No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2004
The author, a former German diplomat now affiliated with the Center for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, presents a detailed and readable account of bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia from the Iranian Revolution through the mid-1990s. The work is based largely on English-and German-language secondary sources, with some reference to the secondary literature in Persian and to newspaper accounts in Arabic and Persian. The first section of the book is a chronological account of the relationship, with chapters on the immediate post-revolutionary period, on the Iran–Iraq War, and on the first Gulf War and its aftermath. The second section of the book focuses on main areas of rivalry, both geographic and issue-oriented. It includes chapters on Saudi–Iranian competition in the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, and for “religious and economic leadership.” The latter chapter focuses on the Iranian revolutionary challenge to Saudi claims of leadership in the Muslim world and on conflict within OPEC over oil policy.
The author, a former German diplomat now affiliated with the Center for Modern Oriental Studies in Berlin, presents a detailed and readable account of bilateral relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia from the Iranian Revolution through the mid-1990s. The work is based largely on English-and German-language secondary sources, with some reference to the secondary literature in Persian and to newspaper accounts in Arabic and Persian. The first section of the book is a chronological account of the relationship, with chapters on the immediate post-revolutionary period, on the Iran–Iraq War, and on the first Gulf War and its aftermath. The second section of the book focuses on main areas of rivalry, both geographic and issue-oriented. It includes chapters on Saudi–Iranian competition in the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia, and for “religious and economic leadership.” The latter chapter focuses on the Iranian revolutionary challenge to Saudi claims of leadership in the Muslim world and on conflict within OPEC over oil policy.
Fürtig's thesis is straightforward: relations between the two states in this period were particularly hostile because each put itself forward as the political leader and model for the Muslim world. Iran, by rejecting the Islamic legitimacy of monarchy in general, “challenged the very roots of the identity of the Saudi Arabian state and its ruling family” (p. xiv). Therefore, the possibility of more normal or even cooperative relations between the two states depends on how the debate in Iran over the role of Islamic revolutionary principles in Iranian politics and foreign policy works itself out.
This thesis might be considered unexceptionable, even obvious, were it not for a persistent strand in the literature on the international politics of the Persian Gulf that emphasizes the deep geo-political roots of competition among the major regional states. This school of thought stresses the continuities in Iran's foreign-policy behavior from the Shah's regime to the Islamic Republic; points to persistent border issues among the regional states; and generally makes a systemic-level argument about the inevitable rivalry for dominance in a tripolar regional system. I find Fürtig's argument more persuasive than that of the “geo-political” school. While there are plenty of reasons for Saudi Arabia and Iran to oppose each other, the intensity of their mutual antipathy in the period under study had important policy consequences that were not characteristic of previous periods: active Iranian efforts to destabilize the Saudi regime domestically; an open Saudi alliance with Iraq against Iran during the Iran–Iraq War; the Saudis' ability to institutionalize their dominance over the Arab littoral of the Gulf in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with fear of Iranian meddling in their domestic politics driving the smaller Arab monarchies into Riyadh's arms.
Fürtig could have developed his thesis at greater length had he extended his analysis past the mid-1990s. It is disappointing in a book published in 2002 that the substantive analysis stops many years before. The late 1990s are an excellent confirming test of Fürtig's thesis. As the “revolutionary” element of Iranian foreign policy fades in significance (though it does not disappear), relations between Riyadh and Tehran improve. Extension of the analysis for just a few more years would also have called into question Fürtig's conclusions about Saudi–Iranian relations on oil questions. He argues that the two states' interests in oil production and pricing issues are largely incompatible. However, in the context of the lessening of ideological tensions, the collapse of oil prices in 1997–98 brought Tehran and Riyadh together in a cooperative effort to cut OPEC quotas and push prices up. By stopping in the mid-1990s, Fürtig also misses the chance to assess the effects of the post–Gulf War increase in the seemingly permanent American military presence in the area on the relationship.
This is a fine synthetic work, based on solid secondary sources. It provides more than sufficient detail on the various aspects of the bilateral relationship. While not grounded in larger theoretical literatures, it successfully argues a clear thesis about what drove Saudi–Iranian tensions in the period. It will be of interest to the specialized audience of readers concerned with the international relations of the Persian Gulf and of transnational Muslim politics.