Source: Bureau of Industry and Security annual reports, U.S. Department of Commerce. [A color version of this figure can be viewed online at www.journals.cambridge.org/mes]
In December 2008, the U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) released its thirteenth annual report on offsets in the U.S. defense trade.Footnote 1 This chart displays numbers for the BIS category Middle East/Africa, taken from these reports beginning in 1993.Footnote 2 Offsets are a variety of industrial and commercial incentives that defense firms provide to foreign governments to facilitate purchases, from coproduction of particular weapons systems to overseas investment. They have become such big business in the Middle East that a system has evolved to allow defense contractors to bank and trade offset credits like any other investment. Unlike ordinary investments, however, offsets represent transfers of substantial resources to authoritarian governments under conditions of near total unaccountability. Because offsets are usually a percentage of the overall contract value, regimes that spend more on weapons get more in offsets.
Although the General Accounting Office (GAO) has repeatedly stated that available information on offsets is inadequate, the 2008 BIS report purged much of its previous content, bringing it to one-third the length of the 2007 edition. The report no longer includes offset percentages, regional distributions or values, or top offset recipients—all in response to industry claims that the information was “proprietary.”Footnote 3
Official numbers from previous years are available but are suggestive of systematic underreporting. The 2007 BIS report indicates $5.9 billion in offsets for the Middle East/Africa from 1993 to 2005. However, a 1998 article in Jane's Intelligence Review cites offsets of $30 billion in the Gulf alone from 1990 to 1997.Footnote 4 BIS statistics also appear to leave out many countries; its database includes forty-one nations, but a 1983 U.S. Treasury report mentions U.S. offset obligations in 130 countries.Footnote 5 BIS also gives a classification of “none reported” for Egypt's offsets during the 1993–2005 period; but evidence of offsets for Egypt exists,Footnote 6 and GAO reports criticize both Egypt and Israel for requesting offsets on purchases financed by U.S.-government aid.Footnote 7
Such scrutiny has likely discouraged many states from formalizing their requests. Publications from industry trade groups report that Egyptian authorities ask contractors for “concessions” and “discounts” instead of formal offsets.Footnote 8 Numerous other Middle East states also not mentioned in the BIS report have offset guidelines—including Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Bahrain, and Oman—suggesting that offsets will grow in magnitude and significance even as the U.S. government collects and publishes less information.
Future reports may be even sparser. Official changes under consideration would eliminate several reporting requirements, including the names and titles of signatories to offset agreements and the reporting category “cash payment,” both already redacted from the publicly available version.Footnote 9 Offsets represent challenges to democratic accountability and pose serious conflicts of interest, even under the best conditions. In a region where patronage politics often determine government policy and investment priorities, and under circumstances where the most powerful U.S. source of oversight abdicates its responsibilities in the face of industry pressure, the implications are much more serious.
