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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2005
The postcommunist transformation of the former countries of “real socialism” has become an intriguing topic for economists and political scientists. The Soviet bloc did not just collapse; it collapsed unexpectedly. There are various consequences for the world as a result of this event, which in many ways resemble a gun that is cocked and loaded, but which has not yet fired.
The postcommunist transformation of the former countries of “real socialism” has become an intriguing topic for economists and political scientists. The Soviet bloc did not just collapse; it collapsed unexpectedly. There are various consequences for the world as a result of this event, which in many ways resemble a gun that is cocked and loaded, but which has not yet fired.
The newly published book by Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism: The Transformation of the Former Soviet Bloc, is an example of the “generalizing” approach to the topic. The author, currently a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC, served as an economic advisor to the Russian and Ukrainian governments in the 1990s, and later, since 1998, he has advised the Kyrgyz President, Askar Akaev. Aslund considers his book an attempt to, “( . . . ) tell a comprehensive story of post-communist economic transitions” and “( . . . ) to clarify the key facts about the transitions because so much clouds the picture” (1). He sees postcommunist transition as a struggle between “valiant liberal reformers” and “gradualists;” and correspondingly, as a struggle between advocates of the free market economy, and “self-dealing rent seekers,” influential groups interested in revenues to invest in maintaining their privileged status. What does the choice of economic strategy depend on? Aslund stresses the significance of free markets and civil society as two major political factors at work. However, and this is the starting point of his reasoning, “distant history seems less salient than the development of democracy, civil society, and thinking in the two years before the collapse of communism” (67). The books is basically an attempt to prove this statement using various materials. Aslund divides the postcommunist countries into three groups depending on political course and economic priorities. In Central Europe, the Baltic, Russia, and Kyrgyzstan, the governments “wanted a transition to market economy” and are supposed to have been “reasonably democratic.” Armenia and Georgia are considered countries close to this group, but where economic reforms failed due to political turmoil.
The second group, represented by Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, and the Ukraine, includes countries where the old Communist elites stayed in power, which predetermined a more conservative and state-oriented economic strategy, but where the governments turned out to be “reasonably democratic” enough to still start the reforms. As for countries belonging to the third group (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), Aslund characterizes them, as those “where the old communist elite just continued to rule.”
All these differences are believed to be due only to decisions made within the most recent decade—here is the major thesis Aslund attempts to prove. Although his “groups of countries” almost completely correlate with certain cultural regions (Roman-Catholic and Protestant Central Europe and the Baltic, with their old traditions of free marketeering and certain elements of Western style parliamentarianism; predominantly Orthodox, agrarian and traditionally monarchist Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, etc.), he emphasizes the insignificance of historical factors. To demonstrate that the burden of the past does not matter, Aslund appeals to the experience of Kyrgyzstan as an example of a successful Western style reform experience in a country without any tradition of market economy or parliamentarianism. The former advisor to the Kyrgyz president contrasts the country with neighboring Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan where the Communist elite “just continued to rule.”
Aslund's characterization of Kyrgyzstan's neighbors is very realistic, although Kyrgyzstan itself is another story. According to numerous data, there are no fundamental differences between Kyrgyzstan and other countries of former Soviet Central Asia—in its economy or in its experience of state building. Except one thing: the weakness of the Kyrgyz economy and its growing dependence on Kazakhstan (including the rapidly increasing Kyrgyz immigration to Kazakhstan).
To avoid “statistical aberrations,” one should put the Aslund scheme in historical context. There is a link between economic strategy and, thus, the fate of the reforms, on the one hand, and the role local communist nomenklatura played as a governing class (or continue to play) in the society. Why do they feel strong and safe enough to launch reforms and conduct them in a fashion they prefer?
To make sense of these options, one must go back to the epoch of Communist takeovers in Eastern Europe. There were big differences among Communist movements in terms of their popularity and social influence. If in Poland or in Hungary they could never have come to power without Soviet bayonets, in Yugoslavia they did it on their own. While some East European countries were governed by Moscow-controlled puppet regimes, some had their own, national, communism. It was under puppet regimes (German Democratic Republic [GDR], Hungary, Poland) that the first attempts of anti-Stalinist and anticommunist revolution occurred. And it was there that Communist governments had to yield in everything except the Moscow-controlled foreign policy (decollectivization in Poland in 1956, large-scale reforms in Hungary in the 1960s and 70s, etc.) and tolerate powerful non- and even anticommunist institutions (the Roman Catholic Church, Western oriented intellectual elites, etc.). Such a coexistence of weak Communist bureaucracy with strong and predominantly noncommunist society created a favorable background for far-reaching reforms.
The national Communist dictatorships had many more options to maintain their own interests. Deeply rooted in their societies, they were frequently perceived not as Moscow's appointees but as protectors of national sovereignty from Russian imperialism. Remarkably, sometimes a Moscow-oriented puppet regime could gradually evolve into a national Communist system, as took place in the countries belonging, according to Aslund's scheme, to the “second group.” Unlike Tito's supporters in Yugoslavia, the small Romanian Communist Party could not have established a one-party dictatorship without support from the USSR. Nevertheless, having started as a Soviet satellite, socialist Romania under Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceausescu (as well as, to some extent, Bulgaria under Todor Zhivkov) became a stronghold of national communism, keeping a distance from Moscow without displaying the slightest bit of liberalism. The only problem for local Communists was the foreign character of their doctrine; having removed this obstacle, the nomenklatura no longer had any serious rivals (comparable, for example, to the Roman Catholic Church with its political experience).
The Russian socioeconomic system in pre-Soviet, Soviet, and post-Soviet times is the topic of Alexander Chubarov's monograph, Russia's Bitter Path to Modernity: A History of the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras. Chubarov is a Senior Lecturer in Russian Studies at the School of International Studies and Law, Coventry University. Unlike Aslund, Chubarov is interested in demonstrating Russia's specificity and explaining its roots in the past.
The book contains a good survey of attempts to modernize the Russian economy and political system from Peter I to the Communist experiment. Chubarov's view on the precommunist attempts at modernization seems rather traditional: he characterizes them as despotic in means while “Western capitalist” in content. (Numerous attempts to reform agrarian economies around the world demonstrate, however, that such ambivalence is by no means a Russian specificity.) Bureaucratic centralization, commonly believed to be the major feature of the Russian economic and political system, has—according to Chubarov—always been due to the predominantly noneconomic methods of “mobilization of the resources at times of military emergency,” in contrast with Western countries where “social progress was achieved mainly through the natural development of economic relations.” To illustrate this thesis, Chubarov appeals to the practices of Czar Alexis and his famous son, Peter the Great. The background of the Russian administrative system had, however, been laid down long before the Romanov dynasty came to power—during the rise of Moscow under the Mongols, when Russian authorities were concerned with establishing good relations with their masters rather than gathering resources for resistance.
Following the history of the Soviet nomenklatura, Chubarov poses the question of its evolution. The book includes, in particular, a good description of the exchange of resources (administrative market) and relations among various bureaucratic “interest groups” under Brezhnev (152). Analyzing factors that contributed to the disintegration of the system in the 1980s–90s, Chubarov recalls the reformist activities of such academic centers as the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the influence of dissidents, and ethnic conflicts. He completely overlooks, however, the central factor—the growing influence of local party secretaries and the formation of their unofficial hierarchy, a place that depended not on relations with the center but on the resources of the secretary's region. Both Mikhail Gorbachev's coming to power in 1985 and his retirement in 1991, as well as the “nomenklatura privatization” under Gorbachev preceding the “voucher-privatization” under Yeltsin can barely be understood without taking this factor into account.
Examining the development of Russian “crony capitalism,” Chubarov inevitably comes to the role of Vladimir Putin and his course of “controlled democracy.” How can the latter coexist with “human rights, democracy, and media freedom?” “Does he (Putin) understand that technological innovation, advanced telecommunications, and venture capital ( . . . ) can thrive only in open and free societies?” (275). It seems, however, that, like many Western observers, Chubarov keeps asking questions, the answer to which have already been given. Both economically and politically, Putin's Russia is in transition to a new style of authoritarianism that, while different from the Communist system, still has little in common with the Western democracies.