Early in his career Richard Sylla laid out a long-term agenda for himself, and for all financial historians. In 1971 he took banking historians to task for having considered banking from the “soundness” tradition at the expense of thinking about how banks contributed to growth (Sylla Reference Sylla1971). Banks failed, to be sure. But so, too, did every other type of business. The hyper-focus on soundness ignored the important role finance played in America’s long-term development. In 1985 he contended that it was America’s early and liberal adoption of the business corporation that contributed, mightily in his opinion, to its commercial ascendancy (Sylla Reference Sylla1985). These two lines of thought intersect because the business corporation arrived early in banking. States with liberal corporate chartering or free banking regimes witnessed rapid and concurrent rates of financial and economic development only witnessed in a handful of places up to the twentieth century.
In his recent writings on Alexander Hamilton, Sylla continues to push the finance-growth agenda forward, recognizing that it was, in fact a more encompassing finance-growth mechanism rather than the narrower banking-growth nexus highlighted in his 1972 article. A genuinely modern financial system has five key components: sound public finance, a stable monetary regime, an integrated banking system, a strong central bank, and functioning securities markets. The United States exhibited none of these features when the first Congress convened in 1789, but it had all of them, if only in a rudimentary way, by the time Hamilton resigned as treasury secretary in 1795. The Federalist financial revolution was underway.
It is fitting on Sylla’s retirement that the editors commissioned eight articles that assess the current state of financial history with an eye toward how Sylla’s agenda has pushed the narrative in sometimes unexpected directions. Five essays address the soundness-growth tradeoff. Michael Bordo and Christopher Meissner argue that, unlike Argentina, which seemingly learned little from its recurrent crises, Americans learned and tinkered with its financial system to make it more stable without short-circuiting its growth-inducing features. Peter Rousseau and Paul Wachtel’s essay follows the now-standard practice of documenting the connection between financial deepening (i.e., growth in the money-GDP ratio) and growth and crisis. Periods of gradual deepening are associated with growth; periods of rapid deepening are conducive to crises. The U.S. experience, as Sylla recognized, is mostly one of gradual deepening.
Marc Flandreau’s essay argues that the New Deal’s restrictions on investment banking were counterproductive for both short-term recovery and long-term growth. Hamstrung investment bankers provided less credible certification, which meant less trust and less international finance. Eugene White’s article shows that the Federal Reserve’s decentralized structure worked well during the 1920–1921 deflation. When the downturn threatened regional bank liquidity, the Atlanta Fed intervened in its lender-of-last-resort function over the Board’s objections. Finally, Charles Calomiris and Mark Carlson argue that soundness can endogenously emerge in a lightly regulated financial system. Regulators tend to emphasize stability through restrictions on balance sheet choices, whereas banks chase stability through ownership structures and governance procedures. The two approaches are complements. What connects these essays is that they show that Americans understand that finance is a complex machine, which, regardless of how careful its tenders may be, is subject to occasional failure. When it fails, Americans do not trash the machine; they keep tinkering.
Robert E. Wright documents the emergence of business corporations in transportation and manufacturing, which were able to tap into securities markets that had emerged earlier to facilitate trade in government debt and bank shares. Wright’s essay shows that it was finance writ large that mattered. John Wallis’ essay connects open access in banking to an increasingly open access polity. Wallis argues that to understand the evolution of democratic institutions historians should move beyond Jackson’s populist rhetoric and explore the consequences of intra-elite competition that led to the freedom to form growth-enhancing organizations. Niall Ferguson brings the connection between America’s financial development and economic power into a modern context. The defining characteristic of the second half of the twentieth century was the Cold War. The United States prevailed because it “enjoyed an ability to finance increased arms spending. .. through the uniquely deep and wide American capital market” (p. 139).
It is unlikely that when Sylla published his calls for a deeper appreciation of finance and corporations he anticipated the breadth or sophistication of the historical scholarship that was to unfold, but he deserves to be fêted for having nudged the conversation in new and productive directions. The eight essays collected in this volume reflect the breadth of his interests and speak to his creativity as a scholar and generosity as colleague, coauthor, friend, and mentor.
