Greco-Roman philosophy seems to be an exclusively male territory. With rare exceptions, most famously Diotima's philosophical speech in the Symposion, women's voices remain largely silent in the philosophical works of Greco-Roman antiquity. Moreover, despite the fact that both Plato and later philosophers, like Musonius Rufus, explicitly defended the capacity of women to philosophise, it is clear that philosophical works from Greco-Roman antiquity address a male audience, something also reflected in the frequency of the use of the word ‘man’, instead of ‘human being’, in modern translations of Plato and Aristotle. Only relatively recently has this practice been questioned.
Alex Dressler in his book Personification and the Feminine in Roman Philosophy suggests that works of Roman philosophy may, if subjected to a certain reading, reveal to us, in surprising ways, the strong presence (and importance) of the feminine in those works. In order to explore this idea D. analyses the figurative language of Roman philosophy, which ‘offers a message that coherently and cogently complicates, and sometimes contradicts, the express philosophical statements of the Roman philosopher pertaining to men and women, relations of dependency and need, and love and attachment’ (1–2). At a first level, such statements link women to passivity, embodiment and dependency, features which ‘must be excluded from the experience of the dominant Roman’. At the same time, however, analysis of the figurative language used reveals the male's dependency on the feminine for his understanding of himself as a ‘subject of care’ (3) or as a ‘relational subject’. Personification is one such aspect of the figurative language used in Roman philosophy, and D. explores extensively the way such (grammatically) feminine concepts as nature, philosophy or virtue are used in the Roman philosophical discourse in a way that (paradoxically) affirms women's personhood (and agency) ‘as a result of the deconstruction inherent in the gesture’ (9). The author suggests that this use of figurative language is peculiar to Roman philosophy and constitutes a ‘performative’ aspect of the philosophical discourse (98). In the process of doing so, D. also constructs a fruitful dialogue between Roman philosophy and representatives of feminist thought.
The Stoic term oikeiosis proves to be a key term throughout D.’s analysis of the feminine in Roman philosophy (especially in chs 3 and 5); this term, which is usually translated as ‘appropriation’ (although D. opts for ‘ownness’), conveys the idea that an individual is appropriated (by cosmic nature) towards what is suitable to him- or herself as a member of the human species. The doctrine has a social dimension as well, since it is by virtue of oikeiosis that we feel related to other human beings and ultimately to humanity as a whole. Suggestive here is the fact that the adjective oikeios incorporates the notion of the ‘other’ as pertaining to oneself (literally to one's household), thus being a most appropriate term to convey D.’s point about understanding personhood as the inherent relational aspect of individuals. D. is, however, not interested in the particular Stoic use of the term but aims to discuss oikeiosis as a ‘broader part of Roman philosophy’ (29).
Ch. 1, ‘Love, literature and philosophy’, focuses on Cicero and Augustine on friendship to study the concept of ‘ownness’. Ch. 2, ‘The subjects of personification and personhood’, approaches personhood (understood as an act of recognition by others and, consequently, inherently linked to the relational character of the subject) on the basis of different forms of personification, an idea supported by the meticulous discussion of numerous examples of personification from Latin literature. Ch. 3, ‘Mothers, sons, and metaphysics: others’ agency and self-identity in the Roman Stoic notion of a person’, the most ‘philosophical’ of all the chapters, offers an exciting new reading of the doctrine of oikeiosis (or ‘ownness’), as it is presented in Cicero's De finibus 3. Contrary to most analyses of this notion in the secondary literature, D. also pays attention here to the rhetorical strategies implied in the presentation of this notion in Cicero. His argument suggests that the literary aspects of the texts of Roman philosophy aim at actually ‘making ownness happen’ (25). In ch. 4, ‘Girl behind the woman: Cicero on Tullia and Lucretius on the life of the body-mind’, D. applies his method of deconstruction to Lucretius by analysing the role of nature in his account of the origin of life and consciousness. Ch. 5, ‘Embodied persons and bodies personified: the phenomenology of perspectives in Seneca, Ep. 121’, offers an analysis of the longest extant ancient source on oikeiosis, found in Seneca's Ep. 121. Again, D. offers an original and elaborate reading of this source by highlighting the phenomenological perspective of the ‘self’ which emerges from the figurative language used by Seneca. Finally, ch. 6, ‘Nature's property in On Duties 1: the feminine communism of Cicero's radical aesthetics’, turns to a discussion of Cicero's On Duties (De Officiis) 1. Here, the analysis of the figurative language of the text reveals the tension between the radically social dimension of ownness and Cicero's defence of private property on the basis of oikeiosis as well.
D.’s book shows that detailed analysis of the (largely neglected) rhetorical or literary aspects of the Roman philosophical texts may offer new exciting readings of them, both from a hermeneutical and a feminist perspective. Furthermore, it may even show, strange though that may sound, that Roman philosophical texts are progressive in their perspectives on the feminine. This is in line with D.’s credo that it is only through the analysis of the aesthetic aspects of the texts that it is possible (from a modern, feminist standpoint) ‘to save the Roman philosopher from himself’ (9).
