Throughout the 1980s, the European Community (EC) was marked by the simultaneous pursuit of ideologically divergent projects. Efforts to liberalise markets coexisted with plans to protect citizens from market forces through social policies and neo-mercantilist strategies fostering new economic sectors and shielding older ones from competition.Footnote 1 Historians have primarily discussed the implementation of neoliberal policiesFootnote 2 – and the relative stagnation of alternative agendas – as an internal process. Their research explored interactions among member state governments, EC institutions, economic and social actors such as corporations, business associations and trade unions as well as intellectuals.Footnote 3 This article contributes to this literature by widening the analytical lens. Considering European integration within a broader Atlantic framework, it examines US influence in the diffusion of neoliberalism in Western Europe in the 1980s. Numerous historical studies have examined the role of US actors such as economists, think tanks and corporations in the transatlantic circulation of neoliberal ideas and policies,Footnote 4 but none has directly addressed a central question: What role did the Reagan administration play in this process?
This question reveals a broader historiographical contrast. While scholarship on European integration in the 1940s to 1960s has long treated the US government as a key actor in the process,Footnote 5 studies on later periods have relegated Washington to a distant background.Footnote 6 There are certainly good reasons for this shift. Overall, Western Europe became less directly dependent on Washington and, as the EC expanded, it developed institutions that generated their own decision-making logics.Footnote 7 At the same time, US support for European integration faded in the early 1970s as the United States increasingly perceived the EC as a potential rival.Footnote 8 Yet these evolutions did not render Washington irrelevant. Rather, as this article explains, US influence took new forms, operating less through direct political support than it did in the early phase of European integration and more through indirect means.
Drawing on newly available material from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, from British, French and German official and private archives and from the archives of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), this article makes three major contributions to the history of US–European relations and neoliberalism's diffusion. First, it demonstrates that the Reagan administration developed sophisticated strategies to promote market-oriented reforms in Europe and to combat alternative interventionist policies throughout the decade. Public relations campaigns were organised to portray Reaganomics as a success and to encourage US allies to follow suit. Support was provided to like-minded politicians in Western Europe. The two main transatlantic economic forums – the Group of Seven (G7) and the OECDFootnote 9 – as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), were used to build a neoliberal framework around the EC.Footnote 10 Washington also resorted to threats and, occasionally, trade wars to push the Europeans to liberalise their markets. As a second contribution, this article shows that US strategies impacted economic debates within and among the EC countries. By empowering and emboldening conservative forces that were pushing for neoliberal reforms from within, Washington altered the balance of power in EC member states. Furthermore, it provided like-minded governments with external leverage that they could deploy in their own domestic and intra-EC battles. This was particularly true of the British government, which realised that it could use US pressures to promote its own neoliberal vision for the EC. Third, the article introduces the concept of the Williamsburg Consensus – named after the G7 summit held in Williamsburg, Virginia, in May 1983 – to describe the transformation of neoliberalism from contested national experiments to institutionalised transatlantic orthodoxy. While the Washington Consensus was imposed on financially vulnerable Latin American countries through the conditional lending of organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank,Footnote 11 the Williamsburg Consensus illustrated US hegemony in its neo-Gramscian definition – the ability of the ruling class of a country to project its ideological preferences by forming domestic, international and transnational coalitions.Footnote 12
This article nuances prevailing interpretations of US–European economic diplomacy in the 1980s. Focusing on transatlantic tensions over macroeconomic, monetary and trade issues, existing archive-based scholarship has paid limited attention to simultaneous ideological convergence.Footnote 13 This article shows that these two dynamics should not be treated separately. Tensions were not merely signs of transatlantic discord but also instruments through which the US government sought to influence European integration. Similarly, this article challenges the interpretation according to which European policymakers, especially the French, championed an orderly neoliberal globalisation, negotiated within international organisations, while the United States favoured an ad hoc, unruly version of neoliberalism, using its power to unilaterally promote its views.Footnote 14 As this article demonstrates, Washington often used unilateral leverage and bilateral pressures to secure multilateral agreements.
The Quagmire of 1981–1982
Rather than signalling the triumph of neoliberalism, the early 1980s were marked by profound political and economic indeterminacy. Across the Western world, competing socio-economic projects coexisted and clashed, both within and beyond the national arena. The initial strategy of the Reagan administration was simple: bold domestic reforms to revitalise the US economy and a massive military build-up were expected to revive US leadership within the Western alliance and to facilitate the international diffusion of the free-market policies favoured by Reagan. In the short term, however, the opposite happened. Reaganomics derailed and triggered a global recession in 1981–2, which fuelled protectionist pressures and provoked sharp criticism in Western Europe. Yet, while Western European governments anticipated the flaws of US policy and refused to emulate it, they neither coordinated a common response nor agreed on a coherent alternative direction for the EC political economy.
Presented in February 1981, Reagan's strategy centred on large tax cuts and domestic deregulation to stimulate economic growth, encourage investment and restore profitability. Reagan assumed that this would reduce both unemployment and inflation.Footnote 15 According to supply-side economists, higher productivity would reduce inflation without provoking a recession: if output grew faster than the money supply, prices would decline. Better still, the tax cuts would allegedly pay for themselves by generating revenues through faster growth, while cuts in non-military spending were supposed to offset the increase in the defence expenditure. According to the administration, the federal deficit of $55 billion in 1981 would be transformed into a surplus by 1984.Footnote 16 While domestic reforms remained the overriding priority, the Reagan administration also sought to liberalise the global economy, notably by expanding the scope of GATT to areas such as services, agriculture, investment and high technology.Footnote 17 This agenda reflected ideological preferences and geoeconomic interests. As the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade noted, the United States remained the world's most advanced economy, but its global domination could be challenged. The Japanese and, to a lesser extent, Western European governments were using industrial and research policies to develop their own technologies and companies. Opening foreign markets was therefore critical to prevent the emergence of powerful competitors abroad.Footnote 18
The announcement of ‘Reaganomics’ was met with widespread scepticism. Concerned that tax cuts would fuel inflation, the Federal Reserve maintained exceptionally high interest rates.Footnote 19 The consequences were severe: from mid-1981 to late 1982, the United States endured its deepest recession since the Second World War. The downturn quickly spilled across its borders. The contraction of US demand was compounded by a global rise in interest rates as central banks tightened monetary policy to limit capital outflows towards the United States. Reaganomics exacerbated the longstanding problem of US ‘twin deficits’ – the combination of public and external deficits. While tax cuts, recession and disinflation reduced federal revenues, defence spending increased and Congress refused to pass substantial spending cuts.Footnote 20 By 1983, the federal budget deficit reached $207 billion.Footnote 21 Meanwhile, the sharp appreciation of the dollar stimulated imports and constrained exports, thereby widening the already substantial trade imbalance.
European capitals quickly realised that Reaganomics would not work as announced. Yet their responses reflected divergent national strategies. In Bonn, the Social-Liberal coalition remained committed to the Modell Deutschland, a coordinated market economy relying on neo-corporatist arrangements and monetary discipline to keep inflation low and sustain export competitiveness. Throughout the 1970s, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt had sought to Europeanise this framework and played a central role in creating the European Monetary System, which he regarded as a stepping stone towards a European Economic and Monetary Union.Footnote 22 Fearing that Reaganomics would destabilise the European economies, the German government used multilateral forums to urge Washington to reconsider its strategy as early as February 1981.Footnote 23 Schmidt also attempted to enlist Margaret Thatcher, the first European leader to visit Reagan, in questioning the US approach.Footnote 24
Thatcher adopted a different stance. Having provoked a deep recession in the United Kingdom through her own monetarist reforms the previous year, she offered to brief the Reagan administration on her ‘mistakes’ – an offer that US officials dismissed – but refused to criticise US policy.Footnote 25 Unlike Schmidt, Thatcher was uninterested in strengthening the EC beyond its function as a large market for British firms and attempted to limit the costs of existing EC institutions. Her confrontational demands for a reduction in the British budget contribution and for reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) paralysed EC institutions and her abrasive personality antagonised most of her EC colleagues.Footnote 26 While some British ministers argued that supporting pressures on Washington would get her some goodwill within the EC,Footnote 27 Thatcher favoured another position. Deeply pro-American, she wanted to revive the ‘special relationship’ with Washington and position herself as a bridge between Europe and the United States.Footnote 28
The election of François Mitterrand in May 1981 further complicated the European landscape. The new Socialist government launched a Keynesian stimulus programme (relance), nationalised banks and major industrial groups, increased the minimum wage and expanded social benefits.Footnote 29 On the European level, Mitterrand announced that he would ‘stand firm against UK efforts (backed by the US) to transform the EC into a free trade area’.Footnote 30 Paris intended to ‘revitalise’ integration along more interventionist lines, promoting a ‘European social area’, stronger corporatist consultations as well as common industrial, energy and research policies to compete with the United States and Japan.Footnote 31 Finally, Paris championed ‘a common firm attitude’ towards US macroeconomic policies.Footnote 32
Throughout 1981, US–European economic diplomacy resembled a dialogue of the deaf. The G7 summit held in Ottawa in summer 1981 illustrated this dynamic. The US priority was to ‘stop the tide of public criticism of US policy’.Footnote 33 While Reagan wanted the G7 to issue a message of ‘optimism’ to the world and to initiate a new round of trade liberalisation, Schmidt, Mitterrand and Italian Prime Minister Spadolini pointed out that US interest rates were about to trigger a global recession.Footnote 34 Meetings in other forums – Group of Five (G5), Group of Ten (G10), OECD and IMFFootnote 35 – similarly revealed deep disagreements over the causes of the crisis and appropriate policy responses. Continental European delegations urged Washington to reduce its fiscal deficit in order to lower interest rates and to halt the drain of international capital. US officials showed contempt for intergovernmental macroeconomic and monetary cooperation and replied to European concerns with wishful thinking, ideological statements and outright dismissal. British representatives occupied an intermediary position, seeking to prevent the United States from being completely isolated by expressing support for the ideological project without backing its actual implementation.Footnote 36
Atlantic tensions intensified as the recession worsened in winter 1981–2. The German and French governments explored schemes to decouple the European capital markets and monetary system from the United States, but Thatcher rejected this approach.Footnote 37 Under mounting pressure on the macroeconomic front at home and abroad, the Reagan administration shifted its focus to trade. It firmly criticised EC support to agriculture and steel and pressed for a new round of multilateral liberalisation within GATT, including agriculture, services and high technology as well as a revision of the regime of GATT ‘safeguard’ measures. It also demanded European compliance with US sanctions against Eastern Europe during the Polish crisis, which generated considerable bitterness.Footnote 38 Confronted with rising unemployment, most European governments were unwilling to expose their economies to additional competition. Although West Germany had traditionally supported liberalisation in industrial goods, it was less enthusiastic about extending negotiations to trade in services. France and Italy, whose economies were less competitive, were even colder. Even the UK was cautious. While it welcomed US pressure for liberalisation in agriculture and services, it considered taking measures to protect its industry.Footnote 39 Overall, London preferred the United States to remain the principal advocate of trade liberalisation, believing that this would force Washington to make more concessions.Footnote 40 US unilateralism on macroeconomic issues in 1981–2 gave European governments little incentive to engage in trade negotiations. French officials argued most forcefully that the real threat to the liberal trading order stemmed from US macroeconomic policies rather than European safeguards. If Washington genuinely wished to stem protectionism, it should first reconsider its fiscal and monetary stance.Footnote 41
At the same time, many EC governments were uneasy with Mitterrand's policies helping French companies ‘reconquer the domestic market’.Footnote 42 West Germany favoured reaffirming GATT principles to discipline national interventions. The British position was particularly ambivalent. On the one hand, British officials considered US pressures for a new round of negotiations ‘ill-judged’; it was better, they argued, to discuss sensitive trade issues within the OECD – the organisation of capitalist countries – rather than at GATT.Footnote 43 On the other hand, London recognised that US pressures could serve its own liberalising agenda within the EC. It urged the EC to react positively on the question of trade in services. On agriculture, it kept a low profile but secretly welcomed US demands as they served Thatcher's efforts to reform the CAP.Footnote 44 The Commission, it argued, needed to find ‘ways of reconciling the United States and EC interests’ to prevent ‘an extremely damaging confrontation’ with Washington.Footnote 45
The GATT ministerial meeting in November 1982 fell short of US expectations. The proposal for a new round of trade negotiations was only supported by the Swiss and Australian delegations while the EC adopted a wait-and-see attitude.Footnote 46 As a concession, it accepted ‘to bring agriculture more fully into the multilateral trading system by improving the effectiveness of GATT rules’ and to ‘exchange information’ on trade in services in ‘relevant international organizations’.Footnote 47 As a senior US official reported to Washington, there would be no further liberalisation without strong economic recovery.Footnote 48 This outcome encapsulated the broader pattern of 1981–2. Inconsistent US efforts failed to impose a coherent neoliberal agenda; European resistance did not crystallise into a unified alternative. Instead, the Western alliance drifted through a period of economic crisis, diplomatic friction and ideological contestation.
The Emergence of the Transatlantic Neoliberal Consensus, 1983
1983 marked a remarkable convergence towards neoliberal positions across the Atlantic world. Two developments facilitated this shift. First, the EC moved rightward after a series of electoral victories for conservative parties in the second half of 1982. Second, the rapid recovery of the US economy in 1983 cooled down transatlantic tensions as the spectre of a global depression receded. It also boosted the self-confidence and bargaining power of the Reagan administration. While its macroeconomic policies remained controversial, Washington launched a proactive effort to place structural reform at the core of Atlantic economic diplomacy.
Social-democratic and socialist parties suffered setbacks in the second half of 1982.Footnote 49 Conservative parties took power in Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany in autumn 1982, leaving France and Greece as the main left-wing governments in the EC. The US administration openly supported like-minded leaders. Reagan's speech in Westminster in summer 1982 marked the beginning of a sustained effort to cultivate ties with Western European conservative forces, culminating in the creation of the International Democratic Union (IDU) in 1983. As the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted, the IDU's political role was limited, but its meetings provided media visibility and prestige to conservative party leaders, especially those in the opposition.Footnote 50 Symbolic diplomacy reinforced this effort. For instance, Washington refused to host Danish socialist Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen while he was presiding over the EC because of his ‘continual anti-U.S., anti-Reagan statements’ but quickly welcomed his conservative successor Poul Schlüter to give ‘a clear signal that the U.S. does not cater to those who treat us badly, but does right by those who treat us well’.Footnote 51 The Reagan administration also tried to weaken the French socialist party. As Mitterrand's economic programme faltered under mounting financial pressure – with three devaluations between October 1981 and March 1983 combined with a progressive implementation of austerity policies – Reagan received opposition leader Jacques Chirac in January 1983. To capitalise on Mitterrand's difficulties, Chirac's Rally for the Republic (Rassemblement pour la République, RPR) soon abandoned its Gaullist stance and adopted an assertive neoliberal rhetoric: denouncing statism and socialism as relics of the past, Chirac called for fiscal austerity and socio-economic reforms inspired by Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl.Footnote 52
At the same time, the US economy entered a phase of solid recovery. As inflation fell during the recession, the Federal Reserve eased its monetary policy in the second half of 1982. US real GDP grew an impressive 9.4 per cent in the second quarter of 1983. The US administration framed the rebound as vindication of Reaganomics and launched a vast political, diplomatic and ideological offensive. The upcoming G7 summit in Williamsburg would serve as the culmination of this effort. While the priority was to impress US public opinion, the administration simultaneously worked on ‘special public affairs efforts’ to ‘persuade foreign public opinion that US economic policies are working’.Footnote 53 US embassies, Voice of America, the newly created International Information Committee, the US Information Agency as well as ‘trusted actors’ in the private sector – businessmen, media magnates, journalists, scholars, etc. – were mobilised to relay the administration's messages abroad. Information was selectively leaked to journalists and special press briefings with foreign correspondents were organised to improve their perception of the Reagan administration. French journalists were the main target since the French government had been ‘the most contentious at the major international conferences of the past year’.Footnote 54
The Reagan administration simultaneously enlisted international organisations to propagate its ideological preferences. While the role of the IMF and the World Bank in the emergence of the ‘Washington Consensus’ has been widely analysed, their contribution to the Williamsburg Consensus was more limited. The most important element was the inclusion of the IMF Managing Director Jacques de Larosière in the G5 meetings to provide expertise to facilitate macroeconomic ‘convergence’ between the main capitalist economies.Footnote 55 Initially, the idea of ‘convergence’ through the G5 was a European attempt to discipline US macroeconomic and monetary policies. In 1983, however, Washington realised that it could now present the United States as the model for ‘convergence’ and use G5 multilateral surveillance to put the French socialist government under pressure.Footnote 56
The contribution of the OECD in embedding neoliberal principles within Western Europe was more important. The organisation had played a key role in macroeconomic and monetary cooperation between North America, Western Europe and Japan in the 1960s and 1970s. In the late 1970s, it developed the ‘Locomotive Theory’ – coordinated Keynesian stimulus programmes in the main Western countries – alongside ‘positive adjustment policies’, a set of measures to make their economies more flexible in order to combat inflation.Footnote 57 Embraced by the Carter administration, this approach was rejected by conservative US economists. As early as 1981, the Reagan administration sought to reassert its influence over the OECD – pushing for the nomination of sympathetic figures to key positions, taking the lead in strategic committees and applying direct pressure on its secretariat – in order to silence criticism of Reaganomics and reorient it ideologically.Footnote 58 Senior OECD officials adapted to the new political climate. As one of them noted, the OECD should act as a ‘pilot fish’ to survive: swim slightly ahead of the sharks without being swallowed.Footnote 59 In late March 1983, OECD Secretary General Emile van Lennep travelled to Washington to receive ‘guidance’ to help prepare the upcoming G7 summit. Seeking to prove his credentials, van Lennep distanced himself from the Locomotive Theory, still supported by France and many small OECD countries. Instead, he insisted on the importance of ‘restoring the profitability of investment’ by ‘reducing real wages and non-wage labor costs especially in Europe’, ‘increasing the mobility of labor and capital’ and ‘reducing the burden of government regulations’.Footnote 60 Washington realised that supporting the OECD's work on structural issues would divert attention from US macroeconomic problems and put European governments under pressure.
The OECD ministerial meeting on 9–10 May 1983 marked a US success. The communiqué stressed that the economic recovery should be used to ‘reverse protectionist trends’ and ‘dismantle progressively trade restrictions and trade distorting domestic measures’, especially with reforms designed to ‘overcome structural impediments’ and to ‘increase the profitability of job-creating productive investment’. The OECD was tasked by the council to intensify its work on positive adjustment policies, described as essential to ‘enhance competition and the flexibility of markets and to improve the allocation of resources’.Footnote 61 The economic opening of the Western countries, it was argued, would boost exports from third-party countries and help overcome the debt crisis that was raging in a growing number of developing countries.
A few weeks later, the G7 summit of Williamsburg endorsed this programme. To be sure, US macroeconomic policies remained a major source of tension as European leaders – Thatcher excepted – complained about the US budget deficit and the debilitating impact of US interest rates on the world economy.Footnote 62 However, these divisive issues received little attention in the final declaration. In a long annex, leaders emphasised the need for economic ‘convergence’. They pledged to maintain tight monetary policies to reduce inflation and ‘discipline over government expenditures’. At the same time, they promised ‘to halt protectionism and […] to reverse it by dismantling trade barriers’ by supporting work on the liberalisation of services and high-technology goods within the GATT and OECD. Finally, leaders pledged to ‘promote continued structural adjustment, especially by enhancing flexibility and openness of economies and financial markets’ and ‘encouraging […] profitability and productive investment’.Footnote 63 Instead of using the communiqué to boost Reagan's domestic prestige, the US administration preferred ‘to stress the collegial nature of the outcome’.Footnote 64 Portraying the summit as a US victory was likely to exacerbate foreign frustration with US macroeconomic policies and Reagan's vague and unrealistic promises. Presenting the communiqué as a consensus would both facilitate its implementation in Western Europe and encourage international organisations to follow its guidance.
Thatcher's re-election in June 1983 confirmed the neoliberal political momentum. Worried by the adoption of the ‘solemn declaration on the European Union’ at the European Council in Stuttgart,Footnote 65 the British government began to develop a comprehensive neoliberal vision for the EC. While reform of the EC budget and CAP remained priorities, the British government also considered longer-term measures to ‘ensure that the Community's collective weight is firmly behind the execution of the programme agreed at Williamsburg’.Footnote 66 London planned to push for ‘an effective policy to control state aids and unfair competition’ and the elimination of ‘various technical barriers to trade’ in order to create a ‘Community-wide home market not only for industrial goods but also for services’.Footnote 67 To counter French interventionist proposals and to improve relations with the United States, London also wanted the EC to selectively support the GATT work programme – prioritising agriculture and services while remaining cautious on high-tech issues.Footnote 68 Where French initiatives could not be blocked, such as cooperation in science and technology, the UK wanted corporations rather than states to play the leading role. At the same time, the British government sought to prevent the strengthening of EC institutions, insisting that they be made more efficient, not more powerful.Footnote 69
Cementing the Neoliberal Framework, 1984
Cooperation between Washington and London intensified in the second half of 1983 to consolidate the Williamsburg Consensus.Footnote 70 For the British government, this was an opportunity to simultaneously reinforce the ‘special relationship’ and position itself as a bridge between both sides of the Atlantic.Footnote 71 At the same time, the US administration took a more assertive position, countering European claims that US macroeconomic policies were to blame for rising unemployment by arguing that Europe's difficulties stemmed from its own lack of economic flexibility.
This interpretation was increasingly accepted by European governments themselves. The CIA reported in December 1983 that ‘all of the West European governments are trimming benefits in order at least to slow the rise of social spending’ and ‘systematically attempting to reduce real transfers and services available to individuals’.Footnote 72 Even Paris and Rome, which had been the main challengers of the neoliberal approach in G7 discussions, were reconsidering their priorities. By autumn 1983, the French government had concluded that the subsidies for heavy industry were draining the state budget and failing to deliver the intended results: instead of financing new investments, a significant part of the capital provided by the state was used to cover structural deficits. To favour the emergence of new sectors, Paris admitted that some old ones should be abandoned. ‘Restructuring’ plans, involving mass layoffs, were announced in sectors such as mining, steel, automobile and shipbuilding in winter 1983–4. Facing accusations of betrayal from workers and unions, the Socialist government was now seeking international support and embraced a new credo: technological change could be a source of job creation and the state should adopt a policy boosting corporations’ profitability to encourage productive investment.Footnote 73 Meanwhile, in Italy, socialist leader Bettino Craxi took the lead of a five-party coalition in August 1983 with the promise of taking difficult decisions. His government refused to raise salaries in 1983 and announced in February 1984 that it would dismantle the scala mobile, the indexation mechanism for wages.Footnote 74 Faced with a referendum called by the Communist Party and the unions, Rome sought international support to convince domestic opinion that, in Thatcher's words, ‘there is no alternative’. The Reagan administration obliged: it invited Craxi to Washington and offered him the platform of an address to Congress to bolster his prestige ahead of the vote.Footnote 75
The consequences of this realignment should not be exaggerated. Political impetus for the liberalisation of capital markets within international organisations came from Washington, not Paris. In September 1983, the Reagan administration launched a major initiative to liberalise international capital flows and investment, seeking to update and extend the OECD's regulations. This framework rested on the 1961 Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the Code of Current Invisible Operations, which had provided a basis for the gradual removal of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions, subsequently strengthened by the 1976 Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, which protected the activities of the latter from host-government interference.Footnote 76 Yet these instruments focused chiefly on long-term investment. Washington now wanted to extend their reach to short-term capital movements, thereby removing a key obstacle to the development of a multinational service industry across the capitalist world.Footnote 77 At the same time, Washington continued to press its partners on trade. In November 1983, the US and Japanese governments jointly stated that the next G7 summit should not only resist protectionism but also initiate a round of negotiations.Footnote 78 Sceptical, the French government repeated the position that it had adopted since the United States had unilaterally abandoned the system of Bretton Woods in the early 1970s: trade negotiations should be paralleled by the rebuilding of a stable monetary system.Footnote 79
The Reagan administration intensified its efforts to shift attention from its macroeconomic policies to European structural problems in 1984. As a strategic goal, the US Treasury wanted ‘to get industrialized (particularly European) countries to recognize publicly that their interventionist approach’ had been ‘a threat to employment growth over the medium term’.Footnote 80 This would lastingly undermine the credibility of social-democratic policies and reinforce the position of the proponents of a neoliberal approach. A large consensus was evident at the extraordinary OECD ministerial conference ‘The Longer-Term Performance of OECD Economies: Challenges Facing Governments’ held on 13–4 February 1984. Proposed in spring 1983 by French Finance Minister Jacques Delors, the meeting was initially supposed to define a ‘new consensus on economic policy’ – then imagined as a middle ground between Reagan's neoliberalism and Mitterrand's socialism.Footnote 81 By the time it took place, the meeting turned into a major US victory. According to the US delegation's report, ‘all participants acknowledged the desirability of structural change’ and ‘agreed that structural change required more supply side flexibility, especially in the labor market’.Footnote 82 The debate was not about the merits of neoliberal reforms but about the pace of their implementation. The ‘fast adjusters’, led by the United States, United Kingdom, West German, Dutch and Swiss delegations, argued that reforms were a condition for faster economic growth while others stated that faster economic growth was needed to make the implementation of neoliberal measures socially and politically acceptable.Footnote 83
Like Washington, London saw the G7-OECD nexus as an instrument to promote neoliberal policies in Western Europe. Thatcher encouraged van Lennep to give broad media coverage to the outcomes of the OECD meeting.Footnote 84 At the same time, the British government wanted to put issues such as the liberalisation of capital markets, the liberalisation of services, the cost of the welfare state, the harmonisation of international standards and the phasing out of export subsidies at the core of the agenda of Western economic cooperation. Technical work would be conducted within the OECD while the G7 would provide political backing. This would put reluctant countries such as France, Italy and, on some of these issues such as trade in services, West Germany under steady pressure.Footnote 85
In spring 1984, the Reagan administration launched another ‘public affairs program’ to ‘generate a positive climate of optimism’ and to ‘highlight the role of dynamic, market-oriented economies in the US and other countries in overcoming recession’.Footnote 86 This campaign was aimed at both European and US publics as Reagan was beginning his re-election campaign. In turn, Thatcher's press secretary was ready to ‘help the Americans as much as possible without causing trouble with other countries’.Footnote 87 Thatcher privately informed Reagan that she was ‘determined not to countenance an attack on American economic policy’ during the G7 summit.Footnote 88 Challenged by the strike of the powerful National Union of Mineworkers, she also wanted to convey the message that neoliberal reforms were starting to pay off and would ensure a new era of economic growth, not only to reassure public opinion but also to facilitate the diffusion of neoliberalism in Western Europe.
A comprehensive neoliberal agenda was adopted by the OECD ministerial council on 17–8 May 1984. Macroeconomic and monetary issues received limited attention as Washington remained hostile to cooperation in these areas. ‘Low inflation’ was praised as ‘an essential component of a stable economic environment leading to higher growth and employment’. Following a monetarist line, the OECD recommended ‘stable and moderate growth in monetary aggregates’. The few governments with fiscal surpluses were encouraged to ‘lower the general level of taxation’. The OECD Council backed a reinforcement of the OECD codes to liberalise capital movements and to protect foreign investments.Footnote 89 On trade, the OECD Secretariat was instructed to draft preparatory studies for future negotiations within the GATT, including trade in services. The French government, however, managed to stall the discussion on high-technology trade.Footnote 90 By contrast, many social recommendations were dropped, including notions that social policies contributed to stabilising aggregate demand and that a ‘stronger social consensus’ would facilitate the implementation of economic reforms.Footnote 91 Income policies, presented as a useful tool to combat inflation in the 1970s, were now seen as one of the many distortions that negatively impacted the labour markets. The G7 summit in London largely supported this agenda a few weeks later. Thatcher's efforts did not prevent Reagan from being isolated during discussions of macroeconomic issues,Footnote 92 but the communiqué mainly focused on structural reforms. It stated that leaders had achieved ‘a large measure of agreement on the basic objectives of our respective policies’. To facilitate economic adjustment, they would combat the ‘rigidities in the labor market’, ‘liberalize capital markets’, ‘accelerate the completion of current trade liberalization programs’ and refrain from protecting ‘obsolescent production and technology’.Footnote 93
The OECD and G7 meetings paved the way for the launching of the British initiative towards the EC. As the lengthy dispute on the British contribution to the EC budget was about to be solved, Thatcher circulated her programmatic paper ‘Europe – The Future’ at the European Council at Fontainebleau in late June 1984. To revive economic growth, the EC should remove internal barriers to business, including services, to form a large and unified market. Such a market, however, should not be protectionist; the EC should instead endorse the opening of GATT negotiations.Footnote 94 To be sure, the completion of the internal market had already been repeatedly discussed within the EC and actively promoted by other actors tooFootnote 95 – but the British shift towards a more constructive European policy was pivotal for its implementation.
Keeping the Momentum for Reagan's Second Term
By 1985, a broad consensus had emerged among EC governments and the Commission that national economies should be deregulated and liberalised to create a larger market. The key question was whether this market should be protected by external barriers and embedded in a broader political and economic structure. Thatcher regarded the single market as a goal in itself: the removal of internal barriers would, by itself, stimulate investment, encourage technological innovation and reduce unemployment. Political cooperation could be organised on an intergovernmental basis and in a way that would support NATO objectives. The new president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, promoted a more ambitious vision. For him, the creation of a European single market needed to be accompanied by the creation of a common currency, the development of a ‘European social area’ to prevent social dumping and the gradual construction of a political structure that would eventually become the European Union.Footnote 96 Seeking to make the future EC as liberal as possible, the Reagan administration combined the continued use of the G7-OECD nexus to project its economic preferences with more aggressive bilateral pressure on its allies, using the threat of a trade war to weaken EC protectionist policies and advance a new round of trade liberalisation within GATT.
Opening EC markets was part of a broader strategy to shift the burden of economic adjustment onto US partners. During the first half of the decade, the sharp appreciation of the dollar had severely weakened the competitiveness of US manufacturers.Footnote 97 As the US trade deficit grew from $67 billion in 1983 to $123 billion in 1985, Congress was flooded with protectionist bills.Footnote 98 The Reagan administration resisted most of them but weaponised the threat to extract concessions from European partners and to advance the neoliberal agenda during its second term: if the Europeans wished to retain their access to US markets, they had to reorient their macroeconomic policies and further liberalise their economies to boost US exports. Such threats had a profound impact on German officials, including Chancellor Kohl, who hoped that concessions would assuage US protectionism and protect German exports.
Attending the GATT ministerial meeting in late 1984 in a ‘belligerent mood’, the US delegation threatened to initiate bilateral negotiations outside GATT if negotiations did not open soon.Footnote 99 Rumours spread that the United States might implement an import ‘surcharge’ to reduce its trade deficits and to force allies to make trade concessions as Nixon had done in 1971. Travelling to Washington in early 1985, Thatcher urged the Reagan administration to avoid initiating a trade war. She conveyed the message that her government understood ‘US impatience on new GATT round’ but that the US ‘striking aggressive attitudes’ towards Europe would be counterproductive and undermine her efforts to reform the CAP from within.Footnote 100 To placate US policymakers and to counter their protectionist mindset, she stated before Congress that her government supported Reagan's call to start GATT negotiations.Footnote 101 Irritated, Paris reaffirmed that there should be no trade liberalisation without a reform of the monetary system. As a compromise, the EC announced that it was willing to participate in a new round of trade liberalisation but refused to commit to a specific date to open these negotiations.Footnote 102
In the following months, the US, British and West German governments used the OECD and G7 to force the hand of reluctant EC governments.Footnote 103 In April 1985, US officials publicly admitted that their macroeconomic policy was unsustainable and requested that allies help reduce the US twin deficits. In a striking reversal, the Reagan administration endorsed greater monetary cooperation to reduce the value of the dollar and pressed both Japan and West Germany to stimulate domestic demand. This led to the Plaza Accord of 22 September 1985 in which the G5 governments and central banks agreed to cooperate to devalue the dollar. At the same time, Washington renewed its calls for European governments to join GATT negotiations without delay and to address their ‘structural rigidities’ as this would allegedly stimulate economic growth and foster US exports.Footnote 104 Under US pressure, the OECD ministerial meeting announced shortly afterwards in its communiqué that GATT negotiations might begin in 1986 and include services and high technology. This scenario repeated itself a few weeks later at the G7 summit held in Bonn. Reagan demanded a clear commitment for trade liberalisation from his partners to counter protectionist forces in the United States. Angry, Mitterrand replied that the G7 was not ‘the Directorate of the world's affairs’ and that it should not define the agenda of other organisations, especially the EC. While Craxi supported Mitterrand, Thatcher and Kohl sided with Reagan, arguing that European concessions were needed to prevent a ‘trade war’.Footnote 105 Eventually, the communiqué announced that ‘most’ G7 leaders wanted the new round of GATT negotiations to start in 1986.Footnote 106
Although Thatcher and Kohl never enjoyed a close personal relationship, they developed an ideological affinity during this period. Thatcher praised the dynamism of the US economy, attributing it to deregulation, lower taxes and a smaller welfare state. Kohl similarly nurtured the illusion that reducing ‘bureaucracy’, eliminating ‘the myriad restrictions imposed on industry’ and rolling back ‘the more irrational of social legislation’ could by itself revive economic growth and reduce unemployment in Europe.Footnote 107 Such interpretations rested on a highly selective reading of the US experience. They ignored the decisive role played by tax cuts and the expansion of military spending in sustaining the US recovery. Despite its ‘supply-side’ rhetoric, the Reagan administration effectively relied on large budget deficits and state consumption to stimulate demand. In fact, even US neoconservative thinkers, such as Irving Kristol, ridiculed the European conservatives’ belief that austerity combined with liberalisation could revive economic growth in Europe.Footnote 108 Yet, whether conservative leaders genuinely believed in it or not, their interpretation of the US policies provided a convenient narrative for resisting calls to adopt more active macroeconomic and social policies to combat unemployment in Western Europe.Footnote 109
Overconfident, the British government assumed that it could count on German support for a European single market without significant macroeconomic, social and political integration. Hostile to the concept of ‘European Union’, Thatcher presented Kohl with a paper that envisaged the Community as a large integrated market, combined with strictly intergovernmental cooperation in foreign and security policy. According to Thatcher, the Commission's White Paper, with about 300 proposals to liberalise the movement of people, goods, services and capital, could be implemented without amending the treaties. Facing domestic pressure to demonstrate commitment to European integration and unwilling to allow Franco-German relations to deteriorate further after the Bonn summit, Kohl opted for a Franco-German proposal which recycled some of Thatcher's suggestions but added the objective of creating a ‘European Union’ at the European Council in Milan in June 1985.Footnote 110 This option eventually prevailed, opening the way to the Single European Act of 1986, the first major reform of the founding treaties of the EC.Footnote 111
While the EC governments debated the future of their Community, the Reagan administration further reinforced the Atlantic liberal framework. Negotiations for the revision of the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements of the OECD started in summer 1985. They lasted until 1989, when the decision was finally taken to include short-term capital movement into the code despite the resistance of Japan and several European governments.Footnote 112 In parallel, Washington pushed to expand the scope of OECD discussions on ‘positive adjustments’. Backed by the OECD ministerial council of 1985, the Secretariat had started to work on studies of members’ experiences with implementing structural reforms.Footnote 113 While its approach focused on industry, Reagan's chief economic adviser Beryl Sprinkel urged the OECD to expand its work to four other areas: the labour market, capital markets, regulatory and industrial organisation issues and taxation and expenditure policies.Footnote 114 At the same time, the OECD peer-review process was also reformed to encourage ‘structural adjustment’ among member states. Established in the 1950s, this procedure required governments to submit regular reports on their economic policies, which were then assessed by the OECD Secretariat and discussed by the Economic and Development Review Committee (EDRC), where member states collectively evaluated national performances. Following this discussion, the Secretariat published a report – negotiated with the government concerned – including recommendations.Footnote 115 While the EDRC had primarily focused on macroeconomic policies, member states were also asked to report on issues such as the ‘size of the public sector and fiscal imbalances’, ‘labour market rigidities’, ‘restructuring of the industrial sector’ and ‘functioning of financial markets’ from the mid-1980s onwards.Footnote 116 This process had two important effects. First, it helped diffuse OECD neoliberal norms within national bureaucracies. Second, it provided governments with international support to overcome domestic resistance to unpopular reforms. In what political scientists have described as a ‘two-level game’, governments could attribute controversial measures to OECD recommendations even when they had already intended to implement them.Footnote 117
US Campaigns and Lobbying to Disarm the EC
Just one day after the Plaza Accord, Reagan unveiled a new approach: ‘free and fair trade’.Footnote 118 The US administration would resort to ‘tactical measures aimed at eliminating unfair foreign trade practices and opening foreign markets’.Footnote 119 Although this primarily targeted East Asian countries, Western Europe was also under scrutiny. The opening of the GATT negotiations – the ‘Uruguay Round’ – in September 1986 did not cool down tensions. On the contrary, Washington increasingly resorted to bilateral pressure, threats of trade sanctions and direct lobbying of EC institutions besides its efforts within the G7, OECD and GATT. While Congress reinforced the legislative arsenal to conduct trade wars, the Reagan administration sought to prevent the EC from acquiring comparable capabilities.
Since the beginning of the decade, an Atlantic trade war had been looming as Washington intended to attack EC subsidies to agriculture and the steel industry.Footnote 120 Tensions escalated in summer 1985 when Washington increased tariffs on EC pasta to punish the EC's agreement with Mediterranean countries on citrus products, a contentious issue since the early 1970s. The 1986 enlargement of the EC to Spain and Portugal gave a pretext to Washington to test EC solidarity on the CAP. It demanded ‘compensation’ for the loss of markets for US agricultural exports to these countries. The EC retorted that the US economy would benefit from lower industrial tariffs that would more than compensate for these losses.Footnote 121 The Reagan administration announced in late March 1986 that trade sanctions on EC food exports would be implemented shortly; the EC Commission threatened to retaliate in April. Behind the scenes, the British and German governments played a pivotal role in solving the crisis. While supporting EC retaliation if Washington carried out its threats, London pressed for a compromise in order ‘to help the US not to take action’.Footnote 122 In parallel, it encouraged Washington to refrain from implementing its sanctions as a trade war would derail the liberal agenda discussed at the G7, OECD and GATT.Footnote 123 Bonn also favoured a compromise. On the one hand, German officials resented the ‘free and fair trade’ doctrine as it massively increased the risk of a clash between the United States and the EC. Enlargement negotiations, a German official noted, were already complex enough without having to accommodate US preferences. On the other hand, the EC should absolutely avoid a trade war with the United States as its economy – and, in particular, the German economy – depended more significantly on trade than the US economy did.Footnote 124 Eventually, the US-EC dispute on agricultural goods ended up with a partial US victory: in early 1987, the EC granted an exceptional regime for US agricultural exports to Spain and Portugal.Footnote 125
Washington did not wait for the agricultural dispute to subside before opening a new front. In late 1986, it attacked European subsidies to the Airbus consortium as a violation of GATT rules.Footnote 126 For the German government, which had hoped that the opening of the Uruguay Round would reduce tensions, this was a disappointment.Footnote 127 But more was to come. After the Democrats won the mid-term elections, Congress became even more protectionist. The Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act substantially expanded the legislative arsenal available for unilateral trade action. It provided that the United States should retaliate and protect its market if foreign countries refused to abandon their ‘unfair’ practices.Footnote 128
Anxious about foreign reactions, the Reagan administration pressed Congress to abandon or soften the most radical proposals. At the same time, it intensified its diplomatic efforts to make sure that the EC would not equip itself with similar trade-policy instruments while negotiating the rules of its single market. Overall, the Reagan administration welcomed the creation of a unified EC market but had three major concerns. First, while the EC Commission was pushing for the dismantling of national protectionist policies, such policies might reappear at the EC level. The second critical issue was reciprocity: the EC might only grant free access to its market to third parties offering similar conditions, thus forcing Washington to either dismantle its own protectionist machinery or to face limited access to the European market. Third, the EC might use the negotiation of its single market as an excuse to delay the negotiations of the Uruguay Round. Accordingly, the Reagan administration considered ways to build a powerful lobbying apparatus in Brussels to influence EC policy-making.Footnote 129
To be sure, the G7 and the OECD continued to play an important role in the projection of US preferences abroad. After the opening of the Uruguay Round, the Reagan administration sought a way of ‘preserving the momentum for continued OECD work on structural issues’.Footnote 130 A broad consensus was soon reached to make the ‘surveillance of structural policies’ the OECD's priority,Footnote 131 since many governments were keen to use the organisation's recommendations as an excuse to implement unpopular policies. The abrupt crash of the stock markets in October 1987 generated considerable anxiety in Western capitals. In the United States, conservative officials, intellectuals and businessmen feared that the shock could trigger a recession and open space for political forces capable of challenging their agenda.Footnote 132 The consequences were particularly serious in France, where the programme of privatisation of public corporations was suspended.Footnote 133 In response, the Western governments used international forums to coordinate their economic policies and reaffirm their liberal creed. At the OECD ministerial council, they adopted a communiqué outlining regional policy agendas and announced that ‘in Europe, structural reforms will be continued and intensified’ with the creation of the internal market.Footnote 134 A few weeks later, the G7 governments congratulated themselves for maintaining a ‘consensus on broad objectives’ including ‘a greater reliance on market forces’, the need for ‘structural reform’ and the strengthening of the multilateral trade system of the GATT.Footnote 135
While the G7-OECD nexus remained central in the ideological promotion of neoliberalism, the Reagan administration endeavoured to build a powerful lobbying apparatus to directly influence EC policies. As early attempts of the US embassy in Brussels to influence Lord Cockfield, the EC Commissioner for the Internal Market, had been ineffective,Footnote 136 the Reagan administration imagined a broader strategy in summer 1988. This involved intensifying bilateral pressure on EC member states in order to ‘amend existing legislation or change/block proposed directives’, while simultaneously expanding contacts not only with the EC Commission but also with the European Parliament and its specialised committees. Exchange of information with countries belonging to the European Free Trade Association, such as Switzerland and Norway, also took place. Finally, the Reagan administration sought to mobilise US business organisations, mostly the American Chamber of Commerce and Business International, to lobby the EC more effectively. US companies with large investments in Europe were expected to have a particularly strong impact on policymakers in Brussels and in national capitals. In countries like the Netherlands, where US companies employed 10 per cent of the national workforce, such pressure was expected to carry considerable weight.Footnote 137
In parallel, the public relations campaigns of the Reagan administration towards Western Europe became more aggressive. In the first half of the 1980s, Washington had primarily promoted Reaganomics as a success story and underlined the US contribution to Western Europe's economic renaissance after 1945 to counter criticism of US macroeconomic policies. In contrast, the second half of the decade was dominated by the massively influential US campaign warning against the creation of a ‘Fortress Europe’. As US corporations, academics and media echoed the administration's message, this concept, which had virtually disappeared since the end of the Second World War, re-emerged quickly.Footnote 138 In response, the EC Commission and governments repeatedly denied publicly that they had such isolationist intentions.Footnote 139 In fact, worried by the rise of protectionist forces in the United States, European officials were increasingly taking the lead in GATT trade negotiations.Footnote 140
Conclusion
The diffusion of neoliberalism in Western Europe during the 1980s cannot be understood solely as an intra-European process. By combining diplomatic pressure, media campaigns, threats and trade conflicts, as well as the mobilisation of multilateral forums such as the G7, the OECD and the GATT, the Reagan administration actively contributed to shaping the environment in which European integration evolved. Overall, the trajectory of the international political economy broadly followed the direction advocated by Washington, albeit more slowly and unevenly than US policymakers wanted. European governments did not simply comply with American demands; they resisted, delayed and selectively adapted them to their own priorities, at times instrumentalising US pressure for domestic and European purposes. The emergence of a transatlantic neoliberal order was thus not the result of unilateral imposition, but of a process of co-construction in which US influence interacted with European political constraints and strategies.
The victory of neoliberalism was not inevitable. In the early 1980s, the Reagan administration was in a defensive position and often isolated in the main Western economic forums. The recovery of 1983 enabled Washington to regain the initiative and build international and transnational coalitions to promote its agenda. On occasion – notably the repurposing of the G5 ‘convergence’ process in 1983 and the 1984 extraordinary ministerial meeting of the OECD – French efforts to discipline Washington were redirected against Europe. The concept of the Williamsburg Consensus captures the moment when neoliberal principles became embedded within transatlantic economic governance.
This broad ideological convergence did not mean harmony. On the contrary, trade tensions escalated in the second half of the 1980s as protectionist forces grew in the United States. The Reagan administration increasingly resorted to direct pressures and threats of trade wars to open European markets. At this stage, it remains difficult to assess the precise impact of US initiatives since the vast majority of US sources remain classified. As more archival material becomes available, historians will hopefully be able to reconstruct in greater detail the interactions between the US administration, business organisations, intellectual networks and their European counterparts that underpinned the Atlantic diffusion of neoliberalism during the 1980s.
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Henry Nau, former US sherpa, for the very enriching conversations in Washington in 2023–2024. This article immensely benefited from them. He would also like to thank the organisers and participants of the conference ‘Varieties of Neoliberalism: Experiences in Late 20th Century Europe’ held in Munich on 26–27 June 2025 for their feedback. He expresses his gratitude to Antero Holmila, Pertti Ahonen, Sabine Pitteloud, Hugo Bonin, Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, and to the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
