186
Malmesbury to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 144/2B
20 April 1866
Stratford Place
I have for some time intended to write to you on a subject wh the possible political crisis now impendingFootnote 1 renders more urgent — It relates to the state of my health wh wd make it impossible for me to take my old office wh is not only a very laborious & responsible one, but unlike others never allows of repose at any hour of the day — My nervous system is not what it was, & suffers at once from overexertion of mind —
[. . .]Footnote 2 You have always been so truly generous & indulgent to me in all our political relations, & I am so entirely devoted to yr wishes, that nothing but necessity wd make me anticipate yr arrangements, but if you have to make them beforehand, it appears to me right that I shd say how far you can depend upon me. — If I took the Foreign Office I know I shd be obliged to resign it soon after, & a change of offices is always damaging to an Administration.Footnote 3
In myself I should be quite content to support you in a private capacity if you were again Prime Minister, but I am ready to make myself useful in any office wh has not the unceasing work & anxiety of the Foreign Dep[artmen]t.
187
Derby to Malmesbury, DP 920 DER (14) 190/2, fos 87–90Footnote 4
22 April 1866
Whatever may be my regret at the decision which you have come to as announced in your letter of Friday, I cannot say that it has taken me by surprise, or that I think your objections, with your frequent attacks of ill health, to take an office involving such incessant and anxious labour as the F.O. are unreasonable. Your withdrawal will no doubt increase the difficulty of my position, if I should be called on again to attempt the task of forming a government; and though I should still hope to have the advantage of your services in some less hard-worked department, I confess that I do not, in the present state of parties, see my way to acceptance of office. I know that the disappointment of our friends, should I be called on, and decline, will be very great; but I cannot, especially in the present unsettled state of affairs both at home and abroad, again undertake the duty without at least a reasonable prospect of an assured majority; and even if we should succeed in carrying Ld Grosvenor'sFootnote 5 amendment, of which there is a fair prospect, the men who would vote with us on that question are so diametrically opposed to us on others of no less importance, that even if they had leaders with whom it would be more easy to confer than with those apparently at their head, I do not see how we could come to such an understanding as would enable us to carry on a government together; and of the ordinary supporters of the present administration, who will reluctantly go with them on this occasion, I cannot look to any one who would have the courage to break off from their party to support a government of which Disraeli & I should be the leaders. The prospect however of my being sent for, with whatever result, is sufficiently near to make it necessary to consider all possible courses; & I should be very glad to have an opportunity of talking the matter over with you, if you could call here at almost any hour tomorrow or Tuesday – [. . .]
188
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/1
24 April 1866Footnote 6
St James's Square
I shall not be back in Town till the question is on the eve of decision. I do not think the result is likely to be my being called on again to form an Administration; and that I should be able to do so is less likely still. There is however a possibility, for which it is desirable to be prepared: and what I wish you to consider, is, whether in that contingency, should I find it desirable to offer you the Foreign Office, you would be willing to undertake it? I have not forgotten that some time ago I expressed myself as thinking that it was not one which would suit you, or which you would wish to accept; but subsequent consideration has materially changed my views, and the letter I showed you from Malmesbury renders a change indispensable. Disraeli is very strongly opposed to the Pr[ime]. Minister & the Foreign Secretary being both in the House of Lords; and he, I know, would not be unwilling to take it himself; but to this there are many and valid objections: and in the H[ouse]. of Commons I know of no one except yourself to whom I should like to entrust it. Moreover, with a view to your future prospects, it would place you in a much more prominent position than the Indian Secr[etary].ship, which takes a man more or less out of the general course of European politics. I don't want an answer to this – nor do I make any definite offer. I must be guided by a variety of circumstances which I cannot foresee; but I wish you to think the matter well over, before the case arises in which it is necessary to act.
189
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
27 April 1866
St James's Square
I should be sorry to see you (or myself either) a minister on sufferance; and I do not see how with the present H[ouse]. of C[ommons]. we can be anything else. I think this will be your feeling also.
I do not hold as strongly as Disraeli does the theory that a Foreign Sec. must be in the H[ouse]. of C[ommons]. The contrary has been the case during the greater part of the last 25 years, (v[ide]. mem[orandum]. enclosed):Footnote 7 under Liberal as well as Conservative administrations: and I never heard objections taken on that ground, though I have heard complaints, not wholly unreasonable, of the two great departments of expenditure (War and Admiralty) being represented in our House by under secretaries.
Between ourselves, I conceive that D.'s theory on that subject had a merely personal origin. Our friend Malmesbury never succeeded in obtaining public confidence: he did not do himself justice in debate, and justice was not done him.Footnote 8 I can understand that D. should have desired a change of persons: and it was obviously expedient to suggest for such a change a general rather than a personal reason. This difficulty is now removed.
In the event of your determining to undertake the government, is Lord Cowley, as Foreign Secretary impossible? The Queen, I am nearly sure, would suggest that arrangement. Clarendon is his personal friend, you would support him in debate, he ought to understand foreign affairs, he is fairly respected, and too little known here to have enemies.
I am in your hands, but the place in question is that of all others for which I judge myself least fit.Footnote 9 Nor do I think, if it can be avoided with honour, that you ought to hold office without a majority. But that question will keep.
190
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 89
4 July [?1866]Footnote 10
Stirling won't do.Footnote 11 In the debates of 1858 he made a violent personal attack on the Emperor. For any other place he would be very fit, if he would accept it: but not for F.O. — I have told Ld D[erby]. this.
191
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/3
[9 July 1866]Footnote 12
Of course I will attend to the F.O. business in the H[ouse]. of L[ords]. but I should like M[almesbury]Footnote 13 to be kept au courant as he suggests.
With regard to the ‘note identique’, if it is right to protest ag[ain]st. the right of Prussia to dissolve the Confed[eratio]n. I think we may, and ought to join in it, as we have a Minister accredited to it.Footnote 14
192
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/5
11 July 1866
Downing Street
[. . .] You will see that the news from Paris today is most important.Footnote 15 As far as one can judge the Emperor's intentions are very friendly towards us, and we must not intimate any jealousy of his proceedings.Footnote 16I think he has got into a scrape.
193
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 93
12 July [1866]
Foreign Office
I send you Cowley's private letters. Also drafts of mine to him.
The Emp[eror]. has got into hot water. He jumped at the position which the Austrian offer of Venice gave him, and forgot the difficulties in his way.Footnote 17 These are great, & increasing. Words will not stop Prussia: and he is not ready to go to war.
We are well out of it.
The language I hold is that while generally favoring [sic] peace, we maintain an attitude of reserve, and do not pledge ourselves to any specific proposals.
I think the Prussians will begin again, and reach Vienna. Farther I don't see.
194
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/8
[12 July 1866]Footnote 18
11 Downing Street
What a crisis!Footnote 19
All you have done turns out quite right —
I go to my election tomorrow, but congratulate you on being again an M.P.
195
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 97
19 July [1866]
Nothing new. Austrians seem determined to try another battle. Venetian reinforcements coming up rapidly. I think they will lose Vienna.
196
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
26 July [1866]
Foreign Office
Brunnow was here on Tuesday, and is coming again tomorrow: his object to ascertain what course England will take, in the event of being called upon to go into a Congress.Footnote 20 I told him I thought it would be premature to discuss that question until we were invited by the belligerent parties, which had not as yet happened, and possibly might not happen: he dwelt at length on the inconvenience of England & Russia being shut out from a European settlement, and was especially anxious that I should consult you on the subject. I am bound therefore to let you know his wish: but I think it would be wiser to reserve our decision until we know by whom, and under what circumstances, we are to be invited to confer.
197
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/7
[30 July 1866]Footnote 21
St James's Square
I enclose you a letter which I found on my return from the H[ouse]. of L[ords]. this evening.Footnote 22 I think the Queen is right, that ‘it would hardly be becoming if no interest was expressed by the English Government in the fate’ of the K[ing]. of Hanover.Footnote 23 I do not think that it would be in the least degree inconsistent with the system of absolute neutrality which we have adopted, & I think wisely, that you should send something like the enclosed to Loftus. We may receive a snub. I don't think we shall; but an absolute indifference as to a case which nearly touches our own Royal Family will hardly be consistent with our international position, and, if known, will not be well looked on by the country.
[Enclosed:]
SuggestedFootnote 24
I have to instruct you to call upon Mr. Bismarck, & represent to him that neither H.M. nor H.M.'s Govt. can view without very painful feelings, the absolute ruin of a Sovereign so nearly connected as is the K[ing]. of Hanover with H.M. & whose dominions were the birthplace of H.M's family. While therefore H.M's Govt. disclaim any title to interfere with those rights which the K[ing]. of Prussia has acquired by successful war, they desire earnestly to urge upon H.M, in relation to the Kingdom of Hanover, such a moderate and generous exercise of those rights as may tend to enhance the triumph of his Arms, and give additional strength to those friendly feelings which it is the desire of H.M's Govt. to see subsisting between H.M. & the K[ing]. of Prussia.
198
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
8 August 1866
Foreign Office
I feel bound to send this to you, as I told Apponyi I would take till tomorrow to consult you as to the answer.Footnote 25 But I have not the slightest doubt as to what the answer ought to be. We ought simply to decline.
There is no reason to think that Italy would accept our advice if offered in the sense proposed.Footnote 26 Indeed we know to the contrary.
Nor do I believe Austria sincere in making the proposition. She is massing forces in the Tyrol with a view to another battle.
Both nations are in the same position. Both have been beaten, and both want a victory to restore their military prestige.
Either Napoleon has blundered in his diplomacy, or he is playing a double game, and trying to revive the quarrel: in which he is likely enough to succeed.
I called on you, but you were out. Disraeli concurs in the above.
199
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/9
8 August [1866]
I do not think we can act at this stage.Footnote 27
The French government does not ask us to help them. It is only the opinion of the French ambassador at Vienna. If the Emperor wants us to join he will ask us. To interfere unasked is to risk a rebuff, and probably do more harm than good. S
[Derby's response noted on reverse:
I concur with Ld. S. Moreover if the application were made and acceded to, there would be no security, if Mr. Elliot's despatches are to be entirely trusted, that Italy would not continue the war single-handed. I think it might be hinted to Mr. E. not to give to the Ital. Govt. reason to expect support from us. He seems to me to have given rather too much encouragement in this sense.]
200
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
16 August 1866
Foreign Office
It would never do to recall Odo Russell.* It would be a bad move, even if we meant to fight the Pope's battles, which we cannot and ought not. I don't expect that the present Pope will consent to any changes, but he cannot last long, and terms may be made with his successor. I do not believe the Italians are hostile to the Papacy, or that they grudge him his sovereign dignity: what they want is the territory, and that in one way or another they are sure to get. Many of them would be content to leave him Rome, or a part of it, (this was About'sFootnote 28 plan): but they will never be in a mood to treat the question calmly, until the French occupation is at an end. It is the foreigner they object to. I fear the Emperor will find it hard to give way on this point, after his other defeats – MexicoFootnote 29 and Germany. But we shall see when the time comes. Russell is coming away on leave for the next month or six weeks. [. . .]
201
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/10Footnote 30
17 August 1866
Grosvenor Gate
I have read Cowley's letters with much interest.
Bloomfield's, both handwriting & matter, are those of a green-grocer: Loftus shd. be the foreign editor of the Morning Herald: Morier, as ambassador,Footnote 31 is ‘high life below stairs’[.]
Elliot a partisan — [. . .]
202
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fos 105–106
22 August 1866
Foreign Office
Cowley is not in haste to get away, and will probably stay till the end of the year. The selection of his successor is therefore not urgent.Footnote 32 [. . .]
All going on peaceably: in Italy the feeling is cooling down fast, and I think the great European question is in a fair way to being settled.
The Greeks are doing all they can to stir up a civil war in Crete, and seem likely to succeed.Footnote 33 But they will not command much sympathy: Greece itself is in such a state that no change could be for the worse. [. . .]
203
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 107
23 August 1866
Foreign Office
I fear I must trouble you to read the enclosed papers. You will see by them what Musurus proposes. It cannot in any case be done without the sanction of an Act of Parl[iamen]t, and I can see no reason why it should be done at all. The Turkish security is bad enough at best: why go out of our way to weaken the hold we have upon that government?Footnote 34
I fear this CandianFootnote 35 business will grow into a war. The Greeks in Greece are encouraging the movement, and though all but bankrupt, are said to be trying to provide arms.
204
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/12
26 August [1866]
Hughenden
The proposition of the Turkish government seems to me inadmissible.
It is a good rule never to change a security: but to change an unlimited security, for a limited one, could never be justified. The proposal is to transform an imperial Turkish security into an Egyptian one —
The Ho: of Commons, wh: originally looked with great disfavor [sic] on the Turkish loan, would never countenance this modification of the security for an unpopular advance.
205
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/16
6 September 1866
Knowsley
[. . .] Cowley's account of the new foreign minister,Footnote 36 confirmed as it is by Fane,* does not hold out a pleasant prospect; but it will not have escaped you that Cowley says the only man he had got on well with was Lyons.Footnote 37
206
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fos 111–112
6 September 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] Nothing urgent in my department: Brunnow is doing what he can to make the Cretan affair a European question, but I am acting, or rather postponing action, with the utmost caution, as I have good hope that the Turks may be able to settle the matter by a display of force, with little or no fighting.Footnote 38 [. . .]
207
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
10 September 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] The Greeks, with their accustomed mendacity, have put about a report that we, the British government, had been advising the cession of Crete to Greece! Erskine* telegraphs to me to contradict this, which I have done in the plainest terms.
All this diplomatic disturbance inclines me to think that the Cretans are now aware they have no choice in the way of armed resistance, and that they are trying to bring about foreign intervention before the movement collapses of itself. If I am right, our policy of delay is justified: and in any event it can do no harm. [. . .]
208
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
19 September 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] The Turkish victory in Crete does not appear decisive,Footnote 39 but I hope it may be enough to stave off the eastern question for the moment. The sick man is very sick, and if handing over Crete to Greece would avert a general collapse, it might be the best thing for all parties: but the Porte can hardly give way on one point without provoking a general rising among the Christian populations.
I believe Brunnow to be sincere when he says his government does not desire to precipitate events in the east. Russia has enough on hand at present. Disordered finance – railroads to the Black Sea not yet made – serfs hardly settled down as free peasants – Poland still deeply discontented – are the real reasons which induce the Russian government to wish things may go on as they are for a while. [. . .]
209
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
22 September 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] You will see from the despatches of this morning that Moustier* is more of a Turk than we supposed.Footnote 40 Now that the Cretan war has fairly begun, I think the less we commit ourselves the better, until time and failure shows [sic] that the Turks cannot regain effectual & quiet possession of the island. If they win, there is nothing to be done except to preach moderation &c as before: if they lose, and the war drags on, we shall have to interfere: but not yet.
210
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/21
23 September 1866
Balmoral
[. . .] I have sent to the Queen Howard de Walden's despatch & private letter. I should think the case of Belgium serious, if it were not for the more than antagonism which subsists between France & Prussia; but I do not think the former has any hostile intentions; and would not be sorry to appear as the protector of Belgium if the latter should attack her, especially if such a quarrel (as soon as she is ready to fight) should give her a pretext for obtaining the Rhenish provinces.Footnote 41
I do not attach much importance (at present) to the Cretan question – nor, I confess, have I much sympathy with these eastern Christians. [. . .] I do not think their condition would be improved by being handed over, like the Ionian Islands, to the constitutional (?)Footnote 42 monarchy of Greece. But their success would be the beginning of the end; for an immediate flame would be kindled throughout all the Greek population, and the ‘Eastern question’ be precipitated, while no power is prepared with a solution of it. I hope therefore that the insurrection will be promptly and effectually put down, whatever influence the protecting powers may afterwards exercise towards mitigating Turkish ferocity. [. . .]
211
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
24 September 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] The Cretan business grows more and more serious:Footnote 43 but Lavallette* [sic] will do nothing, being only at his post provisionally, and Moustier seems Turkishly inclined.Footnote 44 The telegrams are not very trustworthy, but it cannot be doubted that the Turks have been beaten.Footnote 45 [. . .]
212
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
6 October 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] I hear that the Austrians are going to bring over Beust* from Saxony to manage their affairs. They want a man, and he wants power, so both will be suited. Both Apponyi & Bloomfield give a lamentable description of the finances and general position of the Empire.
I have nothing in today.
213
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
11 October 1866
Foreign Office
Brunnow has been here a long while, discussing Cretan affairs chiefly: I shall make into a draft the substance of what he said, and therefore only send you these papers which he wished that you should see. Please return them.
214
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/31
12 October 1866
Knowsley
I return, without delay, the papers confidentially left with you by Brünnow. Your conversation with him may have thrown some additional light upon their meaning; but as I read them the dominant idea seems to be the impossibility of a really good understanding between Russia and France, and a desire to come to one with us, to the exclusion of the latter power. You will not, I am sure, fall into this trap. It is very probably true that the mutual jealousies of France and Russia are much against their united action; it is so much the more our interest and duty to keep on such terms with both as to prevent separate action on the part of either; and, to do justice to France, she seems well disposed to fall in with this view. Russia professes to have no arrière penseéFootnote 46 with regard to the Turkish empire; but Prince Gortchacow lays down as a ‘condition de rigueur’ as to its continued existence the establishment of peace with its Christian subjects, based on the satisfaction of their ‘aspirations légitimes[’]. Now there is no question that so far as Crete is concerned the Christian ‘aspirations’ are, and are admitted to be, the subversion of the Ottoman sovereignty; and although the last paragraph only suggests a pressure on the Turks ‘de ne pas abuser de leur victoire’,Footnote 47 the whole tenor of the despatch is to encourage, and to induce us to encourage with them, this ‘aspiration’. When the insurrection shall have been put down, there is no reason why the three courts should not interpose, even by a note identique in the cause of humanity, and especially if the Egyptian troops have been guilty of the barbarities which are hardly denied; but to concur with one of the great powers in attempting any ulterior object would be alike contrary to our duty and our interests. I shall be anxious to see your draft recording your conversation with Brünnow, or I may say your conversations, for I see by your note to your Mother that you were to have another today.
215
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
18 October 1866
Foreign Office
I send, separate, a paper which the P[rince]. of W[ales].* wished you should see. It is part of a letter from the K[ing]. of Greece.Footnote 48 The P. talked to me chiefly about the Cretan affair: he is very anti-Turk, but I think I made him understand the position, and that it is not expedient, if we can help it, to bring the whole eastern question on our heads. [. . .]
216
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
19 October 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] Since I began this letter Brunnow has been here (as usual) and hinted, or rather told me in plain terms, that the Emperor would be much gratified at having the Garter! Why an Emperor should care to have the Garter I don't understand: but that is his business, and if it pleases him I should think you will have no objection. It seems that he has decorated, as they call it, some of our princes. B. told me the details, but I fear I have forgotten them. If he considers the thing a compliment, it would be a good way of marking the complete reconciliation which has taken place since the war of 1854–6. Please answer as to this.Footnote 49
217
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/36
20 October 1866
Knowsley
If the Emperor of Russia would take it as a compliment to have the Garter, I can see no reason for not giving it to him, but rather the reverse. So if you think fit to recommend it to the Queen, you may say that you do so with my concurrence.Footnote 50 [. . .]
218
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/37
26 October 1866
Knowsley
I return Genl. Grey's* letter,Footnote 51 which I received just in time to answer one from the P. of Wales, who suggested that such a proposition should be made to the Queen. H.M.'s reasons are tolerably plausible; but I have no doubt you are right as to the real motive. It is unlucky that Brünnow should have asked for the Garter. [. . .]
219
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/39
8 November 1866
St James's Square
I quite approve of your proposed draft to Odo Russell. I think it would be useful if you were to circulate it in the Cabinet. They like to know what is done or said, even if they are not consulted about it.
220
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
9 November 1866
Foreign Office
I send a draft of instructions which I propose to send to Odo Russell. He knows my wishes already, and as far as he is concerned I have no fear of any want of caution: but it may hereafter be convenient to have defined beforehand our position.
The French desire only that we should not meddle. The Italians don't ask our interference. In this country there is less feeling than there was on the question, though what sympathy there is is, no doubt Italian and anti-papal.
221
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
11 December 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] — I shall send you in a day or two a couple of drafts on Servian affairs, which I hope you will concur in. France and Austria have already expressed similar opinions.
The Greek government is doing all it can (happily that is not much) to bring about a war.
I have nothing today of importance.
222
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/19
12 December 1866
Grosvenor Gate
What do you hear from Paris?
I have your accounts.
I shall be at that paradise, D[owning].S[treet]. No. 11, early this morning.Footnote 52
223
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/48
13 December 1866
Knowsley
[. . .] I returned your Servian despatches yesterday.Footnote 53 Hammond said it was wished they should go out by today's mail. I concur in the view which they take; but I cannot say I think the suggestion contained in that which I received and return today is likely to be acceptable to either party. [. . .]
224
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
14 December 1866
Foreign Office
[. . .] I lay very little stress on the alternative proposition as to Belgrade. Hammond seemed to think it might be useful as avoiding the name [sic] of a total surrender of the fortress. But the main point is that the Turks should cease to hold it: and that we have advised. It is their best chance for continuing to exist, but I fear they will be obstinate.Footnote 54 [. . .]
225
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/50
21 December 1866
Knowsley
Look at a minute I have made on a despatch of Erskine's returned to Hammond today — We are really carrying to an extreme our forbearance towards that wretched little Kingdom of Greece, whose utter incapacity of government at home is only equalled by its activity for mischief abroad.Footnote 55
226
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/7
22 December 1866
Foreign Office
I will send the Greek despatches which you have noted to the law officers for report: but I hardly see what is to be done. Armed interference in the present state of eastern affairs would even if justifiable be exceedingly impolitic: it would be regarded not as a mere matter of police but as a demonstration in favour of Turkey.
I have as low an opinion of the Greeks as you: nevertheless Turkey is all but exhausted, we shall inevitably have the eastern question on our hands in a year or two, (perhaps in a few months) and I do not want England to be always on the losing side. I don't mean that we should take part against the Turks, but only that we should avoid doing anything that looks like giving them direct assistance. Remember that nothing can be done to remedy such a state of feeling as exists throughout Greece, short of an occupation by an armed force.
I write in great haste.
227
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/51
[?26 December 1866]Footnote 56
Knowsley
Bismarck* surpasses himself in the audacity of his avowals of bad faith, and of having designedly thrown dust in the eyes of France!
228
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/21Footnote 57
30 December 1866
Grosvenor Gate
I have just heard, from a first-rate quarter, that, at the last Cab: Council at the Thuilleries [sic], a proposition, from Bismarck, suggesting an arrangement, by wh: the southern states of Germany should blend with Prussia, & that France shd take possession of Belgium, was absolutely brought forward, & favored [sic] by several of the ministers: principally by Lavalette. It was opposed by the Min[istr]y. for F[oreign].Aff[air]s:
Can this be true? And if so, or if there be any foundation for it – what are Bismarck's relations with us? Have you heard anything from our goosey gander at Berlin,Footnote 58 a pretty instrument to cope with the Prussian minister! And Mr Fane – what does he say?
And what shall we say?
The Emperor is like a gambler, who has lost half his fortune, & restless to recover: likely to make a coup, wh: may be fatally final for himself.
I doubt, whether this country wd. see any further glaring case of public violence & treachery with composure — Reaction is the law of all human affairs: & the re-action from non-intervention must, sooner or later, set in — I wd. rather, however, try to prevent mischief – i.e. as long as we can.
I go to Q[uarter]-Sess[ions]: tomorrow morning, & in the evening to Hughenden, where I shall remain till the 8th.
Write to me there, if you have anything to say= and what about Crete?
229
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 142
31 December 1866
Foreign Office
In Napoleon's position, which though not quite as bad as your friends described it, is unsatisfactory enough, there is no saying what he may or may not do. But nothing that is known here encourages the supposition that there is any understanding between him and Bismark [sic].
That Bismark [sic] offered him Belgium during the war is certain: and it is equally certain that he rejected the proposal with some warmth, probably thinking it a trap.
The feeling in southern Germany, though divided, points in general to union with Prussia: that is, to close alliance offensive and defensive. There is a report that secret treaties to that effect have been entered into by Baden and Wurtemburg: which seems likely enough, but is not certain. But this alliance is directed expressly against France, and is certainly not made with her consent, if it is made at all.
I will try and find out what is passing.Footnote 59 At present I can hardly believe in a deliberate proposal to annex Belgium, though like many other wild ideas, it may have passed through the Emperor's brain.
The Cretan question is likely to give trouble. Up to this point we are perfectly uncommitted and free to act, if we act at all, as events may lead us. Moustier has got a plan of some sort which he will communicate shortly.Footnote 60 I do not know its purport.
230
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 146
2 January 1867
Foreign Office
All good wishes for the new year!
I wrote the substance of your French reportFootnote 61 to Fane, who has answered, but knows nothing to confirm it, and evidently disbelieves. I think it a canard, but it is always well to attend to such warnings.Footnote 62 [. . .]
231
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/8
4 January 1867
Foreign Office
[. . .] You will see what Fane says about the Emperor's growing indolence and irresolution. The same story reaches me from other quarters. La Tour* mildly hints that Moustier seldom sends him any instructions. I don't know that we have cause to regret that state of things.
Beust seems inclined to have a finger in the eastern fire. One would imagine that an Austrian premier had enough to do at home.
La Tour is coming this afternoon, but too late, probably, to allow of my letting you know what he says. [. . .]
232
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 156
‘M. 27’ [27 March 1867]Footnote 63
Foreign Office
Luxemburg is farther advanced than we thought.Footnote 64 An intercepted telegram states that the demand for it is about to be made.Footnote 65 BentinckFootnote 66 knows nothing. Bernstorff, who knows a good deal, looks alarmed, and talks of the danger of a war. I meant to have told you this verbally but hear you are not at your office. [. . .]
233
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 158
3 April 1867 ‘2.40 P.M.’
Foreign Office
The enclosed has just come in. I don't see how war can now be avoided.Footnote 67
234
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/26
‘Wednesday’ [3 April 1867]Footnote 68
Grosvenor Gate
RothschildsFootnote 69 have received information that the Emperor has definitely informed Bismarck, that the arrangement between himself & King of Holland is concluded, & that he shall act at once on it.Footnote 70 What have you heard?
235
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 162
3 April [1867]Footnote 71
The Dutch government are willing to sell, if they can get the consent of Prussia. Bismarck says positively that the feeling of Germany makes it impossible for him to give way. Bernstorff has been here this morning. He expects war – and asks whether we will join!Footnote 72
If the Emperor moves, it will be war. At least I think so.
236
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 164
4 April [1867] ‘2.30.’
Foreign Office
Bernstorff has been with me this morning, and says the K[ing]. of Holland has given way, withdrawn from his offer, and the Luxemburg question is at an end. What dish [sic] for the Emperor to eat! I am not bound to secrecy, and shall make the thing public in answer to any question that may be asked. I think there can be no doubt of the truth of his story: it is an official telegram: but I have telegraphed to Cowley for confirmation.
237
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/58
‘Wednesday’ [17 April 1867]Footnote 73
Roehampton
I send you the enclosed, which please return, by the Queen's command. I see by Telegram that the K[ing]. of the Belgians will not hear of the proposed solution – in which I cannot but think he is ill-advised.
[Enclosed:]
General Grey to Derby
16 April 1867
Windsor Castle
The Queen desires me to send you, very confidentially, for your information and that of Lord Stanley, the enclosed copy of a letter from the Queen of Prussia.
You will doubtless have seen what the Queen has written to Lord Stanley on the subject of Luxemburg, and are aware of HM's anxiety, while we carefully avoid being mixed up in the quarrel between France and Prussia, that we should exert our utmost influence at both Courts to prevent a rupture by assisting, as far as we are able, in finding a mode of settlement honourable to both Parties. Her Majesty is strongly inclined to the opinion, which Lord Cowley seemed to entertain, that the neutralisation of Luxemburg would afford the best chance of effecting this object; but she fears that such an arrangement could hardly be depended upon, if the Grand Duchy were to remain in the possession of the King of Holland, whose necessities would probably soon drive him to make his private Bargain with France. H.M. cannot therefore but think that the most satisfactory settlement of the question would be, the transfer of Luxemburg to Belgium, whose own safety and independence would require the maintenance of the state of neutrality which, in that case, would naturally be extended to the Grand Duchy.
It might be well worth while for Belgium to pay the money required for an acquisition of so much importance to her safety.
P.S. Since I wrote the above the Queen has sent down a telegram from Vienna, dated yesterday, in which Lord Bloomfield says that Baron Beust has made the same suggestion and that it has been well received at Berlin.
238
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/8
17 April 1867
Foreign Office
I return Grey's letter and its enclosure. We are in the dark altogether. Nothing can be more positive than the language of Bismarck in the despatch read to me on Monday, the substance of which you have seen. He says that on no condition whatever will Prussia consent to evacuate the fortress. If Beust has not deceived himself, Bismarck's language to him has been exactly in an opposite sense. Which is one to believe? Till the point of Prussia's willingness to go out of Luxemburg is settled, it is premature to consider how the fortress is to be disposed of. This is what I have been telling Apponyi within the last half hour, and what I shall tell La Tour if he comes.
I don't think, in any event[,] the K[ing]. of the Belgians will consent to an exchange of territory: in which case there remains only the simple solution of leaving things as they are, and the territory and fortress in the hands of the K[ing]. of Holland, minus the German garrison.
239
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/27
17 April 1867
Grosvenor Gate
I like Beust's scheme: it wd. satisfy everybody, if, as appears, Prussia sanctions – let me have a line to Hughenden, where I am now going, if you think there is anything in it.
Your approval, perhaps, wd. help.
240
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 166
17 April [1867]
Foreign Office
I like Beust's scheme too: but you and I are close in our taste. Bismarck declared to me, through Bernstorff, on Monday, that on no condition whatever would Prussia consent to give up her right of garrison: and the K[ing]. of the Belgians on the other hand affirms that nothing shall induce him to consent to the proposed exchange. This does not look like a settlement. I shall hear more in a day or two. [. . .]
241
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/28Footnote 74
[22 April 1867]Footnote 75
Windsor Castle
My visit here has tumbled me into the midst of the Luxembourg [sic] business; & I have had all the despatches, & all the private letters of all the cousins, submitted to me= & you know all the rest.
I assured our Royal Mistress, & most sincerely, that she was quite under a mistake in supposing, that you wd. not act if necessary, & that, I knew, you had well considered all the eventualities about Belgium; that you wd. never act with[ou]t determination & constancy; & that anything you did, or said, wd. have double the effect of the old stagersFootnote 76 with their mechanical interference; sometimes bluster & sometimes blundering.
I told her Majesty also, that we were not really a half Government. until the division of last Friday,Footnote 77 & that a hint from you cd., & wd, do more now, than reams of despatches a month ago.
I think she understood all this: & I think I did good.
I pointed out also, that, so far as matters went, the question of Belgium was not really on the tapis.Footnote 78 This, after reflection, she agreed to = but still thought that, in confidential conversation, our people might let it be known at Berlin & Paris, that the violation of Belgian neutrality shd. not pass with impunity.
At present it seems the pressure shd. rather be put upon Berlin, than on the ancient capital of Julian the Apostate.Footnote 79
Two things seem to me clear: that France is not prepared, & that Bismark [sic] lies to everyone – His explanations prove his perfidy.
I think, myself, as old Brunnow says, ‘it is time for a little re-action’, & that we might begin to dictate a little to Europe – Gladstonism is at a discount.
It[’]s very lucky, however, we didn't take off any taxes: & that by paying off some debt, we shall be able to borrow any amount at a very moderate price. That is to say, in case we want it. Nevertheless, as nothing happens wh: one expects, I begin to believe you will turn out a regular Chatham.Footnote 80 [. . .]
242
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 168
23 April [1867]
Foreign Office
Thanks for your letter. It is satisfactory to see that even the dulness [sic] of a Windsor visit has not affected your spirits.
H.M. has written to the K[ing]. of Prussia in the strongest terms that can be used deprecating war and advising him to give way. The Belgian influence has helped to bring about this interference: Leopold thinks that if a war were to break out, it would very probably end in France getting Belgium and Prussia Holland.
I am ready to go as far as may be necessary in support of Belgium, short of giving an absolute pledge to fight for its independence. Suppose we gave such a pledge, that France and Prussia came to an understanding, Russia and Austria standing aloof, where should we be? But I say nothing in an opposite sense, lest we should lose our influence.
The neutralisation of Luxemburg is the one indispensable condition of peace. If that can be obtained from Prussia, arrangements of detail may be easily made.
Bismarck has chosen this time of all times to go off into the country. He returns tomorrow, when Loftus will see him.
The French say they can put 400,000 men into the field. Our reports give them from 300,000 to 350,000. Excitement at Paris very great. [. . .]
243
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/8
‘7.P.M.’ [29 April 1867]Footnote 81
Foreign Office
I send one line to say that La Tour, Bernstorff, Brunnow, Azeglio, and Apponyi, all of whom I have seen today, look on the Luxemburg affair as settled. I had forgotten Van de Weyer, who holds the same language. I hope it is so – but I don't feel as if the fish were quite landed yet. Still on their joint authority I have held out more hopes to the House than I should otherwise have done.Footnote 82
Italy wants to be in the conference,Footnote 83 which as we know how it is to end, will be a cheap civility. I told Azeglio my personal opinion was favorable [sic], but I could give no pledge.
The House is evidently pleased, and the whole affair will have done us good.
I hope your head is getting right again. I have been incessantly at work since 9.30. but am pretty clear now.
244
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/60
[3 May 1867]Footnote 84
I think the course suggested by Hammond quite the right one. For the reason assigned in his letters to Cowley, I should have thought that Belgium should not take part in the Conference – but it is not very material. The despatch explanatory of the telegram will not reach Petersburg till after the Conference has met.
245
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/61
Sunday night [5 May 1867]Footnote 85
St James's Square
Let me see you, if not at breakfast tomorrow, as early as you can after.Footnote 86
Bernstorff was with me today, and I think the settlement of the European question now hangs on the course we are prepared to take. If the ‘European guarantee’ can be accepted in the sense in which Prussia is willing to accept it, I do not see that it need interpose an insuperable obstacle to a settlement.
246
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/63
13 May 1867
St James's Square
[. . .] I thought it as well to volunteer a statement to the H[ouse]. of L[ords]. as to the signature and purport of the treaty[.]
247
Note by Hammond, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/63Footnote 87
14 May 1867
As the conference has not entered on the Turkish question and was never intended to do so, there seems no occasion to deal with the matters raised in Lord Denbigh'sFootnote 88 papers, which from a cursory inspection seem to partake very much of the character of those which at various former times have been put forth in different quarters.Footnote 89
I am not afraid for Turkey so long as England holds aloof from any joint interference in its internal affairs, which we have no right to exercise, which is uncalled for, and which is only invoked by Russia in order to ensure the destruction of the Turkish empire.
248
Stanley to Cowley, Cowley MSS, TNA, FO 519/182, fo. 321
29 May 1867
Foreign Office
I have thought a great deal about the Luxemburg papers, and consulted Hammond: and I cannot avoid the conclusion that we must publish. In the first place, both Lord Derby and I have promised the papers. In the next, we have entered into certain national engagements, and Parliament has a right to know from us why we did so. But the passages to which you objected have been wholly or partly struck out. [. . .]
249
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/29
10 June 1867
11 Downing Street
What do you hear from Paris?
I hear rather strange things.
I shall be at D[owning]. S[treet]. all day from 2 o’[clo]ck: I could see you at four o’[clo]ck: [. . .]Footnote 90
250
Stanley to Cowley, Cowley MSS, TNA, FO 519/182, fo. 335
15 June 1867
Foreign Office
[. . .] We had Luxemburg brought on last night, in a thin House: the result entirely satisfactory: the guarantee went down more easily than I had ventured to expect or even to hope. [. . .]
251
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/69
[16 June 1867]Footnote 91
St James's Square
[. . .] I congratulate you on your triumph of Friday —Footnote 92
252
Derby to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/7/73
[27 June 1867]Footnote 93
[. . .] Can you send me a copy of your last despatch to Loftus, remarking on the cases of collective guarantee on which Prussia has not thought herself called upon to act? I shd. like to see it before tomorrow.
253
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 213
‘9.A.M. Wed.’ [?June 1867]Footnote 94
St James's Square
[. . .] D[’]Azeglio wants to see me today – I have fixed him for 3 — He will press for intervention – I am against this – what do you say?
254
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 176
30 August 1867
Knowsley
A letter from Fane, which I enclose, tells all the little that is known to me of what has passed at Saltzburg [sic].Footnote 95 The Emperor's speeches, and the tone of the French press, are reassuring on the whole: the press of Berlin on the other hand is using the most offensive language, defying the French [:] ‘We know you would fight us if you dared, but you dare not.’ Whether this is only stupidity, or a premeditated purpose of forcing on a quarrel, the result is the same. What do the Rothschilds say?Footnote 96 [. . .]
255
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/31Footnote 97
1 September 1867
Hughenden
I return Fane's letter with many thanks —
I have heard nothing from the R[othschild]s – I observe, they never write, & only speak, indeed, on these matters in a corner, & a whisper.
To form a judgment [sic] of the present state of affairs, one must be greatly guided by our knowledge of the personal character of the chief actors.
The Emperor will never act alone; Bismarck wants quiet; & Beust, tho’ vain, is shrewd & prudent.
Gorthcff. [sic] is the only man, who could, & wod, act with the Emperor, in order to gain his own ends, on wh: he is much set, but if the Emperor combines with him, he will so alarm, & agonise, Austria, that she will throw herself into the arms of Prussia, in order than an united Germany may save her from the destruction of all her Danubian dreams. I think affairs will trail on, at least for a time, & the longer the time, the stronger will be yr position. In such a balanced state of circumstances, you will be master. I expect you to become the greatest foreign minister since Chatham.
256
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/32
5 September 1867
Hughenden
I took yr hint & wrote to R[othschild].Footnote 98 & not receiving an answer, rather regretted it; but, this morning, the enclosed came —Footnote 99
There is not much in it, but he is a man, who never dresses up a tale, & always understates. It is as well, too, that you shd. have the power of comparing accounts & impressions from quarters of equal, & first-rate, authenticity. I shall, therefore, encourage him. [. . .]
257
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fos 178–179
9 September 1867
Foreign Office
I return Rothschild's letter, with many thanks. My intelligence is not positive as to what passed at Saltzburg [sic],Footnote 100 but all peaceable as far as it goes.
[. . .] — I found the great ladyFootnote 101 in good spirits [,] living out of doors in all weathers: not a word said of home affairs, not much of any business: I don't see that she has at present any political idea, except the old one of supporting Prussia against France, which is not practical, and quite harmless.
La Valette holds language as regards Crete &c entirely opposed to that of Moustier, and it looks as though the French policy was going round again. What fellows they are, not knowing their own minds for six months together. [. . .]
258
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fos 182–183
17 September 1867
Foreign Office
[. . .] All quiet in Europe. Bismarck gives up the Prussian F.O. but retains the chief direction of affairs. I fancy the change is only on grounds of health. I have been long expecting to hear of Moustier's retirement, but he seems to have got a new lease. [. . .]
259
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 185
23 September 1867
Foreign Office
[. . .] Bismarck's circularFootnote 102 has produced a bad effect in France. It was quite unnecessary, and somewhat offensive.
Another Garibaldian row seems likely: but I think the Italian government will stop him.Footnote 103
260
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/8
9 October 1867
Foreign Office
[. . .] Nothing very definite is known as to the state of the Roman business. I incline to think that the revolutionary parties have not made much way. The flight of the Pope, or the occupation of Rome by Italian troops, would at this moment be a very serious addition to the other perplexities of the Emperor.
261
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/38Footnote 104
14 October 1867
Grosvenor Gate
I thought it wise to reconnoitre, & called on our friend yesterday.Footnote 105
He said the Emperor was no longer master of the position, & repeated this rather significantly.
In time, I extracted from him, that they had information from Paris, that there was a second treaty bet[wee]n. Prussia & Italy.
I rather expressed doubts about this, & hinted that it seemed inconsistent with what had reached us, that there was an understanding bet[wee]n. France & Italy, that the Emperor shd give notice of his course &c.
He was up to all this, & showed me, or rather read, a telegram, I shd. think of yesterday, in precisely the same words as you expressed, so I inferred the same person had given the news to Fane & his correspondent. Probably NigraFootnote 106 himself.
The information of the secret treatyFootnote 107 had arrived subsequently, & he stuck to it, & evidently believed it.
I give no opinion, but as I cd. not see you today till late, & might interfere with your railroad, I thought it best to write this.
The Berlin ministry have consulted another member of the family about ironclads. They are going to expend ½ mill: sterling immediately thereon. & told him they thought of having the order executed in America, as, in case of war with France, the ships would not be allowed to defend it if they were constructed in England.
He told me a good many other things, that may wait, as I am very busy this morning — [. . .]
262
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 111/3, fo. 194
14 October [1867]Footnote 108
Foreign Office
Many thanks for your information. I am disposed to believe it: so far at least as to assume that there is an understanding, even if no actual treaty has been concluded. [. . .]
263
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/40
[16 October 1867]Footnote 109
I had not seen it – They don't send me the telegrams now.Footnote 110 It[’]s very grave. I will be with you at F.O. at ½ past two [. . .]
264
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/8
30 October 1867
Foreign Office
No fresh telegrams from Italy up to this date (4.P.M.)[.] BaudeFootnote 111 and Azeglio both suppose that things are going on quietly. The French must by this time be at Rome.Footnote 112 Moustier's circular suggests, in effect, a conference of the Great Powers to settle the position of the Pope: I do not myself see how such a conference can be got together. Without a previous understanding it would be a mere debating-club, and what chance is there of such an understanding being come to? I shall however try and ascertain what the Prussians mean to say in answer to this invitation. – The Queen is anxious that we should not be mixed up in the business, and in that I agree with her: but she is more fidgety on the subject than is necessary.
265
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/45
31 December 1867
Grosvenor Gate
I have just come up from Quart[er]: Sess[ions]: but find here strange accounts from Paris.Footnote 113 I will try to see you in the course of the day: about three o’[clo]ck: in [sic] my way to D[owning].S[treet].: if you are there engaged, we might meet for ten minutes later.
266
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fos 1–2
16 January 1868
Knowsley
I enclose copy of a note from Lyons, by which you will see that it is doubtful whether the Danubian loan guaranteeFootnote 114 will be called for. The secret I suspect to be, that a French company have got the money, which they would like to lend to the commissionersFootnote 115 on usurious terms, knowing the security to be good: but of course the commission will not close with the offer if a guarantee can be had enabling them to get what they want more cheaply. Bismarck is personally favorable [sic] to the guarantee, but says he must consult his colleagues. [. . .]
On 19 February 1868, on the grounds of ill-health, Derby informed Disraeli that he proposed to resign. A letter to the Queen followed on 21 February. On 25 February, after a delay occasioned by the Queen ignoring Derby's requests about peerages, Disraeli went to Osborne to kiss hands and accept the premiership. The Cabinet was left almost completely unchanged, with Stanley remaining as Foreign Secretary.
267
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 15
21 February [1868]
As you are now de facto Premier, I send on my semi-official letters to you, as I have been in the habit of doing to Lord Derby. Please forward them when read, to the Queen. I enclose a label.
268
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/55Footnote 116
23 April 1868
Grosvenor Gate
This appears to me important.Footnote 117
CharlesFootnote 118 is virtually Bismarck.Footnote 119
A few days ago, B was all fury against France, & declared that France was resolved on war &c. but on Monday the R[othschild]s wrote to Berlin, that they understood England was so satisfied with Prussia, so convinced, that she really wished peace &c, that England would take no step, at the instance of France, wh: would imply doubt of Prussia &c.
This is the answerFootnote 120 – I can't help thinking, that you have another grand opportunity of securing the peace of Europe & establishing your fame —Footnote 121
I will call as I go by.
269
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 28
24 April 1868
Foreign Office
I have seen Bernstorff. He knows nothing of intended reductions. I told him the substance of your telegram, not naming the authority, but saying it was good. He promised to enquire and let me know. He says that the language held at Berlin is that they are satisfied, generally, with French assurances.
270
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/60Footnote 122
24 April 1868
10 Downing Street
Bernstorff never knows anything. I am sure there is something on the tapis,Footnote 123 & I want you to have the credit of it. Vide Reuters tels– in Times of today ‘Berlin Ap: 23’ rumor [sic] on the Bourse &c.Footnote 124
What I shd do wd be to telegraph to Loftus, & bring things to a point, & then act.
I feel sure it will be done without you, if you don't look sharp.
[P.S.] You risk nothing and may gain everything[.]
271
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/61Footnote 125
[25 April 1868]Footnote 126
10 Downing Street
I feel persuaded it[’]s all true —
They have a letter this morning in detail, explaining the telegram, & enforcing it. The writer, fresh from Bismarck himself, does not speak as if doubt were possible: gives all the details of the military reductions to commence on 1st May, & the larger ones, wh: will be immediately set afoot, if France responds. How can you explain all this?
What of Loftus?
272
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 30Footnote 127
‘Sat[urday]. 6.P.M’ [25 April 1868]Footnote 128
The telegram confirms your friend's expectations. I spoke to La Tour in anticipation of it, ‘supposing the news were true, what would you do?’ His answer was discouraging. He says (and indeed the tel. confirms him in that respect) that Prussian reductions mean nothing. ‘What security do they give, when it is admitted that the men can be brought back in a week's time, if not in 24 hours’? I am compelled to own there is some force in the reply. Still, with the facts actually before us, we may press them a little.
273
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/70
12 September 1868Footnote 129
Just received enclosed.Footnote 130 What think you of it? You know, Colonel FeildingFootnote 131 was our manager of secret matters during the Fenian affair, & was sent by us to Paris? He is supposed to have first-rate information, having a genius that way, & knowing every one who has. [. . .]
274
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 46
12 September 1868
Foreign Office
Supposing things were as your friend imagines, what can we do?
There is no dispute, no cause of war apparent.
If the French want to pick a quarrel they can manage it: any excuse will serve. But as yet we have not the slightest reason to suppose that such is their intention. Lyons believes in peace, while admitting that if war were intended the language would still be equally pacific.
I see no possibility of useful action. Can't call tomorrow, but we shall meet at Windsor. Thanks for the news.
275
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/72
21 September 1868
Balmoral
[. . .] Last night, a little before midnight, a telegram from Julius ReuterFootnote 132 disturbed us with the Spanish insurrection – shall I say revolution? Something from you today will perhaps tell us that. [. . .]Footnote 133
276
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fos 65–66
25 September 1868
Foreign Office
I return the Belgian letter. What I have always told the Belgian government on the question of a commercial union is that if it should be proposed to them they have the clearest right to refuse, and that then, if any attempt should be made to use pressure to induce them to reconsider their decision, it will be time for them to appeal to us in defence of their right of free action.
What they want is, that we should interfere to prevent any overture of the kind being made, so as to save them from incurring the responsibility of a refusal.
I do not think this request reasonable. It would, if granted, place us in a false and invidious position as regards France, and it would give a plausible handle to French politicians to represent Belgium as willing to come into the scheme, and prevented only by English jealousy.
I have explained my view on this point again and again, but the state of panic in which all Belgian politicians habitually live on the subject of French designs makes it difficult for them to listen to reason.
277
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fos 73–74
26 September 1868
Foreign Office
I leave town for three days, Northcote* taking my place, and EgertonFootnote 134 attending at the office. There is nothing urgent, and I shall take a cypher, and my secretary, so as to be in constant communication with this place. [. . .]
If Moustier can be trusted, the panic has blown over (v[ide]. the despatches received today): I always thought it was the work of journalists and speculators on the Bourse. — The Spanish minister here knows nothing of what is doing in his country, but does not deny that the affair is very serious.
I have explained to Lyons, for Moustier's benefit, that the ships sent to Spain are only for the protection of British interests. The French as yet have sent none. I do not imagine the Queen is in any personal danger: the insurgents would be only too glad to see her safe over the border. It is [in] no way clear to me that if they succeed, they will be able to agree as to her successor. Union with Portugal would seem the best way out of the difficulty, but I suppose it is too rational a thing to be popular in either country. – I think you will admire the ingenuity of the Emperor's last reason for not removing his troops from the papal territory. He tells the Italians, ‘If I did, people would say it was because I was going to war, and wanted them elsewhere.’
278
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 79
1 October 1868
Foreign Office
I return Grey's letter.Footnote 135 There is nothing to be done upon it just now, but the question may and probably will become serious. The Belgian government, backed by our Queen, desires to turn the European guarantee which now exists into what will be de facto an exclusive British protectorate.
Results – the loss of all the military advantage which our insular position gives us, and the creation of a second Hanover.
279
Stanley to Disraeli, Dep. Hughenden, 112/1, fo. 83
14 October 1868
Foreign Office
Do you see any reason for delaying the recognition of the de facto government of Spain? We may get something out of them in the way of improved commercial relations, and it is clear now that there will be no general reaction, such as might put Isabella back again on the throne.Footnote 136
Of course we should not, like the Americans, say anything in the way of congratulation: simple recognition is all that can be required. There are some inconveniences in keeping this question long open. What do you think?
280
Disraeli to Stanley, DP 920 DER (15) 12/3/8/77
15 October 1868
Eridge CastleFootnote 137
I cannot doubt, that we shd. at once recognise the Government, apparently established, at Madrid; though without phrase.Footnote 138
281
Stanley to Derby, DP 920 DER (14) 105/9
30 November 1868
St James's Square
The question of immediate or deferred resignation was discussed by the Cabinet on Saturday, very fully, very calmly, and with the result that an unanimous decision was arrived at, in favor [sic] of the former course.Footnote 139 I placed your letter in Disraeli's hands, and he communicated the substance of it to our colleagues: I need not say that your expressed opinion carried the weight which it always does, but we believed that the bad effect which you fear on the minds of the party would be sufficiently counteracted by the publication of a letter from Disraeli explaining the cause of our retirement: and I must say, that as far as my limited observation goes, I am led to believe that our friends will be better pleased to see us in opposition than in the disagreeable situation of a ministry about to be forcibly expelled from power. I have already explained the reasons which weighed with us, but there is one which I omitted; the state of foreign affairs. It is possible that at almost any moment trouble may break out in Roumania, involving the whole eastern question: [. . .] As a provisional minister, I could hardly commit the country to a decided course of action in the east – and the question whether such action will or will not be necessary may arise at any moment – and thus England will be paralysed at what may be a very critical juncture. [. . .]
