Some are guided by reason in their decision making, whereas others rely on intuition. For J. Eric Oliver and Thomas J. Wood, these differences help explain fundamental divides within the U.S. electorate.

Oliver and Wood propose that some people are more likely to engage in magical thinking than others, believing that outcomes are guided by unobservable forces, even in the face of evidence that shows otherwise. Magical thinkers are more likely to believe in the healing power of crystals and the existence of ghosts. They are often superstitious by nature and inclined to rely on folk wisdom. The authors describe those scoring high for this trait as Intuitionists, guided by emotional thinking and prone to using overly simplified heuristics in difficult domains. When faced with the uncertainties and anxieties of the modern world, they lean on intuitive judgments, visceral reactions, symbols, and metaphors. Those scoring low for this trait are cast as Rationalists, fact-based deliberative sorts who dispassionately use evidence to inform their judgments.

To differentiate Intuitionists from Rationalists, the authors rely on surveys. They create an Intuitionism scale that blends together feelings of trait anxiety and neuroticism in daily life (such as locking doors and shredding bills), apprehensions about the future (including assessments of the likelihood of wars or recessions), and belief in superstitions. Those high on the scale are more likely to believe in angels, karma, and reincarnation while doubting scientific evidence and the wisdom of experts. Higher levels of education and income are tied to lower levels of magical thinking, whereas women, religious conservatives, and ideological conservatives are more likely to score high on the measure. Those with the greatest economic insecurities report some of the highest levels of magical thinking, perhaps reflecting the importance of trait anxiety in the measure’s composition.

In terms of political attitudes, those who rely more on their intuitions respond more strongly to symbolic issue frames, express more support for populism, and were more likely to favor Donald Trump in the 2016 primary election season. Although not distinctive in their levels of ethnocentrism, Intuitionists follow different patterns of reasoning about groups, overestimating the size of minority groups in the population and reporting more hostile views of immigrants. Beyond the ideological divides of politics, Intuitionists also diverge in their health attitudes, favoring alternative medicine while disliking gluten and vaccines.

Enchanted America is an intriguing and powerful narrative in that it challenges existing models of public opinion formation. In contrast to past accounts that considered variations in the information people bring to a decision, the authors show that people also vary in their fundamental decision to consider diagnostic information at all. Some seem to actively dismiss evidence-based reasoning in favor of trusting their instincts and making gut-level choices. Although we know that political decisions can have both physiological and unconscious origins, this scholarship is unique in highlighting that people may actively choose to eschew deliberative thinking in favor of relying on their own best personal judgments. In this way, the importance of information and evidence in politics lies not just in its availability and accessibility but also in people’s willingness to rely on it.

In highlighting the power of intuition in political decision making, this research helps explain things that are difficult to explain well using existing theories. Why are some people more willing than others to believe in conspiracy theories and absorb misinformation? What drives people to reject the advice of experts and seek the views of outsiders? Oliver and Wood’s theory of magical thinking offers perhaps the most compelling answer yet for why we see these differences in how people approach evidence and facts.

Their argument also helps explain why citizens on both sides of the ideological divide sometimes struggle to understand each other and where their opponents are coming from. Liberals and conservatives may not only value different policy approaches but may also reason about political dilemmas in fundamentally different ways. If one side leans on common-sense judgments while perceiving opponents as bound up with esoteric facts and data, it can be harder to find common ground.

Given the wide-ranging consequences of intuitionism demonstrated by the authors, an important next step for this research will be in investigating its origins and development. As they acknowledge, surveys are limited in sorting out matters of endogeneity and in pinpointing what leads people to rely on magical thinking. The authors suggest that people with lower stocks of education and resources may turn to folk wisdom as a way to make sense of a complicated, uncertain world; this reliance may be reinforced by factors such as personality, religious socialization, and media messages. It would be interesting to determine the relative contributions of superstitious thinking and neuroticism in cultivating a reliance on intuition. To the degree to which it is a trait people choose to adopt, then it will be important to investigate what intuition and folk wisdom offer to those who choose to rely on it. If greater magical thinking instead follows from situational pressures and information environments, then we should study how socialization affects people’s cognitive style.

Oliver and Wood tend to present intuitionism and rationalism as opposing ends of a spectrum, where rational deliberation is framed as the ideal and intuition is characterized as a flaw of reasoning and a shortcoming of political decision making. This fits with cases where magical thinking results in conspiracy beliefs and rejection of scientific evidence. It is less compelling in instances where folk wisdom and intuitive thinking function as precursors of policy priorities or candidate choices.

Even if magical thinking raises normative worries about the quality of people’s judgment, a reliance on intuition alone does not. After all, intuitive thinking based on accumulated experience can result in better outcomes than decisions made through careful consideration of the evidence. Even the politically sophisticated will often choose to satisfice over optimize, given the practical and cognitive challenges of meeting the standards of careful deliberation. How should the perils of magical thinking be balanced against the virtues of inference and intuition? Even if careful deliberative decision making is desirable, it is often an unrealistic standard for cognitive misers. What then are the best ways to encourage higher-quality intuitive reasoning while discouraging magical thinking?

With excellent storytelling and great graphs, the book is an engaging narrative describing how people reason about politics. Its findings are provocative and challenge our conventional wisdom about decision making. It should be of interest both to those who study how people construct their opinions in politics and to those who want to better understand the roots of ideological divides in contemporary politics.