I. INTRODUCTION
The Bullionist Controversy was focused on elucidating, on the one hand, the causes of inflation in the period from 1797 to 1811 and, on the other hand, the benefits of returning to the gold standard in the deflationary post-1812 period (Viner Reference Viner1937, pp. 119–217). As a result, economists were grouped into two major schools of thought according to their respective positions: bullionism and antibullionism. For bullionists, inflation was caused by the inconvertibility of the Bank of England’s notes into gold, which allowed the overissuance of its banknotes above the levels that would have been sustainable under a gold standard. On the other hand, for the antibullionist school, the increase in prices and the depreciation of the exchange rate were due to poor internal harvests and war scarcity, which forced England to transfer capital abroad. Likewise, in the second phase of the debate, bullionists played down the cost of deflation when favoring an immediate return to the gold standard; antibullionists were afraid of the contractive consequences of deflation and therefore advocated a gradual return to convertibility (Laidler Reference Laidler2000).
In other words, bullionists were mainly concerned with the effects of changes in the money supply on prices: they thought that an increase in the issue of banknotes would translate into higher prices, while a return to the gold standard would freeze the quantity of banknotes and would thus not affect prices in any significant way. On the contrary, antibullionists were concerned with the effects of money demand on prices and economic activity: antibullionists thought that if the supply of banknotes were to increase as a result of an increased demand for money (i.e., an increased demand for cash holdings), there would be no inflation (in fact, if the supply of banknotes did not increase after an increase in the demand for money, there would be deflation).
Strictly speaking, we can further divide the bullionists into two groups. On the one hand, we have radical bullionism as represented by John Wheatley and David Ricardo: for them, the price level depends only on the money supply. In Ricardo’s words: “There can exist no depreciation of money but from excess; however debased a coinage may become it will preserve its mint value, that is to say, it will pass in circulation for the intrinsic value of the bullion which it ought to contain, provided it be not in too great abundance” (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1811, p. 95). Therefore, for Ricardo, the only determinant of the value of money was the quantity of currency units: not even a debased monetary asset would lose its value as long as its quantity remained constant.
On the other hand, we have moderate bullionism, as represented by Henry Thornton,Footnote 1 Lord Peter King, or William Huskisson: for them, the depreciation of the currency was the result of not only an unduly increase in the money supply, but of its declining quality (and, consequently, a lower propensity of the general public to demand currency). In the words of Lord Peter King: “When the obligation to pay in coin ceases, the currency no longer retains this determinate value, but is in danger of being depreciated from two different causes; viz. by want of confidence on the part of the public, and an undue increase of the quantity of notes” (King Reference King1804, pp. 5–6).
Therefore, radical bullionism was solely focused on the supply of money, while antibullionism was solely focused on the demand for money; moderate bullionism focused on both money supply and money demand.
However, the debate was not limited to these core issues of the Bullionist Controversy. At the same time, these very same economists had to give an answer to other secondary issues that surfaced during the debate: in particular, the relationship between external trade deficits and the money supply (Perlman Reference Perlman1986) and between note issuance by the Bank of England and country banks (Viner Reference Viner1937, pp. 148–170). The latter helped to determine the position that these economists held on the issue of free banking: depending on the effects that they attributed to country banks’ notes, economists were more likely to permit or to ban free banking.
By “free banking” we understand “a regime in which private banks could competitively issue currency papers (and transferable deposits) … without significant legal restrictions, rather than a state-sponsored institution (the central bank) having a monopoly on the issue of notes” (White Reference White1999, p. 53). In this paper we focus on one important aspect of free banking, that which emphasizes the competitive issue of monetary liabilities. That is to say, we compare the opinion of the economists who participated in the Bullionist Controversy concerning the topic of the plurality of issuers as an alternative to the legal monopoly of issues. Of course, this is not tantamount to saying that all the authors who advocated the existence of competitive issuers maintained an identical position on the minimum regulations to which those competitive issuers should be subjected (that is, it does not mean that all of them embraced the same degree of laissez-faire in banking), although all those economists who advocated the plurality of issuers presented a position closer to free banking than those who defended the monopolization of currency issuance.
As will be explained later, radical bullionists worried about the inflationary effects of an increase in the money supply and, therefore, viewed competitive note issuance by country banks with suspicion; moderate bullionism was concerned not only with the money supply, but also with the quality of that money supply, something that led to a favorable attitude toward the activities of country banks as a way of safeguarding the solvency of the commercial credit upon which banknotes were issued; and, finally, as antibullionism was mainly focused on how to achieve a highly elastic money supply that matched changes in money demand, the antibullionists viewed country banks as important players to supplement the Bank of England’s money supply.
Our purpose in this paper is to show how the heterogeneous analytical frameworks of the different schools of thought that took part in the Bullionist Controversy regarding the nature of monetary assets conditioned their view on free banking. We consider that this contribution is original in two regards. First, it extends the debate on free banking to a period in which it had only tangentially been analyzed: the Restriction Period (1797 to 1821). Second, it explains how authors’ positions on free banking were strongly correlated with their respective views on monetary assets—in particular, with views on both the degree of substitutability of monetary assets and the influence of money demand over money supply.
We will start by briefly describing the English banking system at the beginning of the nineteenth century and highlighting the role played by country banks; subsequently, we will study the positions of radical bullionists, antibullionists, and moderate bullionists on the role of country banks.
II. THE ENGLISH BANKING SYSTEM
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the English banking system was organized at three institutional levels: the Bank of England, London’s private banks, and the country banks (Chadha and Newby Reference Chadha and Newby2013). The Bank of England issued the banknotes that were used in London, while country banks issued the notes that were employed outside the metropolitan area of London. The function of the second layer (London’s private banks) was, in essence, to act as a link between the Bank of England and the country banks.
The number of country banks in 1800 was 370; a decade later, that figure had practically doubled (Brown Reference Brown1991, p. 118). Their mission was important to give country merchants access to the London credit market by issuing their own liabilities, which were convertible into Bank of England notes (which, in turn, were convertible into gold, except for the period from 1797 to 1821 when the Bank Restriction Act was passed). In 1805, the value of country banks’ notes equalled more than ten million pounds, representing almost 40% of all paper money in circulation (Pressnell Reference Pressnell1956, p. 188).
The Bank of England had the ultimate mission of maintaining its own liquidity to enhance the liquidity of the whole banking system: outside the Restriction Period, gold convertibility was conceived as assured mainly through the convertibility of its own notes, not through the convertibility of country banks’ notes into gold (these notes were generally redeemed in Bank of England notes). This overdependence of the entire financial system on the gold liquidity provided by the Bank of England provoked episodes of crises, such as the panic of 1825 when seventy-three country banks collapsed (Neal Reference Neal1998).
To some extent, it is no surprise that the overall assessment of the banking system was ambiguous for economists: on the one hand, the several country banks multiplied the aggregate money supply over the narrow quantity issued by the Bank of England, something that could be interpreted as a healthy elasticity of credit allowing a more efficient use of domestic capital; on the other hand, the system also amplified the contractions of credit during the panics provoked by the reckless investments of country bankers, thereby forcing the Bank of England to intervene in the London money market in order to maintain the credibility of the economy as a whole. What could be characterized as a more flexible and adaptable system by some economists could be described as a chaotic and deregulated banking system that periodically unleashed panics and crises by others.
III. RADICAL BULLIONISM: DANGEROUS MONETARY INSTABILITY
Radical bullionism was represented by John Wheatley (1772–1830) and especially by David Ricardo (1772–1823). The basic thesis of both economists was that inflation is always a result of an increase in the money supply (Viner Reference Viner1937, p. 126), either in the form of a larger supply of gold or a larger supply of banknotes. Since no commodity—not even gold—could exhibit two different prices in different parts of the world, if the supply of gold increased in England, its internal price would drop and gold would be exported to places where gold commanded a higher price. As a consequence, the price of gold tends to be equal around the world (Wheatley Reference Wheatley1803, pp. 31–32; Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, pp. 3–4). If the increase in money supply would consist not of an increase in the supply of gold but in the supply of Bank of England notes, the result would be similar: the banknotes whose supply had increased would depreciate against gold, thereby encouraging its redemption in gold and ending its overissuance (Wheatley Reference Wheatley1807, p. 285). Finally, if the increase in money supply was due to an increase in the supply of country banks’ notes, these liabilities would depreciate against Bank of England notes, prompting the holders of the former to redeem them in the latter and thereby limiting their overissuance (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, pp. 42–43).
Therefore, according to radical bullionism, it was convertibility—either in gold or in the Bank of England’s notes—that provided a broad guarantee against paper money overissuance and thus against the depreciation of the aggregate money supply. In fact, Ricardo thought that convertibility restrictions were the only way of preventing the circulation of an excessive amount of banknotes (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, p. 29). Wheatley, on the other hand, was more pessimistic than Ricardo: in his view, if all international banking systems simultaneously issued paper money, not even convertibility would be able to avoid the depreciation of the value of money and, therefore, the general rise of prices: “The general amount of paper throughout the world may be carried to an unassignable extent, and instead of being limited by the value of the gold and silver, which would circulate if there were no paper, proceed without restriction to an indeterminate superiority” (Wheatley Reference Wheatley1807, p. 286).
In short, radical bullionism characterized the various components of money supply as perfect substitutes and claimed that the permanent expansion of any of those components would depreciate the value of all of them. For example, according to John Wheatley (1807, p. 281), “if it be true, all prices are in proportion to the quantity of currency, and that quantity of currency is augmented by the publication on paper, it necessarily follows, that paper must occasion an advance of prices correspondent with the augmentation, and proportionally depress the value of money.” Also, according to Ricardo (1811, p. 49): “That commodities would rise or fall in price, in proportion to the increase or diminution of money, I assume as a fact which is incontrovertible.”
Accordingly, radical bullionism implicitly assumed that demand for money remained constant, or at least that changes in the money supply were exogenous to changes in money demand (Glasner Reference Glasner, Sato and Takenaga2015). In other words, radical bullionism subscribed to a primitive version of the Quantity Theory of Money, in which demand for money was just assumed to be stable without any deeper study of the determinants of money demand (Friedman Reference Friedman and Friedman1956).
This primitive version of the Quantity Theory of Money was clearly observable in the debate between Thornton and Ricardo on the possibility that trade deficits emerged for reasons other than an excessive money supply (Perlman Reference Perlman1986). According to Thornton ([1802] 1965, p. 131), there were some cases (for instance, bad harvests) that could reduce domestic money demand to increase imports of goods. On the other hand, Ricardo denied that an external drain of gold was possible but for an internal redundancy of the money supply (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, p. 12).
It is this depiction of the supply and demand of monetary assets that lays bare the two main reasons for Wheatley and Ricardo to oppose free banking.
For Wheatley, convertibility did not impose ultimate limits to the issuance of new paper money by the banking system, and therefore he thought that the only effective mechanism to control the money supply was to centralize it in the hands of a publicly controlled central bank. That is to say, Wheatley advocated banning the issuance of paper money by country banks and granting a monopoly to the Bank of England in order to restrict inflationary increases of its quantity:
There is a material difference in the institution of a national bank, which circulates its paper for the support of the public revenue and the public credit, and the institution of private Banks that circulate their paper for individual advancement, and detriment the country for their own exclusive benefit.
In order, therefore, to obviate the danger which threatens the Bank of England upon a return of cash payments, and to prevent the probable recurrence of the calamities of 1793 and 1797, it appears to me absolutely necessary, that the circulation of country notes should be prohibited. (Wheatley Reference Wheatley1803, p. 225)
For Ricardo, the reasons that justified the restriction of free banking had nothing to do with the risk of excessive note issue—something that he believed was impossible with free convertibility into gold—but with the perfect substitutability of all types of paper money: country banks’ notes were not only able to multiply themselves on top of the Bank of England’s notes (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, p. 43), but they could also expel the latter from circulation (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, pp. 40–42). This displacement of Bank of England notes by country banks’ notes did not provide any benefits to society, since it only privatized revenues coming from seigniorage: private banks would lend their newly issued notes to the government in exchange for interest payments that taxpayers would end up bearing; on the contrary, a monopolistic public bank would allow the government to finance part of its expenses by issuing paper money at a zero financial cost for taxpayers (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1817, pp. 507–509). If central bank independence could be assured, the nationalization of seigniorage revenues, according to Ricardo’s view, would justify a public monopoly over the issue of paper money: “In a free country, with an enlightened legislature, the power of issuing paper money, under the requisite checks of convertibility at the will of the holder, might be safely lodged in the hands of commissioners appointed for that special purpose, and they might be made totally independent of the control of ministers” (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1817, p. 510). Hence, although in the first stage of his life Ricardo did not make a strong commitment to withdrawing the monetary liabilities of the country banks (Arnon Reference Arnon1987), in the final version of his Plan for the Establishment of National Bank (1824), he did indeed propose (Arnon Reference Arnon2011, pp. 148–150) banning them for issuing any new banknotes: “Within six months after the expiration of the bank charter, the notes of the country Banks shall cease to circulate, and the different banks, which shall have issued them, shall be under the same obligation as the Bank of England to pay them in government notes” (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1824, p. 17).
To sum up, radical bullionists openly opposed the private and decentralized issuance of banknotes by country banks. They thought that this activity was potentially harmful (Wheatley’s view) or unnecessarily wasteful and expensive (Ricardo’s view). These critiques were a logical result of characterizing all monetary assets as perfect substitutes and claiming that any increase in their quantity would result in inflation, as demand for money was thought to be stable. Neither Wheatley nor Ricardo could thus attribute any advantage to the existence of multiple issuers of currency whose purpose was to achieve monetary equilibrium by adjusting the money supply to the fluctuations of money demand (Selgin Reference Selgin1988, pp. 64–69).
IV. ANTIBULLIONISM: HEALTHY MONEY SUPPLY ELASTICITY
The antibullionist camp consisted of thinkers such as Francis Perceval Eliot (1755–1818), the second Earl of Rosse Lawrence Parsons (1758–1841), Henry Boase (1763–1827), Nicholas Vansittart (1766–1851), Charles Bosanquet (1769–1850), and Robert Torrens (1780–1864). The fundamental thesis of these economists was that the inflationary episode experienced by England during the period of inconvertibility of the British pound was not a monetary phenomenon, but a consequence of various real factors, such as restrictions on the supply of commodities (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, pp. 40–41), population growth (Eliot Reference Eliot1811, p. 100), the increase in consumption per capita (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, p. 195), or tax increases to finance the war (Bosanquet Reference Bosanquet1810, p.92). Antibullionists did not deny that an increase in the money supply above and beyond the demand for money would create inflation (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, p. 30), but they did deny that this could happen as a result of the discount operations of the Bank of England: “The Bank never issues its paper but for value received, and for a certain profit, and regulates the amount of it by the demands of public accommodation” (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, p. 28).
In their view, the Bank of England increased the money supply only to accommodate the legitimate demands for financing coming from the public, something which did not contribute to increasing prices, but would rather reduce prices through higher agricultural and manufacturing production (Eliot Reference Eliot1811, pp. 132–133). Any issue above and beyond these legitimate financing demands was not sustainable in the medium term, because banknotes not demanded by the public would tend to reflux to the issuer (Bosanquet Reference Bosanquet1810, pp. 52–59; Torrens Reference Torrens1812, pp. 125–128; Smith Reference Smith1807, p. 55). The views of antibullionists concerning monetary equilibrium conditioned their views on the role of country banks and consequently on free banking.
First, antibullionists considered that the money supply was endogenous to money demand and that, as a result, supply could not exceed demand in the medium term:
Your Lordship fully admits this principle, in admitting that the only standard of the requisite quantity of currency, is the bona fide demands of trade. And it must, I think, be as readily admitted, that as the transfer of goods and property is made only through the medium of currency (whatever the symbols of it may be) there should be a sufficiency of currency to meet all the demands of business; otherwise trade becomes stagnant, and the nation suffers unnecessary loss. (Boase Reference Boase1804, pp. 12–13)
This elasticity of the money supply was channeled through the bank discount of bills of exchange issued against the increase in the supply of real goods (Torrens Reference Torrens1812, p. 127). Therefore, it was assumed that when discounting those bills, the banking industry was just providing new currency to those individuals who had increased their transactions demand for money to acquire newly produced goods.
This conception of the elasticity of the money supply linked to the discounting of bills of exchange was later known as the Real Bills Doctrine (Mints Reference Mints1945, p. 25), but its origins can be traced back even before the Bullionist Controversy in the writings of Adam Smith ([1776] 1904, p. 287; Arnon Reference Arnon2011, pp. 40–45). However, Smith’s version of the Real Bills Doctrine presupposed a regime of monetary convertibility and free banking competition that was lacking in the version espoused by the antibullionists: whereas Smith tried to describe a mechanism of self-regulating bank liquidity within an institutional framework characterized by free banking and metallic money, the antibullionists tried to exculpate the monetary policy of the Bank of England of any responsibility for the inflation in England during the Restriction Period (Glasner Reference Glasner1992). The antibullionists’ version of the Real Bills Doctrine was specially problematic because money supply was ultimately not subject to the demand for money but to the demand for credit by those with sufficient collateral, and that demand for credit could endogenously be manipulated by the banking system itself through changes in its discount rate (something that, as we will see, moderate bullionists explicitly criticized).
Second, antibullionists believed that the various assets that made up the money supply were imperfect substitutes, so that the demand for country banks’ notes could go up only when the demand for the other components of the money supply went down. For example, according to Henry Boase, bullionists were mistaken in thinking that an increase in the Bank of England’s notes would allow an increase in the supply of country banks’ notes and that the joint effect of this larger money supply would be to reduce the value of all monetary assets. On the contrary, it was the increase in the demand for the notes of the Bank of England and the parallel decrease in the demand for the notes of the country banks that would allow an increased supply of the former and a decreased supply of the latter:
An increase of Bank of England notes does not necessarily imply a corresponding, or indeed any, increase of Country Bank paper. In many cases it proves a diminution. When, through the failure of some Country Banks, a diffidence of all or most provincial Bank paper prevails, Bank of England notes, if left to the natural course of things, will fill the chasm, which the discredit of the others produced; and their increase would be proportioned to the decrease of the country circulation. If the whole mass of Provincial notes should be discredited, the necessary augmentation of Bank of England paper would be equal to the diminution of that part of our currency. (Boase Reference Boase1811, pp. 76–77)
A similar approach was used by Nicholas Vansittart to explain how country banks would be forced to increase their supply of banknotes after a reduction in Bank of England notes (and not after an increase of Bank of England notes, as bullionists used to claim). After stating that “an increase of the one of these two species of currency is frequently the consequence of a diminution of the other” (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, p. 54), Vansittart uses the following thought experiment:
I wish the House to consider the situation in which the government, the merchant, and indeed every class of men, would be placed, if the issues of Bank-notes were greatly diminished, while gold was even scarcer that at present. It would be a situation which cannot be contemplated without the most serious alarm. What other currency can be substituted when both coin and Bank-notes shall have disappeared? It is possible, and indeed probable, that the extremity of the evil might produce a remedy, by forcing the notes of country banks into general circulation. (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, p. 65)
Bosanquet also criticized Ricardo for stating that an increase in the Bank of England’s liabilities would lead to a pyramidal increase in the liabilities of the country banks. In his view, Ricardo needed to refute beforehand what Bosanquet himself thought he had shown numerically (1810, pp. 80–82), i.e., that an increase in one type of liability did not occur at the expense of the other: “Mr. Ricardo was bound to shew that some physical impossibility obstructs that increase of bank-notes at the expense of country notes, and vice versa, before he assumes that an increase of bank-notes must produce an increase of country notes” (Bosanquet Reference Bosanquet1810, p. 83).
By characterizing monetary assets as imperfect substitutes whose supply was endogenous to demand, antibullionists learnt to appreciate the general advantages of the plurality of issuers in the banking system: according to their view, the demand for money on the part of the public could be satisfied by different types of monetary assets. Therefore, if any of the various issuers provided a banknote supply of insufficient quantity or quality, it would end up being outcompeted by the rest of the issuers. The general perception, however, was that banknotes from the Bank of England were of a higher quality than country banknotes, so any increase in the supply of the latter was only a way of supplementing the deficient supply of the former. For example, Vansittart described the Bank of England’s notes as “perfectly secure and sound paper” (1811, p. 53), while considering that many country banks provided facilities “to rash speculations … far beyond either their skill or capital” (1811, pp. 52–53). And Perceval Eliot explained the increase in the circulation of country bank liabilities as a consequence of the Bank of England’s restrictive issuance: “The deficit of circulation [of Bank of England’s notes] must, however, have been supplied by some sort of medium; and we have only the paper of the Country Banks to fill up the hiatus” (Eliot Reference Eliot1811, p. 123).
This is why the antibullionists advocated the plurality of issuers as a general public policy: to increase the likelihood that the money supply would constantly be adjusted to money demand, either by the adequate provision of Bank of England notes or by their supplementation with country banks’ notes. For instance, Vansittart, despite denouncing the “mismanagement” of many country banks and the speculative euphoria that they tended to generate, opposed the overregulation of country banks (Vansittart Reference Vansittart1811, pp. 52–53). Perceval Eliot, too, labelled any legislative interference that restricted the freedom of issuance among country banks as “folly” and a “productive of mischief” (Eliot Reference Eliot1811, p 108). But it was Thomas Smith who wrote the clearest defense of free banking, even after admitting the need for some basic regulation:
There is no doubt that these private Banks have been of very great service to the country in general; indeed, it is conceived, that the vast and unexampled extension of the Manufactures and Commerce of Great Britain, during the last hundred years, have been, in a great degree, owing to the introduction of Paper Money, and increase of Banks and Banking. These private Banks are, therefore, fully entitled to a share of public support. (Smith Reference Smith1807, pp. 183–184)
In short, the antibullionists conceived the money supply as a set of imperfectly substitutive assets that were endogenous to the fluctuations of transactions demand for money. As a consequence, they held a far more positive view of free banking than radical bullionists, precisely because they thought that some plurality of banknotes issuers would accommodate the demand for money that the Bank of England left unsatisfied. However, in their view, the country banks’ monetary liabilities were mainly a way of supplementing the insufficient money supply of the Bank of England; that is, there was almost no genuine demand for the liabilities of the country banks, but a demand conditioned on the lack of the Bank of England’s liabilities.
V. MODERATE BULLIONISM: IN SEARCH OF A HIGH-QUALITY MONEY SUPPLY
Moderate bullionism was defended by various economists such as Walter Boyd (1754–1837), Francis Horner (1778–1817), William Huskisson (1770–1830), Lord Peter King (1776–1833), and, more controversially (Laidler Reference Laidler2000; Arnon Reference Arnon2009), Henry Thornton (1760–1815). Moreover, the Bullion Report (1810) could also be considered a product of this line of thought; that is to say, the conclusions of the parliamentary committee set up to elucidate the causes of the depreciation of the paper pound after the Bank of England’s restriction of payments are in line with the premises of moderate bullionism.
Moderate bullionism conceived monetary assets as imperfect substitutes, the demand for which fluctuated at different points in time. Unlike radical bullionism, moderate bullionism did not characterize all assets as perfect substitutes, and neither did it regard the demand for money as invariant over time. For example, Henry Thornton ([1802] 1965, p. 46) criticized Adam Smith for not having taken into account that different monetary assets faced different demands (i.e., they circulated at different velocities) and also that the specific demand for each monetary asset fluctuated over time.
As we have already explained, the instability of money demand was at the heart of the controversy between Ricardo and Thornton over trade deficits. Thornton ([1802] 1965, p. 131), in contrast to Ricardo, admitted the possibility of gold drains happening due not only to a redundant increase in the domestic money supply, but also a fall in the demand for money because of non-monetary factors: for example, bad domestic harvests that pushed the population to reduce their cash balances to finance an increased volume of imports.
Saying that moderate bullionism disagreed with radical bullionism is not tantamount to arguing that it agreed with antibullionism: both groups differed in their characterization of both money supply and money demand. On the one hand, moderate bullionists did not consider country banks’ notes to be intrinsically inferior to the Bank of England’s notes: on the contrary, they considered that different banknotes performed different functions under different contexts. For example, the Bullion Report noted “the preference generally given within the limits of its own circulation to the paper of a well established Country Bank over that of the Bank of England” (Bullion Committee 1810, p. 62), something that had “tended to compress the Paper of the Bank of England, more and more, within London and the adjacent district” (ibid., p. 58). Likewise, Thornton also recognized that the banknotes of country banks could supplant the liabilities of the Bank of England “either in a greater or in a less degree” (Thornton [Reference Thornton1802] 1965, p. 223).
On the other hand, neither did moderate bullionists subscribe to the antibullionists’ version of the Real Bills Doctrine (Viner Reference Viner1937, pp. 148–153). According to their view, the demand for discounting was partly influenced by the amount and the price of money supply and could therefore truly limit that money supply only in the context of banknote convertibility:
There is no method of discovering a priori the proportion of the circulating medium which the occasions of the community require; that it is a quantity which has no assignable rule or standard; and that its true amount can be ascertained only by effective demand.… Where the currency consists of paper convertible into specie, the excess or deficiency is in the same manner prevented by the demand of the public either for cash or notes as circumstances may require. A paper circulation which cannot be converted into specie, is deprived of this natural standard, and is incapable of admitting any other. (King Reference King1804, p. 28)
In other words, contrary to antibullionists’ claims, banks are able to increase the money supply above and beyond their demand in a context of inconvertibility, as the demand for discounting depends on the financial conditions offered by the banks, and those financial conditions cannot be controlled by the money demand of their creditors without convertibility (Bullion Committee 1810, p. 56). From this point of view, the banking rule defended by antibullionists, consisting in limiting financial discounting to those assets that fostered a safe and short-term return of the newly issued notes, was just considered “a prudent banking precaution” (Huskisson Reference Huskisson1810, p. 33) that did not provide any absolute guarantee against the risk of overissuing: without convertibility and thus with an infinitely elastic money supply, it was not possible to determine how many financing demands were to be satisfied in accordance with the state of money demand. Therefore, a necessary condition for guaranteeing against the overissuance of banknotes was the requirement of convertibility, so that bank creditors could ask for repayment as soon as they perceived that the money supply was excessive. This was the third fundamental channel of the Law of Reflux sponsored years later by the Banking School and which was totally forgotten by the antibullionists in their explanations of why overissuance of banknotes was not possible (Le Maux Reference Le Maux2012).
Precisely for this reason, moderate bullionists distrusted the working of the entire banking system—including country banks—in a context of inconvertibility. In spite of the fact that country banks were obliged to convert their liabilities into Bank of England notes, they could increase their money supply above and beyond the demand for money in the case that the Bank of England had previously increased its volume of banknotes. It was through this pyramidal issue of notes that country banks could circumvent the limits on money supply imposed by the demand for money (Bullion Committee 1810, pp. 67–68). Consequently, by restoring convertibility and thereby depriving the Bank of England of its ability to increase the money supply above and beyond the demand for money, the issuance of currency by country banks would be normalized. This does not mean, however, that some moderate bullionists did not consider the activity of country banks as potentially problematic: for example, Thornton ([1802] 1965, pp. 172–187) emphasized their propensity to cause panics with a subsequent deflationary contraction of credit. It simply means that, with convertibility in place, moderate bullionists did not think permanent overissue to be possible.
Accordingly, moderate bullionists allied with radical bullionists in rejecting the idea of a self-regulated money supply in the context of banknote inconvertibility. Unlike Wheatley, however, they did not think that it was possible for banknotes to become redundant as long as their convertibility was maintained. If any individual country bank overissued its own banknotes, it would face adverse clearings (White Reference White1999, pp. 60–61):
The Country Banker withdraws his Notes in a Time of Danger, partly because they expose him to a sudden Demand for Guineas in the following Manner: Rival Banks, when in want of Guineas, have only to possess themselves of his Notes, in order to obtain a Supply of Cash for themselves, which, when his Notes are every where in Circulation, are easy to be obtained, and he is thus exposed both to the Expence and the Risk of supplying Guineas to other Banks who have not sufficiently supplied themselves. If he withdraws his Notes, the rival Banks cannot so easily obtain Guineas from him by the Means of Guineas paid for the Deposits of his Customers; for his Customers will not assist them in any such Attempt. (Thornton [1797, 1802] 1965, p. 305 of 1965 edition; not reprinted in 1802 edition)
Similarly, adverse clearings would also end up appearing even when the overissuance of banknotes was performed in concert by a set of country banks within the same geographical area (White Reference White1999, pp. 61–62). In such a case, local prices would increase relative to those of neighboring districts, resulting in the adverse clearing of local country banks with respect to the country banks of the neighboring districts (Thornton [Reference Thornton1802] 1965, pp. 216–217).
This is the reason why moderate bullionists did not advocate banning free banking, but rather returning to convertibility in a context of multiple and competitive issuers. Nonetheless, as we have already seen, Ricardo also rejected the possibility of overissuance under convertibility and, in spite of this, he opposed free banking for fiscal reasons. What separated moderate bullionists from Ricardo so that they ended up defending free banking? Ricardo considered all monetary assets as perfect substitutes: not only banknotes themselves, but also with regard to gold. From his perspective, an increase in gold supply would have the same effect as an increase in the paper money supply: i.e., a gold mine was identical to a central bank (Ricardo Reference Ricardo1810, pp. 3–5). Money and credit were, from Ricardo’s point of view, identical currencies, provided their quantity was under control (Rist Reference Rist1940, pp. 140–149). As we have already analyzed, moderate bullionists moved away from this taxonomy and accepted the dual nature between real and financial monetary assets: “The case of gold, on the other hand, differs from that of paper inasmuch as the possessor of gold takes credit for that for which no man debits himself” (Thornton [Reference Thornton1802] 1965, p. 80). Precisely by categorizing part of the money supply as “credit” (or “paper credit,” in Thornton’s words) and by distinguishing between money and credit, moderate bullionists ended up agreeing with the antibullionists that the Bank of England’s notes were imperfect substitutes for country banks’ notes and that, therefore, their use was not completely interchangeable: whoever was the issuer of “paper credit” was not an irrelevant question either to the creditors or to the debtors of the bank (White Reference White1995, pp. 66–69).
First, moderate bullionists thought that the local issuance of banknotes helped provincial creditors to monitor them more closely:
To the complete success of a paper circulation it is necessary that there should be no considerable danger or apprehension of forgery, and that there should be the means of ready and immediate payment. But this degree of convenience and security can be found only in notes which are issued and payable in the immediate neighbourhood, or within a moderate distance. (King Reference King1804, pp. 91–92)
Among the provincial creditors who predominantly controlled the quality of country banknotes were their competitors, other country banks that quickly asked for the redemption of redundant banknotes (thereby giving rise to adverse clearings). Precisely for that reason, banking competition was generally considered another necessary condition, together with convertibility into gold, to avoid the overissuance of banknotes:
An excessive issue of notes by any particular banker is soon detected, if not by the public, at least by the interested vigilance of his rivals; an alarm is excited; and he is immediately called upon to exchange a very large portion of his notes in circulation for that currency in which they are payable. Such a demand is always attended with great loss and often with total ruin; and the knowledge that such consequences may be expected will deter bankers in general from making these experiments. Though this argument in favor of provincial banks is merely negative it ought to satisfy every reasonable mind, since it completely proves the existence of a practical limit to notes of that description. (King Reference King1804, pp. 100–101)
Second, they also thought that country banks were more capable than the Bank of England of analyzing the solvency of the local traders whose credits were discounted:Footnote 2
The banker also enjoys, from the nature of his situation, very superior means of distinguishing the careful trader from him who is improvident. The bill transactions of the neighbourhood pass under his view: the knowledge, thus obtained, aids his judgment; and confidence may, therefore, be measured out by him more nearly than by another person, in the proportion in which ground for it exists. Through the creation of banks, the appreciation of the credit of numberless persons engaged in commerce has become a science. (Thornton [Reference Thornton1802] 1965, p. 166)
Given that for moderate bullionism the sound regulation of bank liabilities required a system of diverse and decentralized supervision (both the banker’s oversight over the debtor and the creditor’s oversight over the banker), these economists openly defended free banking competition in a context of gold convertibility. Since not all paper credit was equally sound, it was necessary to create a banking system that fostered paper credit of the highest quality. For instance, Lord King (1804, pp. 110–111) rejected altogether any limits on country bank issues aimed at granting a monopoly to the Bank of England:
A due comparison of the advantages of country Banks, which arise from the nature of the system, with their inconveniences, which depend entirely upon partial and accidental circumstances, may perhaps lead us to the conclusion that these establishments are, upon the whole, highly beneficial to the Public, and entitled to the protection of the Legislature; and that to suppress the circulation of their notes, or to restrict them in any manner tending to give an exclusive privilege to the Bank of England, would be as unjust and impolitic as to grant a monopoly of any other branch of skill and industry to any private merchant or company. When we consider the nature of the banking system … it will appear that there is no subject upon which legislative interference would be more improper and more pernicious.
Francis Horner, who would later become the chairman of the Bullion Committee that wrote the Bullion Report, even criticized Lord King for accepting some restrictions to free banking:
In the course of this author’s liberal remarks on country banks, he gives an opinion in favor of that law which formerly prohibited the issue of notes under the value of five pounds. We are rather inclined to doubt the policy on which this prohibition was founded. The authority of Dr Smith indeed is with Lord King; but the principle of commercial freedom has such firm hold of our conviction, that, to warrant any exception from it, we should require much stronger reasons than are furnished upon this point by either of these writers. (Horner Reference Horner1803, n.p.)
William Huskisson (1831, pp. 459–461) also believed that free banking was in accordance with the general principle of commercial freedom and could therefore not be arbitrarily suppressed (even though Huskisson did accept some level of regulation):
The result, therefore, of any intervention of the legislature for this purpose, beside being highly objectionable as an interference with the rights of individuals and of private property, would be, only to add several millions more, and principally in small notes, to the amount of issues of the Bank of England; leaving the present evil exactly as it is: a change which would open a wide door to forgery, and be attended with many other public disadvantages. (Huskisson Reference Huskisson1810, pp. 39–40)
And Walter Boyd, the author who launched the Bullionist Controversy, not only thought that “the operations of the Country Banks … have been productive of invaluable advantages to the industry and trade of the country at large” (1801, p. 20), but was also against any regulatory interference in the management of country banks’ activities:
To interfere in the exercise of the rights which the Bank of England, or the London Bankers, or the Country Banks, or the Farmers, or the Corn-Dealers, or any other class of Traders justly possess over their own credit and industry, would be impolitic, unjust, and unavailing; but to restore the currency of the country to its pristine purity, to confine it within those limits which good faith and good sense equally point out for it, is not only proper and practicable, but indispensably necessary, in order to prevent the numberless calamities which the uncontrolled circulation of paper not convertible into specie, must infallibly produce. (Boyd Reference Boyd1801, pp. 57–58)
To sum up, moderate bullionists thought that the heterogeneous assets that made up the money supply were endogenous to money demand under a regime of convertibility. But, unlike Ricardo, they opposed restricting the rights of country banks to issue banknotes because they characterized their liabilities as imperfect (and in some cases better) substitutes of Bank of England liabilities. Their differences with the antibullionists in analyzing the effects of inconvertibility placed them closer to radical bullionists in criticizing the Bank of England’s mismanagement and in defending a return to the gold standard. But their differences with radical bullionists in conceptualizing the nature of paper credit placed them closer to antibullionists in defending the benefits derived from a free and competitive banking system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The diverse positions on free banking adopted by moderate bullionists, radical bullionists, and antibullionists were not accidental, but a consequence of much more fundamental disagreements about the nature of monetary liabilities. The greater the understanding of the interdependence between the money supply and money demand and the imperfect substitutability between monetary assets, the greater the inclination to advocate for the competitive and decentralized creation of such monetary assets. Those economists, such as radical bullionists, who believed that banks could increase the money supply above and beyond the demand for money (even in a context of perfect convertibility) tended to defend the establishment of rigid restrictions on the country banks’ rights of issue: this was, in fact, a tendency that became more acute during the following decades, as members of the so-called Currency School advocated a complete ban on free banking out of fear that a deregulated banking system would violate their “Currency Principle” (Jones-Loyd 1837, pp. 48–49; Norman Reference Norman1838, p. 95).
On the other hand, those economists, such as antibullionists or moderate bullionists, who thought that overissuing bank liabilities was impossible (either under gold convertibility or even without it) embraced the plurality of issuers to the extent that they thought that the money supply should adjust itself to changes in money demand. However, the majority of antibullionists saw the plurality of issuers as a supplementary source of monetary elasticity whenever the Bank of England did not sufficiently increase its monetary liabilities.
Only those economists who, like the moderate bullionists, understood that there were no monetary assets intrinsically superior to others and that the superior quality depended contingently on management came to appreciate all the advantages of a free banking system. This was a very similar argument to that which some of the most famous members of the Banking School would resort to a few decades later (Tooke Reference Tooke1844, pp. 156–159; Wilson Reference Wilson1847, p. 99).
In short, the issue of free banking was already intensively debated in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The different positions exhibited by radical bullionists, moderate bullionists, and antibullionists depended on their underlying view on the nature of monetary assets: the larger their understanding of the heterogeneity of monetary assets and of its determinant connection to money demand, the larger the support for free banking. Those ideas heavily influenced subsequent economists both in the Currency School and the Banking School: their stances in favor or against free banking also derived from their view on the nature of monetary assets, which, in turn, was a direct inheritance from the Bullionist Controversy.
