Alan L. Mittleman presents an erudite and elegant brief for human dignity. At a moment when neuroscience enjoys unparalleled cultural prestige, Mittleman warns that what he calls scientism—“an overconfident, ideological application of scientific thought to the whole of life”—threatens the authority of first-person experience and, by extension, the legitimacy of religious commitment (xiii). When theorists invoke neuroscience to deny that there is such a thing as a stable self capable of free choice, they extend scientific reasoning beyond its legitimate bounds, Mittleman contends. Indeed, the scientistic denial of personhood is caught in a performative contradiction—scientists appeal to us as reasoning subjects in an effort to persuade us that we are mere objects. “We are being invited to abolish ourselves to arrive at an allegedly deeper truth about ourselves” (25). If the denial of human dignity closes off urgent ethical conversations, Mittleman invites a “lively dialogue” between religion and science about what it means to be human (xii). Accepting scientific findings about evolution or brain functioning, on Mittleman's view, does not commit one to reject human exceptionalism. Mittleman defends what he calls “the Jewish image of the person”—an image which necessarily affirms “personhood, agency, and moral responsibility”—as a compelling and philosophically resonant vision of humanity's place within nature (98, 20).
Mittleman reconstructs this image by surveying Jewish thinkers' positions on topics including humanity's place within creation, the relationship between body and soul, free will and determinism, the covenantal foundations of political community, and the importance of private property. Mittleman suggests that Jewish thinkers throughout the ages have adopted a salutary “middle way,” integrating various forms of naturalism with an ethical vision of human personhood (43). Mittleman upholds resistance to dualism as a Jewish signature, deriving from “the biblical emphasis on the unity of the person as a somatic-psychic whole” (102). Influenced by Greek philosophy, some medieval Jewish philosophers flirted with dualism, but they tended to modify or soften the stark dichotomies familiar from Platonism. On Mittleman's view, “a unitive account of human nature in which body, feeling, and thinking rise and fall together” is the distinctive “patrimony” of Jewish thought, a patrimony worth reviving (103). This unitive account provides a new basis for affirming human dignity. Departing from traditions that ascribe dignity based on human kinship with something higher (God), Mittleman contends that humans have “the dignity of doers.” “Our dignity is found in our activity and—even before we are able to act—potential for full personhood. Persons in their moral, epistemic, and creative capacities help the hidden goodness, truth, and significance of life to emerge” (183). This alternative theistic account is appealing, Mittleman suggests, both because it acknowledges continuities between human and nonhuman nature, and because it accords “primacy to praxis” (16).
Readers who share Mittleman's skepticism regarding the vogue for neuroscience might still wonder whether elaborating “the Jewish image of the person” constitutes an appropriate or powerful rejoinder. As Mittleman notes, philosophers such as Thomas Nagel have demonstrated that thought (and, by extension, personhood) is irreducible, without reference to Jewish texts. For whom would the elaboration of “a specifically Jewish view” prove authoritative or therapeutic (106)? The answer, presumably, is “for Jews.” Yet Mittleman courts a wide readership, addressing “Jews, Christians, secularists, and seekers” (12). He offers an evocative demonstration of the richness of Jewish texts, their appeal for a diverse audience. But Mittleman does not merely invite readers to engage Jewish texts. He makes the distillation of a Jewish “point of view,” “stance,” or “perspective” the goal of philosophical engagement (11, 183, 106, 171). It is not enough for isolated Jewish thinkers to speak to modern predicaments. Rather, the therapeutic project demands that we posit a unified, coherent, and authoritative “Jewish view.”
Yet many opponents of scientific reductionism are liable to reject the idea that there is such a thing as a “Jewish view,” and that its distillation is a political exigency. The investment in a unified Jewish view reflects the agenda of the book's sponsors, as much as it reflects Mittleman's judgment about how to best resist scientism. Human Nature and Jewish Thought is one volume in the Tikvah Fund's Library of Jewish Ideas, a series that, according to its publicity materials, “presents engaging and authoritative treatments of core Jewish concepts in a form appealing to general readers who are curious about Jewish treatments of key areas of human thought and experience.” The book's sponsors assume widespread agreement between Jews and non-Jews about which areas of human experience count as “key,” as well as a consensus, among Jewish thinkers, regarding “core” concepts. For scholars in Jewish studies, the insistence on a discrete number of “core Jewish concepts” is bound to be controversial—as is the contention that philosophical concepts feature prominently in traditions of Jewish thought. Of course, Mittleman knows that Jewish thinkers disagree about what it means to be human. Indeed, he devotes significant space to Crescas, a medieval Jewish philosopher who endorses determinism. Yet the message that Mittleman conveys is one of overwhelming consensus, throughout Jewish history, on the stature of human beings, the existence of free will, and the ethics of personal responsibility. Having constructed a unified Jewish view, Mittleman does not hesitate to dismiss nihilistic and tragic perspectives, such as those of Job and Ecclesiastes, as less “Jewish.” “Neither escape into contemplation nor tragic resignation fully suits the Jewish image of the person” (98). In its abstraction from historical context and contingency, Mittleman's work is a mirror image of neuroscience.
My point is not to reopen debates about historicism in political theory. Rather, it is to ask why scholars assume that, to establish the “relevance” of Jewish texts to our moral and political predicaments, we must assimilate them to received philosophical frameworks (e.g., core concepts and values). Mittleman hails Judaism “as a powerful ally in the search for a credible and creditable, ennobling yet self-critical account of who and what we are” (11–12). Must Jewish thinkers commit to a unified “Jewish view” in order to serve as effective allies? Mittleman expressly restricts the authority of Jewish texts to reason, their ability to persuade readers irrespective of national identity or religious belief. Indeed, at moments, Mittleman implies that the arguments surveyed are more cogent than Enlightenment (Kant) or secular (Kateb) paeans to human dignity, more likely to cultivate the requisite respect for human limitation. Yet if Maimonides's authority derives solely from the cogency of his arguments, why does it matter whether his stance on free will and determinism exemplifies an authentic “Jewish view”? When Mittleman treats Maimonides as one instance of a transhistorical “Jewish view,” he comes close to suggesting that Maimonides's authority derives more from authenticity than from reason. In other words, Mittleman risks positioning Jewish texts in an auxiliary role—that of persuading readers who already accept their authority (i.e., Jews).
This passionate and evocative book illustrates some of the challenges confronting projects to introduce Jewish texts into Western philosophical discourse. Too often, the classification of Jewish texts as “essays in core human values”—that is, as the functional analogues of Western philosophy—risks reducing, rather than enhancing, their intellectual authority (47). By demonstrating the richness of Jewish texts, Mittleman has not only advanced our understanding of the human. He has also advanced a critical conversation for scholars of Jewish thought, a conversation about how to make Jewish texts intelligible to a wide audience on something approximating to these texts' own terms.
