This book is a model of a coherently organized edited volume. It reports and analyzes the findings of a large-scale survey research project, the East Asian Barometer, in which eight research teams conducted national sample surveys in what the editors term five new democracies (Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, and Mongolia), one established democracy (Japan), and two nondemocracies (China and Hong Kong). There is one chapter on each political community, and the chapters are organized into sections that focus on common research questions and frame those questions in historical and comparative context. The editors penned a helpful introduction that summarizes the findings. The conclusion reviews the state of democratic consolidation in the East Asian region in comparison with regions with other recent democracies and discusses the relationship between mass public attitudes to regime consolidation.

This book is the best available account of what the East Asian people think about democracy in the early twenty-first century. Why does it matter? For one thing, we now have the social scientific research to respond to Singapore statesmen who claim that East Asians do not care about democracy. The research clearly shows that East Asians are committed to democracy as an abstract ideal. However, the study also shows that support for democracy depends on the regime's ability to deliver political goods, and that most East Asians prefer economic development to democracy in cases of conflict (p. 24)—the kinds of claims that Singapore politicians also make in their more nuanced moments.

Knowledge about “what the people think” can also help us understand and predict political developments. The chapter on Hong Kong, for example, shows that Hong Kong people's self-perception of their participatory capacities was the lowest in Asia (only 1.5 percent believed they were capable of both understanding and participating in politics; p. 198), suggesting that the territory may not be the right place to look for rapid democratic change. On the other hand, the results from Thailand that “84.2% expressed confidence in their ability to participate in politics—and included among these were a striking 71.7% who said they could participate even though they could not understand politics” (p. 123) may help explain the development of mass populist uprisings that shook Bangkok earlier this year.

Such findings also challenge theories of democracy and democratic change. Results from Thai respondents—“the banning of opposition parties drew higher support as well among the better educated and persons of higher socioeconomic status, probably because parties are seen as instruments of mass mobilization against elite dominance of the political arena” (p. 131)—cast doubt on modernization theory, which predicts that the urbanized middle class will lead the struggle for democracy. Results from China—“while 84% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed with having elections for national leaders, only 16.3% agreed or strongly agreed with multiparty competition” (p. 216)—challenge the contemporary liberal democratic view that elections for national leaders cannot be meaningful without political party competition. Perhaps the Chinese case should make theorists revisit the nineteenth-century British political thinker John Stuart Mill's argument for democracy without multiparty rule.

Let me end with some questions. First, why should East Asia be regarded as a relevant unit of analysis? What binds together such disparate countries as the Philippines, China, and Thailand? And why leave out Vietnam and Indonesia? Some East Asian countries share a common cultural heritage such as Confucianism, and others partake of regional organizations such as ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) that can help forge a sense of unity and common purpose, but it is unclear what delimits the choice of countries in this book.

Further questions can be raised about the extent of support for democracy in the East Asian region. On the one hand, the survey format may underestimate support for democratic change. In China, for example, more in-depth qualitative interviews may reveal latent aspirations for democratic change. Tianjian Shi, the author of the China chapter, notes that the regime's control over information helps explain the finding that China's authoritarian institutions enjoy higher trust than institutions in Asian democracies (p. 230). One can imagine different findings if, say, the Chinese media could freely run images of the June 4, 1989, killings in Beijing.

On the other hand, the questions asked may bias the results in favor of democracy. The “authoritarian options” to democracy are described as “strong leader,” “military rule,” “no opposition party,” and “experts decide everything” (p. 25). But what if respondents were asked to choose between “democracy,” “meritocracy,” and “a mixture of democracy and meritocracy”? Such choices do not fit neatly within the “good” democracy versus “bad” authoritarianism dichotomy that seems to inform the normative biases of this book.