Christopher Magra's book on the colonial American cod fishery covers the period from seventeenth-century beginnings to the end of the War of the American Revolution. Although not a thesis-driven book, nor a page-turner, it is a thoughtful work, and as rich in information as the dried, salted cod was in protein.
Three loosely connected sections organize the book. The first part looks at the fish itself and the evolution of the industry. Once dried and salted, cod consisted of 80 percent protein, and was a much cheaper source of nutrition than beef or pork. Properly treated, it could be stored safely for five years, far longer than herring or other more oily fishes. The Catholics of southern Europe and the planters of the West Indies provided booming markets for this staple.
The colonial fishery, as Magra makes clear, evolved dramatically after the first Massachusetts vessels tested nearby waters in the 1630s. During the seventeenth century, coastal towns in the Puritan colony were sparsely populated and relatively poor. Many of the sailors and most of the capital for the colonial fishery came from the England's West Country, places such as Cornwall, Devon, and Dorset. The schooners used were small, typically with a three-person crew, and ownership was widespread. By the early eighteenth century, a new era had emerged. Larger vessels, which served both to catch the cod and transport it to market, became the norm. American sailors now crewed, while a tightly knit group of wealthy traders, some from Boston but most from Marblehead, owned the ships. London capital helped break the grip of West Country merchants on this trade. But increasingly, Americans financed and directed the industry.
The book's second part, which discusses how conflict over the cod fishery helped provoke the American Revolution, is the longest and most significant section of the work. Magra makes a valuable contribution to the debate over the causes of the war. Historians such as Bernard Bailyn and Edmund Morgan contend that explanations of the conflict lie in the realm of ideas. Magra shows that, at least for New Englanders, a clash of interests led to increasing tension.
Magra sets the story of imperial conflict within the framework of shifting patterns of trade. One set of problems emerged from the exchanges with the West Indies. During the eighteenth century, New Englanders directed more and more of their fish to the Caribbean, and particularly to the French islands, where they swapped cod for molasses. Protests by British West India planters led in 1733 to the Molasses Act, which prohibited exchanges with the foreign islands. Although British officials never enforced the act, they renewed it every five years, branding New England merchants as smugglers. And while the Sugar Act of 1764 lowered duties on foreign molasses, Parliament put teeth into the new law, restructuring the customs service and stationing more naval vessels in American waters. New England merchants angrily condemned these measures.
Another area of contention, as Magra notes, reflected the competition for cod on the Grand Banks, which lay near Newfoundland and provided the richest source of these fish. By 1750 three commercial fisheries claimed roughly equal shares of the annual catch. The three were the West Country interests, New Englanders, and a relative newcomer, the fishery based in Newfoundland. West Country merchants, who were politically well connected, bitterly resented the New Englanders who competed with them in European markets and the waters of British North America. West Country merchants also complained that Marblehead vessels helped Newfoundlanders by supplying that island with needed foodstuffs. In 1765 West Country representatives secured new instructions for the royal navy: Commodore Hugh Palliser was told to remove New England vessels from the Grand Banks. Despite such harassment, Marbleheaders continued fishing. In early 1775 Britain struck still harder with the New England Trade and Fisheries Act, commonly known as the Restraining Act. This measure shut down the New England fishery by banning colonial vessels from the waters of British North America—and by prohibiting the colonists from carrying fish to the West Indies and Europe. For many in New England, this measure provided strong grounds for taking up arms and declaring independence.
The third section examines the contribution made by the ship owners and sailors of Marblehead to the Revolutionary War. Once hostilities closed the fishery, merchants quickly redeployed their vessels. Many ships were armed, forming in the early years of the war the backbone of the continental navy and Massachusetts coast guard. Other vessels were licensed to export the dried cod stored in merchants' warehouses, and trade that staple for gunpowder and arms. Marblehead men served on these vessels, as well as in the continental and state armies. They helped ferry Washington's troops across the Delaware in 1776. New Englanders insisted that any deal with Britain allow them to fish the Grand Banks, and they were gratified when the 1783 Treaty of Paris secured this right.
In sum, Magra provides material of great value for scholars interested in the cod fishery, the Atlantic economy, the origins of the Revolution, and the Revolutionary War. His book also has resonances for today's world where bitter international rivalries and lack of regulation have led to the destruction of the cod fishery—a resource that fed so many so well for over four centuries.
