The publication of Bettina Koch's book could not be more timely. As terrorist attacks perpetrated by Islamic extremists crowd the news, the question whether Islam is inherently violent (or worse, prone to terrorism) surfaces again. The author's stated intent is to go beyond the Western “one-sided public and scholarly debate” which focuses exclusively on the violent religious discourse of “fundamentalist or extremist movements in Islam or islams” (1).
Koch fulfills her intent by making three fundamental claims. (1) Violent conflicts, even when religiously sanctioned, may have more to do with the political struggle for power, territory, material wealth, or social justice than with a struggle over contested truth claims. This means that they are not always or primarily conflicts over religious orthodoxy. Rather, religion is used for political ends. (2) Religiously sanctioned political violence is not a prerogative of Islam. Political violence belongs to the premodern and modern histories of Christianity and Islam alike. (3) Identifying and addressing the political, social, or economic roots of violence (even when the conflict may have been transformed into a conflict over religious doctrine) is the most likely way to find a feasible solution to violence.
Koch introduces Islamic jihad, the Christian crusades, and church inquisition as examples of premodern political violence, used in medieval Christendom and Islam to fight external and internal “political” dissidents. Quoting the scholar of religion Rollin Armour, Koch reminds her audience that “the Christendom of the Middle Ages was exactly like the society Muhammad had in mind, namely, a society in which religion, law, politics, economics and all of society merged into one interlocking system” (17). Unbelievers, or infidels, were persecuted in both medieval Christendom and Islam not so much for their religious beliefs as for their perceived threat to the established political authority. Likewise, the goal of the Christian crusades and Islamic jihad was mainly political, aiming at ensuring control over territory and land. Koch argues that it is misleading to label either of them a “holy war.” The stated goals of the crusades were “1. Securing people defined through religious creed (Christian pilgrims), 2. Giving military aid to the Byzantine emperor, 3. Conquering land (Jerusalem and the Holy Land)” (33). Similarly, Islamic jihad was not historically a “war founded on exclusively religious motives,” although its targets were the so-called unbelievers (73). In early Sunni and Shi'i scholars' writings, the definition of an unbeliever depended on the political interests these scholars were trying to serve.
Koch's book is filled with many examples of religiously legitimized political violence going all the way up to modern times. Some of these examples are considered a form of hegemonic violence, using coercion to maintain state power. Others are presented as instances of antihegemonic violence, using force to fight against state power. This would be the case of the counterviolence movements incited by the theology of liberation of Camillo Torres in Colombia and the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan al-Banna in Egypt, to cite just two. Both had the goal of forcefully overthrowing unjust and corrupt political establishments, whether secular or religious.
While displaying an encyclopedic knowledge of the premodern and modern political violence movements in Christianity and Islam, Koch's fundamental claims are at times contradicted by the evidence that is presented here, as well as by the larger scholarly debate. To being with, violence perpetrated by religious actors for political reasons seems to be more closely knit to theology (and religion) than the author is initially ready to admit. Koch acknowledges that, while fought for political purposes, the crusades were at the same time justified by appeal to theological notions like martyrdom, atonement, redemption, and right intention. Similarly, proper religious conduct was a central component of the discourse on jihad. For Malik, the founder of the Sunni Maliki school, for example, the jihadist would have been a martyr-like figure, praying, fasting, and paying alms, while fighting in the service of the community of believers.
If religious motivations did account for premodern political violence, they seem to underpin modern terrorism and civil wars far more extensively than they did premodern conflicts. The 1976 Iranian Revolution is a case in point. This revolution was brought about by a new theological interpretation of the role of “the seventh-century grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, from victim to hero-martyr” (Toft, Philpott, and Shah, God's Century [Norton, 2011], 16). Such considerations seem to go against Koch's claim that violent conflicts, and their solution, are mostly political in nature.
Second, Koch's claim that religion is not per se prone to violence could have found support in an examination of the Christian and Islamic voices against political violence. The scholarly literature is replete with examples of Christian and Muslim political theories of nonviolence, democratic dissent, and peace building. Koch partly addresses this when she hints at the mediating role of the Catholic Church in the process which eventually led to the end of the civil war in El Salvador. However, the role of the church in peace building goes far beyond the single case she cites. Likewise, Muslim thinkers and activists have promoted and used nonviolence in very many parts of the world, to combat injustice, exploitation, and corruption. One example would be the nonviolent resistance movement against British rule of the Muslim pacifist Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Including voices such as his would have been an important move toward disproving the commonly held belief that Islam is prone to violence.
Third, Koch's effort to show the similarities between the Christian and Islamic political violence movements tends to minimize the differences between them. One such difference is the treatment of external dissenters in medieval Christendom and Islam. While not granted full “citizenship,” non-Christians would not have been required by the pope or the Christian emperor to abide by canon law. By contrast, the jihadists in medieval Islam required of the unbelievers far more than paying the poll tax. For example, Ibn Khaldun believed that unbelievers should all convert to Islam “either by persuasion or by force” (79). And Ibn Taymiyya called for the necessity to kill and fight those who neglected the established rules of Islam, as laid down in Qur'an and Sunna of the Prophet.
