Heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard
Are sweeter; therefore, ye soft pipes, play on;
Not to the sensual ear, but, more endear'd,
Pipe to the spirit ditties of no tone:
Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare;
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss,
Though winning near the goal yet, do not grieve;
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair!
John Keats, Ode to a Grecian Urn Footnote 1
1. Introduction
John Keats’s poem “Ode on a Grecian Urn” conveys an important aspect of sexual desire overlooked by prominent philosophical accounts. Keats celebrates the intrinsic value of the unconsummated state of the young lovers. The suggestion is that not only is this state valuable, but it is more valuable than the alternative, than consummating the attraction. It would be easy to take this as no more than the familiar sentiment that romantic love is brief and fleeting, that growing old and growing apart are inevitable, except perhaps by being immortalized in the moment of anticipation like the lovers on the urn. However, Keats’s observations reveal a deeper insight into the nature of sexual desire. This deeper insight is succinctly expressed in the line “heard melodies are sweet, but those unheard are sweeter”. Like the unheard melodies, the sexual attraction experienced here is better than the consummation. In both cases there is an air of contradiction. For one thing, a melody is appreciated, enjoyed, is “sweet,” in virtue of being heard; what does it mean to say that an unheard melody is sweet? Similarly, if sexual attraction is a desire, and desires are for something, and consequently they are fulfilled by the achievement of what they are for, how can an unsatisfied desire be better than a satisfied one?Footnote 2
I use Keats’s poem, and these questions, to introduce the phenomenal state that accompanies sexual attraction, its character and its consequences. I call this state ‘phenomenal attraction’; this is a compelling phenomenon that typically accompanies a sensory encounter with someone, or something, that is sexually attractive. I will argue that states of this kind lack objects of satisfaction. The phenomenal attraction state itself, and desires that are formed from it, have intentional objects, yet there is no act that can properly address that state, and any desire that is a desire to affect it cannot be satisfied. Thus, at least with respect to phenomenal attraction—which is distinct from sexual arousal—it is a mistake to attempt to affect this state; the state is better than any misguided attempt at consummation.
Phenomenal attraction is similar, though not identical, to aesthetic appreciation. Like aesthetic appreciation, phenomenal attraction can be intrinsically enjoyable. The experience of a beautiful sculpture, painting, or landscape is intrinsically enjoyable; likewise, a compelling visage, or bodily form, a certain line of the neck, or a subtle movement of lips may produce a state of phenomenal attraction that is elating and engaging. (This is not to say these things are always enjoyable; sometimes puzzling over a piece of conceptual art is vexing, as is an attraction to someone otherwise contemptible.) Thus, phenomenal attraction states are intrinsically valuable, but because they lack objections of satisfaction, there is no act that can satisfy those states, or desires that have been formed to affect them. Thus, they do not also derive value from their satisfaction; in this sense they only have intrinsic value. In this regard, states of phenomenal attraction are very different from states of sexual arousal, or desires formed to affect them. This does not mean that phenomenal attraction is better than sexual arousal, or sexual desire in general; in fact, although a sexual desire may be intrinsically enjoyable, it is, at least in an important sense, better in completion. That is not the case for phenomenal attraction states and desire to affect them. I will argue that it is a mistake to form sexual desires to affect phenomenal attraction states because these cannot be sated and they undermine the intrinsic value of the state of attraction.
The phenomenon of sexual attraction is familiar and is clearly distinct from sexual arousal or the desire to engage in activities that satisfy sexual arousal. While there have been interesting contributions to the understanding and definition of sexual desire offered by Nagel, Solomon, Goldman, and Jacobson, I will argue that phenomenal attraction, a central feature of sexual desire, remains unaddressed.Footnote 3 The impossibility of satisfying desires to affect phenomenal attraction, which are a type of sexual desire, goes beyond the most compelling earlier accounts and explains why sexual activities are so varied and numerous. I also speculate that states of phenomenal attraction may acquire novel intentional objects which lead to conflation and the erroneous formation of desires for activities that tend to fulfill sexual arousal. The acquisition of novel intentional content may also explain why so many activities are able to affect sexual arousal.
2. Perversion, Sex, and Sexual Desire
The definition of sex and sexual desire is at the centre of the published exchange between Nagel, Solomon, Goldman and Jacobson.Footnote 4 It is not accidental that Nagel began this exchange by characterizing sexual perversion. It is the large variety of disparate activities that seem to satisfy sexual desire, some of which appear to be sexual perversions, that make it difficult to say anything informative about exactly what sexual desire is a desire for.Footnote 5 Further, many activities may be sexual in one context and non-sexual in another (touching, hugging, kissing). Intuitively, and by analogy with other desires, it seems that sexual desire is desire for sex, but without a clear independent idea of what sex is this is not instructive. Given the broad range of sexual acts, including sexual perversions, sexual desire can be for a large variety of things, many of which are quite far removed from sexual intercourse: admiration, recognition, collecting shoes, looking through windows, piercing, choking, being restrained with straps, or drinking urine. It is hard to see what these have in common aside from the fact that some people find them sexually desirable. These obstacles lead to the temptation to either define sex and sexual desire very narrowly in terms of physical contact and the pleasure that it brings, as in Goldman,Footnote 6 or very broadly such that it encompasses the seemingly unlimited activities that can be the object of sexual desire. The first strategy excludes sexual perversions and cannot explain their sexuality; the second strategy does not seem to provide us with any interesting taxonomic information about sex at all. As Jacobson puts it,
The problem, in its most general form, is this: there is no a priori reason to suppose that any activity whatsoever could not be desired as the object of someone’s sexual desire; this is the price we pay to accommodate perversions— either they are not sexual, as Goldman’s account suggests, or the category of the sexual sprawls out of all bounds.Footnote 7
3. Sexual Appetites, Activities, and Desires
I focus on Jacobson’s account of sexual desire throughout this paper because he has made impressive progress on the problem by offering a definition that accommodates and explains the full range of sexual desires.Footnote 8 Roughly, sexual desires are desires for activities that are taken to affect sexual appetites. Jacobson’s definition relies on some insightful conceptual clarifications. First, he points out that the object of a desire is typically an activity; if one desires a glass of water, typically one desires to drink a glass of water, or possibly to splash one’s face with it, or someone else’s. In any event, there is an activity involving water that one desires to undertake.
Second, Jacobson distinguishes between sexual appetites and sexual desires. A desire to X is fulfilled just in case one does X.Footnote 9 However, fulfilling a desire is not sufficient for satisfying a desire; this also requires that one is aware of having fulfilled the desire and attains what he calls “cognitive closure”. Thus, fulfillment and cognitive closure are each necessary and are jointly sufficient for satisfaction of a desire. In contrast, while an appetite cannot properly be said to be fulfilled, nor satisfied in the sense just outlined, an appetite can be assuaged without cognitive closure; one’s thirst is quenched by drinking regardless of whether one is aware of having drunk. Thus, it is possible for the thirst to be quenched, but the desire for water to continue unabated or to simply be lost (the desire fails to be satisfied because in this scenario one is unaware that one has imbibed and consequently one fails to attain cognitive closure). The notion of satisfaction that applies to desires is quite different from the one that applies to appetites. Jacobson attributes this difference to the fact that while desires have objects, appetites do not:
My suggestion is that appetites can be satisfied, independent of any beliefs about whether they are fulfilled, because the notion of fulfillment is not applicable to the appetites—that is, because they do not have objects.Footnote 10
Presumably the idea here is that without objects these states are not properly cognitive, and do not require cognitive closure; they can be properly ended, and not simply lost, without the involvement of any beliefs. By saying that they can be properly ended I mean that there are certain kinds things and activities that will alleviate a given appetite (for example, water and drinking for thirst). In addition, without an object there is no cognitively specified activity that will fulfill the appetites by its completion. The difference seems to be that, unlike desires, appetites do not have intentional objects that specify how they can be satisfied.Footnote 11
Having made these points Jacobson is able to offer a definition of sexual desire:
a sexual desire is a desire the object of which is an act or activity desired in virtue of certain effects which that activity has (or is taken by the agent to have) on her states of sexual arousal; the relevant features of the activity which make it desirable are that it will (or is taken to be an activity which will) initiate, heighten, sustain, or assuage states of sexual arousal.Footnote 12
Thus, he makes sexual desire a matter of desiring activities that affect sexual arousal.Footnote 13 States of arousal are aroused bodily states, the aroused states of the appetites that Jacobson distinguishes from desires, for example, the state of being hungry or, in this case, the state of being sexually aroused. Thus, satisfying a desire is a matter of knowingly completing the activity which is its object. In contrast, satisfying an appetite is a matter of ending the appetite in the appropriate way. To avoid confusion I will usually refer to the satisfied appetites as ‘assuaged,’ or ‘relieved’.
4. The End of Sexual Desire Sometimes Includes an Activity and a Desired Effect
Jacobson distinguishes feature-based from object-based taxonomies of desire.Footnote 14 One desires an object in virtue of some feature or features of that object; thus, desires can be classified according to the features of the objects that make them desirable or according to their objects (Jacobson offers a feature-based account in which the desired objects share the feature of being taken to affect sexual arousal in some way.) For Jacobson, fulfilling a desire is a matter of completing the activity that is its object, irrespective of its appealing features, qua features. However, he does not consider that sometimes the features for which an object is desired have a determining influence on the object of desire. For example, I may want to drink a glass of water to quench my thirst; we could say I desire the water for its thirst-quenching properties or features. Suppose I drink a glass of water but my thirst is not quenched (perhaps I needed electrolytes). It seems in this case that thirst-quenching is part of what is desired, and that since my thirst is not quenched, the desire is not fulfilled. More generally, doing X, where X is the activity desired, is at least sometimes a matter of accomplishing the end for which X is desired, and this is often a matter of the act having the feature or power in virtue which it was desired (e.g., the ability to quench thirst). This is not always the case however. It is possible to desire X without explicitly desiring it for an end (even while having one). Sometimes we get what we want and fulfill our desire, but we should not have wanted what we wanted, so we are disappointed. I might want and get water, and then realize I would rather have had wine. Further, the feature in virtue of which the object is desired may not be a power the object might fail to have, and therefore need not be an object of desire. I may want a first edition of a certain novel because of its personal significance, but the object is simply the first edition novel.Footnote 15 A glass of water may fail to quench my thirst, but the novel cannot fail to be personally significant.
5. Sexual Desire and Phenomenal Attraction
Jacobson's distinction between appetites and desires is well drawn, and his definition promising, but a number of problems remain.Footnote 16 His account is an adequate characterization of a certain subclass of sexual desires, but despite its important contribution it misses a type of sexual desire related to the phenomenon described by Keats above. This is a compelling phenomenon that typically accompanies a sensory encounter with someone, or something, that is sexually attractive. Keats’s young lovers are sexually attracted to one another, and that experience has a characteristic feel or phenomenology. It is apparent that there is such a state, but not how it relates to sexual appetites and desires.
Theorists frequently overlook this kind of state or assimilate it to others. Nagel’s account of sexual perversion focuses explicitly on the exchange of sexual glances between a young man and woman (he dubs them ‘Romeo and Juliet’) who have seen each other for the first time, yet his discussion stays focused on sexual desire, as does Sartre’s from which he takes inspiration.Footnote 17 In Jacobson and Scruton there is an emphasis on sexual arousal, but this too falls short of considering the experience of sexual attraction.Footnote 18
States of sexual attraction are not desires, nor are they states of sexual arousal (though they are similar in some respects to appetites in general). Consequently, as one can form desires to undertake activities that affect states of sexual arousal, one may also form desires to affect states of sexual attraction. I will call desires formed to affect the aroused sexual appetites ‘sexual arousal desires,’ the phenomenology associated with sexual attraction ‘phenomenal attraction,’ and the desires formed to affect those states ‘phenomenal attraction desires’. Sexual attraction is not the exclusive cause of sexual desire or sexual arousal. Sexual desires may be formed independently of the immediate sensory experience of sexual attraction, for example, by description or by rekindling a desire for an erstwhile lover. Further, one might desire to engage in intercourse for purely prudential reasons.
Despite my assertion to the contrary, it may seem that phenomenal attraction is merely sexual arousal, which is the collection of bodily states associated with the aroused sexual appetite. That is, one might object that there is no unique state of phenomenal attraction. If true, this would mean there is no phenomena that Jacobson’s account misses; there would be no phenomenal attraction desires, so his definition would not exclude any case of sexual desire. However, there are several compelling reasons to distinguish phenomenal attraction and sexual arousal.
First, phenomenal attraction is not always accompanied by bodily sexual arousal; the experience of finding a person attractive without having any of the bodily states associated with sexual arousal is quite common. That is, phenomenal attraction does not imply sexual arousal. For example, in walking through a bustling neighbourhood, one might find several people attractive in passing, but it would be odd if each of those momentary glimpses inspired sexual arousal. Or consider the experience of a homosexual woman finding a man attractive, or perhaps of finding a relative attractive, or flipping through a magazine and casually observing attractive celebrities or models. In each case there is attraction, but it does not seem that there is (usually) sexual arousal. One might wonder whether there are bodily states of arousal that escape introspection in these cases, but these would be so minute that they could hardly be the kind of thing that one has desires to affect. In contrast, the phenomenal experience of attraction is introspectively apparent.
Second, bodily sexual arousal frequently occurs in the absence of such states of attraction. For example, one may become spontaneously aroused, and there is certainly arousal in unaided masturbation (i.e., not assisted by attractive images or thoughts of attractive things). One might think that spontaneous arousal is particularly phallocentric: erections are certainly conspicuous in their proclivity to appear uncoerced. Yet I see no reason to deny a female equivalent; there are a variety of states of physical arousal in women, both the arousal of the reproductive organs, various tumescences and lubrications, and many contingently associated states—perhaps the flushing of the face, or dilation of the pupils—and it seems that they too occur independently of phenomenal attraction. Certainly, the case of masturbation unaided by attractive images or thoughts applies equally to men and women; it does not seem that in either case there is attraction, but it is possible to arouse one’s self in this way. One might argue that one is self-attracted in these cases; that is dubious, but if it were true, we could consider a case of accidental repetitive contact with an object resulting in arousal. It would strain credulity to insist that the object causing arousal is necessarily an object of attraction in this instance. It seems plausible that these cases have actual, if infrequent, occurrences. Another compelling example is provided by an arousing massage from a masseuse whom one does not find attractive. Thus, sexual arousal does not imply phenomenal attraction. Thus, given the first and second consideration, sexual attraction and phenomenal arousal are logically independent.
Third, these kinds of states end in different ways. If they are both appetites, they are appetites of very different kinds. We have already established that sexual arousal can be brought to an end through a surprising number of different activities and if a sexual desire is for one of those activities, then it can too. With phenomenal attraction things are much less clear. What is the proper object of phenomenal attraction, the thing that makes it end or ‘go away’? Unlike sexual arousal, there is no kind of activity that seems particularly apt. It ends not by the achievement of some proper end, but rather only by gradually diminishing, fading, or simply being forgotten.Footnote 19 This is not to say that it is always desirable that phenomenal attraction states go away; rather, as previously mentioned, they can be pleasant, engaging, transfixing and even elating states. It is only when they are conflated with sexual arousal states—when desires are formed to affect states of phenomenal attraction—that their lack of proper ends becomes problematic.
This leads to a fourth and more complex type of reason to believe these states distinct: their distinctness provides an explanation of why there are so many activities, of such variety, that are the object of sexual desire. Jacobson tells us that almost anything could be found to affect sexual arousal and could be sexually desired, but he does not explain why there are so many things that are sexually arousing.Footnote 20 These various activities are sexual activities in virtue of their effects on bodily sexual arousal, and this also explains how a seemingly unlimited number of activities can be sexual. However, it is quite odd that people find such a disparate set of activities sexual arousing, especially given that many of these activities involve elements that are prima facie quite detached from the assuagement of sexual arousal. If sexual desires are formed to affect phenomenal attraction, but phenomenal attraction cannot be satisfied, then it would be unsurprising that people resort to some very unexpected activities. The need to satisfy an unsatisfiable desire based on phenomenal attraction provides a compelling explanation of this disparate array of sexual activities: they are all based on the formation of desires to execute activities that will alleviate a state that cannot be alleviated. These desires in turn cannot be fulfilled which leads to attempting additional activities. If sexual desires merely aimed to affect the familiar bodily states of arousal, it would be extremely odd that people find so many activities arousing and that many of them have components that seem very far removed from sexual intercourse. This, when taken in conjunction with the other considerations presented, provides a good reason to think that in addition to desires to affect sexual arousal there must be another kind of sexual desire, phenomenal attraction desire. I develop this explanation of the variety of sexual activities and the additional question of how these disparate activities come to affect sexual arousal in Section 6.
6. Phenomenal Attraction, Intentional Objects, and Objects of Satisfaction
I have asserted that states of phenomenal attraction are distinct from both sexual desire and sexual appetite, though like appetites they are motivating and one may form desires to affect them. Nevertheless, it might be thought that phenomenal attraction is more like a desire than an appetite. Like desire, phenomenal attraction is motivating. Also like desire, at least in many cases, there is an object toward which the feeling is directed. At this point we need to be careful. As I have said, phenomenal attraction cannot be relieved through a specific activity; in this sense it lacks a proper object, an object of satisfaction. Despite this, like desires, states of phenomenal attraction have intentional objects. It might be instructive to note that phenomenal attraction is similar in important respects to aesthetic appreciation; it is object-directed and exciting, yet it is unclear what it would be to satisfy this state.Footnote 21 Thus, having an intentional object is not sufficient for having an object of satisfaction. This is clear simply in virtue of the fact that not all intentional states have objectives: neither seeing a red square, nor believing that Paris is the capital of France, entail that there is an object of satisfaction or that the agent has an objective, something that could be done to fulfill that state. It is easy to conflate intentional objects and objects of fulfillment or satisfaction when they are both considered as objects, but when we consider the latter as objectives, it is clearer that the intentional object and the fulfillment conditions of the desire are not identical. Considering objectives is also closely resonant with Jacobson’s claim that desires aim at activities, and this similarity is significant; the intentional object itself is not sufficient for stating the fulfillment conditions for a desire. Typically there is a person to whom one is attracted when one has a state of phenomenal attraction. That person is the intentional object of the state, and one is attracted to him or her in virtue of some feature or features he or she possesses. Thus, while both states of phenomenal attraction and desire have things that they are about, and they are both motivating, only desires motivate one toward an objective. Attraction involves an increased level of excitement that is directed toward an object, but again, unlike arousal of the sexual appetites there is no proper way of alleviating this excited state.
When a state has an intentional object and an object of satisfaction, they are contingently related; the intentional state and the object of satisfaction need not be the same, and as we have seen a state may have one without the other. For example, one may be hungry, and hunger may be an intentional state (pace Jacobsen), but while food satisfies hunger, the intentional object of that intentional state may not be food. It may be the stomach. Further, whatever the intentional object of the appetite, assuming there is one, it will not fully determine the specific activities that are the objects or objectives of desire: the intentional object of hunger is never consuming an order of fish and chips. Despite the contingent relations between the objects of appetites and their objectives, and between appetites and desires, there are still strong influences exerted. If the intentional object of hunger is the stomach, then the objectives will be things that are likely to affect the stomach.Footnote 22 Desires, in this case, will be for things that are likely to, or are believed to be likely to, affect the state of hunger; it is clear that this will involve food and eating which will affect the stomach, but this leaves a lot undetermined. This applies to both sexual arousal and phenomenal attraction. If we think of phenomenal attraction, it is immediately clear that it is not usually accompanied by a desire to engage in a specific activity; of course, in some cases such a desire may be formed quite quickly afterwards, but it is still distinct.
It is now possible to say more about the lack of a proper object of phenomenal attraction. It is because states of phenomenal attraction do not have objects of satisfaction, and consequently do not influence what kinds of desires are formed on their account, that they result in such disparate desires. In contrast, with sexual arousal the effective activities are relatively well circumscribed.Footnote 23 When we form desires to affect states of phenomenal attraction there is no clear guide suggesting what activities should be desired. One possibility is doing the kinds of things that tend to satisfy sexual arousal; however, these kinds of actions are bound to fail to address the state of phenomenal attraction. Consequently, desires to affect these states will also be unfulfilled and unsatisfied, leading to a proliferation of desires.
Not only does phenomenal attraction provide an explanation of why there are such numerous and disparate sexual desires, but it also explains the disparate attempts to characterize the object of sexual desire. These attempts are as odd as the number and variety of the desires themselves. The proposed objects have included reproduction, reflexive mutual recognition, the friction of flesh on flesh, reciprocal incarnation as flesh, interpersonal communication of attitudes, involuntary auditory expressions of pain elicited from another person.Footnote 24 Love and pleasure are also commonly cited. Goldman is critical of the idea that sex is a means to some external end, goal, or purpose. He writes,
They analyze sexual activity as a means to one of these ends, implying that sexual desire is a desire to reproduce, to love or be loved, or to communicate with others.Footnote 25
In place of such views Goldman endorses the claim that:
sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity that tends to fulfill such desire of the agent.Footnote 26
As we have seen, some of these characterizations of the object of sexual desire produce definitions of sex and sexual desire that are too narrow and exclude important instances, others are too broad in that it is no longer clear on these accounts what makes such disparate activities sexual at all. In contrast, phenomenal attraction has no clear goal, internal or external. If desires formed on the basis of phenomenal attraction, which frequently precedes sexual arousal, are conflated with other sexual desires, or are simply taken as a type of sexual desire (which I claim they are), then, given their lack of objects of satisfaction, it is unsurprising that no satisfactory account of the object of sexual desire could be given or that the accounts offered would be diverse.Footnote 27
7. Phenomenal Attraction and the Acquisition of Novel Phenomenal Content
States of phenomenal attraction and sexual arousal can acquire intentional objects. In states of sexual arousal this can also lead to novel objects of satisfaction. These claims are somewhat speculative, though I will try to motivate them here. For example, this is supported by Farkas who argues that phenomenal states can acquire novel intentional objects.Footnote 28 There are a variety of views on the relationship between phenomenology and intentionality ranging from the view that they are completely independent (separatism) to the view that they are completely dependent (inseparatism). Horgan and Tienson have argued for a form of inseparatism according to which paradigmatically phenomenal states have inseparable intentional contents and the phenomenal states determine the intentional contents.Footnote 29 Some forms of representationalism endorse the equivalence of the phenomenal and the intentional state for experiences, though there are dissenting views among representationalists about the direction of the determination relation between phenomenal and intentional states, and the nature of cognitive phenomenology (phenomenology associated with paradigmatically intentional states).Footnote 30
Farkas says that there is a distinct feeling or phenomenology that includes dizziness and shakiness associated with a drop in blood sugar. She recounts that at first she did not know what that feeling was. Later she learned that it was a drop in blood sugar and that, if she ate a biscuit, she would feel better. Eventually, she came to experience that feeling as a drop in blood sugar in a very immediate fashion and with no apparent inference.Footnote 31 The state has acquired a new object; it is now about her blood sugar level. This strikes me as a fairly common type of phenomenon.
Farkas’s view makes the connection between phenomenal character and content appear contingent. One worry here is that, following the inseparatist, phenomenal experiences have their contents intrinsically. Given this commitment, it is hard to see how a phenomenal state can change intentional content. However, there are cases, like the one under consideration here, where experiences have content, but that content changes. If, contrary to the representationalist, there are contentless experiences, then there may be instances in which phenomenal states acquire contents. One possible explanation of these cases is that a new content is added to the existing intrinsic content; that is, in the low blood sugar example the feeling of dizziness and shakiness remains, as do the shaky and dizzy content, but there is an additional content, the low blood sugar content that is also immediately experienced. This is not meant to undermine Farkas’s claim that it feels to her, immediately and non-inferentially, that she has low blood sugar; however, if there is an object associated with the original phenomenal state, it is hard to believe it would be lost—that object is the thing the state conveys, by its very nature (or at least that is the idea according to the inseparatist). The state may now have both contents intrinsically.Footnote 32 On the other hand, if the phenomenal state has no object, then while the initial phenomenal state has no content, it comes to have the low blood sugar content intrinsically. A discussion of the ways this might occur is beyond the scope of this paper.
My suggestion, following Farkas, is that phenomenal attraction begins as a state with an intentional object (an attractive person or thing), but may come to have other closely associated intentional objects. Her low blood sugar experience came to be a reliable indicator of her low blood sugar. In contrast, contents that become associated with phenomenal attraction might be misleading. If one has the phenomenology of low blood sugar, then one should eat a biscuit, but if one has phenomenal attraction and believes it is sexual arousal, or something else, one may form desires to undertake the wrong kinds of activities. One may come to form desires for activities that are unable to affect one's states of phenomenal attraction (there is no action that will assuage phenomenal attraction, so it is a mistake to form any desire to affect that state).
If the intentional contents of states of sexual arousal change in the same fashion as states of phenomenal attraction, the acquisition of novel content can also explain how such an odd variety of acts come to actually affect sexual arousal. Recall that Jacobson claims that sexual arousal lacks an intentional object; that is consistent with this idea, since the change may be that the phenomenal state simply acquires intentional content. On the other hand, states of sexual arousal may have contents that attribute certain properties to parts of the body. According to this view, there may a number of distinct states of sexual arousal involving different sets of body parts, and each of these types of state could acquire different novel intentional content. For example, a state of type F could acquire the content that one has a paucity of shoe-fondling novelty; it would be reasonable to form a desire in response to this state to acquire a new pair of heels to fondle to increase shoe-fondling novelty. Now, can this desire be fulfilled by buying and fondling a new pair of heels? Recall, as discussed in Section 4, that since part of what is desired here is to have a certain effect on sexual arousal, the activity would have to accomplish that to fulfill the desire. There would be two important kinds of case here: first, those in which the act is accomplished and one comes to believe that sexual arousal is affected because the intentional object part of that state has been addressed, but the state of sexual arousal does not abate and consequently the desire is unfulfilled. For example, one fondles the shoes and consequently believes the desire fulfilled, but sexual arousal has not actually abated. The second case, however, is one in which, through continual exposure, affecting the intentional part of the state actually has the desired effect on sexual arousal. That is, in this case, after fondling the shoes one’s sexual arousal is assuaged, and consequently one’s desire is fulfilled; if one believes it fulfilled, it is also satisfied. In this way one acquires different sexual preferences. The intentional object and intentional content play a role in determining the object of satisfaction of the states of arousal, and in turn the objective of the desire. If sexual appetites begin with no intentional objects, then the objects of satisfaction begin distinct. If the intentional objects begin as sexual body parts and other bodily states associated with the arousal of those parts, then those intentional objects play a role in determining the satisfying activities or objects of satisfaction. Similarly, novel intentional objects, like shoe-fondling, come to influence the objects of satisfaction, which in turn makes it possible for desires for those activities to be fulfilled, including sexual arousal desires.
If something like this view is accurate, though it is merely schematic, then one might wonder whether the same thing could happen to phenomenal attraction, whether, for example, those states could come to acquire objects and states and desires that can be satisfied. If they did, it would undermine the explanatory import of the arguments I have presented. Fortunately, this is not a serious threat. States of phenomenal attraction are relevantly dissimilar from states of sexual arousal and other states of arousal: states of phenomenal attraction have no object of satisfaction. The reason it is plausible that the ends of arousal can be changed is that there was already an object of satisfaction; insofar as the object of satisfaction is influenced by the intentional object, it is possible to change it.Footnote 33 In contrast, changing the intentional object or the content of a state of phenomenal attraction does not change the kind of state it is; it is still not a state that has an object of satisfaction. This would require changing not only the intentional object, but changing the kind of intentional state it is. For example, the same content can be presented either by a visual experience, or a belief, or a desire, or appetite (possibly); the way of presenting the content has been called the “manner of presentation,” or the “intentional mode”.Footnote 34 Thus, one may have an object of belief, or an object of desire, or (possibly) of appetite, or even of phenomenal attraction. But only some of these intentional states have objects of satisfaction, and merely changing the intentional object of a belief, for example, would not give it an object of satisfaction. Likewise, changing the intentional object of phenomenal attraction will not create an object of satisfaction. Changing the intentional object of an appetite will likely affect the objects of satisfaction of that appetite, but not so with phenomenal attraction. It is simply not the kind of state that has objects of satisfaction.
8. Conclusion and Two Objections Considered
In summary, sex and sexual desire are difficult to define. Jacobson offered a compelling account of sexual desire. He claims that sexual desire is desire for activities that are taken to affect sexual arousal in various ways. This is an accomplishment because it explains why many disparate activities are objects of sexual desire, why they should be considered sexual at all. They are sexual activities because people find them sexually arousing. We know it is sexual arousal because it affects the sex organs. Though it is an impressive development of the discussion of nature of sex and sexual desire, Jacobson’s account is incomplete.
First, his definition omits a type of sexual desire: desires formed to affect states of phenomenal attraction. Second, his account does not yet explain why people find so many activities sexually arousing, or how it could be that all these activities affect sexual arousal. I claim that the former is explained by the conflation of sexual arousal with phenomenal attraction and the latter is explained by the ability of phenomenal states to acquire novel intentional content, specifically by states of sexual arousal acquiring new content and the effect this has on objects of satisfaction.
Various activities come to affect sexual arousal because the intentional contents of sexual arousal states change as people try to satisfy their desires with sundry activities. The change of intentional content in sexual arousal states may also change their objects of satisfaction. In contrast, change of content in phenomenal attraction states leads to conflation, but the states remain unsatisfiable.
I anticipate two major kinds of objections to my presentation of phenomenal attraction. The first is that, the arguments I have presented notwithstanding, phenomenal attraction is just sexual arousal. The second kind pushes in the opposite direction by claiming that I have not provided an explanation of why states of phenomenal attraction should be taken to be sexual at all. I will take these in turn.
It might be objected that while phenomenal attraction may not be accompanied by bodily symptoms of sexual arousal it is the same kind of mental state. However, Jacobson and others identify the aroused states of the sexual appetite by reference to the sex organs and the contingent signs of the arousal of those parts. Jacobson writes:
Sexual arousal is primarily arousal (heightened sensation states, tumescences) of the sexual organs and those are, of course, the reproductive organs. It is not by metaphor or misstatement that even plants are said to have sexes; it is because they have reproductive parts and capacities. Flushed faces or tingling earlobes borrow their status as sexual arousal from their well-known but contingent associations with the arousal of the reproductive parts.Footnote 35
It is these bodily states that I claim are frequently absent in phenomenal attraction. To assume that in such instances there is nevertheless sexual arousal is unjustified. One might insist that states of phenomenal attraction tend to produce bodily sexual arousal and that this is sufficient for these to be states of sexual arousal. Tending to produce a state is not in general a good reason to think something is an instance of the state it tends to produce. To be sexually aroused is not merely to be disposed to become bodily aroused; it is to be so aroused. Nor is phenomenal attraction a dispositional property (or the categorical base of such a property) and bodily sexual arousal its realization; phenomenal attraction is also a categorical state. To be sexually aroused is to be in a certain kind of state, and as previously discussed, this state has different properties than phenomenal attraction and is independent of phenomenal attraction. There is no clear reason to assimilate phenomenal attraction to sexual arousal.
The second type of objection asks whether states of phenomenal attraction are sexual at all. One reason to think these states sexual is that they sometimes lead to sexual arousal. Of course, as we just saw this is not a good reason to think they are states of sexual arousal. However, the main reason to think states of phenomenal attraction sexual is that they frequently result in the formation of sexual desires. What makes these desires sexual? They are sexual desires because they are desires for activities that people believe will affect their states of sexual arousal in certain ways (even when they do not have any). All these activities are desired because they are taken to share the feature of affecting sexual arousal. This is true even if, as in the case with phenomenal attraction, they are mistaken about the state they are trying to affect, and they cannot affect it.
Another somewhat tempting response to this objection might be to concede that these states are not really sexual, but are merely confounded with sexual states. In this case there is nothing missing from Jacobson’s original definition. My account of phenomenal attraction merely adds a deeper understanding of the range of phenomenal experiences related to sexual desire and an explanation of why there are such numerous and diverse forms of sexual desire and effects on sexual arousal. On this view phenomenal attraction would be a close relative of aesthetic appreciation. Elaine Scarry in her book, On Beauty and Being Just, says this:
[T]he person’s desire for a good meal seems to end at just about the time the good meal ends. But our desire for beauty is likely to outlast its object because, as Kant once observed, unlike all other pleasures, the pleasure we take in beauty is inexhaustible.Footnote 36
This bears some resemblance to the idea that phenomenal attraction has no object of satisfaction. (Scarry seems to be saying there is an object of satisfaction for this desire, but it is indefinitely large, or the desire is constantly renewed, so it can never be satisfied.) Scarry claims the experience of beauty prompts activities such as painting, drawing, and poetry, that attempt to replicate the beautiful thing, often in many iterations.Footnote 37 She also talks of cross sensory stimulation: Augustine touches something smooth and thinks of music and God, and Wittgenstein claims that when the eyes see something beautiful, the hand wants of draw it.Footnote 38 This is reminiscent of the varied activities undertaken in a futile attempt to affect states of phenomenal attraction. This analogy is slightly misleading however since these experiences feel quite different: admiring an iris in bloom does not feel the same as being attracted to a person, the sex parts of the flower notwithstanding. Further, unlike phenomenal attraction there is only a certain subtype of experience of beauty that leads to sexual arousal, namely the kind involving phenomenal attraction.Footnote 39 While this analogy between phenomenal attraction and the experience of beauty in general has some appeal, it seems that they are distinct phenomena.
These considerations bring us close to our starting point—Keats’ mutual admirers frozen and timeless on the Grecian urn. Arguably the would-be lovers are experiencing phenomenal attraction and we are now in a position to understand why that state, unlike a sexual desire or a sexual appetite, is better unsatisfied, why unheard melodies are sweeter, and why our “lover” should not grieve. Simply, phenomenal attraction cannot be satisfied, nor can desires to have some effect on it through a proper object. Consequently, and more loosely, the unfulfilled state is the height of phenomenal attraction and has intrinsic value as such; it does not derive value from satisfaction.
Keats’s poem also suggests that there is some value in the misguided anticipation of the goal. This may in fact be valuable, since in imagination the sexual acts that are undertaken in response to phenomenal attraction hold the promise of satisfaction, but the acts themselves cannot be satisfying, at least with respect to the state of phenomenal attraction (satisfying desires to affect the sexual appetite is another story).
We have seen that Jacobson’s definition misses an important type of sexual desire, and that acknowledging this type explains both the number and variety of sexual desires, and the variety of different objects theorized as the true object of sexual desire. The acquisition of intentional content that figures in this explanation also explains how such disparate acts come to affect sexual arousal. It has been claimed that there is great utility to distinguishing between love and sex.Footnote 40 Similarly, the distinction between phenomenal attraction and sexual arousal is of great consequence, both for understanding the nature of sexual desire and for maximizing our own satisfaction and contentment.
Acknowledgements:
I would like to thank Julien Beillard and two anonymous referees for their helpful and insightful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
