To say that beliefs are untrue, or are “misbeliefs,” is to say that the belief in question can be objectively verified; however, beliefs are by definition subjective. Despite the subjective nature of human beliefs, researchers have learned to use the refining process of the scientific method in order to partly uncover “reality.” Such is the plight of the social scientist and the beauty of scientific method. At what point, however, do the systematic replications and validations go beyond an understanding of the underlying factors giving rise to beliefs? If science, for example, reliably demonstrates that the sun does not in reality move across the sky, does this change one's belief in how the sun is moving throughout the day? It may do so (based on a faith in science), but such change in belief does nothing to change perception. One's subjective perception of the sun's movement is what is real and is the only view that matters to normal functioning. Therefore, there are times when it may be more adaptive and functional to misperceive than correctly believe.
McKay & Dennet (M&D) suggest that in order to identify a systematically adaptive misbelief, such belief may result from processing “biases” in the sensory system itself. Such an assertion assumes that perception gives rise to (mis)belief. Although this assertion may at times be true, at other times perception and belief may be disconnected (e.g., see above), or (mis)belief may actually give rise to perception (e.g., New Look: Balcetis & Dunning Reference Balcetis and Dunning2006; Bruner Reference Bruner1957). In fairness, disconnects between perception and belief are discussed in M&D's discussion of “alief” and error management theory; nevertheless, their proposed connection between perception and misbelief remains unclear.
A similar point of confusion is found in the distinction M&D make between psychological and biological adaption. It has long been recognized that social psychological factors and biological factors are closely related (for a review see Cacioppo et al. Reference Cacioppo, Berntson, Sheridan and McClintock2000). Because of the complementary nature of social psychological and biological factors in human behavior, making distinctions between the two becomes meaningless without specifying how the two may be connected for a given outcome (e.g., Gailliot et al. Reference Gailliot, Baumeister, DeWall, Maner, Plant, Tice, Brewer and Schmeichel2007).
The lack of clarity in distinguishing between perception and belief, and psychological and biological adaption, becomes apparent as M&D investigate whether religious belief might be a good candidate for adaptive misbelief. If inferring the presence of agents is adaptive, for example, is such adaptability psychological or biological? If such agents cannot be seen and are not real, then what role does perception play? In fact, most of the empirical research in the area cited by M&D (i.e., Pichon et al. Reference Pichon, Boccato and Saroglou2007; Randolph-Seng & Nielsen Reference Randolph-Seng and Nielsen2007; Shariff & Norenzayan Reference Shariff and Norenzayan2007) suggest that alief, rather than belief, is involved, and that perceptual priming of agency rather than religion per se may be at the root of the behavioral effects found. M&D do acknowledge these possibilities, but fail to extend these possibilities to the search for adaptive misbelief (a point I return to later).
Where M&D's search does take them is to conscious self-deception. Considering their previously implied condition of adaptive misbelief arising from nonconscious perceptual biases, it is unclear why conscious self-deception is even considered, but it does provide a nice segue into positive illusions (i.e., the unrealistic optimism-type), fulfilling the stated requirements for adaptive misbelief. But why stop there? Are there other types of beliefs that could be considered adaptive misbeliefs (e.g., antecedent misbeliefs giving rise to the positive illusions described by M&D)?
One potential candidate may be gleaned from M&D's discussion of religious beliefs, namely a belief in personal agency. Recent social psychological research suggests that one's belief in free will is (or can be) an illusion (for reviews, see Bargh Reference Bargh, Baer, Kaufman and Baumeister2008; Wegner Reference Wegner, Hassin, Uleman and Bargh2005); however, other research suggests that the more one believes in personal agency, the more prosocial and hardworking one tends to be (Baumeister et al. Reference Baumeister, Masicampo and DeWall2009; Stillman et al., in press; Vohs & Schooler Reference Vohs and Schooler2008). Insofar as a belief in free will is a positive illusion (see Bargh & Earp Reference Bargh and Earp2009), it may be considered a pre-existing belief for the types of positive illusions discussed by M&D. For example, if one did not believe that control over one's actions was real, then there may be less reason to believe that one has what it takes to survive a life-threatening disease.
Proposing a belief in free will as a candidate for adaptive misbelief does bring to the forefront the previously discussed question of the connection between perception and belief. Insofar as the choices one makes are the result of nonconscious thinking instigated by the environment and resulting from our evolutionary past (Bargh Reference Bargh, Baer, Kaufman and Baumeister2008), belief in free will and nonconscious perception do not line up. Nevertheless, rational choice and conscious self-regulation are also thought to be intricately linked to the evolution of human cognition (Baumeister Reference Baumeister2008), in which case belief may be able to feed back into perception. Such a possibility would help explain how humans, despite being mostly unaware of the various messages presented to them from the environment, can successfully navigate through their environment in order to accomplish their personally activated goals. In fact, recent research has found that people can go beyond nonconsciously regulating their responses to consciously perceived stimuli, to preconsciously controlling the impact of nonconsciously perceived stimuli on their responses (i.e., being differently influenced by subliminal primes depending on current nonconscious motivations; Randolph-Seng Reference Randolph-Seng2009). In this way, an adaptive misbelief, such as a belief in free will, may actually become true as human cognition evolves.
