This volume positions itself in the venerable German tradition of Kulturwissenschaften pioneered by Winckelmann in the eighteenth century. S. uses a pair of opposing conceptions of ‘rationality’ – a term which he does not define, but which appears to mean something like ‘the nature of thought’ – to explain the relationship between Graeco-Roman antiquity and the later European intellectual tradition.

The volume is the culmination of a multi-disciplinary research group which S. led on ‘The Self-Conception of Modernity and Interpretation of Antiquity’. Its aim was to understand how thinkers since late medieval scholasticism and the Renaissance constructed their conception of the ‘modern’ and contrasted themselves with previous historical periods, in particular classical antiquity. It is disappointing that S. does not present the findings of the participants' research, on which he heavily draws, or the overall structure of his ‘Modernity’ project more thoroughly at the outset of his book. Instead, he relies heavily on discussions of these findings in his footnotes, with relatively scarce reference to the wider scholarly context.

The main thesis of the volume is that, across all intellectual disciplines, two fundamental conceptions of rationality can be discerned. Since the structure is rather involved, I shall deal with the topics by theme.

S.'s idea of the ‘ancient’ rationality, to be found in thinkers from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, to the Neoplatonists and medieval scholastics down to Nicholas of Cusa, centres on a ‘philosophy of discrimination’ based on a ‘principle of non-contradiction, that something cannot simultaneously be itself and not itself’ (p. 260). This idea builds on S.'s earlier work for the ‘Self-Conception’ project, in particular his article ‘Platon und das empirische Denken der Neuzeit’ (translated as ‘Platonism and Empiricism’, GFPJ 27.1 [2006], 151–92). Identifying contradictions in our opinions, S. argues in Chapters 4–5, is the starting point for distinguishing further between them. The central act of thinking is thus one of distinguishing, or discriminating, between different objects of thought. S. views this principle as the foundation on which Plato proceeded to knowledge of the Forms and Aristotle to knowledge of universals. Essentially, he believes both philosophers conceived of the thinking process as one which ‘relies on abstract concepts and “deduces” experience from them rather than acquiring it “inductively”’ (p. 121).

The ‘modern’ rationality, to be found in thinkers from the late medieval period and the Renaissance to the present day, centres on a ‘philosophy of consciousness’, or of ‘healthy common sense’ (Chapters 1–2). This philosophy is fundamentally empirical: it starts from the premise that ‘we perceive the things of the world through our senses and … construct concepts from what we perceive’ (p. 116), and appeals to sense-impressions as the basis of thought. Thus, for thinkers from Descartes to Kant, Hobbes to Adam Smith, Vico to Cassirer, the central act of thinking is perceiving, rather than, as with Plato and Aristotle, discriminating between concepts.

These ‘moderns’ were prejudiced against the Platonic–Aristotelian view of thought because it focused too much upon the mind's internal rather than external objects. They adopted the motif of revolution, a ‘turn’ away from old to new ways of thinking, to characterise their theories in order to distinguish themselves from their predecessors (Chapter 11). Belief in their own originality assumed a new importance. This belief was, however, misplaced: the Renaissance did not discover antiquity anew, but merely re-evaluated it. S. does not draw the obvious comparison with the polemical spirit in which Greek and Roman philosophy was conducted from its earliest origins, including by Plato and Aristotle (see, for example, H. Reiche, RhM 114 [1971], 296–329; C. Poster, AJPh [1997], 219–49).

In the remaining chapters, S. presents the strengths of the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of thinking and their consequences and, by contrast, the limitations of the ‘modern’, in relation to a number of issues: the soul (Chapter 6), the will (Chapter 7), ethics and aesthetics (Chapter 8), politics and the relation of the individual to the state (Chapter 9) and evolution (Chapter 10).

The volume raises interesting questions about the manner in which each new wave of intellectuals contrasts its own philosophical approaches with those of the past. S. is surely right to emphasise that Plato's and Aristotle's conceptions of the good life, and a correct self-interest which harmonises with the interest of the state as a whole, can still provide fertile material for twenty-first century ethical and political thought. It would have supported this claim to have noted that similar points have been made by a number of scholars in recent decades (for example, A. Nehamas, The Art of Living: Socratic Reflections from Plato to Foucault, [1998]; M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness [1986]). Omissions like this suggest a certain isolation from mainstream debate, or at least a loss of focus in a mass of material.

It is difficult to know how to criticise much of S.'s discussion of Plato, Aristotle and the rest, because he does not indicate where he is trying to interpret his sources and where, in contrast, he is using them as a springboard for his own speculations. However, the general impression is that he is more interested in the latter, as is perhaps unsurprising in a work which aims to draw grand conclusions from so large a range of texts. For example, S. makes an interesting connection between the Homeric and Platonic θυμός, but, instead of pursuing it in greater depth, immediately sweeps on to moralise about the ‘strivings [of the will] that are different from purely sensuous and purely intellectual strivings’ in the ‘man as such’ (pp. 299–300).

The account of Plato's psychology is taken almost exclusively from the tripartite model of the Republic, with little acknowledgement of variations in other dialogues, such as the Timaeus. It is symptomatic of the high level of generality at which S. is operating that his index does not include Plato's works, or Aristotle's, as individual entries, but simply lists references to the two authors by theme (under ‘Plato’, ‘aesthetics’, ‘anglers’, ‘cognition’, etc.).

S.'s work represents a new attempt to assess the significance of Plato and Aristotle upon European thought and to advocate a more central place for their conception of happiness in modern life. It is doubtful, though, whether he has established a sufficiently powerful schema to encompass the superficial similarities of approach in thinkers of widely different periods, cultures and disciplines.

V. Adluri's translation will make the volume, previously not well known outside the confines of German academia, available to an Anglophone audience. His rendering is generally adequate, although it has not succeeded in avoiding all the traps of literality (‘fundament of cognition’ is perhaps not what S. intended, p. 277).