Recent events in Ukraine have cast a sharp light on the Russian state and its foreign policy intentions. Particular attention has been directed at whether and how Russia might use its vast energy resources to further its political objectives in Europe and elsewhere. Thus, the timing of this book could hardly be better. Released in May 2014, it does not directly address the current conflict, but it affords a richly detailed context for thinking about these issues, one that is likely to remain relevant for some years, given Vladimir Putin’s staying power

The focus of the book is Russian energy policy since about 2000, when Putin first ascended to the presidency. Nevertheless, it provides considerable background on the development of the Soviet Union’s oil and gas resources and the disposition of those resources during the first decade of the post-Soviet era. The organization is primarily chronological, with occasional forays into more thematic topics.

In view of the title, readers are most likely to questionwhat Putin’s energy agenda is. In fact, Stefan Hedlund argues, the Russian leader has not had a consistent or comprehensive agenda. To be sure, the beginning of Putin’s presidency was marked by two overriding priorities in the realm of energy policy: implementing an effective tax policy to capture a greater share of the country’s massive energy rents and establishing “national champions,” such as Gazprom and Rosneft. These priorities were consistent with his broader ambitions of restoring domestic order and reclaiming lost respect in the global arena.

Hedlund goes on to identify four more concrete goals of Russian energy policy under Putin. The first two goals—reimposing state control over domestic actors and rolling back the influence of major foreign oil companies—were in response to a feared shift of power over policy into the hands of the owners of private companies. The other two—securing the energy assets of the Caspian basin and locking up the European gas market—had more to do with maintaining favorable international market conditions.

Nevertheless, Hedlund argues that many actions must be viewed as ad hoc responses to emerging conflicts and opportunities, and that the evidence is more consistent with a policy of gradual adaptation to unfolding events than with the presence of a “master plan.” In particular, he questions claims that the use of energy resources for foreign policy purposes has been a priority of the Putin regime. This is especially the case when it comes to relations with the European Union. Conflicts over energy have been but part of the broader pattern of conflict with other former Soviet republics.

Indeed, in contrast to the popular image of tight central control, Hedlund finds that Russian energy policy under Putin has been highly fragmented. He repeatedly describes a virtual free-for-all of multiple actors with different interests pursuing multiple agendas, often at cross-purposes with one another. Certainly, any willingness to use the “energy weapon” for political purposes has conflicted with the powerful commercial interests of the energy companies. Moreover, narrow short-term interests in personal enrichment have often been allowed to take precedence over longer-term state interest in security and sustainability.

Hedlund is particularly effective in laying out the contradictions and negative consequences for Russia of this state of affairs. One has been a pronounced failure to develop new oil and, especially, gas fields in order to put output on a sustainable basis. Although Putin was able to bring Gazprom back under state control, his hand-picked management team failed to improve the natural gas giant’s performance and, in particular, neglected much-needed investment in the core business of extraction. At the same time, Gazprom’s legal monopoly on exports and its control over Russia’s gas transmission system has restrained the growth of potentially more efficient domestic competitors. As a result, Hedlund finds Gazprom unprepared to deal with the international competition posed by the shale gas revolution and growing trade in liquefied natural gas. Meanwhile, Russia faces sharp trade-offs between the goals of limiting foreign control of oil production and exploiting new sources of oil that are invariably located in increasingly challenging environments. The latter task will be much more difficult without access to the experience and technology that could be provided by foreign oil companies.

A second set of problems has emerged in Russia’s relations with neighboring countries, including both exporters and importers of gas and oil. Russia’s attempts to control the fossil fuel exports of the former Soviet republics in the Caspian basin have met with only limited success. And conflicts with countries through which Russian exports pass on their way to European markets backfired, costing Russia its reputation as a reliable supplier and prompting traditional importers of Russian gas to take measures aimed at reducing their dependence. Most notable in this regard have been the reactions to the Russia–Ukraine gas conflicts by members of the European Union, which have included not only the promotion of alternative gas supplies and import routes but also restrictions on and investigations of Gazprom’s activities in Europe.

Not least important has been the mixed impact of Russian energy policy on the broader Russian economic and fiscal situation. Energy revenues have reduced pressure to undertake much-needed economic reforms. And especially since the 2008 financial crisis, the central government has become increasingly dependent on them to fund its expenditures. Indeed, in Hedlund’s estimation, Russia’s energy dependence has become an addiction.

If this were all that the book contained, it might attract only a relatively limited readership. But Hedlund goes on to identify what he views as the underlying reasons for the misuse of Russia’s ample energy endowments, which will be of more general interest. He asserts emphatically that Russia is not just another example of the “resource curse.” Instead, he lays the blame on a uniquely Russian, historically grounded set of institutional legacies rooted in the country’s original physical vulnerability and the resulting imperative assigned to military defense. Although the author’s description of these legacies varies somewhat from place to place, they can be summarized as follows: the traditionally dominant role of the state, which has resulted in a lack of government accountability; a failure to ensure the credible protection of property rights; a focus on economic growth based on the forced extraction of resources; and a tolerance of corruption by officials and their cronies. Thus, Hedlund concludes, the latitude for Russian leaders to implement fundamental change is narrow. Indeed, such is the power of this institutional inertia that “Putin may be viewed more as a hostage to the past than as a shaper of the future” (p. 167). Rather than the resource curse, Russia suffers from an “institutional curse” (p. 15).

Indeed, this analysis underscores an important tension in the book, which may be viewed as a strength or weakness, depending on the reader’s interests. Notwithstanding the title, the book is about much more than Russian energy policy under Putin. Rather, it raises an abiding concern about the broader political and economic evolution of Russia, and the obstacles to reform and modernization.

As a result, Hedlund may be trying to do too much in such a monograph, and may leave both the energy policy specialist and, especially, the reader with a general interest in Russian politics dissatisfied. At least the former will be rewarded with a wealth of detail on Russian actions over the past two decades. But the links between the problematic institutional legacies identified by the author and both Russian energy policy and the country’s more general political and economic conditions could have been more fully developed.