Following the conclusion of the appeal, noted at (2019) 21 Ecc LJ 261, the parties were invited to agree the terms of the order of the court allowing the appeal and granting the restoration order and the order on costs. Following the dismissal of the appellants’ legal team, on grounds of cost, and a failure of the parties to agree in full, the court reconvened to consider written submissions. The substance of the court's order and the restoration order are set out as annexes to the court's judgment at [2019] EACC 2.

On costs, the appellant contended for a wasted costs order against the solicitor for the respondents, in respect of two alleged conflicts of interest. First, it was noted that he had acted for all of the respondents (except the London Borough of Tower Hamlets), involving a significant conflict of interest. The court held that any such conflict (which the court doubted) was a matter for the respondents, not the appellants; in any event, any such conflict could not possibly have added to the appellants’ costs. Secondly, the solicitor had acted even though one of his partners was the registrar of the Diocese of London, and his senior partner was the provincial registrar. As far as the first matter was concerned, while there could be an undesirable perception of bias in such a case, the deputy chancellor had forestalled any such impression by directing that the registrar of the Diocese of Gloucester should act as registrar of the court. As far as the second matter was concerned, this was not a case where the matter under appeal came from the diocese where the provincial registrar was himself the diocesan registrar, such that there was any risk of apparent conflict if criticism were to be directed at the conduct of the diocesan registry in question. The solicitor was not in any way conflicted by the fact that his senior partner was the provincial registrar; in any case, there was no way that any such conflict could possibly have added to the appellants’ costs. There was no basis for a wasted costs order.

The grant of permission to appeal had been subject to a condition that the first-instance costs order – that each side should bear its own costs – not be challenged. There was a reservation to this, in the event of unreasonableness by either party in their participation in the appeal. While the court had hoped for fuller without-prejudice discussions between the parties than had actually taken place, there was not unreasonableness such as to make it proper to re-open the costs order made below. At the outset of the appeal, the parties had agreed that each would bear its own costs of the appeal, save as to the issue of standing, which remained open. On appeal, the appellants had succeeded on the standing issue; but the respondents had succeeded in rebuffing the new intervention by Philip Ouvry. The court saw no reason to depart from the agreed position, and ordered that each party should bear its own inter partes costs, including the costs of the standing issue and the Ouvry intervention. The appellants’ submissions that costs should be assessed on the indemnity basis therefore fell away. The court costs in the appeal were ordered to be paid by the respondents. [David Willink]