“Some Social Requisites of Democracy” is, by official count, the seventh most cited article the Review has published. If we include citations to it as it was reproduced in Political Man (published the following year), we would surely find it to be one of the most influential political science essays of the past half-century. I suggest five reasons why.
First, Lipset's effort to understand the social bases of stable democracy encompassed one of the most powerful and enduring themes in comparative politics, and built on the work of many of the great political and social theorists, from Aristotle to Tocqueville and Weber. Writing in 1958, with democracy still largely a “Western” phenomenon and with most of Africa still under European colonial rule, Lipset did not anticipate that well over half of the independent states of the world would become democracies. Yet clearly, the expansive scope of global democratic change and aspirations has stimulated scholarly interest in its facilitating conditions. Today, much of comparative politics revolves around this issue.
Second, although his key thesis was remarkably simple and concise—“the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy” (p. 75)—his essay was theoretically rich in identifying a nexus of causal factors leading from level of economic development to prospects for stable democracy. Only two of his modernization variables (national income and education) have stood well the tests of time and more complex methods as drivers of democratization. But the key intervening variables that he adduced—changes in political culture, class structure, civil society, and state-society relations—have endured exceptionally well as explanations, spawning in themselves vast subliteratures. To this day, these remain the key social determinants of the democratic prospect (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994).
Third, Lipset's thesis was embedded in the larger body of modernization theory, which would mobilize considerable evidence demonstrating that rising levels of income and education have diffuse impacts on attitudes and values, and through them on political systems. The effects are far from neatly linear, but higher levels of economic development do tend to generate the trust, tolerance, autonomous participation, and valuing of freedom that facilitate democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inkeles and Smith 1974).
Fourth, Lipset's hypothesis about economic development and democracy—advanced at the time with crude and merely suggestive statistical measures—has since been supported by a vast array of statistical studies. Although there is debate about whether economic development actually causes democracy, clearly economic development sustains democracy (Przeworski et al. 2000), and virtually every multivariate analysis of the determinants of democracy identifies\break economic development as a powerful factor. Moreover, considerable case study evidence supports Lipset's (1994) (frequently overlooked) assertion that “a ‘premature’ democracy that survives will do so by (among other things) facilitating the growth” (p. 72) of the critical intervening variables, such as broader literacy, a vigorous civil society, limited inequality, and a democratic culture.
Finally, Lipset was also right in asserting that the stability of democracy (uniquely among political systems) depends on legitimacy, and that this belief heavily depends on effective performance, especially early in a regime. Here again Lipset gave us a rich set of propositions that have shaped political science theorizing about the need for democracies to moderate conflict, the value in doing so of cross-cutting cleavages, and the importance for new democracies to avoid threatening “the status of major conservative groups and symbols” (p. 87), a theme that resonates powerfully in the transitions literature (e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986).
Lipset was not the first to make these various arguments, but he was the first to state them clearly and systematically to a new generation of empirical social scientists, at a time when dozens of new nations were gaining independence and when transitions to and from democracy would become one of the dominant aspects of national development demanding explanation.
At the high end of the spectrum of development, Lipset's theory has held up remarkably: all but one (Singapore) of the 25 most developed states are democracies, and democracy has never broken down once established in a relatively rich country (Przeworski et al. 2000). However, contrary to Lipset's expectation, about two in every five poor countries (with low “human development” on the UNDP scale) are democracies today. It remains to be seen whether these countries can consolidate democracy, but to the extent they do so it will be by accumulating legitimacy through effective performance and by building up the supporting social and cultural requisites that Lipset identified in his seminal 1959 essay.
Seymour Martin Lipset was the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Stanford University and the George D. Markham Professor of Government and Sociology at Harvard University before becoming the Hazel Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University.

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