A quarter of a century has passed since John Wright wrote the last general introduction to the history of Libya (Libya: A Modern History, London 1981). It is therefore very welcome that Dirk Vandewalle has produced a new overall history of the country from the last days of Ottoman rule until the present day.
The book appears in a series of similar introductory or overview histories of individual countries published by Cambridge University Press, serving both as analytical studies of the individual countries and as useful additions to reading lists for modern history and politics courses, filling the gap between the general Middle East histories and the more specialized case studies.
This volume both presents a narrative of the events from the Italian invasion of 1911 until today and emphasizes a particular approach to the study of the Libyan state's development—namely, to focus on the policy of “statelessness.” The author uses this term to explain Qadhafi's jamāhiriyya, a system for circumventing the trappings of the formalized state by in theory appealing directly to the masses and in reality leaving power in the hands of unelected revolutionary organs, outside of any institutionalization.
This term is linked to the Qadhafi regime, and it is inevitable that any study of 20th-century Libya will emphasize his role. However, Vandewalle shows that this concept of “statelessness” largely continues the weak monarchic system that preceded the revolution and indeed colonial and precolonial polities that existed in what became “Libya” only with the Italian invasion less than a century ago. The division of the country into the “Maghribi” Tripolitania and the “Mashriqi” Cyrenaica that haunted anticolonial struggles (mostly fought independently in each province) continued to dominate structures of the monarchy. At the time one of the poorest countries of the region, Libya set up four different governments, three provincial and one federal—all of them so weak they were hardly state structures in more than name.
Qadhafi broke the power of the Cyrenaican elite who had dominated the monarchy, but lacking a nation, he instead went to the masses, a suitably amorphous and noninstitutional entity. The call for “mass power” was more than rhetoric; it was followed up by instituting “popular committees” with actual grassroots participation, but these had no actual power over decisions made at the state level. Thus, the informal structures of the revolution, with Qadhafi at the helm, could maintain their power while professing their lack of accountability because, according to state ideology, “the people govern directly.”
Vandewalle admirably brings out the development of these structures, both in relation to practice and to Qadhafi's ideological development of the “Third Universal Theory.” This has been amply discussed elsewhere but is here located in the historical development of the country. The author builds on his earlier Libya Since Independence (Ithaca, 1998), updating this with changes that have taken place in Libya's internal and, particularly, external policies over the past few years.
Besides the political structures mentioned, the study unavoidably emphasizes the impact that the oil economy has had on Libya's development since the 1960s. Vandewalle delineates four main periods of Qadhafi's regime, largely coinciding with changes in the international oil market. After the first euphoric period of Nasserist enthusiasm, the 1973 rise in oil prices allowed Libya “ten golden years,” which were spent developing the Qadhafi experiment at home and abroad. Then the drop in oil income led to early, but eventually ineffective, attempts at economic reform, or a Libyan infitāḥ. The conflict with the West started to weigh more heavily on the regime, and, at the end of the century, the fourth dramatic turnaround occurred when Libya moved from being an enemy to an ally of the Western world while still maintaining the basic political structures of its state. The continued legacy of “statelessness,” Vandewalle indicates, may put the success of the new set of reforms in jeopardy.
There has clearly been no lack of studies on Libya and its leader over the years. The book under review, however, has the advantage of placing developments after 1969 in perspective relative to the country's early history: it shows how Qadhafi's apparent dramatic and idiosyncratic political ideas can be seen as a logical conclusion of Libya's earlier weakness or failure as a state. Emphasizing economic structures and policies, the book places these into a political, ideological, and structural context that makes it an excellent and up-to-date analytical introduction to the history of this country, which has had an impact so much larger than its size.
