Introduction
We have arrived at a situation in which policymakers and ethicists are considering abandoning informed consent in the governance of certain new technologies, many of which are related to large-scale information systems. A paradigm case is the problem with using individuals’ informed consent to regulate biobanks. As sometimes suggested, there is a need for “new ethical frameworks.”Footnote 1 What these frameworks should look like, however, is not particularly clear. In the biomedical context, one approach has stood out in recent years: the so-called communitarian turnFootnote 2 introduces concepts such as collective consent or solidarity as substitutes for autonomy and informed consent.Footnote 3 Similar developments may also be spotted outside bioethics: concepts such as society, community, and solidarity are increasingly emphasized as important values on high policy levels. For instance, the president of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso, recently called for more solidarity in the efforts to fight off the economic crisis and promote further European research and innovation.Footnote 4
The communitarian turn in no way constitutes a unified school of thought, and there are clearly great differences between the worlds of policymakers and bioethicists. Still, the tendency to emphasize collective values and the interests of “society” over individual rights may be seen as a general trend in Western societies since (at least) the beginning of the 2000s.
For those knowledgeable about the history of bioethics, such a move may not be readily acceptable. Let me quote a central passage from one of the founding fathers of bioethics, Hans Jonas:
[W]e require a careful clarification of what the needs, interests, and rights of society are, for society—as distinct from any plurality of individuals—is an abstract and, as such, is subject to our definition, while the individual is the primary concrete, prior to all definition, and his basic good is more or less known. Thus the unknown in our problem is the so-called common or public good and its potentially superior claims, to which the individual good must or might sometimes be sacrificed, in circumstances that in turn must also be counted among the unknowns of our question.Footnote 5
In this article I focus on the individual-versus-society problem alluded to by Hans Jonas, especially as it appears in contexts relating to governance of large-scale databases.
Jonas himself had “grave doubts” as to the adequacy of the frame provided by the individual-versus-society faction: although it has a long history in the Western history of ideas and in our political and legal institutions, he saw it as a simplification of social, ethical, and political relations. But rather than challenging the individual-versus-society frame, Jonas chose to accept it, owing to the routine familiarity with which it was brought to bear on the issue he was discussing, that is, experimentation with human subjects. The concept of “naivety” in the title of this article refers to this distinction and the tendency to use it uncritically in a new and (by and large) unprecedented context: the governance of large-scale databases.
In order to illustrate my point I describe one case from a Norwegian debate over electronic health registries and another from the introduction of biometrics in the European Union. I use the two cases to point to the fact that the communitarian turn is not merely a phenomenon within bioethics but also part of broader social tendencies in Western societies. Such broad political and technological tendencies, I argue, should be included in bioethical analyses to a greater degree than we see today. In both cases discussed, concepts such as society and the common good are strongly predicated on notions of social control and technical mastery through the (potential) interconnection of ever-increasing sources of information. Such notions are strong drivers of development but frequently also rely on a number of unquestioned assumptions that are not necessarily conducive to good governance. In many cases of ethical and political dilemmas posed by large information systems, uncertainties and complexities loom large. Problematic though the society-versus-individual argument may be when taken on its own terms, when it is joined with planned and emerging large-scale information systems, the difficulties increase.
I begin by considering the two cases, that is, electronic health registries and biometrics. This consideration also pays some attention to the debate over communitarian bioethics. I hope that these descriptions will allow us to see why the initial framings provided in many political, ethical, and regulatory debates are not always constructive. A central point, discussed in the third and fourth sections, is that we should also consider important societal mid-range levels, especially the great diversity of social groups and the specificities of particular technological applications. I argue that there is a need to pay closer attention to the ways in which specific technological systems transform our very concepts of society, groups, or the individual. I suggest that such technologically and socially created groups and identities should be the starting point for ethics analysis, and not the commonly presupposed concepts of individual and society. I end with some reflections on where one might start to look for sources of new ethical frameworks.
Health Registries: The Communitarian Turn, Norwegian-Style
My first example is from a recent initiative to construct centralized health registries for the public health services in my home country, Norway. The strategy was recently outlined in a white paper entitled “Good Health Registries—Better Health: Strategy for Modernisation and Coordination of Central Health Registries and Quality Registries for the Period 2010–2020” (my translation).Footnote 6 The document provided the foundation for public consultation and ensuing political debate. It is full of images of happy and healthy people, mainly of a Nordic complexion. The imagery goes a long way to promote the document’s central message that “[g]ood health registries lead to better health for the whole population.” A photo of a young boy flexing his muscles and wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with the words “All around the world” covers the front page of the white paper’s short version. Although it is probably coincidental, the message points to the wider intent of the document: the building of an information infrastructure necessary for the global exchange of the boy’s bodily information.
The document gives the impression that privacy and informed consent have been adequately addressed. It cites the initial clause of the Norwegian Act on Health Registries, which states that informed consent remains the default requirement for health registries. In March 2010, however, the Act on Health Registries was changed in order to facilitate the kind of digital and centralized health registries described in the white paper. Such registries, the new act states, will contain personal, identifiable information while at the same time avoiding any requirement for informed consent. In the main section on ethics and privacy, the white paper defines medical ethics as consisting of four principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. The report asserts, however, that the four principles were primarily intended for the healthcare context, that is, aiming at treatments for individual patients. Health registries, on the other hand, are different, because their primary purpose is aimed at the collective level. Without further argument, therefore, the white paper immediately translates the four principles into the “parallel” principles of integrity, safety, utility, and solidarity.
Although argumentation is scarce, the main reasoning for reinterpreting the principles relates to the cumbersome and often meaningless task of obtaining consent from every person involved, a lesson well learned from the biobank context. Another central argument is that, in most cases, it is the stronger and healthier patients who give their consent, whereas the weaker ones often are not in a position to do so. This creates an imbalance in the participation of the population, with especially negative consequences for representation in research. In the end, the document does not debate these premises but merely states that, in this case, the common good and utility brought by digitalized health registries is given priority over the privacy of the individual. Thus, the common good is equated with the perceived needs and interests of science. I take this to be one of the scenarios Hans Jonas warned against.
Strong opposition came from the Data Protection AuthoritiesFootnote 7 as well as the Conservative Party, each of whom argued that privacy and informed consent had been disregarded in favor of a strong emphasis on data protection. They claimed that, in the name of the common good, privacy had become a technical issue and not an ethical or political one. The Norwegian Board on Biotechnology developed an alternative proposal based on the use of encryption by an external agency, which they argued would be more privacy friendly while at the same time keeping most of the registries’ central functions intact.Footnote 8 This proposal was turned down. In the parliamentary debate about changing the Act on Health Registries, the logic of the preliminary document prevailed. The main speaker, Tove Karolin Knudsen from the Labour Party and the ruling coalition, had already stated: “If we are going to achieve real improvement of quality, we need registries enabling us to connect information and generate the knowledge needed to bring healthcare services forward. I will never forgive those who make privacy stand in the way of the possibility for the right treatment of the highest quality.” The main opposition, coming from the Conservative Party, countered with: “If we are to follow the logic just used by the minister, this Parliament can adopt whatever it wants. As long as it has been approved by Parliament, privacy has been taken care of!”Footnote 9
Similar, although much more refined, arguments can be found in Daniel Callahan’s article of 2003, “Individual Good and Common Good: A Communitarian Approach to Bioethics.”Footnote 10 Callahan defines communitarianism loosely, as a matter of framing that starts with the whole of society rather than the individual’s rights. He sees it as a necessary counterweight to the overwhelming individualism of Western societies, and U.S. society especially. Interestingly, he also sees this individualism as going hand-in-hand with a certain technological optimism that, he claims, should not be taken for granted in bioethical discussions. That is, in order for medicine and technology to serve society (and not the other way around), science and technology must be questioned.
However unwittingly, Callahan has taken part in a certain framing of the debate that was also operating in the Norwegian context. The position that eventually won out in Norway shares a number of argumentative, but not normative, premises with Callahan’s exposition. This is primarily the opposition between the individual and society itself: either we focus on the individual or we focus on society (and then, finally, we work out a balance between them). Both Callahan and the Norwegian white paper move directly from the level of the individual to that of the collective without considering the many levels in between (I return to this point in more detail in the concluding section). Furthermore, Callahan also “translates” the four principles into communitarian ones. A word of caution should be sounded here: I strongly doubt if Callahan would have supported the Norwegian health registry proposal; it combines communitarian ethics with a strong faith in the power of information technologies. Furthermore, Callahan has argued the need for a communitarian turn since at least the 1990s. Although collectivism now seems to enjoy some political success, this is in all likelihood owed not to ethical arguments but rather to changes in major societal undercurrents. Some of these undercurrents emerge through large-scale information systems, such as biobanks and, as I now discuss, biometric information systems.
Biometric Mobility: Security versus Privacy and Freedom?
In terms of direct impact on our daily lives, biometrics may affect us much more rapidly than digital health registries or genomic medicine. Debate, however, has been largely absent from Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects of Life Sciences and New Technologies (ELSA) research and ethics. Perhaps the most well-known biometric application is the fingerprint reader, frequently encountered when one enters buildings and some airports. The advantage of biometrics is the possibility of verifying that a given piece of information, such as that in a passport registry or a database, actually relates to an individual.Footnote 11 Biometrics, it is argued, provides more reliable answers to questions such as, Does this person have a rightful claim to this social service or not? Is this woman the person her passport says she is? Is this person a threat to public order? Is this person the owner of this laptop?
Identity verification can be carried out through the use of some unique identifier, such as a fingerprint, iris scan, or facial image. A central claim put forward by proponents of biometrics is that documents and operations become more “secure” and reliable as means for verification. But biometric technologies are not only used in contexts in which security is already an important issue, such as access to high-risk facilities or in the search for dangerous criminals. They are also fast emerging in other contexts, such as immigration, healthcare, and access to low-risk facilities (for instance, my gym). Thus, critics claim, biometrics brings security-invested values and practices into social domains in which they were not commonly used before. Hence, biometrics promotes practices and ways of talking that enter into emerging discourses of securitization. Footnote 12
One domain in which biometric securitization has been high on policy agendas is that of mobility and migration. After 9/11 it was perceived that more secure travel and identity documents would be highly useful for fighting terrorism. A number of large-scale biometric information systems are now being implemented worldwide. One important European system is Eurodac, an automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) in use since 2003. The purpose of Eurodac was to govern and coordinate asylum procedures to avoid double work, or “asylum shopping,” across jurisdictions. However, the database has also been extended to uses and domains for which it was not initially intended, such as control of “illegal immigration.”Footnote 13 There is also the Visa Information System (VIS), which will coordinate visa applications and procedures among all European member states. It also gives extended access to designated authorities, such as internal security and police. Hence, both Eurodac and VIS promote securitization in the domains of immigration, asylum, and visa policies. The system is presently being rolled out in embassies and consular posts in North Africa. The most ambitious project under way is the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), which is intended to replace the original Schengen Information System (SIS). The SIS contains alerts on objects and persons to be stopped, interrogated, denied access to European territory, or placed under surveillance: SIS II, which introduces biometrics, holds out the promise to increase interoperability and efficiency among national authorities as well as international agencies such as Interpol and Europol.Footnote 14 The system was supposed to be up and running by 2007 but has been riddled with a number of (technical, business-related, and political) problems.Footnote 15
Important aspects of biometric policies are given by the concept of interoperability and its claimed added value to a great number of executive challenges and operations. Interoperability has been defined as “the ability of IT systems and of the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the sharing of information and knowledge.”Footnote 16 In 2005 the European Commission issued a communication to the Council and the Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability, and synergies among European databases in the area of justice and home affairs. The three databases VIS, SIS II, and Eurodac figured as central. The specific purpose of the document was to strengthen the fight against crime and terrorism through the enhanced use of databases and data exchange between authorities. Other benefits claimed for interoperable systems include enhanced efficiency and even improved privacy. But promises to connect rapidly increasing numbers of databases are not uncontroversial. In the words of one lawyer, the developments projected in the document tread “a highly sensitive terrain, implying definite risks for infringing privacy and other civil rights and liberties. Improving interoperability and synergies means nothing else but knitting the network of surveillance tighter and closing gaps and loopholes in the control of criminals as well as reputable citizens.”Footnote 17 As is well known, the main legal tools for avoiding such consequences are given by existing privacy and data-protection regimes. The European Data Privacy Directive prescribes that personal data should be processed only for the purposes for which they were collected, that only those authorized to access data can do so, and that the use and processing of personal data should be proportional to the task at hand. This speaks in favor of a number of precautionary measures, such as (1) strict containment of data within specific systems, (2) strict restrictions on access by authorities or other third persons, and (3) that the purpose of using biometrics should be strictly defined and proportional to the tasks and challenges at hand. This ambition to promote synergies, enhanced effectiveness, and interoperability between European databases, however, almost by definition holds the potential to flood the gates put in place by privacy regulations.Footnote 18
Here, in the tension between increasingly interoperable and interconnected systems and privacy regulations, we again encounter the individual-versus-society nexus. Consider the following remark by Franco Frattini, commissioner for freedom, security, and justice from 2004 to 2008, during which period he strongly promoted biometrics in the EU: “There is a need to overcome the traditional dogma of seeing collective security and individual freedom as two opposed concepts which exclude each other. Individual rights can only flourish in an atmosphere of collective security.”Footnote 19 In the biometrics context, we also spot a communitarian turn,Footnote 20 this time accompanying the discourse on securitization. Frattini’s remark may initially be seen as different from the society versus individual argument: he argues that it is false and can be overcome by firmly emphasizing collective security, in this case for the entire EU. The position against which he argues, however, is exactly that of strong individual rights as the basis of legal and political systems. In most cases those opposed to biometrics (or other security technologies) have no other option than to frame their opposition in terms of individual rights, especially privacy. As stated by Bennet and Raab: “Privacy protection is normally justified in individualistic terms in the academic literature and in the popular mind.”Footnote 21 In a classic text on privacy by Warren and Brandeis, the authors state that “the protection of society must come mainly through a recognition of the rights of the individual.”Footnote 22 Thus, Warren and Brandeis turn Franco Frattini’s argument on its head: collective security flows through the primary provision of individual security.
The predominantly individualistic framing given to privacy has wide implications for the ways in which it can be implemented. One reason for this is that privacy is notoriously difficult to define. It has come to be seen as a subjective value, as something to be defined by the individuals themselves. If no one articulates and gives content to privacy, therefore, it may even disappear.Footnote 23 As we saw in the case of the Norwegian health registries, it may be reduced to the more technocratic function of “data protection,” whereby individuals, lacking specific roles or possibilities for participation, become passive holders of “rights.”
In the case of interoperable biometric systems, privacy may indeed prove an elusive goal. First, many developments are shrouded in secrecy, so it is very difficult even for those who are seriously concerned to engage in meaningful ways. Next, there is the question of scope and scale. With information systems stretching throughout 27 countries, potentially containing information on 450 million people and with increased access by a great number of authorities and institutions, how will individuals be able to keep track of the movements of their data? A strong case in point is the building of the SIS II. A report for the European Parliament Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) committee describes the system as a “complex and opaque project—hard to understand, even for experts and absolutely incomprehensible to citizens.”Footnote 24
Hence, there is good reason to question a predominant metaphor in EU policy discussion, namely that of “striking the right balance” between security and privacy.Footnote 25 Here, the unknowns in Jonas’s equation loom large: do the systems increase security or do they increase insecurity? In the case of biometrics, the answer to the question remains unknown: the systems are highly complex and in the early stages of development, and there is no evidence base for system operating at the scales now promoted. There is also the question of what sense we can realistically ascribe to the position of the “individual” relied on by Jonas: how do we know, within such complex information structures, the “interest of the individual”?
What Is So Problematic about the Individual-versus-Society Nexus?
From the developments described it may seem that we are passing beyond a threshold in which collective values increasingly take precedence over individual rights. The criticisms raised by Callahan of individual-based ethical principles seem fair: when applied in practice, they often end up ignoring the wider sociocultural context. But recognition of the validity of that perspective should not lead to the opposite view, in which individual rights are abandoned. In a climate of increased securitization and prioritizing of society over the individual, the weak and vulnerable are especially exposed. Hence, it is also easy to agree with Jonas’s claim that as long as we do not have reliable knowledge, the protection of the individual should take precedence. It therefore seems that the society-versus-individual nexus constitutes a dilemma that, when used for the ethics and governance of large-scale databases, cannot be worked out within its own frames. In the case of highly complex systems, our knowledge remains limited, and any attempt at balancing the individual with society is problematic. Some main issues at stake include the following three points.
First, who gets to define the “common good”? One could perhaps argue, as in the Norwegian case, that this is the role of government. The developments proposed in the white paper, however, have much wider reach than national borders, especially when connected to increasingly “harmonized” international infrastructures for biobanks and population studies. This can be clearly seen in the case of deCODE Genetics in Iceland. While drawing heavily on Icelandic national sentiment, deCODE was also busy selling the Icelandic genetics heritage to multinational companies.Footnote 26 This points to another important dimension of the question: large-scale databanks and information systems are normally state governed. States, however, often lack the technological and productive capacity to manufacture and run systems, and so these frequently emerge as joint state–industry ventures.
A second and related point is that the overall interest of “society” in health and security is frequently predicated on idealized and overly optimistic visions of information processing, in which ever-increasingly connected systems are assumed to result in greater control, security, and well-being. When it comes to practical implementation, however, technical complexities tend to be greater than those projected, especially by politicians looking for one-size-fits-all solutions to pressing issues. In the case of biometrics, the number of such complexities is mounting. For example, interoperability is anything but simple, given that there are a great number of available standards and systems implemented in highly proprietary regimes in different countries. There are also problems with persuading national regulatory cultures to adopt the same codes of ethics, operative culture, and information, in order for systems to operate in a reliable manner. European collaboration and exchange of best practices is seriously hampered by secrecy of both national regimes and business or industry.Footnote 27
A third point relates to the evidence base on which one may meaningfully make individual and collective decisions. Supposedly, both individual consent (for instance to be entered in a database) and public debate should be based on publically accessible empirical facts. However, the systems implementations described previously are experiments, and consequently there is no way of asserting their effectiveness and usefulness prior to their implementation. Owing to their scale and nature, there is of course no possibility of testing them in the laboratory. Biometrics is a case in point. Currently, there are no trials that prove that these systems will work on the scale at which they are being implemented. The point about secrecy made in the previous section further adds to this problem. Hence, we could reasonably claim that the universal ethos of science, according to which one acts on evidence and not on expectation, has been made a mockery. Similar things could be said for health registries. They hold the promise of doing good, but there is still little evidence to prove their added value. A number of uncertainties and unknowns are also looming. For instance, medical identity theft is a sharply growing, though largely unexamined, phenomenon.Footnote 28 This is not an argument against electronic health registries; it is an argument in favor of greater caution. The lack of sufficient evidence on which to base decisions speaks in favor of stronger roles for ethics, legal principles, and political debate.
Concluding Discussion
As stated earlier, a sociological corrective and supplement could be useful. It is, after all, problematic to talk about highly social (although also technological) developments without considering in more detail what “the social” is. A primary observation is this: the information infrastructures we are talking about are, on a quite fundamental level, dealing with issues of identity. Biometrics identifies people. It uses bodily information to ascribe to individuals a certain position within a social universe based on belonging to this or that group. Hence, biometrics constructs and ascribes identities on both group and individual levels, and these only make sense when seen in the light of one another.Footnote 29 There is no such thing as a pure identification of an individual: an individual is always identified in terms of further information. This is why biometric identification cannot work on a purely individual level; it has to pull in information that does not come from the body itself, and it has to subsume individuals under group identities.Footnote 30
The identification of an individual with a group category is a matter of social selection processes. When technologically mediated, this normally takes place through statistical associations. Likewise, medicine has, since the 1970s, been moving steadily in the direction of predictive medicine, which basically means providing people with risk profiles in relation to specific diagnoses. Personalized medicine and genomics hold out the promise of taking this further. Personalized medicine, however, is not exactly what its name suggests. It works with probabilities and associations and so cannot link any one patient or individual directly with a determined genotype in any but extremely rare cases. Predictive, genomic, and personalized medicine subsumes individual medical identities under risk categories; this is how a profile is constructed. A few categories central to the business of the Norwegian health registry include the mentally ill; drug addicts and victims of violence; people with cardiac disease; women giving birth; cancer patients; children and youngsters (including a number of those who suffer from rare disorders, syndromes, and malformations); diabetics (types I and II); people with diseases relating to infection, muscular and skeletal diseases, neurological disease, and respiratory disease; victims of accidents, violence, and trauma; and those in intensive care. The Norwegian health registry is an identity management system.Footnote 31 It provides means for identifying individuals according to specific categories: Which treatment is this person to be given? Is she or he eligible for this or that service? Electronic health registries will link health categories with legal rights categories, and these will be important for prioritizing healthcare services. Something similar applies to emerging biometric systems: they work by subsuming people under certain predefined categories, such as EU citizen, terrorist suspect, threat to public order, or third-country national, be they Sudanese, Icelandic, French, German, American, or Chinese. Each category comes with widely differing implications and consequences for the concerned groups and individuals.
Databases and large-scale information infrastructures for identity management actually transform the subjects analyzed in this article, that is, individuals, communities, and societies. The categories I listed in the previous section, however, are much more plural in nature than those of individuals and society. These are products of technical and social selection processes in which certain categorizations are selected and prioritized, sometimes with far-reaching implications for groups and individuals. Such emerging interactions between social identities (group and individual) and concrete technical systems mean that new ethical, social, and political issues will arise.
Is it not strange that we keep presupposing the static quality of the individual and society and frequently call on their mutual opposition, when in fact these entities are being transformed by identity management systems? Is it not strange that communitarian values are called on, without our really asking who is the community here? The society-versus-individual nexus takes an outsider’s view as if it is trying to place itself outside the social groups and processes that it wishes to assess.
I suggest that as long as we talk about society, solidarity, or the individual, we tend toward framing the debate in terms of interests: in order to arrive at a common measure, we invoke an imagined utilitarian calculus to render different things (societies and individuals) comparable. Sometimes such frames may be in order. Other times they may pose problems, especially in cases of future projects and plans implying (extremely) high social and technical complexity. In order to enable a balanced choice to be made, the concept of interest requires that we first weigh the total consequences, both bad and good outcomes. As argued previously, we lack the evidence and knowledge that seem to be required for balancing one type of interest against another. A more useful alternative, therefore, is to place the emphasis more firmly on values and identities by asking such questions as, What are this group’s basic values and identity claims? Which values and worldviews are at stake? How are groups transformed through large sociotechnical systems? (This is of central importance to issues of social justice.)
Questions such as these must be linked to the concrete technologies through which identity management systems are constructed and implemented. As argued by Lawrence Lessig, “Code is law!”Footnote 32 If we stay with the outsider view (society versus individual), we are restricted to crude distinctions. These distinctions do not question or articulate technology options and their implications for rights and justice, nor do they begin to address the ways in which groups and individuals imagine themselves as caught up in ongoing sociotechnical reconfigurations. The more interesting questions, therefore, relate to the ways in which identity management systems produce new relations between technologies and social groups. This is by no means determined. A number of choices will have to be made about system design and architecture, and these will have real implications for the relations between groups, individuals, and societies.
As argued previously, technical, organizational, and cultural complexities are likely to interfere much more frequently than imagined by decisionmakers, thus making choice and deliberation necessary. According to this argument, taking seriously the identities perspective also entails taking seriously systems design. Algorithms, codes, protocols, and software are, and will be, highly relevant for changes to relations between groups, societies, and individuals. This necessitates seeking more active integration with the technology communities in question (and this of course invokes the old call for more and better public engagement). In situations in which decisions are increasingly delegated to sociotechnical systems, and in which these in large measure unfold outside national regulatory boundaries, there may be no other option than to embed ethics and governance discourses more firmly within the systems themselves. Stronger and more dynamic connections must be made between the people implementing and operating systems and those who are governed by and concerned with them, including academics and ethicists.
I have argued that, currently, the long-standing duality between individual and society in Western culture seems to be strongly leaning in the direction of society, even though what that term entails remains obscure. Perhaps, as implied by Callahan, this can be seen as a backlash from strongly individualistic premises inherent to Western societies and institutions. Such increasing individualization may turn out to be too costly, institutionally unfeasible, and culturally damaging.Footnote 33 As seen in the cases described here, however, there is also the danger that the pendulum is swinging too quickly in the opposite direction, so as to make privacy and informed consent obsolete. I have argued that more detailed attention to the ways in which identities emerge through new technologies holds the promise of a more balanced view. We need to establish more of an overview of the sociotechnical restructurings brought about by emerging identity management systems and find more effective ways to discuss them with those concerned. In doing so, we may also create new lines of communication that allow us to talk meaningfully about privacy, informed consent, and justice. There are a number of academic traditions, in ethics, philosophy, and sociology that can be used for better articulation of these relations.Footnote 34 But such perspectives will be in vain if not related to viable institutions in which some of the debates and issues discussed here can be successfully extended to include a greater number of concerned parties. There is, in short, no lack of theoretical sources if we want to look for “new ethical frameworks of emerging technologies,” but the practical, ethical, and political challenges of implementing such frameworks are both complex and considerable.
