Enlightenment thought has long been associated with an emphasis on reason. But there was, of course, more to the Enlightenment than this. Michael L. Frazer highlights another side, one focused on sympathy and, more broadly, sentiment. In his book, Frazer explores sentimentalism and, in particular, sentimentalist theories of justice, across a variety of eighteenth-century thinkers. He aims not just to describe sentimentalist thought but to recover it as a resource for contemporary political theory, social thought, and politics.
As Frazer observes, the idea of reflective autonomy is a key characteristic of much Enlightenment thought, especially as epitomized by Immanuel Kant. Reflection, however, tends to be understood as the exclusive domain of reason. From the Enlightenment to the present, sentiments have too often been seen as “the low road” to political morality: “Rather than treating emotion as an integral part of conscious reflection, this dominant model instead sees emotion as a source (among others) of the unconscious heuristics by which we make most of our decisions unreflectively” (p. 172). Even when the results are good and just, some thinkers, such as Kant, would maintain that actions arising from emotional responses are necessarily lacking in moral virtue. Frazer's response is “reflective sentimentalism,” an emotional, rather than simply rational, form of reflective response, which incorporates sentiment into reflective autonomy. Along with Kant, John Rawls emphasizes reflective autonomy, and at times it seems that Frazer's work is animated by a desire to synthesize eighteenth-century sentimentalism with the more rationalistic thought of Rawls, although this theme is never made explicit. The author ultimately seeks improved politics and more complete justice from the conscious incorporation of reflective sentimentalism into political judgment.
The book explores sympathy and, more broadly, sentiment in the thought of a series of eighteenth-century thinkers. After providing some brief background on early writers like Lord Shaftesbury and Francis Hutcheson, the author fittingly devotes the largest treatment to David Hume, who, he maintains, “provides a free-standing ethics built from a psychologically holistic account of moral reflection” (p. 40). To a significant degree, Hume provides the basis for consideration of the other thinkers treated. Frazer perhaps does the best job of explicating the relationship of sympathy to justice in the case of Adam Smith, whose “liberal sentimentalism” he prefers to the more “conservative sentimentalism” of Hume. While the appeal of Smith over Hume is understandable, the primary driver in Frazer's case seems to be his belief that “a liberal concern for fairness to individuals … is not a feature of Hume's own theory of justice, nor is it part of … the Burkean conservative traditions that developed out of it” (p. 88). An assertion that British conservative traditions are not animated by concern for individuals and contain no liberal elements is a controversial one (but appears to go unrecognized as such), and one which some may argue is contradicted by the historical record, as well as by a closer and wider reading of relevant writers. One gets a better sense of what is going on when the author refers to common fears “that the streams of thought growing from Hume's work could never provide a normative justification of a theory of justice focused on fairness to individuals” (p. 88). This language is highly evocative of Rawls, suggesting that the real criterion is the suitability of each form of eighteenth-century thought for enlistment in support of particular contemporary, liberal models.
Frazer's treatment of Kant is perhaps the most interesting, since it addresses both Kant's early embrace of sentimentalism and later rejection of it. One really gets a sense of the author fruitfully wrestling with the material here, although this treatment may also suffer the most from its brevity in the face of the potential size of its subject. The treatment of Johann Gottfried Herder, though again not extensive, may be the most illuminating of the book. With the benefit of some successful synthesis with Hume and Smith, Frazer develops and explicates a “pluralist sentimentalism” in Herder and explores its significance for theories of justice. A brief final chapter treats the relationship of sentimentalism to selected contemporary thought, such as in psychology, and touches on the potential application of the ideas expressed in the book.
It is both a strength and a weakness that so many different philosophers are treated in this average-length monograph. A particular weakness is that despite some useful synthesis and comparison across thinkers, The Enlightenment of Sympathy tends to take on the character of a survey. Also, there is only a modest amount of engagement with the secondary literature on the writers discussed. The sentimentalist dimensions of all of these writers have been the subject of considerable scholarly attention, and the book would benefit both from more extensive utilization of available scholarship and from more direct defense of the author's interpretations against competing ones. That said, the treatments of the various thinkers are all well done and well written.
In addition, since the book aims to recover sentimentalist thought for use today, additional probing, testing, and discussion of the author's “reflective sentimentalism” would have been welcome. While some defense is offered against those who would criticize this work from a rationalist perspective, possible concerns from other perspectives are not really addressed. For example, “reflection” comes across as a bit of a cure-all, yielding “corrected” sentiments, which then contribute toward just politics. But surely one may engage in considerable reflection and yet still have unsound sentiments. And surely there are many cases in which someone's unreflective, immediate sentiments are precisely correct. One may suggest that sound sentiments, along with sound reasoning, require an agent with sound character, and one who has developed a sound intuitive grasp of the world. Frazer does state that “as our moral sentiments progress, we reflectively expand our sense of sympathy, increasing the degree to which we share specific feelings with an ever-wider array of fellows. As our circle of sympathy expands, we will in turn demand reforms that show increasing concern for all” (p. 12). He also urges such a focus in children's education. But surely there is much more to developing politically and morally sound sentiments—the sort which contribute to right action—than extending the sphere of one's sympathy. More generally, it would be helpful to have more exploration and discussion of precisely what, experientially, “reflective sentimentalism” is. “Reflection” seems a function of reason: Does one merely think rationally about one's sentiments? Also, although the word “imaginative” appears frequently, the nature and role of the imagination is never really treated. Despite the book's positioning against typical rationalist perspectives, in some ways it may not move all that far from typical Enlightenment, rationalist thought.
One book, alas, can rarely offer all that we would like. This work should be appreciated for what it is. The fact that the role of sentiment in so many different thinkers is well treated within a single, highly readable book makes this a much-welcome contribution. It also draws needed attention to the important role of emotions in political judgment and in justice itself. The Enlightenment of Sympathy lays a promising foundation—and, we can hope, provides a catalyst—for more work in this area, perhaps by the author himself, perhaps by his readers.
