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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 September 2004
Paul Seabright's book is an exploration of the ways in which economic and social life depend on our willingness to hold our fire and trust strangers. Whereas a predisposition to trust and cooperate with close relations can be explained from an evolutionary perspective via the Hamilton kin selection mechanism, this is not true with respect to such behavior among nonrelatives. Our social and economic relations depend on an ability to trust and verify, as we used to say in the Reagan Cold War years, and to retaliate against those who violate our trust. These behaviors sometimes require us to play strictly dominated strategies, so we cannot be too calculating (rational) in our behavior, or we will never develop relations with strangers. We also cannot be too trusting, or others will take advantage of us. Finally, although social cooperation requires us to refrain from harming other conspecifics, there is a dark side to our ability to work successfully with nonkin. As Seabright notes, “the human capacity for cooperation is double edged. It is not only the foundation of social trust and peaceful living but also what makes for the most successful acts of aggression between one group and another. Like chimpanzees … human beings … harness the virtues of altruism and solidarity, and the skills of rational reflection, to the end of making brutal and efficient warfare against rival groups” (p. 7).
The book, written with great confidence and style, traces out the implications of trusting strangers in a wide variety of venues, and is enriched by vignettes from the author's wide experience observing economic development in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and other parts of the developing world. The author places special emphasis on the evolution and functioning of money and credit institutions in both historical and developing country contexts. Those who work through this wide-ranging work will be rewarded with many surprising observations on topics to whose diversity a short review cannot do justice.
The book is not entirely satisfying, however, because its overall argument has a major weakness: its failure to provide a satisfactory account of the origins of our predispositions to trust. Are they based on human institutions, and thus ultimately cultural, or are they to some degree “natural,” in the sense that their genesis predates the Neolithic revolution, the “invention” of culture, and perhaps also our two million year Pleistocene apprenticeship as hunter gatherers?
The idea that humans are savages whose propensities to tear one another apart are kept in check only by a “thin veneer of civilization” is deeply embedded in our intellectual and literary traditions. One sees it in the social contract theorists, most notably Hobbes, in Huxley's Evolution and Ethics, in Freud's Civilization and its Discontents, in Lorenz's On Aggression, in classical anthropology and sociology, such as the work of Durkheim or Parsons, and in a wide variety of literature, such as Golding's Lord of the Flies. Although Seabright has much discussion of our evolutionary heritage in the first parts of the book, he does not ultimately break with this tradition. Thus Part Two's title: “From Murderous Apes to Honorary Friends: How is Human Cooperation Possible?” In the prologue to Part Two he writes: “… in the absence of incentives to the contrary, human beings can behave so violently toward one another that no sane person would trust others based on their natural dispositions alone” (p. 27). Thus, he argues, it must be our institutions or culture that allows us to do so.
First, whether or not we call it sane or rational, it is clear from both experimental and observational data, as Seabright emphasizes, that humans do sometimes trust, help out, or refrain from murdering others who are not closely related, and they do so in settings where “incentives” might counsel the contrary. Particularly striking examples occur in military squads, where closely knit individuals may in some cases treat each other as a “band of brothers.”
It is one thing to take a bullet for your actual brother. We may understand that kin selection mechanisms may predispose us to do so (although organism level incentives clearly counsel against it). But to take a bullet for your buddy? It is not enough to note that squad members have awarded themselves the status of honorary or fictive kin, as is common also in clan-based groups. Why would any “sane” individual do so?
Secondly, as Seabright has already noted, chimpanzees also cooperate in bands, and we shared a common ancestor roughly six million years ago. There may well be small numbers of chimpanzee psychopaths, as is true in human populations, but most killing within both pan troglodytes and homo sapiens occurs when individuals work together in groups. We are murderous in much the same way as are chimps, and we cooperate easily in groups, in much the same way as do chimps. Thus it is too facile to suggest that, in contrast to us, chimpanzees are “murderous” whereas culture has allowed us to overcome our savage animal impulses and work together in groups.
Third, the trust and cooperation levels required to allow humans to live together in bands of 30–100 (the typical size of hunter-gatherer groups) are far beyond what can be explained on the basis of kin selection alone. One cannot simply blur one's vision and assume the contrary. The corollary is that a behavioral predisposition to trust nonkin must have a more ancient lineage than Seabright is prepared to allow.
To see why kin selection is insufficient to explain trust and cooperation in groups of 30–100, one needs to appreciate both the effects of exogamy and how rapidly genetic relatedness drops off. Ideally, if one wanted a group within which trust and cooperation could be explained entirely by kin selection, the ideal method of reproduction would be by budding. But although humans may soon have access to the technology to clone themselves, it is certain that our hunter-gatherer forebears did not.
Assuming we are stuck with the system of sexual reproduction, and setting aside the problem of trusting the initial mate, the next best thing for humans predisposed to producing offspring sharing the highest fraction of their own genetic heritage would be to impregnate or be impregnated by their own progeny or encourage their offspring to impregnate each other. But this would not be a winning genetic strategy, because the children of such unions face a much higher probability of sterility, deformation, mental retardation, or other defects that reduce the likelihood of procreation. The reason is the increased likelihood of a pairing in offspring of recessive—and damaging—alleles by common descent from a recent ancestor. All known societies have a taboo against mother-son, father-daughter, or brother-sister pairings, where the genetic dangers are the greatest, although some cultures have extended the taboo to unions of more distant relatives (first cousins) where the dangers are lower.
About the closest one can come to maximizing intragroup genetic relatedness without jeopardizing its survival by increasing the likelihood of genetic defects is to practice first cousin unions, and these indeed have been used historically for dynastic purposes as a means of concentrating bloodlines as well as property.
But the genetic relatedness of first cousins is lower than one might think (only 1/8), and the inbreeding coefficient of a pairing of two first cousins is only 1/16 (the inbreeding coefficient is the probability that the offspring genotype at a particular locus contains two identical alleles by common decent from a recent ancestor, such as a grandparent). Moreover, it is quite likely that many of our hunter-gatherer forebears practiced exogamy. It is exceedingly unlikely, therefore, that prior to the Neolithic revolution, or even the first instances of symbolic representation, the levels of trust required to enable survival and reproduction of small bands of 30–100 hunter gatherers can be accounted for through kin selection alone. This means that predispositions to behave in this fashion must have a lineage more ancient that the invention of culture.
Thus while I agree with Seabright that “the unplanned and sophisticated coordination of modern industrial societies is a remarkable fact that requires an explanation,” I disagree that “nothing in our species' biological evolution has shown us to have any talent or taste for dealing with strangers.” Thus I disagree that the explanation for our willingness to do so can be sought entirely in the “presence of institutions that make humans willing to treat strangers as honorary friends” (p. 8).