The Phases of Japan’s Engagement with the Central Asian Region

The diplomatic relations between Japan and Central Asia were established in 1992, and a clearly defined concept targeting the region, called the “Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy,” was introduced in 1997. The announcement of the new strategy followed the so-called Obuchi mission, an official visit that a delegation of 60 Japanese leaders paid to Russia and Central Asia to establish cooperation and further relations with these actors (Yuasa Reference Yuasa2007). The Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy rested on three pillars: (1) political dialogue aiming to enhance mutual trust and understanding, (2) economic cooperation and cooperation in the field of natural resources development aiming to foster prosperity, and (3) cooperation in building peace through nuclear non-proliferation, democratization, and the fostering of stability (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997).

The next phase was launched with the adoption of the Central Asia Plus Japan initiative in 2004. The concept was proposed by Foreign Minister Kawaguchi during her visits to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan and was designed to contribute to further facilitation of cooperation with Central Asia (Len, Uyama, and Hirose Reference Len, Uyama and Hirose2008). The first “Central Asia plus Japan” meeting was held in Kazakhstan and resulted in a joint statement that outlined the main areas for collaboration, which included consolidation of peace, promotion of social and economic development, energy and environmental issues, cultural exchange, and human resource development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan 2004, 2–3).

The third significant phase in Japan-Central Asia relations emerged in 2006 with the announcement of Japan’s new foreign policy vision—the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” initiative. According to the concept, Japan was to add the principle of universal values (democracy, freedom, human rights, the rule of law, and the market economy) to the existing pillars of its foreign policy strategy.

Although on the surface it might seem that the three initiatives and related discourse are aimed at dealing with different issues, the analysis reveals that certain continuity persists throughout this period. In this light, I present my findings thematically rather than chronologically.

Conceptualizing Japan’s Foreign Policy toward Central Asia

Not surprisingly, scholarly endeavors to understand the nature of Japanese engagement with Central Asia have produced a growing divergence of opinions—the various theoretical schools of thought attempt to explain this interaction in a different manner.

Central Asia has been traditionally seen as “a testing field for great-power relations” (Flikke and Wilhelmsen Reference Flikke and Wilhelmsen2008), which has provided a fertile ground for realist thinking. Although different realist studies assign different weight to possible reasons for Japan’s interest in Central Asia, and to its potential motivations to use particular foreign policy strategies, I group them together under the “realism umbrella” because these studies assume that states are “instrumentally rational” actors that seek to ensure their own survival and to maximize their expected utility in an anarchical international system (Mearsheimer Reference Mearsheimer1995). Thus, realism is viewed here “not as [unified] theory” (Donnelly Reference Donnelly2000, 6), but as an “attitude of mind” with “a quite distinctive and recognizable flavour” (Garnett Reference Garnett1984, 110), as a paradigm or “disposition,” which rests on several basic assumptions. In line with this logic, these studies share a number of tenets that would suggest that Japan has to ensure its survival and prosperity as a rational actor in world politics. Because of its lack of natural resource deposits, Japan must make strategic calculations in order to guarantee its energy security and to maximize the state’s power beyond traditional ambit. In an attempt to achieve this goal, Japan tries to strengthen relations with the oil- and gas-rich countries of Central Asia (Usubaliev Reference Usubaliev2001; Calder Reference Calder2001; Dobrinskaia Reference Dobrinskaia2011; Muzalevsky Reference Muzalevsky2012; Gavrilina Reference Gavrilina2012).

While these studies discuss the realistic gains that Japan could enjoy if it were more active and assertive in the region, none of these reflect the reality. In particular, the relations between Japan and Central Asia are not “distinguished by high activity” (Nurgaliev and Shaymergenov Reference Nurgaliev and Shaymergenov2007, 125). Even though “energy security is considered to be the key sphere of interest for Tokyo” (Dobrinskaia Reference Dobrinskaia2011), the overall “Japanese involvement has been slow and remains limited” (Watanabe Reference Watanabe, Garnett, Rahr and Watanabe2000, 45). Dobrinskaia explains that while the actors’ cooperation in the oil and gas industry is mostly limited to the projects devoted to reprocessing of the hydrocarbon resources, to this day, Japan does not directly benefit from those (Dobrinskaia Reference Dobrinskaia2011, 45). Moreover, the level of trade with Kazakhstan—Japan’s largest Central Asian trading partner—remains very low even in the energy sector (approximately 10 times less than China’s and Russia’s levels) (World Bank 2016).

In an attempt to rationalize Japan’s continuous refusal to get involved in the “energy rivalry unfolding in the region” (Len Reference Len2005, 127), some scholars refer to neorealist explanations. The neorealist axiom, which links struggle for power and rivalries to the structure of international system as opposed to the nature of states (Morgenthau Reference Morgenthau1978; Waltz Reference Waltz1979; Reference Waltz1993; Gilpin Reference Gilpin1981; Elman Reference Elman1996), generates arguments that “Japan cannot afford the confrontational structure in Central Asia” (Mangi Reference Mangi2011, 1). In other words, Japan’s international behaviour is constrained by the international structure, which assigns the country with a particular role. According to this view, this is the reason why “Japan-Central Asia relations have been and remain predominantly economic in nature” (Mangi Reference Mangi2011, 1). Andrei Kazantsev (Reference Kazantsev2008), for instance, believes that its geographical remoteness, its lack of experience in cooperation with the Central Asian countries, and its military-political alliance with the United States force Japan to mainly operate through economic means. Thus, given the structural constraints, one would expect Japan to step up its activity in the region but only to the degree to which it is economically capable.

Nevertheless, from the outset of its presence in the region, Japan’s foreign policy behavior goes against the abovementioned logical expectations about the country’s economic involvement in Central Asia. It is evident from the nonsubstantial trade relations between the two and meagre Japanese direct investments (Watanabe Reference Watanabe, Garnett, Rahr and Watanabe2000, 45); from Japan’s overall activity in the region, which is largely limited to its prolonged “status as the region’s biggest ODA donor country” (Tanaka Reference Tanaka2013); from its unceasing assistance to the Central Asian development; and from the lack of any visible avaricious interests apart from idealistic aspirations of promoting peace and security around the globe.

An alternative reasoning for Japan’s foreign policy behavior is provided by the studies that are premised on the liberal paradigm—primarily, on the idea that international relations are all about transnational relations, where state-state affairs “have been supplemented by relations among private individuals, groups and societies” (Rosenau Reference Rosenau1980, 1). The important aspect of it lies in the fact that stronger transnational ties between individuals and groups would lead to the “emergence of security communities” and, ultimately, result in the prevalence of peaceful relations over rivalries (Deutsch, Burrell, Kann and Lee Jr. Reference Deutsch, Burrell, Kann and Lee1957). In addition to that, a higher degree of transnational links between states equals a higher level of interdependence between them. Therefore, the importance of military welfare is expected to decrease (Keohane and Nye Reference Keohane and Nye1977), while potential for cooperation ought to become more significant with the establishment of international institutions and the alleviation of international distrust among actors in a self-help international system (Keohane Reference Keohane1989; Young Reference Young1989; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger Reference Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger1997).

With respect to Japan, after its defeat in the World War II, the country became strongly attached to the ideals of pacifism declaring its belief in non-aggressive human nature. It is clearly manifested in Japan’s “Peace” Constitution, which states that the country aims to preserve its security by “trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the World” (The Constitution of Japan 1947, preamble).

Moreover, in line with republican liberalism, which claims that liberal democracies are more inclined toward peace, and are more submitted to the law than other political systems (Kant Reference Kant1957), some scholars argue that Japan has “a developmental rather than a geopolitical focus in the region” (Len, Uyama, and Hirose Reference Len, Uyama and Hirose2008, 11). This is evident from its significant and consistent support for democratization efforts and market development in the area. Institutional liberalism also provides a fruitful avenue for expanding the knowledge about Japan-Central Asia relations through analyzing the cooperation between the two within international institutions and various initiatives (Kawato Reference Kawato, Len, Tomohiko and Tetsuya2008; Marat Reference Marat, Len, Tomohiko and Tetsuya2008; Len, Uyama, and Hirose Reference Len, Uyama and Hirose2008; Yuasa Reference Yuasa2007). According to these frameworks, Japan attempts to promote cooperation based on equal partnership and to ensure peace and security in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2004).

These arguments are useful in explaining the peaceful development of relations between Japan and Central Asia, especially in light of globalization and strengthening of economic interdependence. However, they do not fully explain fluctuations in Japan’s strategic behavior patterns, which changed from a high level of intensity to inertia when existing policies remained unaltered. For instance, it was not until the early 1990s when Japan applied certain political conditions to its official development assistance, reflecting its concern with the promotion of democracy and the protection of human rights in the “four philosophies” of its aid programs (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan n.d.) However, although this transition from purely commercial- and diplomatic interests-based aid disbursements to a scheme aimed at promoting certain political and economic standards has been widely discussed, the reasons that induce these changes remain poorly understood.

Recently, valuable insights on Japan’s foreign policy toward Central Asia have been offered by scholars who emphasize the importance of nonmaterial factors (identity, norms, values) in shaping Japan’s foreign policy vis-à-vis Central Asia. For instance, Dadabaev (Reference Dadabaev2014) adopts the constructivist standpoint to compare the strategies of Japan and China toward the region. By leaving the domain of rationalists’ approaches of realism and neoliberalism, he shifts the subject of inquiry into another domain, where “rationality” is not a given but is socially constructed in line with one’s self-understanding (Adler Reference Adler1997; Ruggie Reference Ruggie1998; Wendt Reference Wendt1999). Dadabaev (Reference Dadabaev2013, 508) argues that being “largely the victim of its identity,” Japanese foreign policy is “ambiguously defined” and is trapped somewhere between “idealism and pragmatism.” He contends that “Asian [cultural] roots” and “Western” norms determine the duality of the national identity of Japan, which in turn shapes “ambiguously” defined interests in the region, as well as the strategies of Japan, which are perceived to be “a lesser degree of efficiency compared with the engagement of other states in the region” (Dadabaev Reference Dadabaev2014, 143).

I concur with Dadabaev regarding the necessity to move away from the mere rationalist framework in examining Japan-Central Asia relations and focus instead on nonmaterial influencing factors such as identity, norms, ideas, and culture. Such an approach can offer a more nuanced understanding of Japan’s foreign policy behavior vis-à-vis Central Asia and yield more insights into causes of its formulation and change over the last two decades.

Dissecting Japan’s “Reality” through National Identity Analysis

With the cultural turn in international relations theory (Lapid and Kratochwil Reference Lapid and Kratochwil1996), identity is frequently considered as a frame of reference for comprehending the behavior of a foreign policy actor in international relations (Prizel Reference Prizel1998, 2; Cronin Reference Cronin1999, 18). With its shift from a “harshly marginalized” (Lapid Reference Lapid, Lapid and Kratochwil1996, 3) concept to a highly important and popular notion within the field, many arguments have been advanced about how, exactly, identity is relevant to foreign policy. In empirical studies based on constructivist theoretical framework, two trends of conceptualizing identity with regard to Japan’s international behavior can be identified.

One group of scholars tends to treat identity as an explanatory variable, considering it among the “most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics” (Smith Reference Smith2004, 302). The concept of identity being applied in this literature is considered to be constituted by various factors, most importantly by norms, values, and culture. Scholars who adopt this line of logic, have generally conceptualized culture as a “socially shared knowledge” (Wendt Reference Wendt1999, 142), while norms as set of “shared expectations” about the “proper” way of behavior (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, Reference Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein and Peter J1996, 54; Checkel Reference Checkel1999, 83) for a given identity. Norms thus either “define” (“constitute”) identities or “prescribe or proscribe (“regulate”) behaviors for the constituted identity (Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein Reference Jepperson, Wendt, Katzenstein and Peter J1996, 54).

Distancing themselves from the mainstream approaches to international relations, these scholars argue that domestic politics, norms, culture and identity determine Japan’s post war international behavior. More specifically, when investigating the nature of Japan’s reluctance to become a military great power despite its flourishing economy, certain scholars have pointed out that the primary reason for it does not stem from structural factors, but is rooted in Japan’s postwar “culture of anti-militarism” (Berger Reference Berger1993, 120). It has been argued that general population became strongly attached to antimilitaristic views, the evidence of which can be seen in continuous support for the internalized ideology characterized by “peaceful preferences and beliefs” (Chai Reference Chai1997, 405). In this regard, these scholars assert that pacifist norms and antimilitaristic culture constrains the range of public policy options of the Japan’s elite as it creates particular obstacles for various foreign and public policy initiatives (Hook Reference Hook1996). As a result, the option of the “full-scale rearmament” remains to be seen as a completely “irrational act” for Japan (Chai Reference Chai1997, 390). Conceiving that the security policy formulations informed by national interests, which are defined by “social and legal norms,” the endurance of this normative context in Japan is explained by the wartime memories, institutional constraints embodied in the Peace Constitution, and the development of Japan as a peaceful and prosperous country (Katzenstein and Okawara Reference Katzenstein and Okawara1993, 104).

Certain scholars explicitly referred to the significance of Japan’s national identity for its choice of foreign policy behavior. For instance, Kuniko Ashizawa introduces “the value-action framework” in understanding the foreign policy action of Japan and argues that two values, mainly “reassuring Asian countries about Japan’s activism” and “keeping the US in Asia” function as the key “determinant … for [Japan’s] foreign policy action, values and associated preferences” (Ashizawa Reference Ashizawa2008, 585). It has been argued that these values spring from the particular ideas with regard to state identity— “a conception of what the country is and what it represents” (Ashizawa Reference Ashizawa2008, 587). In line with this logic, Japan’s involvement in security affairs and foreign policy formation is explained by the security identity of domestic antimilitarism (Oros Reference Oros2008, 9), “peace-state security identity,” or “international state security identity” (Singh Reference Singh2013, 4).

It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that by bringing up certain important insights these studies have managed to give a great impetus to the discussion related to Japan’s foreign policy—in particular, the argument that norms and values are essential constitutive features of national identity, while identity of states is not universal but is domestically produced. This line of thinking has allowed scholars to explain the deviant behavior of international actors that do not act in accordance with given prescriptions. At the same time, however, it does not adequately explain the changes in Japan’s international behavior, as it is premised on the view that identity of a state remains relatively stable over time and becomes a subject of change due to structural or material modifications.

Another group of academics studies identity as a “relational” concept. These scholars consider that identity is not constructed domestically, but rather produced and reproduced through the interaction with Others. They assert that a state cannot acquire its identity solely from within; it can do so through communication and engagement with Others. Adopting this conceptualization of identity as a standing point for research, this group of scholars managed to detect a significant number of Japan’s Others: China (Suzuki Reference Suzuki2015; Gustafsson Reference Gustafsson2015), North Korea (Son Reference Son and Hook2011), South Korea (Tamaki Reference Tamaki2010), Russia (Bukh Reference Bukh2010), the West (United States, Europe), and the East, or Asia (Tanaka Reference Tanaka1993; Oguma Reference Oguma2002; Klien Reference Klien2002; Ashizawa Reference Ashizawa2013; Hagström Reference Hagström2015). Cumulatively these research efforts have produced a more nuanced representation of the discursive realms, through which Japan constructs and reconstructs its identity depending on the temporal, spatial and relational dimensions. Depiction of various identity discourses allows drawing several important points relevant to this research, which can be summarized as follows: the discourse of Japan’s self-image should not be considered as separate from the discourse on the West (Western Europe and the United States) and the East (various Asian countries) (Oguma Reference Oguma2002). This is due to the view that the East-West dichotomy dominated the discourse from which the national identity of Japan emerged. This dominant identity narrative has resulted in the duality of Japan’s national identity. The duality of identity is defined by its “in-betweenness” (Dadabaev Reference Dadabaev2014), meaning that Japan is positioned between the West and the East. Asia, in this regard, has consistently being utilized as a “signifier for Japan to proclaim itself as neither Western nor Asian” (Tamaki Reference Tamaki2015, 41).

Furthermore, it has been assumed that the interaction of Japan with multiple Others is defined by the creation of a power relationship due to the nature of the particular constructed narrative. This narrative is labeled the “hierarchic worldview,” which implies that Japan’s Self “is constructed through its differentiation from Others, who are alternatively understood as superior or inferior to Japan” (Hagström and Gustafsson Reference Hagström and Gustafsson2015, 6). In particular, Asian Otherness has been continuously depicted as inferior to Japanese Self (Tamaki Reference Tamaki2015). This identity discourse establishes particular cognitive frames that are used as interpretative frameworks through which foreign policy makers make sense of Tokyo’s policy options. I discuss these assumptions in more detail below.

Japan’s “Self” vis-à-vis Central Asian “Other”

The main purpose of the following discussion is twofold. First, I aim to untangle particular foreign policy discourse that constructs Japan’s national identity vis-à-vis Central Asia and thereby generates a particular “reality” in which these foreign policies acquire meaning. Second, my goal is to reveal the textual mechanism through which reality, objects, and subjects are constructed, and to interpret the official statements related to several foreign policy initiatives, in particular, the “Eurasian (Silk Road) Diplomacy,” the “Central Asia plus Japan,” and the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.” This is an attempt to comprehend the intersubjective knowledge and analytical lens through which Japanese foreign policy makers conceive and interpret the constructed “reality,” produce foreign policy choices, and choose among the identified alternatives. Accordingly, I analyze the official statements related to the foreign policy initiatives under study in order to identify the oppositional positioning contained in the statements that assigned Japan’s “self” and Central Asian “other” with particular attributes, and to reveal the background knowledge that is being generated in these official statements.

It should be noted that although the scope of this discussion is largely focused on the regional level, it does not assume the Central Asian region as a natural scale of analysis. On the contrary, I consider regions to be “socially constructed rather than natural entities” (Jayasuriya Reference Jayasuriya1994, 411). From this standpoint, Central Asia, which comprises the five states, is conceived as an “imagined” region (Neumann, Reference Neumann1994).

In the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse, academic and policy discussions pertaining to a regional designation called Central Asia have largely coalesced the former five Soviet republics, which further strengthened an impression of their unity (Koch, Reference Koch2015). The production and institutionalization of the region continues to be sustained to this day through the commonly used “five stans” discourse, which is built upon shared history and culture. Within this conceptualization, the “five stans” is imagined as the single regional “inside”—the collective “Self”—vis-à-vis and outside “Other” (Azizov, Reference Azizov2015). Whereas now the Central Asian countries have little in common in terms of their levels of economic and social development, as well as their geopolitical orientations and priorities, the regional “imaginary” was enthusiastically pushed forward by newly independent republics themselves. As such, in early 1990s, the Central Asian leaders declared, “Central Asia was one cultural unity” (Kennedy-Pipe Reference Kennedy-Pipe and Karp1993, 274). This view was backed up in practice by “the creation of the Central Asian Commonwealth in January 1993” (Kennedy-Pipe Reference Kennedy-Pipe and Karp1993, 273), followed by the proposal to establish the Union of Central Asian States: “In the region, we share economic interest, cultural heritage, language, religion, and environmental challenges, and face common external threats. The founding fathers of the European Union could only wish they had so much in common … I see integration as the only way to become worthy of our common great ancestors who always envisioned us together” (Nazarbayev, Reference Nazarbayev2005, §5.3).

As for the external actors, this “regional” thinking continues to inform their policies directed toward Central Asia, too well: “C5+1” of the United States, the European Union’s Strategy for Central Asia, “The Korea-Central Asia” initiative, and the New Silk Road Strategy of China, to name just a few. The path pursued by the Japanese foreign policy-making elites corresponds with this trend. In the Japanese foreign policy discourse, “five stans” are largely grouped together and are imagined, as a collective Other vis-à-vis Japan’s Self.

First, Central Asia is represented as a region with “unfortunate geographic circumstances” (chiriteki jōken ni megumare nai), where “interests of various powers” (iroirona seiryoku no kanshin) have been mixed for a long time; an unstable and economically “fragile” (zeijaku) area that reminds of a “volcanic magma” (maguma); a weak link” (yowai rinku) in a chain that can be “tossed by, or forced to submit to the interests of outside countries” (sho gaikoku no tsugō ni honrōsare tari, fukujū o shiirareru toiu yōna koto) as a result of the New Great Game (Aso Reference Aso2006a).

In contrast, Japan is inscribed with a different set of qualities. Japan is represented as an “advanced democracy” (senshin minshu shugikoku) (Aso Reference Aso2007b) that wields “great influence” (ōkina eikyōryoku) on international relations; “the first Asian country to establish itself as an advanced industrial nation” (ajia shokoku no naka de ichi hayaku senshin kōgyōkoku no nakamairi), which has a certain “status” (chii) in international community (Hashimoto, Reference Hashimoto1997). Unlike new born states of Central Asia that have just come into existence (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997), Japan is declared to be “of an age,” (ii toshi), a country that made “achievements in pacifism” (heiwa shugi toiu jisseki); and when it comes to “universal values” (fuhenteki kachi), like democracy, or human rights, Japan deserves to be considered as “a veteran player” (shinise), the one that does not hesitate to state its views openly (Aso Reference Aso2006b). While Central Asia is seen as an “object” of the ongoing New Great Game, Japan is represented as one of the major powers in the world that is capable of preventing Central Asia from becoming a victim of other countries’ potential imperialistic interests. The following statement depicts Japan’s self-representation: “Japan wishes to cooperate with nation-building in the region based firmly on our recognition of ‘ownership’ (onashippu) by the countries of Central Asia” (Aso Reference Aso2006a). Therefore, unlike other actors, which might aim to establish control over the region, Japan is represented as “a catalyst” (shokubai) to the process, through which the Central Asian countries could become “the main players” (shuyaku) in determining their own future (Aso Reference Aso2006a).

As such, Japan’s presence has been primarily associated with its great contribution to the development of Central Asia through distributing aid, which over the years has come to amount for several billions and has been characterized as very pragmatic and result-oriented. Japan has reportedly played a role in the inclusion of the Central Asia countries into the list of aid recipients at the Asian Development Bank, which launched the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation program in 1997. Moreover, Japan established the Central Asia Institution Building Cooperation Fund through the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the initiative that was among those of a particular importance as the five republics found themselves amidst a serious economic slowdown from 1996 to 1998 (Len Reference Len2005). Japan’s official development assistance strategy in Central Asia is directed at capacity building of the former Soviet republics, providing assistance in empowering their local communities and establishing sustainable profit-generating productions that the recipients could continue to run and benefit from independently in the long-term.

Despite being the biggest donor to the region, which has allocated over $2 billion between 1991 and 2004, Japan has been welcomed by the Central Asia republics as a strong and reliable partner that does not try to interfere into their political affairs (Rakhimov Reference Rakhimov2014). For instance, former Kyrgyz president Akaev has described Japanese mode of engagement with the region as exemplary. Japan’s decision to prioritize and contribute to the stabilization and reintegration of Central Asia before proactively seeking opportunities to exploit the local natural resource deposits was perceived as desirable (Len Reference Len2005). Both Kazakhstan’s and Turkmenistan’s leaders have also expressed their interest in further cooperation with Japan because of its primary focus on creating favorable economic environment and modernization in Central Asia as opposed to pursuing its own geopolitical interests (Mager Reference Mager2016).

Second, one of the main features of Japan’s general foreign policy discourse is its unique positioning regarding the Western and Asian countries, which are hierarchically arranged. Japan’s national identity, which is constructed through the foreign policy discourse, positions Japan as an actor responsible for maintaining peace and prosperity in “Asia” and, more importantly, as an actor that has the legitimacy to bear that responsibility. For instance, it has been explicitly stated that Japan acknowledges that the Central Asian countries “have great expectations of Japan as an Asian country” (ajia no kuni toshite) (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Moreover, Japan takes pride in the fact that it managed to develop “from a primitive state” (Oguma Reference Oguma2002, 14) to one of the world’s great powers, and conceives that it should be committed to addressing the challenges the international community faces.

Japan was quick to take on the role of an actor that aims to ensure peace and stability in the region by promoting nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and supporting antiterrorist activities in Central Asia. Such aspirations on Japan’s part can be exemplified by its proactive support of the establishment of the Central Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone in the early stages of its development. While such nuclear powers as the United States, United Kingdom, and France were very critical of the proposal on various grounds, Japan showed its readiness to offer assistance (Potter, Kassenova, and Loukianova Reference Potter, Kassenova and Loukianova2008). For instance, Japanese government sponsored a series of expert-group meetings aimed at producing the draft text of the initiative, which the country hosted in 1999 and 2000 in cooperation with the United Nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2000). Moreover, in 1992 Japan adopted the Official Development Assistance Charter (later revised in 2003), which symbolized a shift in strategy away from simple allocation of large amounts of aid to the assistance that would produce visible results in development in Asia.

Japan sees itself as an active participant in the creation of a “new international order” (aratana kokusai chitsujo), whose reconstruction started in the post–Cold War era (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Several factors underpin this self-representation that Japan was able to construct through its foreign policy discourse. As mentioned above, Japan has been quite successful in absorbing the Western knowledge and managed to achieve the status of a great economic power—a fact that has been pointed out in several official texts. In this light, it has been mentioned that the economies of all five Central Asian countries combined barely meet “the level of Mie Prefecture,” (Aso Reference Aso2006a) whereas “the combined economies of China, the Republic of Korea and Russia still do not measure up to the size of the Japanese economy” despite the fact that Chinese economy has expanded dramatically (Aso Reference Aso2007a). Thus, Japan is established as a country that is taking the role of the leader in the Asian region, given the view that “economy” of an Asian country “cannot develop without maintaining a relationship with Japan,” even “becoming a member of the ‘Asian network’ (ajian nettowaku) would frankly be impossible” (Aso Reference Aso2007a). Japanese policymakers in particular emphasize its determination to further maintain the atmosphere when it is “impossible to ignore Japan while discussing Central Asia” (nippon wa chūōajia nikanshite mushi dekinai sonzai da toiu fun’iki) (Aso Reference Aso2006a).

In a similar manner, because of Japan’s superior position within the “hierarchic worldview” narrative, and the duality of its national identity, its foreign policy discourse describes Japan’s national interests as being synonymous with those of the Asia-Pacific region or Asia as a whole. This status and position within the international hierarchical structure “imparts [certain] responsibility” (sekinin) (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Therefore, Japan’s main diplomacy is portrayed to be based on “tireless efforts to create a suitable global environment” and, in particular, to “maintain peace and prosperity of the Asia–Pacific” (Ajia Taiheiyō chiiki ni okeru heiwa to han’ei no iji) (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Apart from that, Japan also pursues “value-oriented diplomacy” (kachi no gaikō) (Aso Reference Aso2006b), which can be regarded as a part of its broader civilizing mission.

To understand the construction of the reality, in which this foreign policy became possible, it is necessary to set the scene or the context, in which Japan had to operate. In particular, after the end of the Cold War, given that the Soviet Union—“the main conceptual challenger to Western liberal democracy” (Gill Reference Gill2002, 1)—vanished from the long-lasting ideological race, the beginning of a new epoch of world politics represented “the triumph of the West” and “of the Western [liberal] idea” (Fukuyama Reference Fukuyama1989, 3). Western liberal democracy was widely presented “as the final form of human government” and “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution” (Fukuyama Reference Fukuyama1989, 4), and turned out to be a part of the mainstream acceptance. These dynamic processes, thus, strengthened the self-image of Japan as a part of the advanced and superior community of the Western liberal democratic countries, while the non-democratic states were perceived as backward and inferior. As Ghia Nodia (Reference Nodia1996, 20) comments, “to live under autocracy, or even to be an autocrat, seems backward, uncivilized, distasteful, not quite comme il faut—in a word, ‘uncool.’” Since it was the time of factual evidence to the assumption that democracies, indeed, tend to be more prosperous, more stable, and more peaceful than its non-democratic alternatives, Japan committed itself to “assist” other countries on the road to “peace and prosperity” (heiwa to han’ei) (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Japan, “the first country to modernize in Asia,” which has “the longest tradition of democracy” and possesses “over 100 years of accumulated wisdom” became “responsible” for ensuing “the prosperous and stable region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2004).

Further, its unique positioning between the West and the East ensures the dialogue between the two since “the East and the West don’t have many opportunities to meet with each other” (Aso Reference Aso2006a). According to the foreign policy discourses, what makes Japan unique is its mission-oriented approach. It aims to be an “escort runner” (bansō ranā) in guiding the developing countries on the road to “peace and happiness through economic prosperity and democracy” (keizaiteki han’ei to minshu shugi o tsūjite, heiwa to kōfuku) (Aso Reference Aso2006a). Unlike the West, Japan does not aim at “imposing values,” but rather is “considerate of each country’s culture, history and stage of development” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007). Accordingly, Japan intends to support Central Asian efforts in building “democracy” and establishing the “rule of law.” Japan has the capacity to sustain and ensure what is “normal” in international affairs, and, to be more precise, assigns itself with a mission to continue supporting and diffusing “universally” acceptable norms of freedom and liberal democracy.

Arguably, this approach does bear some fruit as despite its “mission” Japan continues to enjoy an overwhelmingly positive reception among the ruling elites and general public in all five Central Asian republics (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2015; Inoguchi Reference Inoguchi2005). This can be explained not only by the absence of heavy historical baggage, Japan’s long-term commitment to the region’s development, the lack of any visible signs of neocolonial ambitions and perceived closeness between Japanese and Central Asian populace (Dadabaev Reference Dadabaev2016), but also, to no lesser degree, by its flexibility in dealing with the “five stans.”

Japan tends to avoid direct confrontation on politically sensitive issues, leaving a channel of communication through which it could encourage further democratization in the respective republics. An illustrative example is Uzbekistan’s “Andijan unrest” of 2005. While the West (United States and European Union) was vocal in its strong public criticism of the Uzbek government and even backed up their position with the implementation of a series of sanctions, Japan also raised serious concerns over the incident and called to improve human rights situation, yet without causing Uzbek authorities to lose face (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005). As a result, Uzbekistan’s ruling elite cut ties with the West by responding to the strong criticism of the government’s actions in Andijan and affirmed Uzbekistan’s aspirations to establish a system similar to that of Japan, showing a major shift of the government’s focus away from the West onto the Asia (Karimov Reference Karimov2005). Holding the view that the values of democracy and human rights cannot be imposed or transplanted from the outside, Japanese officials continue to underscore the importance of democracy and human rights as “beneficial to their countries’ prosperity and stability,” persistently instilling “these lines of thinking” to the Central Asian partners (Chung Reference Chung2016, 108). The message is clear: “if adopted, these political values will loosen the hold that authoritarian neighbours like Russia and China have through the SCO over the Central Asian states” (Chung Reference Chung2016, 108). As such, Japan manages to pursue its “value-oriented” diplomacy, which can be regarded as a part of its broader “civilizing mission,” finding an optimal way of dealing with the Central Asian countries, in particular with Uzbekistan, which has never been a very easy partner either for Moscow, or for the United States.

Third, it is important to stress that contrary to some studies, this analysis revealed that Japan does not consider itself to be inferior to the West. Quite the opposite, Japan has been portrayed as a leader, who is capable to lead Asia, and whose significance has been recognized by the world leading economies. The Western major powers were interested to see “how Japan would react” to various initiatives, proposed by the West (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). This is considered to be of a particular importance since Japan has been traditionally perceived as being dependent on the United States. More specifically, it has been often argued that Japan’s interests in Central Asia are compatible with the ones pursued by the United States. This view stems from the fact that it was the United States that led the Allied occupation of Japan in the aftermath of its defeat, rewrote its Meiji Era Constitution in 1946, and set Japan’s postwar development strategy. It is often assumed that being bounded by the newly redrafted constitution, mainly by Article 9 of Chapter 2, the unarmed Japan had to rely on the United States for protection from then onward. Thus, since September 1951, when Japan was accepted by the international community, after signing a peace treaty with 48 countries, it has been largely perceived as “a member of the Western bloc” (Hara Reference Hara2001, 361). In addition to it, intertwined economies of the United States and Japan (Okita Reference Okita1960; Fukushima Reference Fukushima1985), along with the strong influence of democratization and flow of Western culture to Japan (Tamamoto Reference Tamamoto1995) strengthened support for classifying Japan’s interests as being identical to those of the United States. Some even claim that Japan acts as “an intermediary between, on the one hand, the interests of the United States and the European Union, and on the other, those of Russia and China” (Laruelle and Peyrouse Reference Laruelle and Peyrouse2015, 105).

Contrary to these explanations, a different kind of relations has been identified in the Japanese foreign policy discourses. To ensure stability and its own security within the existing hierarchical arrangements, Japan wants to design an “arc of freedom and prosperity” (jiyū to han’ei no ko) (Aso Reference Aso2006b). It has been conceived that “stability in Asia cannot be secured” unless “democracy [is] firmly rooted” in Asia (Aso Reference Aso2007b). In this regard, to ensure a successful outcome, Japan must “join its efforts with great powers that share common universal values.” Japan-US security arrangements create “a platform to stage Japan’s basic foreign policy” (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). Thus, the significance of the Japan-US relationship does not stem from the fact that Japan relies on the US umbrella, but because it provides “sense of security to the countries of the Asia-Pacific” (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). In particular, Japan does not represent itself as being dependent on the United States. In contrast, if a new security order was initiated by the United States in accordance with how the world is “viewed from the Atlantic” (taiseiyō kara mita), Japan would be established as the actor, which has the capability to introduce “a perspective … viewed from the Pacific” (taiheiyō kara mita) (Hashimoto Reference Hashimoto1997). In line with this view, Japan provides “infrastructure of security in the broadest sense—infrastructure which supports stability and development of the Asian economy—with the Japan-US Alliance as its primary axis” (Aso Reference Aso2006a). Thus, the United States is an “ally,” with whom Japan shares common “universal values and strategic interests” (fuhenteki kachi to senryakuteki rieki) (Aso Reference Aso2007b). The Japan-US alliance is represented as the cornerstone of security that supports the universal “pursuit of peace and happiness through economic prosperity and democracy.” This alliance is designed as alliance “for the world and for Asia” (sekai to ajia no tame no) (Aso Reference Aso2006a).