The articles in this symposium present politics as an important intervening variable in the relationship between inequality and development. They highlight the complex and contingent ways in which politics mediates this relationship. The articles examine three key issues: (1) the extent and nature of international inequality and domestic inequality in the developing world; (2) the process through which inequality becomes—or does not become—a salient issue on the political agenda; and (3) the relationship between inequality and development under democratic and authoritarian regimes.

My contribution finds that in a world of unprecedented prosperity, issues of inequality have great political salience in part because global inequality is at historically high levels and more developing countries have experienced an increase in domestic income inequality than have experienced a decline. Nicolas van de Walle cautions against taking a pessimistic view of recent developments, reminding us that economic growth in the past decades has lifted hundreds of millions of peoples above the poverty line. While some forms of international inequality have worsened, van de Walle calls attention to the fact that non-income forms of inequality—for instance, public health and education—have substantially declined and improved the lives of peoples throughout the developing world. Though international institutions in some ways unnecessarily limited the potential benefits to poor countries and to the world's poor, van de Walle points out that the international development community has made an important contribution to alleviating inequality by providing large amounts of assistance for poverty alleviation and by encouraging countries to adopt a more pro-poor policy agenda. Regarding the nature of economic inequality within poor countries, van de Walle underscores the relative stability of these rates over time and the importance of variation across countries as evidence of the long-term causes of domestic inequality.

All authors agree that the manner in which inequality becomes translated into the political process is complex and contingent. Robert Kaufman's analysis highlights the difficulties of identifying preferences from deductively imputed economic interests. Drawing from an impressive range of empirical studies from around the world, Kaufman persuasively demonstrates that the relationship between inequality and preferences for redistribution is much more complicated and unpredictable than presumed by influential formal models. Further Kaufman and van de Walle illuminate how people's attitudes towards inequality are configured by how they are embedded in, as Kaufman writes, “a broader socio-political matrix of relationships” including ties based on ethnicity, race, gender, religion, and region. Philip Keefer's article adds to the complexity by demonstrating how frequent absence of inequality from the political agenda is also a consequence of the impediments to collective action in poor countries. These barriers affect both the poor and elites. Keefer contends that where the poor have difficulty organizing public action, redistributive struggles play little role in democratization and politics in general. Where intra-elite conflict creates incentives for elite-driven democratization, elites generally attempt to expand their support by incorporating non-elites through clientelism rather than through programmatic appeals. This is especially true in high-inequality settings where the poor give greater value to the benefits of clientelism. Ironically, the institutionalization of clientelism in poor democracies continues to marginalize issues of inequality and distribution while limiting the state's capacity to provide public goods that might alleviate the problems of inequality.

My article and those by Carles Boix and Evelyne Huber illuminate ways in which the political process contributes to persistent high inequality. I observe that politics contributes to high inequality when the political process enables elites to configure economic and political institutions in ways that protect their interests. Economic and political institutions that support high inequality are not incompatible with rapid economic growth, but they diminish the efficiency of resource allocation and unnecessarily limit benefits to the poor. Boix's article argues that the contradictory and inconclusive findings of the empirical literature on inequality and development are a consequence of the fact that the relationship is conditioned by variation in political and social institutions across time and space. Boix observes that the introduction of new technology may increase growth and inequality when it is controlled by a limited segment of society. In a subsequent phase, the dissemination of the technology throughout society may produce growth and declining inequality. However, this equalizing phase may never occur if political institutions provide elites with preferential access to state authority that they might use to protect their monopoly over the innovation when they (1) do not perceive any benefits from disseminating the new technology, (2) own specific assets that cannot be easily redeployed to new sectors, or (3) the dissemination of the technology might otherwise disrupt their economic and political dominance. Huber further elaborates the mediating impact of the state on the relationship between inequality and development. Drawing on the experience of Latin America and the Caribbean, she shows that the historically high levels of inequality in the region for the most part thwarted the mobilization capacity of popular forces to pressure for the development of state capacity for providing for macroeconomic stability, tax revenues, inclusive property rights, and social policies that might diminish inequality. However, in states where democratic institutions became firmly institutionalized, state investment in public health and education helped to reduce inequality. This was especially true for longstanding democracies like Uruguay and Costa Rica where parties with a social-democratic orientation gained control over state authority. Comparing Latin America and the Caribbean with advanced industrial countries, Huber finds that the relative weakness of democracy and the Left are important factors in explaining Latin America's high inequality. In sum, despite the many circumstances where democracy is compatible with high and rising levels of inequality, articles by Huber and me provide evidence that over a broad sample of countries the length of democratic rule is associated with diminished inequality largely through increased investment in public health and education and by strengthening the representation of less privileged social sectors.

Mary Gallagher and Jon Hanson's article on East Asian authoritarian regimes shows that democracy is not a necessary condition for the reduction of inequality. Other variables affect the relationship between inequality and development. Gallagher and Hanson point out that it is possible for authoritarian regimes to stay in power despite rapid social change by using state repression to raise the costs of opposition while promoting inclusive economic development to build support by increasing the benefits of the regime. Given the narrow base of the ruling coalition in South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore, one might expect a narrow distribution of the benefits of development and an increase in inequality. Gallagher and Hanson point out how “systemic vulnerability”—that is, external and internal threats to the regime—along with state capacity for effective repression and development led these authoritarian regimes to implement inclusive development strategies that kept inequality at low levels. China is a contrasting case because inequality increased substantially during its era of rapid economic development. In addition to the narrow base of the ruling coalition, contextual factors contributed to the rise of inequality. These include linkages to ex-patriot communities in Hong Kong and Taiwan, a development strategy giving priority to coastal provinces, and continued barriers to urban migration. Gallagher and Hanson point out that China has initiated broad-based social welfare programs in recent years. It may yet follow a strategy of maintaining regime support by spreading the benefits of development more extensively.

All of the articles highlight the central role of politics in mediating the relationship between inequality and development. Whether under democratic or authoritarian regimes, the impact of inequality on development is fundamentally shaped by the complex and contingent construction of popular preferences, the opportunity structure for collective action, and the manner that state authorities interpret and respond to popular preferences through policy formulation and implementation. Political scientists studying developing and post-communist countries are only now beginning to understand the role of economic inequality in these processes. Appreciating their complexity is the first step toward enhancing our understanding and improving our efforts to bring about desirable change.