‘Somebody must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.’
(Franz Kafka, The Trial)It’s easy to miss the jokes in Kafka. Scholarship and biography have recast Kafka’s stories as self-referential parables of anomie written by a tortured neurotic who did not want to be read. In a cruelly accurate portrayal of how the academic and biographical industries can be a barrier to understanding, Alan Bennett’s play Kafka’s Dick satirises how biographical prurience over Kafka’s life has obscured the fact that he wrote simple stories, steeped in black humour, about myopic men vainly trying to do impossible things. The two books considered here – Law after Auschwitz and Darker Legacies of Law in Europe – follow Bennett’s theme. They share a desire to strip away received assumptions and counter-factual conjectures in order to explore fascist legal thought and activity on their own terms. On the way they offer interesting parallels with contemporary European law, medico-legal thought, administrative law, penal theory and so on. But, more simply, these books, like Kafka’s, recount the stories of men – self-styled members of the master race attempting to take over the world – desperate to analyse and systematise laws created by authorities who despise law. And failing. They failed to see that a war economy is not conducive to enduring legal reform. They failed to see that basing contract and criminal law on community feelings is going to be a frustrating business. And while the tragedy that engulfed Europe – including the unprecedented man-made hell of bureaucratised corpse manufacturing – is the background radiation of modern history which we ignore at our peril, one neglected story of the authors of this tragedy is that fascist lawyers were engaged in the task of legitimising the most ill-conceived political and legal project ever to have been undertaken.
The theoretical orthodoxy explored and challenged by both works is that ‘Nazi legality’ is a contradiction. It is a contradiction that denotes either a pseudo-order (there was one or more legitimating characteristic missing from the Nazi legality), or an order-violating order (being either an argument from natural law or an argument that at some point Germany became a non- or criminal-state). Partly as a consequence of this orthodoxy, Nazi law (and fascist law generally), has been largely neglected by scholars. Darker Legacies, a collection of edited and expanded conference proceedings and seminar papers, takes up the challenge of this neglect to engage in a sober investigation of Nazi and other fascist legal thought. Law after Auschwitz is a battle-cry challenging the ‘contradiction’ of Nazi legality, which seeks to restore, uncomfortable though it may be, a continuum between ‘their’ and ‘our’ law. Both books expose a number of fascinating contradictions. Darker Legacies exposes contradictions arising from the tension between the practice of law and the primacy of the political under fascism, and Law after Auschwitz exposes the problems generated if we try to get away entirely from conventional suspicions concerning Nazi ‘legality’. The books also offer a ‘history of the present’. That is, they show resonances of fascist legal thought in contemporary European law and wider Western culture. Darker Legacies attempts this by identifying parallels between fascist law and the policy the European Union, and Law after Auschwitz by documenting antisemitic-inspired discourses of ‘forgiving and forgetting’, and asserting an uncomfortable parity between contemporary medico-legal thought and eugenics.
In brief, Darker Legacies is a re-evaluation of fascist thought with comparative, biographical and historical interest. Law after Auschwitz, on the other hand, has some fascinating material on antisemitic-fuelled amnesia but remains, for me, an inadequate account of both of its key themes: law and Auschwitz. In the analyses that follow I will move through three possible comparative themes (roughly, practices, values and constitutions). I will suggest that Darker Legacies exposes the deficiencies in the more ambitious Law after Auschwitz.
Practices
Plato’s conclusion about public orators – that we should not expect people who speak well in courts of law to be moral experts – certainly holds true for fascist lawyers. In German, Italian, Spanish and Austrian courts of law in the 1930s and 1940s there was what could be called a mass migration by lawyers towards ‘duty’ as their moral base-line. Duty to Reich, Volk, community, destiny and Il Duce were all variations on the theme of making the will of the leader universal. Extensive exploration of the origin and potency of this combination of obedience and moral formalism is beyond the scope of either of the works considered here, but Darker Legacies sets the scene by augmenting the fact that German lawyers of the 1930s were generally of a conservative bent with some interesting statistics concerning a dramatic fall in the number of new lawyers being trained between 1933 and 1945. There was, however, maintenance in the number of those teaching and engaging in jurisprudence (pp. 10–11) and it is this body of men that forms the focus of roughly a third of the book. What Darker Legacies brings most powerfully to the fore is the efforts of these legal theorists to systematise what was not systematic and legitimise what was, at a bare minimum, suspect from the point of view of international norms. So, alongside a number of interesting discussions of, inter alia, Nazi contract law and administrative law, four papers are dedicated to Carl Schmitt and other theorists who turned their attention to radically transforming international law. Eager to get away from statism and its backwards-glancing nationalism, the idea of ‘spheres of influence’ as a rationalisation of German expansion is debated between Schmitt and others. Ingo J. Heuck quotes Reinhard Höhn on this theme:
‘[A] sphere of influence system means recognition of the fundamental idea that quite definite historically powerful peoples bear responsibility for quite definite areas. In Europe and the living space (Lebensraum) associated with it, it is the German idea of the Reich and the Fascist idea of the Imperium that take account of the history and the current importance of these peoples.’
(p. 82)The three spheres of influence (Germanic, British, American) are roughly blocs of ‘these peoples’, ‘peoples’ being more authentic than the ‘nations’ associated with the state since the nineteenth century. Many of Schmitt’s colleagues, though generally in agreement with him, rightly contest part of his theory. Why, for example, are the ‘Aryan’ Anglo-Saxons not part of the Germanic sphere? (The answer is because, unlike Germans, they are a people ‘of the sea’ (p. 81).) Why is a melting-pot like America a ‘people’? (Because ‘feeling’ is more important than culture or language (p. 51).) Some contributors make interesting use of this combination of international relations theory and ugly racial kitsch and Christian Joerges’ chapter is a subtle piece of cautious comparison, but of course it readily concedes that any constructive use of this comparison breaks down where it is inseparable from unbridled militarism and the notion of ‘master peoples and slave peoples’ (p. 77).
The analyses in Darker Legacies are at their most interesting when they explicate the work of individuals like Schmitt (see the chapter by Navraj Singh Ghaleigh) and when these positions are counter-poised against contemporary liberalisms (see Matthias Mahlman’s fascinating chapter on legal methodology and liberalism). Fraser (who contributes a chapter to Darker Legacies) centralises these contemporary encounters with Nazi-era German law. But he also wants to suggest that his Law after Auschwitz is a more fundamental, political, historical and ontological investigation of the status of German law 1933–45. His thesis is that law, lawyers and law-making under the Third Reich have been portrayed as qualitatively distinct from real, legitimate and justified law-making. In fact, to accept this qualitative difference, argues Fraser, is to succumb to a post-war ideological orthodoxy constructed at Nuremberg and accepted unthinkingly in today’s law schools. Fraser argues that we cannot write German law out of the annals of law, nor can we paint the role of law out the story of the Holocaust. Auschwitz was ‘full of law’ (p. 13); the camp was ‘nomos’ (p. 56). At the heart of Fraser’s book is, then, a contrast of two readings of the Third Reich. The first is that it was a period characterised by non-law: that law and lawyers were engaged in a criminal enterprise in a ‘criminal state’ (see below); that law experienced a rupture or breach during the Third Reich and that law-proper was only restored after 1945. The second is Fraser’s counter-veiling position that Nazi law was law but that for the purposes of maintaining the post-war politico-legal status quo it has been denied this status amongst lawyers and legal scholars.
Fraser’s analysis, then, hinges on the contrast between law and non-law. This involves eschewing ‘barren’ schematisations of law in favour of a more fundamental investigation of whether the entire period of German history from 1933 to 1945 can be characterised as being a period of irredeemable illegality where ‘the legal system’ functioned but did not, in fact, produce law (p. 8 ff). In attacking this reading of German legal practices in the Nazi era, Fraser is clearly not seeking to rehabilitate Nazi practices or ideals. However, it is not at all clear what Fraser is arguing other than that a ‘non-law’ or ‘discontinuity’ thesis is an unsustainable discourse constructed and transmitted by dominant post-War legal and political forces (p. 25 ff). A problem with this, however, is that there is not a great deal of evidence to suggest that there exists a group of scholars or lawyers defending this pure, unalloyed, ‘discontinuity’ thesis. The most important evidence comes from the obiter of Telford Taylor, judge at the Nuremberg trials, who said this:
‘…those men, leaders of the German judicial system, consciously and deliberately suppressed the law, engaged in an unholy masquerade of brutish tyranny disguised as justice, and converted the German judicial system to an engine of despotism, conquest, pillage, and slaughter…The defendants and their colleagues distorted, perverted, and finally accomplished the complete overthrow of justice and law in Germany.’
(p. 143)(Additionally, Taylor also made reference to ‘the anti-Semitic “Nuremberg Laws”’ (p. 127); Fraser holds this to be an assertion that these laws were not laws, which, although it may be a fair rendering, begs the question of who added the scare apostrophes to the transcript.) To be sure, Taylor’s position may well be representative of language and politics within Nuremberg, but a paragraph of obiter does not constitute an ideological agenda. There is no evidence that this position was systematically pursued at Nuremberg nor that it was used to fuel a more general attempt, beyond Nuremberg, to discredit Nazi law qua law. Evidence beyond this is even thinner. Fraser’s intimation that widespread subscription to the discontinuity view can be inferred from the absence of Nazi-era German legal debates in contemporary jurisprudence classes (p. 10) seems to me a poor inference.
It might be noted at this point that we have yet to address the ‘Auschwitz’ in the title of Fraser’s book. While the text slips easily between, on the one hand, ‘German law 1933–1945’ and on the other, ‘The Holocaust as lawful’, the meaning of the first phenomenon needs clarifying at a socio-political and a historical level (which Darker Legacies does, but which Law after Auschwitz deliberately glosses with pre- and post-Nazi law), and the second to be treated with caution. I will address the latter first.
It is conventional to point to the Wannsee Conference as the point at which the fate of European Jewry was sealed. Arendt, with a forceful simplicity, describes two key references to law at Wannsee:
‘The aim of the conference was to coordinate all efforts toward the implementation of the Final Solution. The discussion turned first on ‘complicated legal questions,’ such as the treatment of half- and quarter-Jews – should they be killed or sterilized?…The legal experts drew up the necessary legislation for making the victims stateless, which was important on two accounts: it made it impossible for any country to inquire into their fate, and it enabled the State in which they were resident to confiscate their property.’
(Arendt Reference Arendt1994, pp. 113–15)This is interesting because it provides evidence that the Nazis were eager to give effect to the ‘final solution’ through legal means that were both ‘conventional’ (denial of citizenship) and the logical conclusion of their already existing racial laws. But as to whether the establishment of death camps was ‘lawful’, both Fraser and to some extent Arendt are wrong. Arendt here accepts Eichmann’s characteristically over-blown account of significance of the events he was involved in. A crucial turning point towards the Holocaust had already been made six months earlier with the issuing of the German Army Orders on ‘Conduct of the Troops in the Eastern Territories’ which stated:
‘…the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe, but just revenge against Jewish subhumanity. …the pitiless extermination of foreign treachery and cruelty [being] the only way to fulfil our historic task to liberate the German people once and for all from the Asiatic-Jewish danger.’
(Hochstadt, p. 112, emphasis in the original)Although there was some resistance amongst commanders to the severity that these orders would entail for Soviet prisoners of war, it was agreed that this harsh message was necessary to counteract German soldiers’ tendency to abide by the laws and customs of war. What is the significance of this? First, the Holocaust was actualised for the most part through military orders rather than public law. Of course, racial laws laid the ground-work for domestic and international outrages but the ‘final solution’ was not a public legal event but rather a quasi-military exercise shrouded in military convention and Nazi double-speak. Second, and relatedly, although it is anachronistic to see contemporary norms of international law as squarely prohibiting these acts (see below), there was certainly sufficient treaty and customary law in place (including the laws and customs of war, by now internalised by many soldiers) to make the Nazis’ work difficult and covert.
The argument that the ‘Holocaust was lawful’ also takes the form that the concentration and death camps were a ‘site’ of law (p. 51 ff), an argument derived from Agamben, Schmitt and Foucault combining notions of biopolitics, emergency powers and sovereign exclusion. Further complication is added by Fraser’s use of ‘Auschwitz is…law-ful’ (p. 15). The synecdoche Auschwitz in itself is problematic (though Fraser is by no means alone in using this) but not nearly as much as this phrase. This postmodern wordplay shrouds lack of clarity. ‘Auschwitz as law’ (or Fraser’s alternative ‘Auschwitz as nomos’) is, one would suppose, the idea that Auschwitz is (á la Agamben) the fullest realisation of contemporary biopolitics. This is consistent with Fraser pursuing his theme of positing continuity between pre- and post-Auschwitz law: the law is the action of the sovereign realised through the creation of homo sacer. This point is interesting but inconsistent with the essence of law being the actions of an ‘interpretative community’ (see below). Conversely, ‘Auschwitz as law-ful’ is one or two different points of dubious validity: either that Auschwitz was created through legal instruments (yes and no, there are key antecedent laws but no ‘Death Camp Act’) or that Auschwitz was ‘full of law’ (no, it was an illicit death factory full of a shifting web of arbitrary rules). Admittedly the groundwork of the ‘final solution’ to the Jewish question was established using some legal measures. But the Nazis’ own double speak, the day-to-day conduct of the Holocaust through military orders, and the evidence of post-war trials indicate that as far as possible these measures were hidden from the German populace and the Nazis themselves, they certainly weren’t vaunted in legislation. It took decisions for antisemitic laws to mutate into Death Camps, and this mutation (contra Agamben and Fraser) was not ‘inherent in’ or an ‘inevitable consequence’ of either law or modernity.
That Fraser concludes it was, however, may be at least in part a result of his methodology. He states early on that:
‘I shall try to set up a framework of analysis which allows us first to see the ways in which contemporary actors understood law and Nazi law and secondly permits us to perceive some of the basic practical and jurisprudential continuities which preceded and followed the 1933–1945 period.’
(p. 21)This methodology contains a two-fold problem. First, his ‘allowing us to see the ways in which contemporary actors understood law and Nazi law’ seems to amount to no more than simply legal positivism augmented by some additional legal and philosophical information about the Nazis in power. The occasional use of the idea of an ‘interpretative community’ to characterise lawyers and judges – those Nazis in power – is a less helpful term than it appears. Although it indicates a family of textual practices (‘law is in reality little more than the persuasive deployment of devices and signifiers…’ (p. 8)) it does not amount to a phenomenological bringing to light of the legal ‘life-world’. Treating lawyers and law-makers as an ‘interpretive community’ says nothing about interplay, at an individual level, of professional practices, professional identities and, say, antisemitic norms in 1930s Germany. Lawyers and judges were an already conservative strata of society who more or less willingly bent to Hitler’s will. But this characterisation of them does not explain why these lickspittles and chancers, in time, became as vulnerable to Hitler’s arbitrary will and internal policing as any other group. Or why they, like everyone else, should not be expected (due to their relationship with ‘law’) to have either a ‘moral expertise’ which preserves them from moral failure, or the unique prescience to see that racial laws would mutate into the death camps. I also wonder why the idea of an interpretive community was not used – where it might have been particularly helpful – in the context of the sovereign’s creating an exception in homo sacer. If the essence of law lies in this sovereign power, the idea of an interpretative community, if it is to have any meaning, must lie in its realisation of this exception. How does this realisation square with ‘the ultimate flexibility of legal discourse in constructing and redefining facts and rules to serve other purposes or to ignore other uncomfortable realities’? (p. 198). In short, the ‘law’ that is the quarry of Fraser’s study shifts between being autopoietic, a primordial moment of sovereign power, and, in most cases, positive law.
Fraser’s second goal: ‘perceiving continuities’ with pre- and post-Nazi law not only replicates the epochal reading that Fraser wants to challenge but also fails to offer a coherent outcome. His message was unclear to me. Is it that Nazi era debates should be rehabilitated or that much law is tainted with ‘crypto-fascism’? Although Fraser does not use the tired idea of the crypto-fascist (he prefers an Agamben-esque gesture towards the prevalence of biopolitics), he gestures towards continuities between eugenic race laws and today’s reproductive debates, but curiously refrains from reference to recent medico-ethical literature in which the rehabilitation of the notion of ‘eugenics’ is openly and carefully debated (see Agar, Reference Agar1998), and deploys the kind of ‘universal victim’ discourse that Agamben finds in Auschwitz’s Muselmänner (Agamben, Reference Agamben1999). The question we should ask Fraser, as we should of all analysts of biopolitics, is: what is to be done? Have we now negated the value of public health debates by exposing their double-whammy of biopolitical manipulation and alignment with Nazi policies? How is it possible to escape this ending of history, with its negative dialectic of sovereignty and biopolitics, without messianic intervention? It is the hyperbole of this kind of analysis which means that even evidence which usefully supports Fraser’s position is treated poorly. Consider the following passage:
‘For Mannheim [a Nazi-sympathising legal scholar who spoke approvingly of American provisions concerning the castration of dangerous sexual offenders], as for others, a central element of Nazi criminal policy, a bio-racial worldview which informed a eugenic crime prevention practice, a practice which would lead ultimately to the extermination of millions of asocial and anti-social “elements”, found its inspiration in the United States. Clearly, any idea of that the body of Nazi law, even in its most vital conceptual elements, informed by the bio-politics of the Volksgemeinschaft, was (or can be) understood as inimical to other ideals or practices inherent in democratic rule of law notions or in rule of law nations, is refuted here.’
(p. 105)First, Mannheim is a commentator not a legislator: his views are possibly representative of conservative thought, but he was certainly not an influential Nazi. Second, what exactly is being refuted? That there is a clear and distinct division between some domestic law and the criminal legislation of the Nazis? Then this is absolutely right but surely trivial: the rule of law and the law of nations are both concepts with shifting content. In fact, perhaps rather than refuting any fundamental misconception concerning the nature of law, this passage points to incommensurability between different uses of ‘law’. But, most importantly, this passage raises for me, in a way that it did not for Fraser, an absolutely key, but also simple question that is not well served by the language of biopolitics: were the Nazis’ challenges to human plurality foreshadowed, and perhaps inherent in, Western/Liberal/Enlightened culture more generally?
Values
Plurality, that is to say human biological plurality, but also cultural and normative plurality, is one possible hermeneutic key to understanding the Holocaust. Arendt sees in the Holocaust an onslaught on human plurality and defends the execution of Eichmann on the grounds that someone who is not prepared to share the world with another group should be denied the possibility of sharing the world with others (Arendt, Reference Arendt1994, p. 279). Whether or not we accept Arendt’s argument for retributive symmetry, it is true that the world-view of Nazis was not one challenged the inviolability of human plurality. The theme is obliquely explored in Fraser’s concluding chapter where he considers recent English case law on the separation of conjoined twins. The argument here is that there is a creeping eugenics which under the cover of ‘law’ has allowed us to inhabit the same moral sphere (or perhaps ‘interpretive community’) as Nazi Germany. Certainly divisions of ‘human life’, ‘persons’, and ‘legal subjects’ continue to fuel debates of the most profound import: whether or not these terms are treated as synonyms can mean life or death. And, moreover, these issues are not relevant only to medical ethicists or lawyers.
Plurality is not amongst the values inherited from the Enlightenment. It is a hackneyed point (but one worth reiterating) that the light of the Enlightenment had a blind-spot as to its white, male European originators. And consequently, although the Nazis clearly did directly and consciously challenge many Enlightenment ideas, their challenge to human plurality was of a different conceptual order. There are a number of consequences that could be drawn from this. The first is that Fraser is right to suggest that when the Nazis questioned whether all life is valuable or sacred they were not opening a Pandora’s Box but were acting in a way consistent with ancient antecedents. Second, anti-liberal Nazi laws did not simply put Hitler’s gutter antisemitism into play but crudely mirrored anti-Enlightenment debates within the mainstream of German philosophy at that time (led for the most part by Heidegger and his rejection of inauthentic notions of ‘the human’ in favour of Dasein grounded in the world around him). Finally, learning the lessons of fascist law-making is not exclusively a question of reacting against their assault on plurality, claiming this was a moral constant which was suspended with disastrous results, and that should now be at the core of law and life as a whole. Human plurality still presents enormous moral complexity and perplexity and it does not entail any one single normative constant, but, ultimately, this is not a symptom of biopolitical apocalypse, it is a difficult human challenge.
One further point can be made here. Absence of a single moral constant (or absence of ‘the one key lesson of Holocaust’) should be thought to include the notion of ‘dignity’. This point is discussed by Agamben in his Remnants of Auschwitz through discussion of Primo Levi (Agamben, Reference Agamben1999, p. 66 ff) and by Fraser with his reference to death with dignity in conjoined twins. The body of contemporary, post-war human rights does in fact represent a commitment to dignity, but portrays dignity as both the foundation of, and a distinct instance of, fundamental rights. This confusion is amplified by James Q. Whitman in Darker Legacies. Dignity is read there as synonymous with ‘honour’ (p. 243 ff). But Whitman goes on to conflate this narrow meaning of honour (which, though a synonym of dignity, has a far more focused meaning) with dignity’s evolution of meaning in post-war human rights law. In other words, in narrowly circumscribed contexts dignity has legal meaning but it also has other meanings that are both laden with significance and devoid of meaning in a non-theological context. A quick run-through of synonyms should suffice to illustrate this. Human ‘worth’ and ‘value’ are of incontrovertible importance to ‘dignity’, but their foundations are problematic (inalienable human value is not incompatible with Nazi ideology because the ‘human’ that they are inalienably connected with is contestable). ‘Grandeur’ and ‘elevation’ are perhaps synonymous with honour but the inalienable dignity that is being appealed to in human rights instruments should be present even where there is no grandeur or elevation (for example in the disabled, or the poor). ‘Having no price’, being outside all commodity relations, is the Kantian way out of the problem , but commodity relations – people having a price – pervades life before and after the Nazis. Gerald L. Neumann takes Whitman to task on his use of dignity (p. 267 ff), but the possibility of salvaging the word from the multitude of complex and anachronistic readings it gives rise to is beyond the scope of the study. Having said that, dignity is the primary value in many contemporary constitutions (South Africa amongst others) as well as in the ill-fated European Constitution. And so, while many contributors to Darker Legacies look for parallels between Fascist thought and Europe and European legal thought, they avoid the possibility that treating something inchoate like dignity as the core value of the Union, even if it is meant as diametrical opposition to ‘fascist values’, means that the project is founded upon moral and normative incoherence.
Constitutions
Fascist legal theorists felt ambivalence to constitutions and any efforts to uphold or codify a constitution were always hedged round with the notion of an ‘unwritten’ constitution shadowing the actual constitution (Darker Legacies, p. 3). This shadow constitution admits the evolution of the political and legal order after the will of the leader and the liberation of the volk. And it also allows for ‘expansion’. On the face of it, the language of ‘European expansion’ could, in this context, set off ‘fascist’ warning bells. And it might be interesting to enquire how far expansion eastwards to Turkey is likely to challenge un-interrogated assumptions in ‘European’ consciousness. Darker Legacies does not pursue this enquiry, however. What the book does discuss is how both German and Italian fascists were at best ambivalent about their Christian origins and attempted to re-invent their identity in non-Christian ways. For example, La Torre quotes the Italian Mortati on what distinguishes Italian legal theory from that of the Germans: ‘It is a “Roman”, “classical” form, not a Germanic, “romantic” sentiment ’ (p. 314). Of course, as Schmitt reminds us, a key to self-identity is exclusion, so far more illuminating than any self-stylisation is the portrayal of the enemy or Other. Darker Legacies touches upon the contemporary parallels with these themes but, as I will conclude below, fascist theorists are not necessarily the best place to start in considering them in a sophisticated way.
A slightly more comfortable topic, continuing the theme of constitution through others, is the nature and essence of statehood. It is generally held that statehood simply requires recognition by other states and implicitly, that this recognition can also be withheld. One orthodoxy which Fraser seeks to challenge is that the Nazi state was a ‘criminal state’. This aspect of the discontinuity thesis again is something that has been constructed at amongst other places Nuremberg and represents efforts to build some kind of division between real law (pre- and post-Third Reich) and the non-law of the Nazis. Even if it is conceded that ‘the Nazi criminal state’ was something that was created at Nuremberg as part of a narrative of moral vindication of the Allies and moral condemnation of the Nazis, however, we are faced with two clear problems. The first is that none of the crimes within the Statute of the Tribunal, although they were problematic and untested (even ex post facto in the case of Crimes against Peace) negates the Nazi state as a state, but rather they presuppose it. The second is that then as now, portraying Nazi law as the non-law of a criminal state founders on the rocks of international law. The ‘criminal state’ had no meaning in the 1930s and 1940s and even now has no clear meaning. Even Fraser’s criminal state seems to shift from a meaning more or less coterminous with the contemporary ‘rogue state’ (i.e. having no, or a questionable democratic mandate, being outside of international legal practice or having morally problematic domestic law) to a more imprecise (and aesthetic) notion of a state populated by caricature Nazis arbitrarily spreading cruelty and chaos (p. 101). Fraser is right to indicate that the latter is an inadequate caricature and that the former is lacking foundation in legal theory, but both are straw men anyway. The more interesting position may not be a blanket condemnation of Nazi-era Germany but may be one which points to both commonalities and discontinuities (such as in many chapters of Darker Legacies).
This foray into public international law is interesting and important. Clearly, the thrust of Nuremberg was to create criminals and to create an authorised narrative of the Second World War which could be used for pedagogical purposes as well as, undeniably, propaganda purposes. Thus, Fraser is right to distinguish ‘the legal functions of the process and the broader political, representational or metaphoric roles assigned to the trial’ (p. 123). He is also right to suggest that among these latter functions is the pedagogical function of creating a narrative of guilt (and, more dubiously, the moral virtue of the Allies), but he may be on more questionable terrain when he suggests that this latter function means that Nuremberg was therefore equivalent to a ‘Show Trial’ (ibid.). In a show trial the outcome is a foregone conclusion. In Nuremberg there was sufficiently robust due process to ensure that this was not the case. To deny that the clumsy due process of Nuremberg is different from a Stalinist travesty glosses over the breadth and extent of debate at Nuremberg. But, regardless of the manifest or latent function of Nuremberg, international lawyers, Fraser concedes, would not buy his discontinuity thesis. Fraser admits this in a footnote:
‘[I]t is important to note that as a matter of international legal theory and practice, revolutionary governments and their legal systems are not by definition illegitimate or illegal. As a practical matter, it is equally important to remember that the Hitler regime was recognised internationally by other actors as the legitimate government of Germany.’
(p. 29, n 29)Further on, in a passage that merits close scrutiny, Fraser summarises data in a way that gives the impression, contrary to his own evidence, that international lawyers did consider the Nazi’s law to be illegitimate law:
‘Thus while many American and other international law scholars expressed the view that the Nazi regime may have been “illegal”…’
In fact the evidence Fraser amasses is entirely to the contrary. He goes on:
‘…or at least that some of its policies and practices, may have been contrary to international law, this position was far from universal.’
(p. 83)The evidence in the paragraphs leading up to this indicates just the opposite: international law at that time did not have the resources to indicate that a state’s internal practices were illegal. Although scholarship of the early 1930s (usually American scholarship) shows a prescience in its highly suspicious attitude to Nazi legislation and the Nazi state as a whole, it is unanimously accepted that it is only international moral opinion that was opposed to the Nazi regime, not legal opinion. Of course, the question central to Fraser’s thesis is whether this changed after the war in an ideological shift towards the idea of a ‘criminal state’. But international legal theory did not change as radically, nor was it as ideological as Fraser implies. Certainly Nuremberg kick-started the development of the still nascent ‘international criminal law’, and international trials and tribunals do often spend as much time establishing their own right to exist as they do trying defendants. But it takes a state to commit a crime against peace: the drafters of the Nuremberg Charter were not seeking to define the Nazi state out of existence; rather they tried to find a way to treat it acts as criminal. Nuremberg may be a prime example of law being created not through a moment of consent but through violence, but it was also, and is still popularly conceived to be, a challenge to the untrammelled power of the state.
It is my intent to conclude on this note of utopian, or at least cosmopolitan, optimism. Regardless of the imperfections of international criminal law and human rights law, the perception that sovereignty and state-authorised abuse now have internationally recognised limits is an empowering discourse, however difficult its realisation in practice. Admittedly, prevailing philosophical orthodoxy is far more in line with Fraser’s dystopian, biopolitical, world-view. However, to treat the concentration and death camps of the Second World War as somehow persisting in or animating contemporary law is poor history and even worse philosophy. The essence of human action – and the condition of politics and sovereign law-making – is beginning, being able to begin anew at any time. This is the lesson that should be learnt from totalitarianism: that law-making which hinges on an unchangeable destiny or an unerring progress can, and has, led to the worst inhuman depravity. It means a death camp is not around us (though we cannot forget them), and it means that the European Union is not a totalitarian project (though we cannot shirk the responsibility to form it democratically). There are undoubtedly resonances between fascist law and contemporary law which these books identify, but, a fortiori, we are not enchained to them.
Being free to choose new beginnings also means we are free to choose who we are in dialogue with. To choose a sphere of enquiry as powerfully charged as this is to choose, perhaps bravely, to be in dialogue with men who attempted – through a number of motives, many of them personal failings – to radically rethink law in a way and in a context which we would hope will never be repeated. As such, our dialogue with them has to be uniquely cautious, avoiding the assumption that because their context was unique (and because their ideas have been neglected) there are necessarily untapped riches to be had if only we can fight through their cadaverous casings. But we also have to return to an even more fundamental question, why do we want to be in dialogue with them? That scholars and scholarship have passed over them in a ‘communicative silence’ (Darker Legacies, p. 398) is embarrassing for those close to the individuals in question but is not a damning failure on the part of the contemporary intelligentsia to dispel post-war ideology. It is not that words are wasted on these lawyers and scholars but that we are not condemned to confront their ideas on their terms. Whether it is ‘expansion’, ‘eugenics’ or even ‘identity cards’ and ‘terrorists’, we are free to begin our conversation (including our definitions and our frame of reference) anew. And perhaps if we are to take the European project seriously then we should take care to be in dialogue with its prospective members and law-makers in non-Christian Europe, rather than fascists of the 1930s. And, even more importantly, if we are to take law after Auschwitz seriously then it is plurality in general we have to take seriously – both biological plurality and value plurality – rather than debased notions of race and destiny. This should be the beginning of learning from fascism, not the end.
