If Islamists took power in Egypt, what kind of state would they make, and what role would non-Muslims play in it? This question stands at the heart of Rachel M. Scott's compelling book, which draws on an array of published Arabic sources and interviews. “The question of the role of non-Muslims in an Islamic state,” argues Scott, “runs parallel to many issues that emerge in discussions about Islamist thought in general, such as the Islamist positions on democracy, pluralism, and citizenship. It is for this reason that the question of the role and status of the [Christian] Copts is so important” (pp. 90–91).
Scott implicitly acknowledges another tricky question: how “secular” has Egypt ever been? During the 20th century, the Egyptian state asserted its Islamic character in various ways. The 1923 constitution declared Islam the official state religion. In 1971, Sadat ratified a new constitution that declared shariʿa law a main source of legislation. The indefinite article was changed to a definite one in 1980, and shariʿa became the main source of legislation—a step that Scott describes as a move toward “Islamization” (p. 58). At the time, many Copts appear to have viewed these constitutional recognitions of shariʿa with dismay. Yet it is no longer true—if it ever was—that Copts endorse the creation of a (more) secular state.
Coptic secularists—like Muslim secularists—are rare creatures today. At a time when the Coptic Orthodox Church exerts a powerful influence over its members and provides them with welfare services, few Copts are calling for a purely secular, pan-Egyptian civil law. Instead, argues Scott, “the majority of Copts,” like the majority of Muslims, appear to “envisage a kind of [Egyptian] citizenship that preserves religious identity and religious community” (p. 169).
As for members of the Muslim Brotherhood, a glance at their writings might suggest that they are evasive, even cagey, about the place of non-Muslims in an Islamist state. Some accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of practicing a Shiʿi-like taqiyya (dissimulation), hiding their true ideas for the sake of self-preservation. But as Scott argues, “rather than interpreting ideological inconsistencies as duplicity on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood, one should view the group as a complex organization with competing and conflicting visions” (p. 53). That is, among Islamists there are liberals, conservatives, and radicals as well as some who have changed their views over time.
Because Islamists tend to value early Islamic historical precedents so highly, many of them have hailed the dhimma—the “pact” that historically applied to Christians and Jews in Islamic domains—as a model for regulating Coptic–Muslim relations in a future Egyptian Islamist state. Scott therefore pays close attention to Islamist discussions on this subject. Yet while the term dhimma may evoke positive feelings among Muslims (who associate it with an ideal of Islamic state tolerance toward “people of the book”), Copts in Egypt seem to widely fear the formal revival of the dhimma system, recalling its assumptions of non-Muslim subordination and potential for humiliation. (They appear less concerned, by contrast, with the idea of the millet system of religious communities, as it existed in the late Ottoman period.) In some detail, Scott explains how various Egyptian Islamists have tried to reconcile ideals of shariʿa law and the dhimma with notions of citizenship in the modern nation–state. Many questions arise from their discussions. Should Copts, as a dhimmī group, be able to serve in an Egyptian army that requires defense of an Islamic state? (Many Islamists have rejected the notion of Coptic army service and accepted the idea of reviving the jizya tax on Christians in lieu of military service.) Would a Christian's testimony count as much as that of a Muslim in court, and would the life of a Christian (e.g., in a homicide case involving a Muslim) be as highly valued? (Islamists have not broached this question.) Can Christians serve as judges or even as presidents? (Most Islamists say no.)
Maʾmun al-Hudaybi, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood from 2002 until his death in 2004, argued that his organization would accept Coptic involvement in the political system “as long as these Copts do what they are required to do” (p. 111). Meanwhile, the most radical Islamists deny that Christians should enjoy the protection enshrined in a dhimma system at all and reject the idea that Muslims and Christians can be friends. But as Scott points out, such hardliners “are largely going against the Islamic historical experience, which is one that was defined by Christians and Muslims living together” (p. 191).
Scott highlights one group of Islamists that split off from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1996 to form a party called al-Wasat (meaning “the middle,” implying centrism) and praises their contributions to Islamist theories of citizenship. “For the Wasatiyya Islamists,” she writes, “non-Muslims have evolved to be part of the umma, which is the historical product of the cooperative efforts of all religious groups that have lived and worked together” (p. 135). Similar to other Islamists, Wasatiyya intellectuals stress Islamic law as the critical basis for Egyptian governance. What distinguishes them from other Islamists is their more inclusive understanding of Egyptianness and their congenial attitude toward Christians as conationals.
Why is the Wasatiyya vision of Egyptian Muslim–Christian fellowship not more prevalent among Islamists? Perhaps the reason for this is that Islamist debates over citizenship have occurred at a time when Muslims and Christians (outside of elite circles) have become increasingly isolated from each other. Scott quotes the Coptic intellectual Munir Fakhri ʿAbd al-Nur, a supporter of national unity, to characterize relations between the two groups: “Muslims and Christians are not mixing together anymore. . . . I can see that; I can feel that. I go and sit in the cafes in the small streets of the very, very popular quarter. There are no Copts. I go to the churches, you find all the Copts there where they do everything” (p. 71).
In refreshingly clear, jargon-free language, Scott examines the spectrum of Coptic and Islamist thought as it relates to the theoretical place of non-Muslims as dhimmī groups or citizens in an Egyptian Islamized state. By the end of the book, the question posed at the outset—if Islamists were to assume power in Egypt, what kind of Islamic state would they make?—still lingers. But one point, at least, seems evident: anxious to preserve power in the church, Pope Shenouda III and certain Coptic Orthodox Church leaders share the Islamist desire to see the state and the law enshrine religious communalism. Thus church leaders may be willing to make a pact with Islamists in return for autonomy. In short, some Coptic leaders may welcome a neo-millet arrangement that lacks the official subordination of the dhimma system but that tacitly accepts the definition of Christians as junior citizens.
In Scott's narrative, the most vulnerable non-Muslims in Egypt are the Bahai, a tiny community with some 2,000 members. As followers of a post-Islamic religion, the Bahai have not enjoyed recognition as “people of the book” and have labored under a variety of civil disabilities in Egypt. Among Islamists, not even Wasatiyya thinkers (including the pro-Islamist Evangelical Christian Rafiq Habib) have been prepared to endorse broad civil rights (such as the right to build places of worship) for Egypt's Bahai. This last point suggests that, if an Islamist state were to take hold, religious liberty in Egypt would run against some hard limits.
