Work on the ethics of care has grown exponentially during the first decades of the twenty-first century. Scholars from many disciplines—moral and political philosophy, psychology, geography, gender studies, theology—and those working in applied areas such as nursing, social work, and education have found within it a welcome counter to the dominance of neoliberal ideology. Assumptions of the rational, individual choice maker as a basis on which social and economic policy should be constructed have had profoundly negative consequences for those both working in and needing to use welfare services. Daniel Engster is a political scientist working on political theory and theories of justice. I regard myself as an applied social scientist whose work on social policy has focussed on the way service users have sought to impact social policies and practices, and on evaluations of policy programs. I note this because while a strength of care ethics is its capacity to speak to scholars (and practitioners) working in diverse areas, this also means we bring to it rather different ways of thinking.
Engster's first book on care ethics, The Heart of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2007) appeared to want to invent a welfare state. It felt as if he was rehearsing some very familiar arguments about the importance of collective responsibilities for welfare. His current book goes much further in this direction. Its aim is not only to develop a theory of justice based in care ethics, an objective that others have pursued in recognition of the necessity to avoid an either justice or care approach to welfare, but also to develop the policy implications of such a theory. His attempt is a bold one. It starts from a view with which I have considerable sympathy: that political philosophers should not stop at theorizing but should build a bridge to practical policymaking. Engster does this through developing and applying a nonideal theory of welfare-state justice.
Others have sought to bridge the divide between philosophy and social science—Margaret Urban Walker (Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study in Ethics [Oxford University Press, 2007]) from the standpoint of philosophy and Andrew Sayer (Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life [Cambridge University Press, 2011]) from a position within social science. Both see the contextual and relational stance of feminist care ethics as one way of making such connections. But Engster's purpose is very different. He develops quite precise policy proposals that, he argues, a theory of justice based in care ethics indicates are the right way forward. He addresses policy relating to children, health care, older people (I cannot adopt his term “the elderly”), disability, and poverty (again I eschew use of “the poor”). In each case he develops a nonideal theory of justice linked to care. He then reviews empirical evidence—primarily international comparative data on expenditure and outcomes—as a basis on which to build his arguments concerning the broad policy approach necessary to achieve justice. He sets out specific policy proposals and makes an estimate of their costs as a proportion of gross domestic product. At one level this ambitious program can be applauded for its consistency of commitment to reviewing data and applying a coherent analytical framework to policy proposals capable of informing governmental programs encompassing commitments to both care and justice.
This short review cannot engage with and assess the specifics of the policies proposed. But it can consider whether they constitute a specifically care-ethical approach to policy that reflects the centrality of care to justice. My concerns in this respect reflect the distinctiveness of care ethics as an approach that emphasizes context and relationality, that understands care as a process of receiving as well as giving in which both care giver and care receiver are active moral agents. Attentiveness to specific contexts for care and the responses of those receiving care mean that care practices should develop out of dialogue rather than be imposed. The dimensions or phases of care practice are most typically considered in the context of face-to-face care, but can be and have been applied to both the processes of policymaking and the nature or content of policy (M. Barnes, Care in Everyday Life: An Ethic of Care in Practice [Policy Press, 2012]).
Engster's prescriptive approach sits uneasily with the dialogic or deliberative implications of care ethics for policymaking. With one exception, the voices and perspectives of those who are the objects of policy are missing from his account. Agreement with policy recommendations is assumed and Engster does not shrink from mandatory proposals—for example, parental training classes for all new parents. An emphasis on quantitative research evidence means that complex relationships between policies, their implementation, and how they interact with the experience of those using welfare services are missing. Acceptance of choice-based arguments, for example that caregivers of older people can easily be replaced if they prove unsatisfactory, sits uneasily alongside more nuanced work exploring the different rationality of choice and care (A. Mol, The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice [Routledge, 2008]). The chapter on disability is perhaps most effective. This can be accounted for by its engagement with the way in which disabled people themselves have challenged official policy on the basis of existential theorizing about disability and its relationship to both care and justice.
Context is absent in other ways. Engster writes from a North American perspective but seeks to encompass Western Europe, Australia, and New Zealand within his purview. But he adopts a domestic welfare-state perspective rather than addressing the increasingly significant impacts of globalization on care (F. Williams, “Migration and Care,” Social Policy and Society 9 [2010]: 385–96). He explicitly avoids consideration of race and ethnicity, and only in the book's penultimate paragraph does he acknowledge that his policy proposals would need to be adapted to specific circumstances and cultures. Combined with the prescriptive articulation of policy proposals, the result is that the ambition demonstrated sometimes feels either naive or arrogant.
As a basis for debate among students about policies that a care-ethics theory of justice might imply, individual chapters could provide useful texts. Some of what Engster proposes offers an important corrective to dominant policy influence—for example, his emphasis on the care element within health care policy. I continue to applaud Engster's intention. But ultimately I found myself reflecting on the problems of constructing a soundly engineered bridge between political philosophy and practical policy within the frame of one book.
