The purpose of this slim but insightful volume is neither to introduce a new theory of punishment nor to improve upon existing theories. Instead, Shuster seeks, through a rigorous textual analysis of some of the primary philosophical thinkers on punishment, to sharpen the “fundamental questions of criminal justice” so as to “improve the quality of our theorizing” (11, italics in original). He has undertaken this task in part because “political theory… has so far ignored criminal justice” (132). This is not a plea for greater communication between two disciplines. Shuster addresses the quarrel between punishment and political philosophy because modern punishment lacks a coherent justification.
Traditionally, punishment has been the preserve of a god or the gods. In a secular age, we have to look elsewhere for its source. Shuster's second chapter addresses this problem by examining Thomas Hobbes's thought, as Hobbes is the founder of both modern liberalism and the problem of punishment in liberalism. There is a conflict between the aims of liberalism and punishment because, according to Hobbes, the basis for civil society lies in the state of nature. The problem with the state of nature is that it provides a right to resist capture or punishment. But a sovereign, to be sovereign, must be able to punish. Hobbes denies that there is an individual right to punish in the state of nature, as that would make some persons more equal than others. The burden on the philosopher who ushers in liberalism is to demonstrate the naturalistic ground of the right to punish and to justify its existence in civil society.
Shuster delves into this knotty problem with great sophistication. He patiently explains the Hobbesian dilemma between punishment and resistance, but believes that Thomas Schrock goes “too far” in concluding that this conflict undermines “Hobbes's whole theoretical framework” of punishment (155). For Shuster, the solution to Hobbes's punishment problem lies in the social contract, by which he means that, once a criminal act occurs, the criminal falls back into the state of nature and his “obligation to his sovereign becomes void” (70). But this move fails to address the core of Schrock's concern, namely, that the right to resist is a right that carries over from nature to polity and cannot be transferred or abrogated.
Shuster next discusses Montesquieu and Beccaria. According to Montesquieu, a republican people are at liberty not just when they have security, but when they feel secure. The feeling of security prompts Shuster to raise the core question confronting Hobbesian deterrence theory: as Montesquieu opposes retribution, is deterrence sufficient for a people in the face of “rape, sadism, and pedophilia” (88)? Shuster shows in his subtle way that Montesquieu's turn away from Hobbes's concerns about nature and punishment and toward a republicanism that combines elements of righteous indignation with the softness of civic virtues may not lead to softer punishment, better deterrence, or greater security.
A chapter on Bentham might have shed more light on Hobbes's punishment problem. But the analysis of Beccaria is not without benefits. Beccaria tries to uplift Bentham's utilitarian creed and preserve the reasons for deterrence over retribution. As the social contract is the “origin of the right to punish” (93, italics in original), utility gains a moral foundation in democratic politics. But that foundation, as we have already seen, is soft, if not contradictory.
Shuster then turns to Kant, who bases his penal thought not on deterrence but on retribution. Kant reverses the Hobbesian dilemma. The problem is not the state's source of power. Rather, criminals deserve punishment. Kant derives the right to punish from neither nature nor civil authority, but from the individual's inherent dignity and moral autonomy. For Kant, punishment is “recompense for [individual] moral guilt” (105). Kant appears to buttress the connection between republicanism and punishment because “retribution resonates with ordinary moral experience” (113). But Shuster raises the question whether “moral consciousness” leads to retribution or to “equity and mercy” (114).
Foucault is not, properly speaking, a political philosopher. But he was a self-professed Kantian. With Foucault, Kant's autonomous subject reveals itself to be both an object of power and a self-constituting subject. Once Foucault eliminates the Kantian subject's autonomy, he reveals that there is nothing dignified about being such a subject. As we are surrounded by power, there can be no basis for punishment except power. Foucault argues that the birth of the prison is not the product of humanism and republicanism. Through an anthropological critique rooted in discourse, Foucault reveals that there is no moral difference between the modern prison and the medieval dungeon. We are forced to confront Philadelphia in 1773: America's city of brotherly love was the first to incarcerate its own citizens. For Foucault, the republican idealism of the prison's founders has given way to knowledge of and power over the body.
The collapse of the modern notion of punishment was “inevitable” (126) for Shuster. The problem, as he sees it, is with liberalism, a problem Hobbes and his followers (but not Foucault) did not want to shake off. Shuster suggests that we rethink liberalism, the subject of his first chapter, on Plato's Laws. Its discussion of crime and punishment takes place against the backdrop of a different kind of republican politics. Shuster sees the conflict between Kleinias and the Athenian Stranger as the problem of political philosophy and punishment, that is, the right ordering of the soul in a particular kind of regime. Kleinias represents the conventional view, that punishment should be inflicted on the guilty and that the purpose of the regime is security. The conventional view wants to punish offenders because they have voluntarily done wrong. The Athenian argues that no one voluntarily does wrong. But if all wrong actions are the product of involuntary desires, then retribution is unjust, and deterrence is nothing more than brute force. The Athenian disagrees with both retribution and deterrence, and moves the conversation toward a gentler and nobler understanding of punishment, one concerned with the shaping of young souls toward the good. Shuster reminds us that in all cities there exists a tension between knowledge of good and bad that cannot be resolved either by abandoning nature as a telos or by fashioning humanity as either base or autonomous.
Shuster has undertaken to examine the fine points of punishment from texts whose main mission is not to discuss policy problems. He has handled this problem with great delicacy. But for this reason, one will not find “solutions” to the “problems” that plague our carceral society. The solutions, such as they are, lie beneath the surface. Shuster has forced all those interested in punishment to take political philosophy seriously. He has laid the ground for further investigation into punishment's meaning and purpose in the civic and moral education of citizens.
