Long's book is an adaptation of parts of his Cambridge University PhD thesis, employing revised versions of thesis material in Chapters 2 - 4, incorporated alongside new material in the other chapters. Chapter 2 was also previously published in 2005 in the Cambridge Classical Journal; so we have a bit of a hodge-podge of ideas cobbled together into a nice looking package by Oxford University Press. Unfortunately the packaging does little to disguise the hodge-podge.
The central aim of the book is ostensibly to establish that, for Plato, philosophy requires conversation. This is not an examination that focuses on Plato's use of the dialogue form to convey his ideas, but rather an attempt to suggest that Plato considers both interpersonal conversation and internal dialogue (thinking things through on your own) as essential to philosophy. The book sets out to answer the question why Plato, on a developmentalist approach to his writings, starts with interpersonal conversation in his early writings but later incorporates internal dialogue into his approach. The book takes on a number of Platonic dialogues in an apparent attempt to answer this question: Chapter 1—Phaedrus, Chapter 2—Protagoras, Chapter 3—Hippias Major, Chapter 4—Phaedo, Chapter 5—Republic, Chapter 6—Theaetetus and Sophist, and Chapter 7—Laws. There is no conclusion, and frankly the book simply ends without any attempt to show how the proposed question has been answered. The chapter on Laws seems very far indeed from addressing the book's central question.
The methodology is a bit strange. One is introduced at the outset to what seems like an interesting question, namely to what degree Plato is committed to conversation as essential to philosophy, but much of the book is filled with exegetical remarks on the dialogues in question, remarks that do very little to address the book's central question. I would venture to say that at least 70% of the book is exegesis that fails to deal with its proposed topic. If I were to distill what looks like the thesis of the book, it would seem to be that originally Plato thought that philosophy could be done or should be done primarily by interpersonal conversation, but that he came to realise that of three elements of interpersonal conversation—teaching, protreptic, and accurate representation of views to which one is opposed—the first two can best be accomplished by interpersonal conversation, and the latter would seem to be impossible without it. According to Long, Plato believes that internal dialogue can succeed in the refinement of one's own position, as well as questioning one's position from an external position that is opposed to it, but Plato (on a developmentalist reading) is initially less confident that full and proper representation of an external position to which one is opposed can truly be accomplished without interpersonal conversation. This difficulty is brought into sharp relief by the depiction of Callicles, in the Protagoras, who is unwilling to share his thoughts fully in conversation with Socrates. How can one articulate the position of a non-cooperative interlocutor? Long seems to suggest that later Plato has Socrates take on this problem, representing Protagoras' position in the absence of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, suggesting that it is possible to represent an opponent's views in the absence of one's opponent.
My primary criticisms of this book are of two kinds. The first is something that I have already mentioned, namely that much of the book is taken up with exegesis that seems irrelevant to the book's central thesis; that is much of the exegetical work has nothing to do with interpersonal conversation or internal dialogue. Long wants to maintain that Plato rarely addresses the question he (Long) is asking directly, requiring us to pay attention to the form of what is being presented in the dialogues, as opposed to the topic under discussion. However, Long could offer more help in articulating that form, as opposed to simply claiming that it is there, and this could be more effectively accomplished without the extended exegesis. More signposts and elaboration of the author's intuitions would better serve to address the subject of the book. Often one finds that the exegesis obscures relevant topics that need more examination. For example, one might say that Socrates does engage in internal dialogue quite a bit—consider his lapse into self-thought at the beginning of the Symposium, and Alcibiades' account of a similar lapse (Socrates on military campaign) at the end of that dialogue; consider Socrates' own self-dialogue in response to his characterization of the cryptic exhortation of the Oracle at Delphi in the Apology, or the 'proxied' self-dialogue as a representation of the position of the Athenian Laws in the Crito. All of these are mentioned briefly by Long, but they are not brought effectively to bear on what the central question of the book is supposed to be, and no strong answer to that question is ever offered. This leads to perhaps a larger issue that the book's ostensible question raises. It seems rather obvious that Plato thought that an opponent's view could be quite clearly represented through internal dialogue. The best evidence of this is to be found in Plato's dialogues themselves, which are after all, replete with representations of people who lived a generation before Plato's maturity, and comprise much of our knowledge of their positions, be it through the precise and careful articulation of ominous political or epistemological positions to which Plato was opposed, or through the artistic employment of profound colourful pastiche that has engrossed readers of Plato's dialogues for two and a half millenia. In brief, the question of the book—the way it is motivated and explained—leaves something to be desired; perhaps the question deserves a more refined and continuously sustained argument than Long offers. At the very least a conclusion and clear answer to the question asked might be supplied at the end of the book. There is a reasonable Bibliography and an Index Locorum, as well as a General Index.
