provide them with ‘refreshment or kola nuts to quench their thirst’. In the end, Akufo-Addo secured 1,096 votes (or 48%): two points short of an outright win (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010: 65). Kyerematen was the runner-up with 738 votes (or 33%). Since no candidate got the constitutionally mandated 50% + 1 votes, however, Article 12 (7), which provides for a run-off between the two front runners (NPP 2009: 59), was cited. Kyerematen, however, conceded defeat, and Akufo-Addo was declared the party's presidential nominee.

Nevertheless, these acrimonious campaigns fractured the party to the grass-roots level, with parliamentary candidates aligning themselves with the Akufo-Addo or Kyerematen factions (Kennedy Reference Kennedy2009). They were troubling for party cohesion months before national elections. Kyerematen resigned from the NPP in April 2008, alleging harassment of those of his supporters who wanted to contest the party parliamentary elections (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010: 66). In the interest of unity, Kyerematen was prevailed upon to rescind his decision. His behaviour proves McCaskie's (Reference McCaskie, Falola and Childs2009: 466) argument that ‘cooperation and unity are the things that the Asante deploy collectively when they are seeking advantage over non-Asante’. Nevertheless, his return to the party did not stop some of his supporters going independent; and, ultimately, factionalism contributed to the party's defeat in the national elections (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar and Bob-Milliar2010: 66).

As with the NDC in 2000, the NPP's defeat pushed it to adopt far-reaching constitutional reforms in 2009. The size of the selectorate was increased from 2,340 to 115,000 delegates, and the number of presidential contenders limited to five (NPP 2009: 57–9). The Akufo-Addo faction supported the reforms, arguing that the expansion of the electoral college would ‘transfer ownership of the party from a small oligarchy to the grassroots’ (Statesman 20.9.2009). The Kufuor faction, on the other hand, favoured the status quo, saying that it had ‘served the party well’ (ibid.). The formal positions of the two factions were read differently by the party members: the Akufo-Addo faction, it was said by the members, could not match the Kufuor faction in terms of resources; hence their desire to curtail the influence of money in party competitions. The wealthy Kufuor faction could ‘buy’ the votes of the 2,300 delegates more effectively than it could do those of 115,000 delegates. The factions have exhibited the cooperative type of factionalism. I next turn my attention to the main theme of the article.

NDC: PRO- AND ANTI-RAWLINGS FACTIONS

The NDC was originally founded in June 1992 as a vehicle for the presidential ambitions of Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings. It is an assemblage of several interest groups: the NDC borrows its core principles and values from the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the PNDC, which Rawlings headed in 1979 and 1981 respectively. These two putsches introduced a new kind of populist leadership, and established certain values and principles relevant to this analysis. On 15 May 1979, Rawlings and some associates were arrested for taking part in an unsuccessful putsch. During his court martial, Rawlings talked about the need for probity and accountability. His courage in the dock and his scathing indictment of the military leadership resonated well with the public. The AFRC freed Rawlings on 4 June 1979, and installed him as head of the junta.

The principles of probity, accountability and social justice, though not new to the Ghanaian political arena, were popularised by Rawlings in the wake of the uprising. The ARFC shook the foundations of middle-class power in a popular move characterised as a ‘house cleaning’ exercise (Nugent Reference Nugent1996). Three former heads of state and eight senior army officers were court martialled and executed for ‘crimes against the state’. Hundreds of ‘corrupt’ officers and civilians were sentenced to long prison sentences (Chazan Reference Chazan1983). Because most members of the AFRC harboured no ambition other than a ‘house cleaning’, however, the transition to civilian rule was unaffected. The Third Republic was inaugurated on 24 September 1979, when the AFRC handed power to the People's National Party (PNP).

The PNP administration was short-lived. On 31 December 1981, Rawlings returned to power as chairman of the PNDC, which was an amalgamation of several interest groups: radical Marxist scholars, liberals, socialists and military officers (Dadzie & Ahwoi Reference Dadzie and Ahwoi2010). The dominant military bloc, headed by Rawlings, was unattached, and definitely non-ideological (ibid.). To lay the foundation for what the regime called ‘true democracy’, it created several political structures, including the Peoples' Defence Committees and Arbitration Committees (Oquaye Reference Oquaye2004). One such was the 31st December Women's Movement (DWM), headed by Nana Konadu Agyemang-Rawlings. The regime model of participatory democracy relied on a carrot-and-stick approach in dealing with grass-roots problems. Real or perceived injustice was swiftly addressed through a tribunal system and decision-making at the grass-roots became consensual.

For ten years Rawlings and his ‘provisional’ government searched for a suitable governance model. Domestic and international agencies, however, forced the regime to redemocratise in the early 1990s (Gyimah-Boadi Reference Gyimah-Boadi1994). The imminent return of the country to constitutional rule brought factionalism to the fore within the ruling junta. While some members preferred a return to the Nkrumah and Danquah–Busia political traditions, a second group proposed breaking up the Council and allowing members to choose for themselves (Dadzie & Ahwoi Reference Dadzie and Ahwoi2010: 88). The harmonisation of experiences, principles and values of the two military administrations into a new political party was a compromise proposal acceptable to Rawlings (ibid.).

The PNDC leadership managed the transition process to its own benefit, partly by poaching influential politicians from the Nkrumah and Danquah-Busia blocs and extending patronage to new political groupings. The NDC allied with two other parties, the Nkrumahist-leaning National Convention Party (NCP) and Every Ghanaian Living Everywhere (EGLE), to form the Progressive Alliance (Nugent Reference Nugent1996). Cooperative factionalism characterised the behaviour of the various interest groups during the transition period. Rawlings, who was firmly in charge of the state machinery, was acclaimed as the NDC presidential candidate after countrywide consultation with faction leaders and grass-roots organs. Similarly, parliamentary candidates were selected on the basis of consensus (Daddieh & Bob-Milliar Reference Daddieh and Bob-Milliar2012: 211). The choice of his running mate was critically important, and yielded the vice-presidential slot to the NCP's Kow Nkensen Arkaah.

The outcome of the presidential poll gave the Rawlings-led Progressive Alliance a national victory, which the opposition parties disputed. There were soon personality disagreements between Rawlings and Arkaah (Frempong Reference Frempong and Boafo-Arthur2007). The factions became opposed: the NCP faction was increasingly sidelined by the NDC faction (Nugent Reference Nugent1999: 292), and competitive factionalism permeated the cabinet and government. The vice-president was blamed for disloyalty to his coalition partners in some of his public pronouncements. As Ayee (Reference Ayee and Boafo-Arthur2007: 174) reports, in a May Day speech the vice-president appealed to workers to oppose the government economic policy, arguing that the decision to implement the 17.5% VAT was not approved by the cabinet. The disagreement shown in relation to economic policy goals is consistent with Janda's (Reference Janda and Finifter1993) argument that parties containing ideological factions also tend to have leadership factions. In the case of the Rawlings–Arkaah alliance, party members responded to signals from senior party figures. The alliance all but collapsed when Rawlings physically assaulted Arkaah at a Cabinet meeting on 28 December 1995 (Frempong Reference Frempong and Boafo-Arthur2007: 143; Nugent Reference Nugent2001: 413).

In the 1996 election Rawlings, running on the NDC's platform unopposed, had to choose a replacement for Arkaah. Meanwhile, a resurgent NPP had gone into an electoral alliance with the People's Convention Party (PCP).Footnote ¹ The Kufuor–Arkaah alliance threatened the NDC's dominance in the Central Region, from which Arkaah hailed. In the multiparty environment, where numbers decided who won the presidency, the NDC could not afford to lose votes in swing constituencies in the Central and Western regions. According to Nugent (Reference Nugent2001: 413), President Rawlings' initial preference for running mate was Goosie Tanoh, a dyed-in-the-wool supporter of the PNDC regime. Tanoh, however, did not get Mrs Rawlings' support because of his commercial interest in a cassava chips export business, in which the latter's DWM also had an interest. Rawlings' selection of a hitherto political unknown, John Evans Atta Mills, came as a great shock in party circles. Mills had no grass-roots political experience and was not a member of the PNDC or any of the known political traditions. For a quarter of a century before working at the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), Mills had taught tax and corporate law at the University of Ghana's Faculty of Law, and rose to the rank of associate professor. In the 1970/80 s, members of the law faculty promoted vigorous intellectual discourse on leftist politics and development paradigms. Mills' membership in this group is uncertain (Essuman-Johnson 2012 int.). Nonetheless, others from the ‘Legon Left’ (cf. Nugent Reference Nugent2010), including Kwesi Botchwey, Tsatsu Tsikata and Kwamena Ahwoi, would later dominate (P)NDC politics.

Among the factors that informed the choice of Mills was his marketability. After the acrimony of his Arkaah partnership, Rawlings wanted somebody independent of factions and ‘politically dependent on him’ (Frempong Reference Frempong and Boafo-Arthur2007). Above all, a politically neutral candidate would be no obstacle to the Rawlings hegemony or any future presidential ambitions of Mrs Rawlings (Nugent Reference Nugent2001: 413). The NDC's manipulative strategy as the guardian of the Nkrumah heritage (Milne Reference Milne1999: 268) also played a part. Like many youths of his generation, Mills' sympathies were thought to be with the Nkrumahist tradition: he had a brief stint at the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science (also known as Winneba Ideological Institute). Nevertheless, while at the University of Ghana, Mills was not a member of the ‘Legon Caucus’ of Nkrumahists (Essuman-Johnson 2012 int.). Another reason for the choice of Mills was the polls permutations: they implied that the NDC needed to win the Western and Central Regions. Consistent with the ‘favourite son’ thesis (Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar2011: 466), it was anticipated that Mills' nomination would help swing the Fante vote to the NDC (Jeffries Reference Jeffries1998). The Rawlings–Mills ticket secured the NDC and its allies a second term, which was to end in 2000. Vice-President Mills, unlike Arkaah, was allocated an office space at the Castle,Footnote ² where he worked directly under Rawlings. Under the tutelage of the so-called ‘Fante Confederacy’,Footnote ³ Mills was carefully groomed to succeed Rawlings. He avoided controversy, and worked behind the scenes.

The 2000 election was the first in Ghana's history after an incumbent president had completed the constitutional two terms. Rawlings was constitutionally barred from seeking a third term. The succession question polarised opinion, and ended the cooperative factionalism in the party. The NDC thus entered Boucek's (Reference Boucek2009) competitive factionalism phase with the emergence of pro- and anti-Rawlings factions. The pro-Rawlings faction wanted the mantle to pass to Vice-President Mills; the anti-Rawlings faction favoured an open contest. With the powers of incumbency, and capitalising on his huge grass-roots popularity, Rawlings ignored any threat to party cohesion, and in June 1998 used his veto power to declare Mills the NDC presidential nominee at a party rally in the Central Region town of Agona Swedru (Frempong Reference Frempong and Boafo-Arthur2007: 145). The pro-Rawlings faction which insisted on leadership continuity supported the declaration. The anti-Rawlings faction, mainly reformists, questioned the democratic legitimacy of Rawlings' action (Nugent Reference Nugent1999: 314). Dissent over what is popularly known as the ‘Swedru Declaration’ gave birth to the Reform Movement, and the NDC leadership resorted to Machiavellian tactics to deal with this open rebellion. The succession issue faded away when advocates of reform serving in the government were dismissed (Boafo-Arthur Reference Boafo-Arthur and Mohamed Salih2003: 228).

Goosie Tanoh, who emerged as the spokesman for the Reform Movement, argued that ‘the kind of energy required to reform the NDC is the kind of energy needed to form a new political party’ (Thisweek 15.2.1999). Consequently, the Reform Movement was turned into a political party in June 1999 under the name National Reform Party (NRP). This styled itself as the platform for all progressives, and therefore articulated no policy goals different from those of the NDC. The NRP contested the elections, but performed dismally when Tanoh, its presidential candidate, polled only 1.20%; it also lost all the parliamentary seats it contested (Ayee 2005). After the 2000 elections the NRP leadership exited the political scene. Many of its rank and file members secretly rejoined the NDC.

Meanwhile, other factions in the NDC waged long campaigns to have one of their own nominated as vice-presidential candidate. The EGLE and Democratic Peoples' Party (DPP) factions supported Dr Obed Asamoah (Daily Graphic 17.7.2000), who was instrumental in the formation of the NDC (Nugent Reference Nugent1996). Mills picked Martin Amidu, who happened to be Dr Asamoah's ministerial deputy. The denial of the vice-presidential slot to Asamoah resulted in the EGLE leader and deputy information minister, Owuraku Amofa, deserting his portfolio in protest (Frempong Reference Frempong and Boafo-Arthur2007: 154). As a result, the NDC entered the 2000 election with a presidential candidate with a legitimacy deficit, who also lacked significant popular support among party members. Mills led the fragmented NDC into opposition, where it stayed for eight years.

FACTIONALISM AS A CONSEQUENCE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE

The primary goal of political parties in Ghana's emergent two-party system is, essentially, executive power, which means winning more than 50% of valid votes cast in national elections, and forming a government. The defeat of the NDC in the December 2000 election led to major changes in the party hierarchy. The reforms implemented in the NDC in 2002 are consistent with the argument of performance theorists, that political parties only change when their survival is threatened (e.g. Harmel & Janda Reference Harmel and Janda1994).

From the transition period through the first stages of consolidation, the NDC functioned virtually as an ‘election winning machine’, securing it office on two occasions (Chronicle 17.7.2001). Its defeat thus necessitated an in-depth evaluation of its performance in government. The most important consequence was the adoption of a major policy document, titled ‘A social democratic agenda for Ghana’. The NDC (2002: 1) adopted social democracy to guide the party's policy goals and programmes. It operationalised its social democracy to mean:

Related to party organisational change are other intra-party dynamics, such as alternation in the executive leadership and the party's dominant faction (Harmel et al. Reference Harmel, Heo, Tan and Janda1995: 4). The formal structure of power in the NDC is significant. Before 2002 Rawlings held the party's founder and leader positions, both carrying executive powers. Similarly, the national chairmanship position was occupied by two individuals: too much power was thus concentrated in Rawlings' hands. Functions were also duplicated in the co-chairman concept. The anti-Rawlings faction, concerned about intra-party democracy, campaigned for separation of the founder and leader positions and for abolition of the co-chair (Seidu 2008 int.). Advocates of the reforms were pitted against defenders of the status quo, for whom the ‘party was inseparable from Rawlings' (Bob-Milliar Reference Bob-Milliar2011: 467). The pre-congress campaigns were dominated by political mudslinging, with the pro-Rawlings faction seeking to maintain the status quo, and the anti-Rawlings faction, spearheaded by Dr Obed Asamoah, against the ‘Rawlingsisation’ of the NDC (CDD-Ghana 2002: 10). The Rawlings and Asamoah feud is personal and based on Asamoah's belief that he had not been adequately rewarded for his efforts in putting the NDC together (see Nugent Reference Nugent1996).Footnote ⁴

Meanwhile, in the race for chairmanship the pro-Rawlings faction supported the candidacy of Alhaji Mahama Iddrisu, and the anti-Rawlings rallied behind Dr Obed Asamoah. The contest was seen as a proxy battle between the factions for control over the party apparatus (CDD-Ghana 2002: 10). On 27 April 2002, the pro-Rawlings faction suffered its first real defeat in an internal contest when the separation of the positions of party founder and leader was approved by party rank and file members. Henceforth, the leader of the NDC would be the party's presidential nominee when in opposition, and the incumbent president when in government. The party founder description was conferred on Rawlings, and enshrined in Article 6 of the party's constitution (NDC 2002: 1). In the chairmanship race, Dr Asamoah narrowly won (334 to 332), making him the first sole national chairman since the founding of the NDC.

Every organisation, and certainly every political party leader, needs supporters to carry out changes (Panebianco 1988). The leadership change in the NDC affected the pro-Rawlings faction. Indeed, the approval of the reforms further deepened the personality rivalry between Rawlings and Asamoah. Competitive factionalism became part of the internal power struggle, with the executive leadership split into pro- and anti-Rawlings factions (Josiah-Aryeh 2008: 89–127). In the party's first presidential primary contest, in December 2002, the factions first sought to realign the power blocs or consolidate their power bases by supporting rival candidacies. Professor John Atta-Mills enjoyed the support of the pro-Rawlings faction. Critics of the Mills candidacy pointed to his closeness to Rawlings and lack of a real constituency within the NDC. Dr Kwesi Botchwey, his co-partisan competitor, was backed by the anti-Rawlings faction (Africa Confidential 8.11.2002). As Ghana's longest serving finance minister, Botchwey was better known than Mills, and enjoyed the support of the party's cadres. Intimidation and violence marred the day of polling. Mills garnered 1,116 votes, against 194 votes for Botchwey (Ghana News Agency 22.12.2002).

The competitive factionalism described thus far has revealed the emergence of two powerful blocs, whose power was balanced. Both backed candidates in the chairmanship and party leader races, but neither was able to win both positions. The leadership contest of December 2005 not only reaffirmed the continuing relevance of the pro-Rawlings faction in the NDC; it also gave them control of the party, at great cost to party cohesion (Josiah-Aryeh 2008: 125–6; CDD-Ghana 2005). In contention was the unilateralism of the party founder. Dr Asamoah, the party chairman, acknowledged the usurpation of his powers when he said: ‘I believe that the NDC should be run through the structures established by its constitution, but Mr. Rawlings wants the party to be run from his house. He calls all sorts of meetings to take decisions which are not right’ (Daily Graphic 2.12.2005).

In the end the candidates backed by the pro-Rawlings faction won the key positions of party chairman and general secretary by a landslide. Dr Kwabena Adjei defeated the incumbent, Dr Obed Asamoah, polling 1,158 to 208 votes. For the position of general secretary, a former minister, Johnson Asiedu Nketsia, defeated Bede Ziedeng by 1,068 to 188 votes (ibid. 24.12.2005). Following the party congress, some aggrieved members, including Asamoah, resigned from the party, citing violence, intimidation and harassment (CDD-Ghana 2005). The breakaway faction later, in February 2006, and without much planning, founded the Democratic Freedom Party (DFP). Indeed, Dr Asamoah built his factional following with people who did not share his ‘ideology’. Many of his followers were aggrieved members who lost their positions in the NDC leadership contest. As a result, on 16 October 2008, no sooner was the DFP founded than Frances Assiam, a second vice chairman of the party, announced her resignation, and joined the then governing NPP. The party made no impact in the 2008 general election, when its presidential candidate was placed a distant fifth, polling 0.33% (see EC 2008).

As Ghana approached its fifth national election in December 2008, many NDC party activists questioned Mills' electability. Having lost two elections in succession, a third defeat might have fractured the NDC further. The selection of a presidential candidate again created problems. The party old guard backed Mills, while the younger generation wanted the mantle to pass to Ekwow Spio-Garbrah (Africa Confidential 15.12.2006). A wavering Rawlings grudgingly obliged, and in an open contest three senior members competed against Mills; Mills triumphed when he polled 81.4% of the votes cast (Daily Graphic 22.12.2006).

The cooperative spirit in the party hierarchy did not last long. Less than eleven months before the December 2008 election, Mills' health status polarised opinion in the NDC.Footnote ⁵ Rawlings publicised a cell phone text message from one of Mills' competitors, asking him to persuade Mills to step down. The publicity was bad for the party strategists, and became worse when an ally of Rawlings was reported to have said: ‘Whether we like it or not, we are going into the race like wounded tigers, and we cannot allow a sheep to lead lions into such a battle. I'm afraid for my party’ (Daily Guide 31.1.2008). The party leadership was called on to organise an emergency congress to select a replacement for Mills. Party insiders alleged that Rawlings was keen to abandon Mills on the grounds of poor health, but was persuaded that it was unfeasible to change the presidential candidate in the middle of the campaign (Anonymous B 2012 int.). The ‘Fante Confederacy’, which groomed Mills when he joined the party as vice-president, and included prominent (P)NDC members (the Ahwoi brothers and Totobi Quakyi), thwarted any moves to dethrone their man (Anonymous C 2011 int.).

The NDC healed its fissures, presented a united face to the general public, and won the presidency in a run-off. With the party firmly in control of state affairs, President Mills quickly consolidated the power base of the Fante bloc when he brought into government prominent members of the (P)NDC who had fallen out with Rawlings towards the end of his regime (Essuman-Johnson 2012 int.). Factionalism with varied motives emerged when party members perceived as ‘Rawlings boys’ were rewarded inadequately for their roles in the NDC's return to office (see Adjei 2012; Spio-Garbrah 2009).

‘GAME’ AND ‘FONKAR’ FACTIONS

For nearly two decades (1981–2001) Nana Konadu Agyemang-Rawlings ‘held sway in Ghanaian politics’ (Gyimah-Boadi 2004: 22) as Ghana's First Lady and president of the DWM. The DWM was instrumental in the formation of the NDC (Dadzie & Ahwoi Reference Dadzie and Ahwoi2010; Nugent Reference Nugent2001), and was, effectively, the women's wing of the NDC. It contributed to party funds, and mobilised women to the NDC's platform (Bob-Milliar 2011: 469; Nugent 2007: 264). Nonetheless, Mrs Rawlings held no official position in the government or party until 2010, when she was elected one of several vice-chairpersons in the NDC.

Throughout the eight years the NDC stayed in opposition the party founder and his wife supported it in diverse ways. First, they used their high profile to find sponsorship for it at home and in the Ghanaian diaspora (Chronicle 15.8.2007).Footnote ⁶ Second, Rawlings' charisma and popularity are unparalleled in the modern history of Ghana, so he is the party's most effective campaigner (Gyimah-Boadi 2009; van Walraven 2002). Indeed, a senior NDC figure admits that ‘Rawlings was “a blessing and a curse”, vital to the cause for his charismatic appeal, but equally risky as a loose cannon who sometimes loses sight of his role’ (quoted in Statesman 12.9.2011). After the NDC's return to power, however, he and his wife were not given due ‘recognition for their contribution’, and were allowed less say in the party's direction (Anonymous B 2012 int.). Party factions usually seek representation on the boards of agencies or in the cabinet in order to influence programmes and decisions. In launching her bid for the vice-chair, Mrs Rawlings pointed out that a place in the party's executive would be the ideal platform from which to ‘espouse [the party's] principles and ideals to help steer affairs more successfully’ (Myjoyonline.com 11.11.2009).

In early January 2010, the pro-Rawlings faction attempted to reclaim the party by supporting candidates for executive positions in the leadership contest. Most of the old executives were retained (Daily Graphic 17.1.2010). In order not to ‘embarrass the founder’, three Rawlings loyalists were elected: Kofi Adams, his spokesperson, was elected one of two deputy general secretaries; and Mrs Rawlings and Ekwow Spio-Garbrah were elected as vice-chairpersons. This outcome denied the pro-Rawlings faction total control of the party machinery. After the congress, Rawlings and his wife intensified their criticism of President Mills' leadership style and the government's abandonment of the core NDC values and principles. The ex-president summed up his frustrations in the following words (Rawlings 9.10.2010):

The pro- and anti-Rawlings schism carries undertones of factionalism of principles and interests. Of the former, three policy-oriented goals can be discerned. First, the expectation of the pro-Rawlings faction, and of rank and file members, was that the NDC government would be guided by the ideals of probity, accountability and social justice in assessing the record of the past NPP administration (Agyeman-Rawlings 4.6.2011). On the issue of justice, the NDC, while in opposition, accused the NPP administration of complicity in the murder of an important northern traditional chief, Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II and some of his kinsmen on 27 March 2002, in what the government described as a ‘disturbance’ (Republic of Ghana 2002).

The ruling NPP administration set up the Wuaku Commission to investigate the crime, but the government failed to prosecute the alleged killers. A recent study has concluded that ‘political manoeuvring and complicit actions’ by influential politicians in the NPP administration may have contributed to the death of the chief (Ahorsu & Gebe Reference Ahorsu and Gebe2011). It became a major campaign issue during the 2008 electioneering campaigns, and the NDC capitalised on the issue to gain political advantage over co-partisans in Dagbon. In its 2008 manifesto the party promised: ‘We will set up a new and truly non-partisan, professionally competent and independent Presidential Commission to reopen investigations into the murder of the Ya Na, Yakubu Andani II and his followers in March 2002’ (NDC 2008: 34). Consistent with the campaign pledge, the administration reopened the case, and charged fifteen individuals. Instead of the Presidential Commission pledged in the manifesto, though, a committee without the powers of such a commission did the investigating. The accused persons were all acquitted and discharged on legal technicalities by an Accra High Court. The pro-Rawlings faction called for justice for the people of Dagbon, consistent with the NDC's principles of accountability and justice.

Second, on the principle of probity, the NDC campaigned on an anti-corruption platform and promised in its manifesto: ‘we shall promptly investigate allegations of corruption and allow the law to take its course’ (NDC 2008: 24). Since assuming office, the Attorney-General and Justice Ministry have been unsuccessful in prosecuting corruption cases brought against appointees of the Kufuor regime. For example, in the famous case of ‘Ghana@50’, two appointeesFootnote ⁷ of the NPP administration, Dr Wereko-Brobby and Kwadwo Mpiani, were charged with ‘willfully causing financial loss to the state’. Both were discharged by the Accra High Court. Many in the NDC expressed their frustration with the performance of the Attorney-General's department, and claimed that the ‘losses in courts’ were bringing embarrassment to the government.Footnote ⁸

Third, another policy-related grievance of the pro-Rawlings faction was that the Mills administration was slow in executing its ‘Better Ghana’ agenda. A critic summed it up:

The pro-Rawlings faction claimed that the president's leadership did not inspire confidence and that it also lacked revolutionary adrenalin. They further accused the president of appointing non-NDC members to key positions in his cabinet, disregarding NDC policy goals. Nevertheless, Rawlings (2009) revealed self-interest when he said:

A critical analysis of the above quotation reveals self-interest as the motivation of the pro-Rawlings faction. It appears that Rawlings wanted redress for the humiliation he and some of his followers suffered under the NPP administration. The NPP administration withdrew Rawlings protocol courtesies to ‘bring him to order’. As explained by President Kufuor, ‘whenever [Rawlings] had the chance anywhere in the world, he would call a press conference and insult me’ (quoted in Africawatch April 2010). The withdrawal of state protocol courtesies saw Rawlings carrying his own luggage at international airports. Additionally, several of Rawlings' ministers were successfully prosecuted for ‘willfully causing financial loss to the state’. Despite several attempts by the NPP administration to rope Rawlings in, the closest they got was his wife (see Josiah-Aryeh 2008: 138–9). Mrs Rawlings was charged for the role she played in the divestiture of a state-owned cannery at Nsawam. Her case dragged on for the entire eight years of the NPP administration. The implications of the trials and subsequent imprisonment of several high-ranking NDC functionaries were very embarrassing to Rawlings. Despite talk of probity and accountability, the Rawlings administration presided over corruption.

The NDC, then in opposition, described the trial of Mrs Rawlings and the others as ‘political persecution’. Their claim of political witch hunt was given weight when, on the eve of power transfer to the NDC administration in January 2009, President Kufuor dropped the charges against Mrs Rawlings and four others. The pro-Rawlings faction pursued a ‘politics of equalisation’ and wanted the NDC government to send ‘some of the big NPP thieves to the cooler at Nsawam’ to satisfy the egos of functionaries who were ‘wrongfully prosecuted’ under the NPP administration. The Mills administration agreed but wanted the law to take its course.

Furthermore, another interest-related motive of the pro-Rawlings faction was linked to the largely unelected ‘kitchen cabinet’ around Mills. The Ahwoi brothers (Ato and Kwamena), Dr Cadman Mills, Kojo Tsikata, Totobi Quakyi and Professor Kofi Awoonor, among others, were ‘all trusted advisors’ and the real power-brokers in the government (Africawatch May 2011). Many members of Mills' ‘kitchen cabinet’ came from the Nkrumahist tradition, which Rawlings always saw as a threat to his own legacy (Anonymous D 2012 int.). Despite the claim in the party's campaign manifesto that ‘our governance proposals have been inspired by the pioneering work that the first President of the Republic of Ghana bestowed on this and future generations'(NDC 2008: 32), Mills was accused of promoting an Nkrumahist agenda by aligning the party with Nkrumahist principles. His ‘revolutionary’ credentials were questioned because as president he stopped attending the annual ‘revolutionary’ parades commemorating the 4 June and 31 December rebellions. He was thus accused of dishonouring their memories, and sponsoring distortion of the ‘achievements of the revolution’.

Despite the pro-Rawlings emphasis on NDC's values and principles as the basis of the divisions, the anti-Rawlings faction sees self-interest as the principal motive for the intra-party squabbles. Some party members were promised ministerial and ambassadorial portfolios but never got them, and some of the old guard were overlooked in the president's ministerial allocations.Footnote ⁹ This group of aggrieved party members looked to Rawlings to bring President Mills to order but ‘he would not listen to wise counsel’ (Myjoyonline.com 14.9.2011). The public pronouncements of members of the pro-Rawlings faction, according to one interpretation, were aimed at undermining the authority of the president within the party. The launch of FONKAR, which supported Mrs Rawlings' presidential nomination bid, thus did not surprise observers. President Mills' supporters formed GAME. Mills won the presidential primary election with 2,771 votes (96.9%), while Mrs Rawlings trailed with 90 (3.1%). Three main factors, all rooted in the internal NDC politics already analysed, contributed to Mills' victory.

First, Mills was able to use his position as party leader and incumbent president to construct a patronage network in preparation for his re-nomination bid. For example, almost all national party executives and regional chairmen were appointed by the president to serve on the governing boards of government organisations and parastatals, where many are paid huge sitting allowances. The pro-Rawlings faction was no longer able to call on the advantages of incumbency, which the Mills faction manipulated to its own advantage. Many of the individuals who gave campaign funds in the past simply switched to the Mills camp. Mills also had a clear advantage over Mrs Rawlings because, as a three-time party presidential nominee, he enjoyed a monopoly over the mainstream media sources that the pro-Rawlings faction struggled to match.

The second essential factor underpinning Mills' victory was the smallness of the party's electoral college, which numbered slightly over 3,000. The pro-Rawlings faction's popularity was grass-roots-based, but most of the delegates voting at the NDC congress were party executives, MPs and other government appointees. Another, related, reason for many delegates and senior NDC ‘king makers’ supporting the Mills ticket was the fear of retributive justice – something the pro-Rawlings faction had been known to use. In this context the personalities of the two candidates were repeatedly stressed: Mill's conciliatory demeanour contrasted with Mrs Rawlings' combative style.

Finally, reformists supported Mills because they wanted to depersonalise politics and deepen democratic culture in the party. This group of reform-minded ‘Young Turks’, some of whom were relative newcomers to the party, resisted the resurgence of the ‘undemocratic’ pro-Rawlings faction within the NDC and the recycling of the old PNDC era elite. They supported Mills largely because as a ‘former law professor, he is the candidate most likely to continue with democratising the party’ (Anonymous D 2012 int.). Although competition between pro- and anti-Rawlings factions was fierce, the boundaries between them are not always easy to draw. Interestingly, the anti-Rawlings faction, or GAME, comprised people who gained prominence under President Rawlings, many of whom were survivors from the PNDC era.

All political organisations contain diverse interest groups. The variety of ideas sometimes leads to parties achieving their policy goals. It can also result in gridlock when ideas become contested and split the party. The academic literature shows factionalism to be common among political parties. The NDC, a by-product of the ‘military oligarchy’ headed by Rawlings (Bratton & van der Walle 1997), is an assemblage of interest groups. Boucek's typology provides a model for analysing party factions from a dynamic perspective. Factionalism has always been a character of the NDC. Nevertheless, the first eight years of its existence were characterised by cooperative factionalism. The various interest groups, though separate, bonded together under the ‘big-tent’ party. The NDC became an integrated party but with executive powers concentrated in one individual. Consistent with Boucek's argument, decision-making in the NDC during this period was consensual. Fissures were blurred and in the process the dominant Rawlings faction consolidated its power base. Personality rivalries between key figures in the NDC in the run-up to its first national leadership contest triggered the party's competitive phase of factionalism. The key change came when reforms curtailed the powers of the dominant faction. But only after the democratisation of the presidential candidate selection did factional support become almost indispensable for figures seeking the NDC nomination.

Power in Ghana's two main political parties is concentrated in the party hierarchy. Whoever controls the hierarchy also enjoys a certain amount of patronage. As a result, the competition for executive leadership positions in the two main parties and the distribution of political patronage are heavily influenced by factional alignment. Competition has become keen, giving rise to ad hoc groupings which are largely factions of interest. Factionalism in the NPP resembles the cooperative type. The basis of the NPP's divisions is personal rivalry between ‘reactionary lawyers’, each of whom feels better qualified to lead the party and represent the interests of their group. As a conservative party, the NPP values individual achievements and loyalty to the Danquah–Busia tradition more highly.

In contrast, factionalism in the NDC is a very complex phenomenon. It has fluctuated between cooperative and competitive phases. Nevertheless, the NDC is characterised more by cooperative factionalism, which often looks like veering into competitive factionalism. Cooperative factionalism enabled the various groups to retain their distinct identities in the transition to the Fourth Republic. Factionalism during the consolidation period of the party relied on consensus-building in the distribution of patronage. Power was concentrated in the hands of President Rawlings, giving rise to the pro-Rawlings power bloc.

On the whole, ideological differences between the NDC and NPP are marginal. Arguably, factionalism in the two main parties offers little difference. Factions in both are largely of the interest type, and operate to obtain privileges and resources for their members. Factions are nurtured in the party hierarchy usually around specific issues and are constellated around individual leaders. However, the NPP factions appear separate and are not necessarily opposed, and also have undertones of ethnicity characterised by Asante/Akyem rivalry. Nevertheless, the Danquah and Busia factions usually remain in the NPP and jockey for influence. In contrast, the condition for the existence of factionalism in the NDC appears to be policy-oriented on the surface; but beneath, self-interest of key party figures underpins factionalism.

The NDC is prone to factional fragmentation because of its so-called ‘revolutionary’ antecedents, but the NRP and DFP factions, which broke away from the NDC in 1999 and 2006, respectively, struggled to survive. Both registered poor results in national elections, and eventually returned to the NDC fold. Nevertheless, in July 2012, some members from the FONKAR faction broke away from the NDC and founded the National Democratic Party (NDP).Footnote ¹⁰ This is consistent with the behaviour of aggrieved NDC members. Like the NRP and DFP, the NDP has no nation-wide appeal and therefore it is not aiming to win the national election but to position itself as one of several brokers in the unlikely event of a presidential run-off between the NDC and NPP. However, following the untimely death of President Mills on 24 July 2012, Vice President John Dramani Mahama was sworn in as President of the Republic to serve out the remaining term of the late president. The death of President Mills has affected the power dynamics in the NDC. Former President Rawlings participated in the 31 August 2012 party congress that proclaimed President Mahama as the NDC's presidential candidate for the December 2012 election. Significantly, the FONKAR faction did not contest the proclamation of Mahama. In the foreseeable future, the GAME and FONKAR factions will remain in the NDC fold. Nevertheless, the FONKAR faction would gain from the NDC’s defeat in the presidential election, empowering the pro-Rawlings group to reclaim the party by pushing for the expansion of the electoral college to enfranchise more grass-roots members. On the other hand, a fresh mandate for President Mahama could see the NDC return to cooperative factionalism as the GAME and FONKAR factions would need each other's endorsement to contest key party leadership positions.