The inspiration for this work apparently came from Peter Singer's Practical Ethics, a book whose influence the author admires but whose point of view he does not share. Like Singer's book, it is meant to serve as an introduction to applied ethics for the serious reader, but it espouses an approach to the subject that does not lead to what the author believes are the highly “impractical and counterintuitive” conclusions encountered in Singer's book. The basis of this alternative is a set of principles the author, James Otteson, a philosopher who teaches at the University of Alabama, identifies as “classical liberalism,” and his claim is that they reflect an outlook “almost everyone endorses, implicitly if not explicitly, in everyday life.”
Predictably, however, that claim is in tension with much of what he has to say in the rest of the book. For it is just not the case that “classical liberalism” corresponds to the way most people ordinarily think, especially not in the form presented in this book. In its own way it is just as unconventional as the view Singer holds, and for the same reason: it privileges one particular good—personal autonomy—at the expense of everything else that might matter in determining what constitutes a moral way of life. It does not take much exposure to the book to see that this is the case. Very quickly readers find themselves being confronted with the same sort of startling challenges to common-sense moral reasoning that one encounters whenever he reads Herbert Spencer or a pamphlet produced by the Cato Institute. Anything that smacks of collective action, whether it be public schools or EPA regulations, is treated as bad. Even acts of charity are treated with suspicion on the grounds that they could undermine the ability of the intended beneficiaries to be self-reliant.
In principle nothing is wrong with challenging the conventional wisdom, of course, and to some extent it is what any reasonable reader should expect in a work of this kind. Why engage in philosophical reflection on moral issues if it is not to discover something one might otherwise not recognize? But it is odd for the author of a scholarly book to make such a point of criticizing his adversary on these grounds and then proceed to do exactly the same thing in elaborating his own position.
Whenever an author espouses a view of this sort, moreover, he poses a challenge for himself that must be met effectively if the book is to be at all persuasive: whatever the position in question may be, it needs to be defended on grounds that will be sufficiently plausible to the skeptical reader. It should at least make him wonder whether he needs to rethink his position. The author needs to function as an apologist, in other words. My guess is that Singer's book has been so popular because, to some extent, it meets that test. Even if one is not predisposed to accept his view of the obligations we have to other living things, Singer offers reasons sufficiently strong that cannot just be casually dismissed.
The author of this book does not meet that test. He is clearly not interested in taking seriously the arguments that might be put forward by those who do not share his point of view. Anyone who approaches the book believing that the set of institutions we now know as the “welfare state” has done some good, for example, is bound to react skeptically to the claim that state action in that form inevitably violates the personhood of individuals affected. And such a reader is bound to want more from the author than just a simple declaration that this is so. Even if the argument were conducted solely at the conceptual level without discussing any of the relevant empirical issues, one would expect, at the very least, that an author making that claim would recognize other ways of understanding human personhood besides the one he favors. Furthermore, he would attempt to make a case for the superiority of his own view. But that is not what one finds in this book. Without even acknowledging that there are other ways of thinking about that subject (Rawls is the obvious candidate in this case), the author simply posits a particular view and then proceeds to draw all sorts of sweeping conclusions.
Moreover, even the argument he makes for his own premises is nowhere near as compelling as he seems to imagine. One might have thought that an author who makes so much of the autonomy of persons would feel the need at some point to confront the problematic fact that the most common instrument for realizing such autonomy in the design of states is democracy. However, democracy is the source of much of what he dislikes. But he does no such thing. The idea of democracy scarcely comes up at all, in fact, even though it is arguably the most important consideration of all in trying to think through the issues at stake in this book.
